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Abstract 
 
 
International humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) 
have shown an influence on the conventional arms control. A series of negotiations to 
control the trade of small arms, in particular the diplomatic conference on the arms 
trade treaty in July 2012, provide some evidence of this increasing influence. The 
negative impact of the widespread availability of small arms on human security 
justifies the linking of the use of these weapons with humanitarian and human rights 
law.  
 
The Security Council arms embargo, a reactive sanction measure imposed 
retrospectively, the only legal mechanism restricting small arms transfers, is often 
ineffective in achieving its objective. What is required is preventive action. Other 
international mechanisms, such as the 2001 United Nations Programme of Action on 
small arms, the UN Register, and the 2005 International Tracing Instrument cannot be 
implemented effectively for several reasons, in particular, because they are not legally 
binding instruments.  
 
The contemporary principle of State responsibility obliges States to regulate the small 
arms trade in the interest of preventing violence and ensuring security of all peoples. 
This obligation extends to those within and beyond their boundaries, in other words 
to the global population as a whole. Therefore, a selling State should not transfer 
weapons to another State if it is aware that the weapons may be used by the receiving 
State for internationally wrongful acts which would constitute a violation of 
international law. States have a responsibility to act in accordance with international 
norms of human rights and humanitarian law. Hence, a small arms transfer to another 
State, including for the purpose of self-defence, should be compatible with the 
requirements of IHL and IHRL.  
 
An examination of the treaties regarding conventional weapons from the 1868 St 
Petersburg Declaration to the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions shows the 
increasing reference to principles of humanitarian law and human rights law. Their 
influence is also evident in the regional and sub-regional instruments.  The recent 
adoption of the Mine Ban Convention and the Convention on Cluster Munitions was 
finalised outside the United Nations with a wide participation of civil society which 
promotes respect for human rights. This suggests that a future arms control 
negotiation may have to take into consideration human rights and humanitarian 
concerns, and can be pursued outside the United Nations framework.  
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“You get rich by giving the poorest people on the planet the means to continue killing 
each other. Do you know why I do what I do? I mean, there are more prestigious 
assignments. Keeping track of nuclear arsenals. You'd think that’s more critical to 
world security. But it's not. No. Nine out of ten war victims today are killed with 
assault rifles and small arms. Like yours. Those nuclear missiles, they sit in their 
silos. Your AK-47, that is the real weapon of mass destruction.” 
 
(Part of dialogue in the film Lord of War (2005) between Agent 
Valentine and arms dealer Yuri Orlov) 
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Chapter I: 
Overview of the Small Arms Issue  
 
A. Introduction 
 
This thesis argues that international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human 
rights law (IHRL) increasingly influence arms control treaties, including the process 
of negotiations to control small arms. The thesis examines the related treaties on 
conventional arms control to see the explicit evidence in the texts.  Doing so shows 
the increasing consideration of IHL and IHRL in arms control treaties and 
negotiations as is evident in the current negotiations of an arms trade treaty. For the 
purpose of examining this influence, the thesis studies the contemporary concepts of 
State responsibility including the Articles of Responsibility of States on 
Internationally Wrongful Acts
1
 adopted by the International Law Commission (ILC) 
and the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP).
2
  In 2001, the ILC adopted the Articles 
which suggest a responsibility of State
3
 when it commits an internationally wrongful 
act. Meanwhile, the RtoP is the commitment of States and the international 
community to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity.
4
  
 
The thesis focuses on normative value describing how the international law should 
control the circulation of small arms. The arguments to restrict circulation of small 
arms are based on normative of IHL and IHRL found in international documents of 
the ILC‘s Articles of responsibility of States on Internationally Wrongful Acts and 
the Responsibility to Protect.  
 
                                               
1 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), as adopted by the UNGA res 56/83 
of 12 December 2001. The thesis hereinafter refers to ―the Articles‖. 
2 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) The 
Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa, International Development Research Centre, 2001). 
3 ―State‖ is written with capital ―S‖ in conformity with the customs in which State is referred to in 
conventions, the United Nations resolutions and other legal documents. Writing ―State‖ as a noun also 
makes it easier to differentiate it from ―state‖ as a verb.  
4 2005 World Summit Outcome (A/Res/60/1). There are three reference paragraphs of the resolution 
dealing with this responsibility, namely paragraphs 138, 139, and 140;  See also, the International Law 
Commission articles on responsibility of States in internationally wrongful acts (2001); and  "The 
Responsibility to Protect" (2001), report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty, co-chaired by Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun. 
2 
 
This first chapter consists of background information that explains why the issues 
relating to small arms and light weapons (hereinafter, small arms)
5
 emerge, affect 
people‘s lives, undermine respect for humanitarian law thus becoming concern of 
international humanitarian law, and come to the attention of the international 
community. The chapter provides clarification of some important definitions of 
certain terms, central hypotheses, structures and the methodology used.  The thesis 
will primarily test and probe the notion that international law is now being 
humanized. That is, the norms of international humanitarian law (IHL) and 
international human rights law (IHRL) are more likely to be taken into consideration 
in the adoption of international arms control treaties.
6
 This close examination is 
focused on conventional arms control, in particular, the negotiations in finding an 
instrument to control small arms. The relationships between the availability of small 
arms and their impact on human security will then be analysed.  
 
The research identifies important elements that are involved in addressing the effort 
to restrict international circulation of small arms. Those elements are State interests; 
contemporary principles of international norms, and the geo-politics of the post-Cold 
War era. The research explores theoretical arguments to demonstrate that, in line with 
the growing norm and contemporary principles of State responsibility, it is a State‘s 
responsibility to restrict the circulation of small arms.   
 
1. Significance of the topic 
 
The inspection of the international efforts to find solutions to regulation of small arms 
is significant because the existing international legal mechanisms are not able to 
adequately regulate their circulation. The free circulation of small arms contributes, in 
part, to fuelling, intensifying, or extending conflicts and violence. Small arms can be 
the tools of genocide and repression.
7
  For such reasons, the world is seeking ways to 
control the circulation of such weapons in order to limit their humanitarian impact.  
                                               
5 Throughout the thesis, the term ―small arms‖ refers to ―small arms and light weapons‖, unless noted 
otherwise. 
6 The terms ―treaty‖ and ―convention‖ are used interchangeably in this thesis.  
7 Zeray Yihdego The Arms Trade and International Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007) at 9. See 
ICTY, Prosecutor v Radislav Krstic, Judgement, Case no IT-98-33-A, 19 April 2004, at 2-8.  The trial 
3 
 
 
Small arms have killed more people than all other kinds of weapons. Each year, small 
arms directly kill hundreds of thousands of people before, during, or after conflicts.
8
 
These deaths occur in armed conflicts and violence around the world, particularly in 
developing countries.  Most studies on the use of small arms in conflicts reveal that 
around 80 per cent of the victims in armed conflicts are civilians.
9
 That most 
casualties are civilians makes the issue an important part of human security, attracting 
the interest of a wider international community beyond traditional disarmament 
society.
10
   
 
The implications of the wide availability of uncontrolled small arms go beyond 
killing. They can prevent economic and human development, destabilize countries 
and regions, increase costs of public health, cause loss of productivity, increase crime 
and insecurity, force migration, and restrict people from accessing basic needs.
11
  The 
wide spectrum of the impact of small arms requires research on small arms to view 
the issue from a human security perspective in order to reflect multiple implications.  
 
Small arms are known to have a long durability and may last for generations and still 
work with minimum maintenance. That many small arms in conflict areas are actually 
weapons from World War II and the Cold War clearly illustrates their durability.
12
 
For the people in armed conflict, the durability of small arms means that the weapons 
will continue to be a threat long after the armed conflict ends. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
Chamber of the Krstic case found that genocide occurred in Sebrenica in which small arms play a role.  
The role of small arms in genocides and massacres in Rwanda (1994) and the former Yugoslavia 
(1995) will be elaborated in Chapter II of this thesis. 
8 Muggah Robert Humanitarianism Under Threat: The Humanitarian Impacts of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons (2001) at viii;  Robert Muggah ―Moving Forward? Assessing Normative and Legal Progress 
in Dealing with Small Arms‖ in Thomas J Biersteker and others (eds) International Law and 
International Relations: Bridging Theory and Practice (New York, Routledge, 2007) at 31. 
9 1997 Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, A/52/298 of 27 August 1997 
<www.un.org/Depts/ddar/Firstcom/SGreport52/a52298.html>. Last accessed 4 January 2011.   
10 S Neil MacFarlene and Yuen Foong Khong Human Security and the UN: A Critical History (Indiana 
University Press, 2006) at 197. 
11 Koh Harold ―Commentary: A World Drowning in Guns‖ in Thomas J Biersteker and others (eds) 
International Law and International Relations: Bridging Theory and Practice (New York, Routledge, 
2007) at 61.    
12 Zeray Yihdego The Arms Trade and International Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007) at 17. 
 
4 
 
The existing current international mechanisms to control small arms proliferation 
have been proven to be ineffective in most cases; however, States still continue the 
effort to find an effective way to control these weapons. The transfer of arms to 
armed conflict zones continues despite various United Nations (UN) arms embargoes. 
That arms continue to be transferred to countries like Zimbabwe, Sudan or Somalia 
which were on the brink of, or are in a state of civil war, where respect for IHL and 
IHRL norms is minimal, further exposes the ineffectiveness of attempts to restrict the 
transfer of weapons. There is, in fact, no overall and comprehensive international 
legal instrument to deal with the small arms trade.
13
  
 
The negative impact of free circulation of small arms on human lives, as described 
further in Chapter II, should be eliminated. The international community does not 
have a legally binding mechanism to prevent small arms transfers from flowing to 
countries in the middle of armed conflict or civil war where human rights violations 
are widespread. There is no international legal instrument, apart from selective 
Security Council arms embargoes, that prevents a State from transferring arms to 
another State which oppresses its citizens, and hence potentially would abuse the 
weapons to continue oppressing its own people. The world does not have a standard 
in small arms transfer which regulates when an arms transfer is allowed and when it 
is not, as there are no agreed common criteria. Criteria should be able to prevent the 
weapons from being used to commit violations of human rights or humanitarian law. 
While the world has managed to have a set of arms control treaties, there is no treaty 
to control small arms transfers. 
 
The end of the Cold War had a great impact on small arms availability. Marked by 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, this created new directions for the flow of 
small arms, a departure from pragmatic political-ideological reasons to more 
economic ones. While the demand for major conventional arms reduced after the end 
of the Cold War, the number of small arms increased.
14
   
 
                                               
13 Security Council of the United Nations may sanction, on a case by case basis, an arms embargo on a 
particular State/entity.  
14 Denise Garcia Small Arms and Security: New Emerging International Norms (New York, 
Routledge, 2006) at 41.     
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2. End of the Cold War and the trade trends of small arms  
 
The global political change following the end of the Cold War has greatly affected 
the direction of small arms transfers. Previously, the small arms flow followed the 
ideological patterns in the context of great rivalry between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. The Soviet Union provided its allies and satellite countries with 
economic and military assistance in the fight for influence against the Liberal West 
led by the United States which did the same in supplying its allies with economic and 
military assistance.
15
 The global arms race of the Cold War ended in 1991, illustrated 
by a reduced trade in major conventional weapons, but this had a contrasting impact 
through increasing small arms availability.
16
 
 
The changing world has brought challenges different in nature from those of the Cold 
War era. For conventional arms, the related challenges are, among other things, the 
destruction of surplus weapons and the indiscriminate use of the weapons in armed 
conflicts which create new security and humanitarian problems.
17
   
 
Some reasons for the increase in small arms trade after the Cold War are the break-up 
of the former Soviet Union and the Yugoslav Federation along with ethnic warfare 
within the successor States of these regions; the breakdown of central authority in 
Russia and the former Soviet Republics; possession by NATO and Warsaw Pact 
forces of large stockpiles of surplus weapons; and the proliferation of ethnic, tribal 
and religious conflicts.
18
 Another explanation for the increase is that, after the Cold 
War, some major producer countries continued to manufacture small arms at their old 
levels, hence creating a dramatic oversupply.
19
 
                                               
15 Rachel Stohl and Dan Smith ―Small Arms in Failed States: A Deadly Combination‖ (1999) Center 
for Defense Information < http://www.cdi.org/issues/failedstates/march99.html>. Last accessed on 4 
June 2011. 
16 Denise Garcia Small Arms and Security: New Emerging International Norms (New York, 
Routledge, 2006) at 41. 
17 Erwin Dahinden ―The Future of Arms Control Law: Towards a New Regulatory Approach and New 
Regulatory Techniques‖ (2005) 10(2) J Conflict &Security Law 263 at 267. 
18 Denise Garcia Small Arms and Security: New Emerging International Norms (New York, 
Routledge, 2006) at 41. 
19 Harold Hongju Koh ―A World Drowning in Guns‖ in Thomas J Biersteker and others (eds) 
International Law and International Relations: Bridging Theory and Practice (New York, Routledge, 
2007) at 63. 
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The geo-political situation in the early 1990s greatly favoured the uncontrolled spread 
of small arms. Many Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries had large 
quantities of small arms as residual weapons from the Cold War. Exporting the 
surplus weapons, rather than destroying them, was one option to generate a quick 
economic benefit, taking into account that those countries were economically 
desperate after the end of the Cold War.
20
  The surplus weapons then spread freely to 
other parts of the world at reduced prices. The widespread availability of small arms 
has multiple effects from changing political stability, narrowing negotiating space, to 
creating a violent culture to express power.
21
     
 
A new trend in the flow and trade of small arms followed the end of the Cold War. 
The patterns of supply and demand for arms were no longer dictated by the concerns 
of the super-power rivalry but directed more by practical economic-based demands 
and pragmatic political interests.
22
 Since the direction of supply of small arms is no 
longer controlled by a certain ideology, it flows relatively freely following demand 
regardless of the political ideology of the buyers. The weapons now go without 
restraint to the increased number of major armed conflicts.
23
 The total number of 
major armed conflicts increased from 102 in 1985-1994 to 107 in 1995-2000, and 
most took place in Asia and Africa.
24
 This suggests that the end of the Cold War has 
not necessarily resulted in a more peaceful world.  
 
The end of the Cold War, however, offers new focus and opportunities for arms 
control to go to the negotiating table. Some important agreements on arms control 
were reached in the 1990s and early 2000s, particularly some on conventional 
                                               
20 Denise Garcia Small Arms and Security: New Emerging International Norms (New York, 
Routledge, 2006) at 66.   
21 Damien Rogers Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control: Theory, Politics, Security (Hants, 
Ashgate, 2009) at 62.  
22
 Denise Garcia Small Arms and Security: New Emerging International Norms (New York, 
Routledge, 2006) at 31.  
23 Christian P Scherrer Ethnicity, Nationalism and Violence: Conflict Management, Human Rights, and 
Multilateral Regimes (Hants, Ashgate, 2003) at 46. According to the definition, major armed conflict 
claims at least 1000 deaths per annum; see Chapter II.  
24 Christian P Scherrer, ibid.  
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weapons such as Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (1995),
25
 Protocol on 
Explosive Remnants of War (2003)
26
 to the Certain Conventional Weapons 
Convention, and the Mine Ban Treaty (1997)
27
. It was after the end of the Cold War, 
the issues of small arms started to be discussed in multilateral forum.  
 
In a region where government and government institutions are fragile and unstable, 
availability of small arms may enhance the tendency to resort to violence to resolve 
differences.  The weapons enable those who own them to contest for power over 
government institutions, particularly when small arms are in the hands of an 
organized armed non-State actor.
28
  Small arms in the hands of insurgents or 
separatist groups would, therefore, certainly be used to pursue their interests using 
force generated from utilizing the weapons. This is how small arms could influence 
the decision to go to an armed conflict, taken with perception of an enhanced strength 
of possibility to win. The availability of a supply of arms would prolong and intensify 
the on-going conflict, which in turn, could bring the whole region into instability. 
This is particularly true in the case of Africa and to a certain degree, in South 
America and Southeast Asia.   
 
Under the current international law regime, there is no practical international legal 
instrument to regulate the trade of small arms. In fact, the trade of small arms can be 
considered the least transparent of all.
29
 The world has managed to have conventions 
to regulate nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons, but nothing 
to regulate small arms. The total number of the weapons keeps growing. Some 
studies indicate that the most destabilizing feature of the arms trade after the Cold 
War is the uncontrolled trade of small arms to intra-State conflicts.
30
 
 
                                               
25 Protocol on Blinding Weapons (1995), 1380 UNTS 370; Doc CCW/CONF.I/16 part I.   
26 Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (2003), 2399 UNTS 126. 
27 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel 
Mine and on their Destruction (opened for signature 3 December 1997, entered into force 1 March 
1999), 2056 UNTS 211.   
28 Damien Rogers Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control: Theory, Politics, Security (Hants, 
Ashgate, 2009) at 62.  
29 Report of the Secretary-General on Small Arms, 5 April 2011 (S/2011/255) at [2-6]. 
30 Denise Garcia Small Arms and Security: New Emerging International Norms (New York, 
Routledge, 2006) at 38. 
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3. Small arms industry                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
The producers of small arms are not limited to certain countries, as was the case 
before the 1990s. There are also more countries or actors now involved in the making 
and transfer of small arms. Many actors play the role of arms suppliers, no longer 
exclusively governments, in contrast to a handful of arms suppliers existing during 
the Cold War.
31
 The weapons flow in diverse directions including to armed conflict 
areas and even to failed or failing States, such as Somalia and Sudan. 
 
Economic profit generated from the arms trade certainly benefits some States. Small 
arms exporting countries that publicly profess their commitment to peace are often 
also major suppliers of arms to conflict-ridden States.
32
 This contradiction occurs 
because the small arms trade involves a considerable amount of money and countries‘ 
actions are partly influenced by pragmatic economic interests. The US, Italy, Brazil, 
Germany, Belgium, Austria, Russia, and China are among top exporters of small 
arms.
33
 The considerable value of the arms industry indicates the influence the 
industry has on governments to discourage any limitation by regulation of small arms 
production and transfer.  
 
Arms producing companies are generally in developed countries although the recent 
trend shows an increasing number of developing countries producing weapons. Some 
of the top manufacturers of small arms, including their ammunition, are Berreta 
(Italy), a company dating back to 1526, producing about 1,500 guns a day and 
exporting the weapons to more than 100 countries; Heckler & Koch (UK/Germany),  
makers of G-36 assaults rifle; Smith &Wesson (US); Colt (US); FN Herstal 
(Belgium) producing popular FN pistols; Norincho (China), known to produce 
thousands of cheap pistols for export; Izhmash (Russia); Israel Weapon Industries 
(former Israel Military Industries-IMI, Israel), makers of the UZI sub-machine gun; 
KBP (Russia); Saco Defense (US); Sellier & Bellot (Czech Republic); Winchester 
                                               
31 Ibid, at 36. 
32 Amalendu Misra Politics of Civil Wars: Conflict, Intervention and Resolution (New York, 
Routledge, 2008) at 141. 
33 SIPRI database provides information on top exporters and importers of conventional weapons 
<http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers>. Last accessed 5 July 2010. 
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Olin (US/Belgium); Nammo (Finland/Sweden/ Norway); Giat (France); General 
Dynamics (US); and Singapore Technologies (Singapore).
34
 In addition, there are 
also names like Armalite (US) (maker of M4 and M-16 assault rifles), Walther, Sig 
Sauer (Germany), and Remington (US). 
35
 
 
Data available at the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfer (NISAT) on 
export and import of small arms revealed the scale of economic value from the small 
arms trade. However, it comes with a note that the values may be underestimates 
since some countries did not report all their small arms trade.
36
 Among the top five 
small arms exporting countries for 2010, the United States was top (US$674 million), 
followed by Italy (US$402 million), Germany (US$376 million), Brazil (US$314 
million), and Switzerland (US$209 million).
37
 
 
Considering the lack of transparency in small arms transfer, it is no surprise to see 
that Russia and China are not in the top five. In 2010, Russia exported small arms 
with a value of ―only‖ US$ 150 million and China US$40 million.38 However, these 
figures are considered much lower than actual values.
 39
 The figures come from the 
available data and authorized trade which, considering the lack of transparency in 
arms trade, suggest the real value from small arms trade may be much higher. The 
Small Arms Survey ranks small arms exporters rather differently and includes China, 
India, North Korea, Pakistan, Russian Federation, and Turkey in top 15, apart from 
usual countries in authorized small arms trade.
40
   
                                               
34 Small Arms Survey www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/home/FAQ.html#FAQ5; Hackler & Koch 
<http://www.heckler-koch.com/en/company.html>. Last accessed 14 April 2012. Also BBC ―Who 
Makes the World‘s Guns‖, Monday, 12 November 2007 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6294242.stm>. Last accessed 12 April 2012. 
 Last accessed 9 November 2008. 
35 BBC ―Who Makes the World‘s Guns‖, Monday, 12 November 2007 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6294242.stm>. Last accessed 12 April 2012. 
36 Small Arms Survey 2011: States of Security (Cambridge University Press, 2011) at annexe to ch 1.   
37  NISAT Database < http://www.prio.no/NISAT/>.  Last accessed 12 April 2012. The figures 
rounded to closer number. The year 2010 is the latest data available on the NISAT database.        
38 NISAT Database < http://www.prio.no/NISAT/>.  Last accessed 12 April 2012. The figures rounded 
to closer number.        
39 NISAT Database < http://www.prio.no/NISAT/> . Last accessed 12 April 2012. See also Small Arms 
Survey 2011: States of Security (Cambridge, 2011) at annexe to ch 1. 
40 ―Weapons and Markets: Industrial Production‖ Small Arms Survey 
<http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/producers/industrial-production.html>. Last 
accessed 13 April 2012.  
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Some countries are known to trade arms with little or no transparency, which exclude 
them from top list of exporting countries. The Small Arms Survey 2011 released a 
transparency barometer which shows Russia, China, South Africa, Singapore, 
Taiwan, Ukraine, Iran, and North Korea as the bottom eight, among the least 
transparent exporting countries.
41
 
 
From an import perspective, the US was also in the top importing countries list in 
2010 with US$1.1 billion, followed by UK US$164 million, Canada US$152 million, 
Germany US$133 million, and Australia US$114 million.
42
 The high economic value 
of small arms transfer could be threatened once a legally binding treaty was adopted. 
This partially answers the question of why, apart from strategic and political 
considerations, States are very cautious about having an arms trade regulation. 
Companies in the arms industry, generally, are State-owned enterprises, partly owned 
by States, or highly State-controlled.
43
 The wave of privatisation of arms industry in 
1990s has reduced government-owned companies; however, States still largely 
finance, provide political support, regulate, and control development and production 
of arms.
44
 It is then making sense that State policy is most effective in controlling the 
supply side of arms.  
 
4. Arms control  
 
An arms control agreement, particularly a multilateral one, seeks to limit or constrain 
particular weapons; regulate military force structure; prevent the spread of particular 
capabilities;  create security, stability, and predictability; reduce the cost of an arms 
race; reduce suffering should war occur; and improve confidence and transparency.
45
 
                                               
41 Small Arms Survey 2011: States of Security (Cambridge, 2011) at 16-17. Small Arms Trade 
Transparency Barometer 2011 has a range from 0 to 25. Russia gets total 6.00 and is fifth from the 
bottom (with only Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Iran and North Korea being lower). Meanwhile, China 
gets total 8.00, ranking nine from the bottom. 
42 Small Arms Survey 2011: States of Security (Cambridge, 2011) at annexe to ch 1. 
43
 Sam Perlo-Freeman ―Arms Production‖ in SIPRI Yearbook 2009: Armaments, Disarmament and 
International Security (New York, Oxford University Press, 2009) at 286. 
44 SIPRI ―Transparency in Arms Industry‖ 
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/production/researchissues/transparancy. Last Accessed 14 
April 2012. 
45 John Freeman ―Is Arms Control in Crisis?‖ (2004) 9 J Conf & Sec L 303 at 307.  
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This illustrates that arms control has a wide range of purposes which serve as 
multiple reasons to motivate control of particular arms. These could be a combination 
of economics, strategic politics, security, and humanitarian. 
 
Arms control agreements between countries have existed for centuries. In this 
instance, a treaty would be signed between countries to reduce or prohibit the use of 
certain weapons. In the early history of war, arms control, or disarmament to be 
precise, was imposed by the victor on the defeated or was a term imposed by the 
stronger State on a weaker one. This is illustrated in the negotiation between Rome 
and Carthage before the Third Punic war, where Carthage was obliged to destroy its 
fleet and vast stocks of weapons to avert war.
46
    
 
Following defeat in World War I, disarmament was imposed on Germany in the 
Treaty of Versailles (1919).
47
 The number of infantry, guns, machine guns, trench 
mortars, rifles and ammunition were all set down.
48
 The Versailles treaty imposed 
arms restriction on Germany but not to the victorious Allies, as the treaty instructs, 
―the German military forces shall be demobilised and reduced‖.49 Limitations were 
set on the navy, air force, and Germany was prohibited from export and import of all 
kinds of arms.
50
 This was to ensure the defeated would never be a military power 
again, at least in the near future. Similarly, demobilization and disarmament were 
imposed on Germany and Japan by the allied forces following the end of World War 
II. Such dictated arms control only takes place after the war situation when the victors 
dictate the number and type of arms the defeated may have.  
 
Arms control and disarmament agreements were also negotiated between sovereign 
States based on an equal footing. An arms control treaty may have been agreed to ban 
                                               
46 Adrian Goldsworthy The Fall of Carthage:  The Punic Wars 265-146 BC (Cassel, London, 2003) at 
338. 
47 Versailles Treaty (1919), the Avalon Project, Document in law, history and diplomacy, Yale Law 
School < http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/parti.asp>. Last accessed 14 April 2012.    
48 Versailles Treaty (1919), art 183 and 199, the Avalon Project, Document in law, history and 
diplomacy, Yale Law School < http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/parti.asp>. Last accessed 14 April 2012.    
49 Ibid, art 159; see also discussion of forced arms reductions after the First World War in Alexander 
Gillespie A History of the Laws of War: The Customs and Laws of War with regards to Arms Control 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011) vol 3, at 29.  
50 Versailles Treaty (1919), art 165 and 170, the Avalon Project, Document in law, history and 
diplomacy, Yale Law School < http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/parti.asp>. Last accessed 14 April 2012.    
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the armament for political, security, humanity, and economic reasons. From an 
economic perspective, an arms race consumes huge amounts of the State‘s budget. 
From a political and security perspective, an arms control agreement achieved would 
bring a feeling of security. Humanitarian concerns demonstrate that they also can be a 
rationale for the prohibition of the use of certain weapons for their indiscriminate 
nature or the superfluous or unnecessary injury that they cause to combatants. This 
will be discussed in Chapter III.   
 
An agreement on arms control could be made by either a bilateral agreement 
involving only two concerned States or a multilateral process involving many States.  
The 1868 St Petersburg Declaration
51
 to prohibit the use of incendiary bullets is one 
example of multilaterally agreed conventional arms control. During the Cold War, the 
world witnessed a series of bilateral arms control talks between the two blocs.  One 
example of bilateral negotiation is the agreement between the US and the Soviet 
Union on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). The bilateral negotiation 
between the US and Russia on the reduction of nuclear weapons warheads continued 
after the Cold War with 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT)
52
 and, 
recently, the agreement on the New START (2010).
53
  
 
Bilateral agreements on conventional weapons are less common than bilateral 
agreements on nuclear weapons, because only a few countries own nuclear weapons 
while conventional weapons are owned by almost all sovereign countries. Hence, a 
conventional weapon agreement needs a multilateral agreement to be effective to 
restrict, ban or limit the use of a particular type of conventional weapon. Because of 
the universality of conventional weapons‘ ownership, a multilateral mechanism is 
required to achieve a universal and widely adhered to norm on particular arms 
control. The international community has previous experience in dealing with some 
conventional weapons, such as with anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions, 
                                               
51 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of war, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes 
Weight, adopted at St Petersburg by the International Military Commission, 11 December 1868,  
(1907)1 Am J Int‘l L Supp 95.  
52 Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Strategic Offensive 
Reductions (concluded in Moscow, 24 May 2002), 2350 UNTS I-42195. 
53 Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the 
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (signed 8 April 2010). 
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which focuses on the indiscriminate effects of the weapons or weapons causing 
excessive injuries, but not much experience with the small arms issue.   
 
States‘ achievement of an agreement on an arms control treaty is encouraged by the 
factors that serve their interests. One of the most important factors is the perception 
that an agreed arms control treaty would provide more stable security for them. When 
presented with a concrete arms control proposal, each State will cautiously scrutinize 
its own security
54
 and only sign it if the proposal helps increase the feeling of security 
or at the very least does not pose a danger to its security. This thesis not only views 
small arms from the security angle but links this with the efforts to control the 
proliferation of small arms with humanitarian reasons. 
  
5. Framing focus of the thesis: State‘s supply of small arms 
 
The effort to reduce avoidable deaths caused by small arms can be seen from several 
perspectives. The first is the supply side focus which is to see the problem of small 
arms as caused by excessive availability of the weapons; hence, the transfer of small 
arms should be restricted and regulated. States play a dominant role in restricting the 
supply by applying regulations limiting the trade. The international trade restriction 
by regulating of supply by States is what the thesis examines. 
 
In examining States‘ efforts to control small arms, the thesis analyses considerations 
and rationales in arms control. The analysis weighs the importance of IHL and IHRL 
development and their influence on the adoption of an arms control instrument.   
 
There is a second focus which analyses the issue from the demand side. This is to 
explain why there is demand for weapons and how to reduce the demand for small 
arms. The demand side deals with the perception that conflict can be resolved using 
weapons. The belief that weapons have the power to resolve conflicts persuades 
people to possess weapons. From the demand approach, to reduce violence caused by 
small arms is to change the view that weapons could resolve problems. The 
                                               
54 Guideo Den Dekker The Law of Arms Control: International Supervision and Enforcement (Leiden, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001) at 31. 
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perspective of the demand side focuses on peace, conflict resolution, and peace 
education in dealing with the small arms problem. This thesis does not examine this 
issue. 
 
Another approach examines the issue of the misuse of small arms. The weapons may 
be properly owned, legally acquired and be in legitimate hands, such as armed forces 
personnel; however, even they may misuse the weapons in their hands to attack 
civilians.
55
 The main idea is that the weapons should not endanger civilians, instead, 
the legally acquired weapons in the hands of governments should bring security to 
civilians.  
 
Legally acquired weapons belonging to security personnel for legitimate use, in 
certain circumstances, may also be a problem. Weapons in military stockpiles may 
also disappear because of lack of discipline and weak regulation on stockpiling. An 
answer to the misuse issue is to hold the perpetrators responsible, improve discipline, 
restrict access to weapons by repeat offenders, and adopt a strict domestic regulation 
on arms stockpiling. This thesis reviews some aspects of this issue, in particular to 
demonstrate that legally acquired weapons may also become a threat to civilians.  
 
Lastly, there is a focus on reducing the existing pool of weapons. Some of the UN 
peace keeping missions have been given the task to collect weapons.
56
 In collecting 
weapons, there should be a well planned policy on disarmament and destruction of 
weapons, particularly in post-armed conflict situations where small arms are 
prevalent. Security in a post conflict situation depends on the success of the program 
of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian 
life (DDR). The thesis does not directly examine this issue. Rather, it focuses 
primarily on small arms transfers in the first instance, not arms disposal after the 
conflict. 
                                               
55 Amnesty International ―Gaza: Misuse of Weapons‖ (19 Feb 2009) 
<www.amnesty.org.nz/news/gaza-misuse-weapons>. Last accessed at 22 December 2010. Amnesty 
International indicates that both parties to the conflict in Gaza, Palestine, misuse the conventional 
weapons they have to attack civilians. 
56 UNSC resolutions on several UN peace keeping forces have given the mandate to include the DDR 
programme. See the resolutions on the peace keeping mission in Congo, for example the resolution 
1925 (2010) of 28 May 2010.  
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The thesis restricts its focus to the States‘ effort to restrict supply as it examines what 
States can do based on contemporary State responsibilities and the principles of IHL 
and IHRL. While the thesis acknowledges the need for a coordinated effort of all 
approaches in combating the free circulation of small arms, for the purpose of the 
research, the thesis focuses on what is the most effective way for States to restrict the 
global supply of small arms. The focus on State supply is based on the practical 
realization that the international system is founded on States. States are still dominant 
and not replaceable in the foreseeable future, even though non-state actors such as 
transnational companies and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
are increasingly present.
57
     
 
As the thesis deals with the focus on State supply of small arms, it therefore inspects 
the efforts of States to control the small arms trade in multilateral fora.  Hence, it 
examines efforts under the UN framework which include small arms negotiations in 
the Security Council and General Assembly. The thesis, in addition, also observes the 
response of regional organizations to the threat of small arms in complementing the 
global effort.          
 
 
6. Human Security in the small arms discussion 
 
The human security approach applies in this thesis‘ analysis. The human security 
approach on small arms is intended to observe the issues from a broader perspective. 
The thesis analyses the issue of small arms by not restricting it only to a humanitarian 
focus which is mainly limited to an armed conflict, or a traditional arms control view 
that only looks at the issue from the geo-politics of State interests, but also from a 
broader context. Applying a human security approach justifies the thesis‘ observation 
of the implications of small arms from multiple humanitarian perspectives: social 
development, and human rights. International human rights law is increasingly being 
                                               
57 Joseph S Nye Jr Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History (7th, 
Longman, 2009) at 2. 
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used to provide standards in evaluating some areas of international law, including 
arms control.
58
   
 
The thesis uses the concept of human security as defined by the Commission on 
Human Security: ―to protect the vital core of human lives in ways that enhance 
human freedom and human fulfilment‖.59 The concept of human security is concerned 
with violent conflict, is associated with non-traditional security issues, and focuses 
more on humans in general and protection of individuals rather than of States.
60
 
Human security, in the view of the 2003 Report of the UN Commission on Human 
Security, has goals that include protecting people from violent conflict and from the 
proliferation of arms.
61
 It benefits this thesis to study the issue of small arms beyond 
restricted concepts of only humanitarian law or arms control. The framework of 
human security views human rights as a security problem, a notion that is in 
agreement with the emerging norm of the Responsibility to Protect.
62
 This will be 
discussed further in Chapter IV. 
 
The significance of applying a human security approach to control of small arms is 
that the excessive supply of weapons is a threat and has had a destructive effect on 
human security.  The most important reason for international society to strictly 
regulate the trade of these weapons is based on the fact that most victims are 
civilians.
63
 In addition to humanitarian concerns, the wide availability of small arms 
before, during and after armed conflict, is often associated closely with widespread 
                                               
58 Saladin Meckled-Garcia and Basak Cali ―Lost in Translation:The Human Rights Ideal and 
International Human Rights Law‖ in  Saladin Meckled-Garcia and Basak Cali (eds) The Legalization 
of Human Rights: Multidisciplinary Perspective on Human Rights and Human Rights Law (New York, 
Routledge, 2006) at 12. 
59 Commission on Human Security Human Security Now (New York, Commission on Human 
Security, 2003) at 4. 
60 Commission on Human Security Human Security Now (New York, Commission on Human 
Security, 2003) at 4-6, 57; Michael E Smith International Security: Politics, Policy, Prospects 
(Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) at 42. 
61
 Commission on Human Security Human Security Now (New York, Commission on Human 
Security, 2003). 
62 Ibid; also Michael E Smith International Security: Politics, Policy, Prospects (Hampshire, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010) at 42.  
63 S Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong Human Security and the UN: A Critical History (Indiana 
University Press, 2006) at 197. 
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criminality and violence which is a case for human security as small arms become a 
threat to peace building.
64
   
 
7. Central questions  
 
The thesis will address the central issue of why the international community has 
difficulty in restricting the flow of small arms. The central question asked by the 
thesis is: 
  
How does international law control the small arms supply?  
 
Additional questions are:  
- How extensive is the influence of IHL and IHRL in small arms control 
negotiations? 
- What are the limitations of current mechanisms in the control of small arms?  
- What are the contemporary global principles of State responsibilities in 
preventing small arms proliferation?  
- What is the role of civil society and international organizations, including the 
UN, in establishing norms on the use of small arms?  
- What are the challenges and opportunities in adopting an international legal 
instrument to regulate the small arms trade?    
- How do regional organizations respond to the small arms issue? 
 
The central and additional questions could be developed into the statements  
below. 
 
a. Statement 1: The contemporary global principles of State 
responsibility demand that States regulate and restrict the flow of 
small arms   
 
                                               
64 Ibid.  
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The conclusion of the Cold War has brought to an end some ideological hostilities 
and promoted greater respect for human rights.
65
 Respect for human rights is now a 
well accepted global norm which States have to observe.
66
 The contemporary 
principles of State responsibility demand that States protect their populations from 
any crimes against humanity.
67
  States have a responsibility toward the international 
community and must behave in accordance with acceptable human rights and 
humanitarian norms.
68
 Louis Henkin has long advocated this view, as he argues that 
human rights have in fact been deeply implicated in the realities of international 
politics.
69
 State responsibility refers to obligations which result from any of the 
sources of international law.
70
 
 
A situation where there is no global restriction in small arms transfer, so that these 
weapons are widely available, is not in conformity with the principles of State 
responsibility and respect for human rights. In theory, restricting and controlling the 
flow of small arms will help prevent these weapons from causing serious human 
rights violations, and threatening economic and social development.
71
 The thesis 
argues that restricting the flow of small arms is part of a State‘s responsibility to 
protect its population. 
 
b. Statement 2: IHL and IHRL are increasingly influential in arms 
control negotiations, which are particularly evident in the negotiation 
of an arms trade treaty. 
                                               
65 Gennady M Danilenko ―Russia and International Human Rights‖ in Sienho Yee and Wang Tieya 
(Eds) InternationalLlaw in the Post-Cold War World (New York, Routledge, 2001) at 182. 
66  Saladin Meckled-Garcia and Basak Cali ―Lost in Translation:The Human Rights Ideal and 
International Human Rights Law‖ in  Saladin Meckled-Garcia and Basak Cali (eds) The Legalization 
of Human Rights: Multidisciplinary Perspective on Human Rights and Human Rights Law (New York, 
Routledge, 2006) at 12. 
67 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), as adopted by the UNGA res 
56/83 of 12 December 2001..   
68 Theodor Meron Humanization of International Law (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006) at 
249; see also, Louis Henkin The Age of Rights (Columbia University Press, 1990) at 11-65. 
69 Louis Henkin, ibid at 27. Henkin gives example on colonialism which was once a domestic affair, 
but now (at least in its traditional form) is illegal. 
70
 James Crawford The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, 
Text and Commentaries (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 14. 
71Amalendu Misra Politics of Civil Wars: Conflict, Intervention and Resolution (New York, 
Routledge, 2008) at 140. Internal armed conflicts, in which small arms are widely used, are the fertile 
places for potential crimes against humanity. ICTY and ICTR trials show that massacres in Rwanda 
and Bosnia were executed with the help of small arms.   
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Human rights have long been influencing international law.
72
 The effort in adopting a 
new arms control treaty, including a treaty dealing with small arms control, is 
influenced by IHL and IHRL. The effect of the widely available, unrestricted flow of 
small arms is destructive to human security and thus requires the inclusion of IHL 
and IHRL considerations in the negotiation to control small arms trade. The influence 
of IHL and IHRL is substantially reflected in the process of negotiation as reflected in 
the draft and final text of recent arms control treaties. Significantly, the same 
influence is apparent in the negotiation of any arms trade treaty which is to include 
small arms.  The efforts to regulate the uncontrolled proliferation of small arms 
cannot escape the argument of humanitarian law and human rights law, in particular 
when the weapons are used in violation of humanitarian and human rights law.  
 
International law has been growing rapidly since the end of the World War II. 
Respect for humanity and human rights values have been codified and incorporated 
more into international conventions.
73
 The trauma of unprecedented deaths of 
civilians and combatants, pushed the international community to establish a set of 
international laws to agree on what was and was not allowed, both in time of war and 
peace with respect for humanity and human rights norms, that went beyond what had 
been agreed before World War II. After 1945 the rules were considerably advanced 
as particularly codified in the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols.
74
 
Among these rules, the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention on the protection of civilians 
in times of war was the first international instrument to focus on civilian needs in 
armed conflicts.
75
 The Geneva Conventions cover only civilians in the Fourth 
                                               
72 Ibid, at 45. 
73 See for example, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951), reprinted in Shirley V 
Scott International Law and Politics: Key Documents (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006) at 
341; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), 
reprinted in Shirley V Scott International Law and Politics: Key Documents (Boulder, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2006) at 359; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1996), reprinted in 
Shirley V Scott International Law and Politics: Key Documents (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2006) at 371; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(1979), reprinted in Shirley V Scott International Law and Politics: Key Documents (Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2006) at 406;  and the Geneva Conventions (1949), reprinted in Shirley V Scott 
International Law and Politics: Key Documents (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006) at 439.  
74 Alexander Gillespie A History of Laws of War (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011) vol 1 and 2.   
75 Geneva Convention to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (IV) (1949), 75 UNTS 
287; see Alexander Gillespie A History of Laws of War (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011) vol  2 at 183 .   
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Convention. More attention to civilian protection, both in international and non-
international armed conflict, is covered in the Additional Protocols I and II adopted in 
1977.
76
 The 1949 Geneva Conventions and their additional Protocols were among 
fundamental treaties most States have ratified that stress the laws of armed conflict 
and protection of civilians. By the end of 2011, 194 States had ratified the Geneva 
Conventions, which reflects the universal acceptance.
77
          
 
The establishment of the United Nations after the end of the World War II marked the 
new international order. The decisions of the Security Council resolutions bind all 
member States of the United Nations, and thus become highly persuasive. States 
agreed and bound themselves by signing treaties in social, economic and security 
areas that further promote international law.
78
 In the era following World War II, 
treaties have increased greatly in number.  
 
The end of the Cold War further expedited the rapid growth of international law. The 
subsequent absence of ideological competition was conducive to the opening of more 
negotiations of treaties containing more respect for humanity and human rights. The 
                                               
76 Geneva Convention to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (IV) (1949), 75 UNTS 
287; Additional Protocol II (1977), 1125 UNTS 609; see also, Alexander Gillespie A History of the 
Laws of War (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011) vol II at 183-197.  
77 ICRC < http://www.icrc.org>. Last accessed on 16 April 2012.  
78 Among economic and social treaties, there are nine human rights treaties, namely the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (open for signature 21 December 1965, entered 
into force 4 January 1969); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) (adopted 
16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976), 999 UNTS 171; the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 
1976), 993 UNTS 3; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (adopted 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981); the Convention Against Torture, and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (adopted 10 December 1984, entered 
into force 26 June 1987); the Convention on the Rights of the Child (concluded 20 November 1989, 
entered into force 2 September 1990), UNGA res 44/25.; the International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrants Workers and Members of Their Families (adopted 18 
December 1980, entered into force 1 July 2003); the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities  (open for signature 30 March 2007, entered into force 3 May 2008); the International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances (open for signature 6 
February 2007, entered into force 23 December 2010). Among the security treaties are: the Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on 
Their Destruction (opened for signature 13 January 1993, entered into force 29 April 1997); the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti- Personnel 
Mines and on their Destruction (opened for signature 3-4 December 1997, entered into force 1 March 
1997); the Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May be Deemed Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (concluded 
10 October 1980, entered into force 2 December 1983).    
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codification of international human rights law has developed rapidly, shown by the 
number of international treaties with respect for humanity and human rights values in 
them. The adoption of a number of international human rights treaties is among the 
examples. Another example is the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (1998), which prosecutes individuals for war crime and crime against 
humanity.
79
   
 
The United Nations has been endeavouring, with no success, to establish a 
meaningful international legal instrument to regulate small arms. The attempts to 
address the issue started in the 1990s and increased, leading to the United Nations 
conference on small arms in July 2001.
80
 The conference, however, failed to produce 
a legally binding instrument. Over the following decade, the discussion of small arms 
centres on a series of following meetings of the 2001 UN Program of Action with no 
prospect towards more binding instruments. However, in 2006 States agreed to start a 
negotiation on an arms trade treaty (which includes small arms), which culminated in 
a diplomatic conference in July 2012.   The thesis then argues that IHL and IHRL are 
increasingly influential in arms control negotiations.  
 
 
B. Definitions and Terms 
1. Small arms and light weapons 
 
The combination term of ―small arms and light weapons‖ gained popularity in the 
1990s and became frequently found in reports, papers, or media as more people were 
concerned with the problems created by the easy access and wide availability of these 
weapons. There are several definitions of the terms ―small arms‖ and ―light 
weapons‖. The definitions by research institutions, academia, States, regional 
organizations, and the United Nations differ slightly from one to another. Hence, it is 
                                               
79 The adoption of the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court (1998), was based on the 
codification of international law by the International Law Commission (ILC) with its ―Draft Statute for 
International Criminal Court (1994)‖. See, Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court 1994 
(United Nations, 2005).  
80 Robert Munggah ―Moving forward? Assessing Normative and Legal Progress in Dealing with Small 
Arms‖ in Thomas J Biersteker and others (eds) International Law and International Relations: 
Bridging Theories and Practices (New York, Routledge, 2007) at 32. 
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central to use a definition appropriate for the purpose of the thesis. The Oxford 
dictionary defines small arms (in plural noun) as ―portable firearms, especially rifles, 
pistols, and light machine guns‖.81 This dictionary includes light machine guns in the 
definition of ―small arms‖ and, reasonably, does not have an entry on ―light weapon‖.    
 
Realizing the need for an exact definition of the term, the United Nations has worked 
on the definition. A working group,
82
 formed by the United Nations to find an 
international instrument on tracing small arms, formulated a definition which is 
employed in the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a 
Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (here after 
International Tracing Instrument or ITI). Adopted by the UNGA in 2005, the ITI 
defines ―small arms and light weapons‖ as: 
 
[A]ny man-portable lethal weapon that expels or launches, is designed to 
expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, 
bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive, excluding antique small 
arms and light weapons or their replicas.
83
   
 
The instrument further describes the small arms and light weapons in detail as 
follows: 
a)[S]mall arms are, broadly speaking, weapons designed for individual use. 
They include, inter alia, revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and 
carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns;  
 
b)[L]ight weapons are, broadly speaking, weapons designed for use by two 
or three persons serving as a crew, although some may be carried and used 
by a single person. They include, inter alia, heavy machine guns, hand-held 
under barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-craft guns, 
portable anti-tanks guns, recoilless rifles, portable launcher of anti-tank 
missile and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-air craft missiles 
systems, and mortars of a caliber of less than 100 millimeters.
84
 
 
                                               
81 Oxford Dictionary of English (revised 2nd ed, Oxford University Press, 2005). 
82 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 58/241 of 23 December 2003. The Working Group is 
to negotiate an international instrument to enable states to identify and trace illicit trade of small arms 
and light weapons.   The working group uses the definition produced by a previous panel to study the 
definition of small arms mandated by the GA resolution 50/70 B of 12 December 1995. 
83 International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, 
Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (2005), UNGA Decision 60/519 of 8 December 2005. 
84 Ibid.   
23 
 
Based on the definition above, swords, knives, axes and landmines,
85
 do not fall into 
the definition of small arms and light weapons since they are not designed to expel or 
launch a shot, bullet, or projectile. For the sake of clarity: in the case of an armoured 
tank, it cannot be classified as a light weapon as it cannot be carried by three or fewer 
persons.   
 
The thesis uses the definition above provided by the ITI and adopted by the UN, for 
all discussion. The thesis employs the term ―small arms‖ to include ―light weapons‖ 
throughout all chapters. Some publications favour the abbreviation of SALW 
referring to small arms and light weapons instead of small arms. In the thesis, any 
quotation including SALW is then regarded as referring to small arms. For research 
purposes, the thesis takes the terms ―firearms‖ or ―hand guns‖ as sub-parts of small 
arms.    
 
The choice to employ the definition provided by the ITI is based on the priority to 
ensure the definition of the most common value agreed within international 
relations.
86
 The ITI definition is the most current definition adopted by the 
international order, namely the United Nations General Assembly.  
 
a. Other definitions 
 
While the thesis uses the ITI definition on small arms and light weapons, there are 
some other definitions. The 2001 Protocol on Firearms, as the title suggests, uses the 
term ―firearms‖. The thesis regards these as included in the term ―small arms‖. The 
Protocol definition is: 
 
―Firearm‖ shall mean any portable barrelled weapon that expels, is 
designed to expel or may be readily converted to expel a shot, bullet or 
                                               
85
 A broad definition as employed in the 1997 Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small 
Arms includes anti-personnel landmines. Paragraph 6 of the Report explains that ―[t]he issue is, 
however, being addressed in other forums. The Panel, therefore, agreed to avoid duplication of effort 
and different approaches by excluding anti-personnel landmines from its deliberations.‖ 
<www.un.org/Depts/ddar/Firstcom/SGreport52/a52298.html>. Last accessed 4 January 2011.   
86 Zeray Yihdego The Arms Trade and International Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007) at 46. 
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projectile by the action of an explosive, excluding antique firearms or their 
replicas.
87
  
 
Similarities can be seen in the ―firearm‖ definition in the Protocol and the ―small 
arms‖ definition in the ITI in which both definitions are based on the portable 
barrelled weapon that expels a shot by the action of an explosive.     
 
Inter-governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations define small 
arms based on their perspective. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
defines small arms and light weapons slightly different from the ITI: 
 
―Small arms‖ are, broadly speaking, weapons designed for individual use. 
They include, inter alia, revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and 
carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns.
88
 
 
Here, it is noticeable that the NATO definition does not include the idea that the 
projectile should be expelled or propelled by an explosion. Hence, having no 
indication of whether the bullet is expelled or propelled makes the NATO‘s definition 
rather loose in comparison, as more weapons may fall into this definition as long as 
they are designed for individual use.  
 
For light weapons, the NATO definition is: 
 
―Light weapons‖ are, broadly speaking, weapons designed for use by two 
or three persons serving as a crew, although some may be carried and used 
by a single person. They include, inter alia, heavy machine guns, hand-held 
under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, 
portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of a calibre 
of less than 100 millimeters.
 89
 
 
 
On the other hand, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) defines 
small arms as referring to ―assault rifles, machine guns, hand grenades, and other 
                                               
87
 Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and 
Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime (2001), 2326 UNTS 208, art 3(a).  
88 NATO Small Arms and Light Weapons and Mine Action 
<www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52142.htm>. Last accessed 4 January 2011. 
89 Ibid. 
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weapons designed for military use by an individual combatant.‖90 The definition 
comes with the explanation that it includes ―commercial firearms such as handguns 
and hunting rifles.‖91   
 
As for ―light weapons‖, the ICRC refers to them as ―portable weapons designed for 
use by several persons as crew, such as heavy machine-guns, mounted grenade-
launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, portable launchers of 
anti-tank missiles, and mortars.‖92 Here the ICRC does not clearly limit the size of 
mortar as do the UN and NATO definitions, defining it as less than 100 mm. 
Although there are some slightly different definitions, they generally refer to the same 
weapons.   
    
 
2. Civilian or non-combatant 
 
To present a strong argument on the possible danger to civilian lives of excessive 
availability of small arms, the term civilian needs to be defined. Norms of both war 
and international humanitarian law seek to mitigate the effects of violent conflicts and 
protect civilians, therefore the parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish 
between civilians and combatants.
93
   
 
For the purpose of the research, the definition below of civilian from the Geneva 
Conventions shall apply to the thesis. A civilian or non-combatant is defined by 
article 50 of Additional Protocol I to Geneva Conventions:  
 
1. A civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the categories of 
persons referred to in Article 4 A (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third 
                                               
90 ―Centre, Unregulated Arms Availability, Small Arms & Light Weapons, and the UN Process‖  
(2006) Report, ICRC Resource Centre <www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/small-arms-
paper-250506.htm>. Last accessed 4 January 2011. 
91
 Ibid. 
92 Ibid.  
93 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law  
(New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005) vol I, chapter I., at 3. The customary international law 
rules that: ―Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed against 
civilians‖.  
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Convention and in Article 43 of this Protocol. In case of doubt whether a 
person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian. 
2. The civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians. 
3. The presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not 
come within the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its 
civilian character.
 94
   
 
 
Reading this definition together with article 4 A(1)(2)(3) and (6) of the Third 
Convention and  article 43 of the Protocol I, civilians are any persons who are not 
members of an armed force, members of other militias including those of organized 
resistance movements, members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a 
government or an authority not recognized by the detaining power, and inhabitants of 
a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up 
arms to resist the invading forces.
95
  
 
3. Non-State actors 
 
Non-State actors are defined as ―actors other than States and organizations of 
States.‖96 They, among others, are non-governmental organizations, religious groups, 
individuals, indigenous peoples, ethnic minorities, and business enterprises.
97
  The 
thesis discusses NGOs to identify whether they have any role in international efforts 
to combat small arms. NGOs have found that they can be important players in the 
creation, interpretation, and enforcement of international law on matters of interest to 
them. The NGOs increasingly participate as active observers in multilateral treaty 
negotiations, commenting on draft treaty text and otherwise seeking to influence the 
views of States.
98
 The NGOs are active in monitoring the conduct of States, such as 
                                               
94 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I, 1977), 1125 UNTS 3, art 50 (1,2,3). The 
prohibition to attack civilians by distinguishing civilian from combatants as to protect them against 
effect of hostilities is spelled out in the article 51 (1,2) of Protocol I;  for discussion on distinction 
between civilians and combatants see Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck Customary 
International Humanitarian Law  (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005) vol I, at ch I. 
95 Third Geneva Convention (1949), art 4 A(1)(2)(3)(6); Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol I, 1977), 1125 UNTS 3, art 43;  
96 Jeffney Dunoff, Steven R Ratner and David Mippman International Law Norms, Actors, Process: A 
Problem-Oriented Approach (Aspen, 2006) at 27.   
97 Ibid.   
98 Sean D Murphy Principles of International Law (St Paul, Minnesota, Thomson/West, 2006) at 59.  
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on matters of implementation of human rights regimes, as a means of shaming States 
into compliance, and play important roles in the promotion of international law and in 
its observance.
99
 
 
Technology and the information age are changing the allocation of power and 
authority in the international system, with non-State actors, to some extent, assuming 
decision-making roles previously reserved primarily for States.
100
 Some argue that 
the greater role of non-State actors should not be seen merely as a threat to State 
authority, and propose a partnership between public and private entities to formulate a 
global public policy using a ―cross-national culture of public interest‖ and the 
creation of ―more dynamic and responsive institutions of governance‖.101   As far as 
non-State actors are concerned, some of them have a different agenda from the 
governments and in some cases even equip themselves with weapons to pursue their 
own political agenda. Many of them fight the government and are known as rebels, 
insurgents, separatist groups, guerrillas, freedom fighters, and/or terrorists.
102
  
 
In acknowledging the presence of non-State actors in international relations, the 
question arises of who decides who should enjoy access to small arms.
103
 In the 
current international system, governments are probably still the easiest possible 
answer although the answer is open for further debate.
104
    
  
This thesis recognizes the role of civil society in campaigning for international arms 
trade control, particularly the role played by non-governmental organizations such as 
the ICRC, the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), and the 
Human Rights Watch, in developing and promoting norms relating to the regulation 
of small arms. The NGOs have been sources of norm development emphasizing 
                                               
99 Ibid, at 59-60.  
100 John King Gamble and Charlotte Ku ―International Law-New Actors and New Technologies: 
Center Stage for NGOs?‖ in Charlotte Ku and Paul F Diehl International Law: Classic and 
Contemporary Readings (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2003) at 505-507. 
101 Ibid, at 506. 
102
 Siemon T Wezeman and Mark Bromley ―International Arms Transfer‖ in SIPRI Yearbook 2005 
(Oxford, 2005) at 452. SIPRI Yearbook 2005 put the term non-state actor and rebel group in the same 
category by having them written by slash (non-state actor/rebel group).  
103 Damien Rogers Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control: Theory, Politics, Security (Hants, 
Ashgate, 2009) at 254. 
104 Ibid.   
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concerns about the effects of small arms.
105
  Some scholars acknowledge the 
emergence of a civil society that plays a supporting a role in efforts to find a small 
arms control mechanism.
106
 Following this line of thinking, the thesis views the 
increasing involvement of the NGOs in international efforts is by support, applying 
pressure, conducting research, and presenting recommendations for policy makers in 
designing policies on small arms issues. A multilateral process, in which small arms 
are discussed, rather than in a more exclusive secretive bilateral process, gives more 
room for the NGOs to be involved.  
 
4. Genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity 
 
This thesis will frequently use the terms genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity. The wide availability of small arms creates the potential for their use in 
armed conflicts that may include in commission of ―genocide,‖ ―war crimes,‖ and 
―crimes against humanity‖. For this reason, the thesis needs to clarify these terms. 
 
For ―genocide‖, the thesis adopts the definition provided by the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948):  
 
[A]ny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or 
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious groups, as such: (a) Killing 
members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of 
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) 
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly 
transferring children of the group to another group.
107
 
 
 
 
For ―war crimes‖, the thesis uses the definition provided by article 8 of the ICC 
which is grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 that include 
wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, and other serious violations of the laws 
                                               
105 Muggah Robert ―Moving Forward? Assessing Normative and Legal Progress in Dealing with Small 
Arms‖ in  Thomas J Biersteker and others (eds) International Law and International Relations: 
Bridging Theories and Practices (New York, Routledge, 2007) at 27. 
106 Damien Rogers Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control: Theory, Politics, Security (Hants, 
Ashgate, 2009) at 4. 
107 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), UNGA res 263 A 
(III), art 2. 
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and customs applicable in both international and non-international armed conflict. 
Article 8 of the ICC has an extensive list of what it means by war crimes when 
―committed as part of a plan or policy or as a large-scale commission of such 
crimes‖.108      
 
For ―crimes against humanity‖, the thesis uses the definition of the ICC: 
 
[A]ny of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against civilian population, with knowledge of 
the attack:  
(a) Murder; 
(b) Extermination; 
(c) Enslavement; 
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; 
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in 
violation of fundamental rules of international law; 
(f) Torture;  
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of 
comparable gravity; 
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, 
racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 
3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under 
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph 
or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; 
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons; 
(j) The crime of apartheid; 
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great 
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
109
    
 
The definitions of  genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity are used in the 
thesis to clarify when in later discussion those terms appear in relation to the use of 
small arms. 
 
 
5. Arms control  
 
Arms control refers to action to change the total amount of armament; to reduce or 
increase the number of weapons. By the 1960s, as the emphasis moved towards the 
reduction of nuclear weapons, the meaning of arms control in the context of 
                                               
108 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), 218 UNTS 90, art 8 (1,2,3); see 
discussion on war crimes in Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck Customary 
International Humanitarian Law (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005) vol I, at 568.  
109 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), 218 UNTS 90, art 7. 
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deterrence changed to ―the reduction of the chance of war, particularly nuclear war; 
reduce damage in case war did occur and reduce the cost of defence‖.110 A realization 
of an arms control could mean States increasing their armaments to reduce the chance 
of war.
111
 Arms control, therefore, could mean the increase, not the decrease, of 
armament. Arms control is also defined as a State action in a process to ―enhance 
security by cooperation with other States‖.112  Some scholars define ―arms control‖ as 
an agreement among States to regulate some aspect of their military capability which 
includes the location, amount, readiness, types of military forces, weapons, and 
facilities.
113
 In short, the term arms control is to ―denote internationally agreed rules 
limiting the arms competition rather than reversing it‖.114 That implies that arms 
control may not mean to reduce arms.  
 
 
6. Conventional arms 
 
In practical terms, conventional arms are differentiated from weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) by the inherent nature of these weapons. Basically, any weapon 
which does not fall into WMD is then a conventional weapon. Currently, recognized 
WMDs are biological, chemical and nuclear weapons, thus other weapons fall into 
the conventional weapons category.
115
 Generically, conventional weapons range from 
the old era sword, cross-bow, grenade, pistol and rifle up to an attacking helicopter, 
                                               
110 Guido Den Dekker The Law of Arms Control: International Supervision and Enforcement (Leiden, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001) at 24. 
111 Gregory J Rattray ―Introduction‖ in Jeffrey A Larsen & Gregory J Rattray (eds) Arms Control: 
Toward the 21st Century (Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996) at 8. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Jeffrey A Larsen ―An Introduction to Arms Control‖ in Jeffrey A Larsen  (ed) Arms Control: 
Cooperative Security in a Changing Environment (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002) at 8. 
114 Jozef Goldblat Arms Control Agreements: A Handbook (Praeger Publishers, 1982). 
115 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on Their Destruction (1993), 1974 UNTS 45, provides in details the definitions of 
chemical weapons, toxic chemicals and precursor (Article II). However, the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968), 729 UNTS 161, does not provide a definition of nuclear 
weapon. Likewise, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling 
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (1972), 1015 UNTS 163, 
has no definition provision but article 1 demands each State party to undertake never to develop, 
produce, or stockpile: ―Microbiological or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or 
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective 
or other peaceful uses; Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins 
for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.‖  
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warship, or missile. The subject of the discussion in the thesis, small arms, falls into 
the category of conventional weapons.  
 
Conventional weapons have been the subject of arms control efforts since the early 
history of war. In the Cold War era, attention on arms control focused on WMD 
disarmament, particularly nuclear, for the obvious reason that the world could not 
afford to have a nuclear war as a nuclear war would assure mutual destruction. 
However, even during the Cold War, based on humanitarian concerns, States 
successfully managed to adopt the 1980 CCWC. The importance of the adoption of 
the CCWC was that it demonstrated that even in the middle of sharp ideological 
confrontation, the international community could unite to ban and control certain 
weapons based on humanity and humanitarian concerns as they recalled ―the general 
principle of the protection of the civilian population against the effects of 
hostilities‖.116 
 
Internationally, the world has managed to have legally binding treaties on WMD to 
control and regulate biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.
117
  It was after the 
end of the Cold War that the world paid more attention to the danger and impact of 
uncontrolled conventional arms, small arms in particular. A series of negotiations 
have been organized, although resulting in non-legal documents only. The end of the 
Cold War proves that the complexities of States‘ interests, although they are less on 
an ideological basis, remain strong, as reflected in the negotiations on arms control. 
Nevertheless, the world has witnessed the successful adoption by the majority of 
States of the legally binding 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their 
Destruction; and the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions. 
 
                                               
116 Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which 
May Be Deemed Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (concluded 10 October 1980, 
entered into force 2 December 1983), preamble para 2.  
117 They are the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (1972), 1015 UNTS 163; 
the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on Their Destruction (1993), 1974 UNTS 45; and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (1968), 729 UNTS 161. 
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The non-legal instruments arguably remain important to promote transparency and 
create confidence building measures. Non-legal instruments, including the General 
Assembly resolutions, are significant in establishing norms and initiating agenda 
setting, particularly in multilateral processes. 
 
 
7. IHL and IHRL 
 
The thesis frequently uses the terms IHL and IHRL in the discussion, particularly in 
demonstrating the influence of IHL and IHRL in the adoption of an arms control 
treaty, so clarity about those terms is needed. While the international humanitarian 
law and human rights law have different characters, both are concerned with the 
protection of people against abuses.
118
 Definitions on the difference of the terms can 
be based on who has the rights and duties or when the abuses take place.   
 
Some commentators, for instance McCoubrey suggests international humanitarian 
law as the branch of laws of armed conflict:  
 
Concerned with the protection of the victims of armed conflict, meaning 
those rendered hors de combat by injury, sickness or capture, and also 
civilians. It is founded upon the ideas that the legitimate scope of military 
action is not unlimited and that those who are or have been rendered non-
combatant are entitled to impartial humanitarian concern and that both they 
and those charged with their care and welfare in the rendering of 
humanitarian aid are not legitimate targets in hostilities.
119
  
 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) defines international 
humanitarian law, the definition which the thesis uses, as ―a set of rules which seek, 
for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict‖.120 The ICRC 
                                               
118 Saladin Meckled-Garcia and Basak Cali ―Lost in Translation:The Human Rights Ideal and 
International Human Rights Law‖ in  Saladin Meckled-Garcia and Basak Cali (eds) The Legalization 
of Human Rights: Multidisciplinary Perspective on Human Rights and Human Rights Law (New York, 
Routledge, 2006) at 15. 
119 Hilaire McCoubrey International Humanitarian Law (Dartmouth Publishing, 1990) at 1; Louis 
Henkin and others International Law: Cases and Material (3rd ed, West Publishing, 1993) at 1025.   
120 ―ICRC Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law‖ (2004) ICRC 
<www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/humanitarian-law-factsheet/$File/What_is_IHL.pdf>. 
Last accessed on 8 July 2011. 
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differentiates the terms of IHL and IHRL, stating that ―humanitarian law applies in 
situation of armed conflict, whereas human rights, or at least some of them, protect 
the individual at all times, in war and peace alike‖.121 The ICRC further explains that 
some human rights treaties may permit governments to derogate in state of 
emergency but no derogations are permitted under IHL.
122
 Another scholar, Yihdego, 
defines IHL as ―deal[ing] with the rules and customs of war and constitut[ing] a part 
of international customary law.‖123  
 
 
C. Research Methodology 
 
The methodology used in this research is to gather and examine information from 
primary sources i.e. conventions, protocols, the United Nations resolutions, as well as 
secondary sources such as publications, books, reports, journals, and websites. There 
are on-going developments in  events relating to the issue of small arms in the United 
Nations as there have been series of preparatory meetings in 2010 and 2011 before a 
scheduled diplomatic conference on arms trade treaty in 2012. The thesis examines 
the primary sources of the process to adopt an arms trade treaty up to July 2012, 
before the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty in April 2013.  
   
The information collected was critically reviewed, analysed and organized logically 
for the writing of the thesis. The argument in the thesis is developed by using 
deductive research, which is testing or extending existing theory. The thesis expands 
the argument that IHL and IHRL influence international law by showing that IHL and 
IHRL also greatly influence the negotiation process on small arms. 
 
                                               
121 ―What is the difference between humanitarian and human rights law‖ (2004) ICRC  
<http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/5kzmuy.htm>. Last accessed on 9 August 2011.  
122 Ibid; see also, Louise Doswald-Beck and Sylvain Vite ―Origin and Nature of Human Rights Law 
and Humanitarian Law‖ in Judith Gardam (ed) Humanitarian Law (Hants, Ashgate, 1999) at 100. 
There is no concept of derogation in humanitarian law because it is made precisely for the situations of 
emergency and war. 
123 Zeray Yihdego The Arms Trade and International Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007) at 195. See 
also Chris af Jochnick and Roger Normand ―The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the 
Laws of War‖ (1994) 35(1) Harv Int‘l L J 49 at 52, referring to humanitarian law as Geneva laws, 
―which protect specific classes of war victims‖. 
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1. Theoretical approach: Arms control is increasingly influenced by IHL and 
IHRL  
 
 
The research of this thesis examines whether the concept of humanization of 
international law also applies specifically in international efforts to find a restriction 
on small arms trade. In critically examining the issue, the thesis employs a theoretical 
approach in international law to help to structurally understand the international effort 
to control the small arms trade.  The approach employed is the basic argument that 
over the years there has been a trend toward the humanization of the law of war. As 
the thesis demonstrates in the following chapters, IHL and IHRL have increasingly 
influenced the conventional arms control process, including small arms. There is a 
trend to respect the principles of humanity, including respect for human rights. IHL 
and IHRL have become quoted more often in the negotiation of arms control and 
grown into strong rationales.  
 
Significant contributions in explaining the influence of human rights and 
humanitarian law on general international law have been published by several 
scholars. One of them, Theodor Meron, argues that under the influence of human 
rights ―the law of war has been changing and acquiring a more humane face; the 
fostering of accountability; the formation, formulation and interpretation of rules.‖124 
Meron points out that the term ―humanitarian law‖ has increasingly replaced the ―law 
of war‖ or the ―law of armed conflict‖ as the result of increasing influence of the 
human rights movement.
125
  
 
Human rights law, as Meron notes, has a ―major influence on the formation of 
customary rules of humanitarian law‖.126  This argument is supported by Henkin 
                                               
124 Theodor Meron The Humanization of International Law (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,  
2006) at 1.  
125 Ibid; see also the discussion of the relationship between human rights and humanitarian law in L C 
Green ―Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law and Threats to National Sovereignty‖ (2003) 
8 J Conflict & Sec L 101; Kenneth Watkin ―Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights 
Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict‖ (2004) 98 Am J Int‘l L 1 at 2.      
126 Ibid, at 3; see also, Louis Henkin The Age of Rights (New York, Columbia University Press, 1990) 
at 16; Marko Milanovic ―A Norm Conflict Perspective on the Relationship between International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law‖ (2010) 14 J Conf & Sec L 459 at 459.  
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stating that human rights influence international law.
127
 Henkin refers to this 
influence as the humanisation of international law as a result of 
internationalisation.
128
 He argues that internationalisation has brought agreement, at 
least in political-legal principle and in rhetoric, that human rights are subject to 
international concern, and thus have become subject to diplomacy, international 
institutions, and international law.
129
   
 
International law, in facing the challenges of armed conflicts, is responding with 
considerations for human situations. Consideration of humanity is present in 
contemporary international law, which, with recognition of human rights, can play a 
role in curbing the arms trade.
130
 It hints that international law has undergone a 
development of its humanization.
131
   
 
Linking the development of international law to the main concern of the thesis, 
namely small arms, the research is discussing not specific rights given by treaties, but 
rather a general growth in ethical awareness that seeks to restrain the violence, 
especially towards civilians, helped by easy access to small arms, and how 
international law may support this.    
 
In describing the increasing humanization of international law, it has been 
acknowledged that the greatest impetus comes from international human rights 
instruments and the creation of international processes of accountability.
132
 The norm 
established requires the law of war to focus not only on the State interests but also the 
component of human being‘s protection.133 It suggests a shift of attention from the 
                                               
127 Louis Henkin The Age of Rights (New York, Columbia University Press, 1990) at 16-17. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid; see also, Kenneth Watkin ―Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in 
Contemporary Armed Conflict‖ (2004) 98 Am J Int‘l L 1 at 2, 9-10. 
130 Antonio Augusto Cancado Trindade International Law for Humankind: Towards a New Jus 
Gentium (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010) at 399. 
131 Ibid, at 635. 
132
 Theodor Meron The Humanization of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 
2006) at 5; see, Antonio Augusto Cancado Trindade International Law for Humankind: Towards a 
New Jus Gentium (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010) at 635. 
133 Theodor Meron The Humanization of International Law (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2006) at 5; Commision on Human Security Human Security Now (New York, Commission on Human 
Security, 2003) at 4.  
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security of State to the security of the people.
134
 The report of the Human Security 
Commission supports the notion that all parties in armed conflict should equally 
protect human rights and uphold humanitarian law.
135
   
  
Furthermore, in the humanization of the State responsibility, there is a shift from 
bilateralism to multilateralism.
136
 This change also helps explain the growing 
involvement of civil society in the discussion of international arms control treaties.
137
 
Multilateralism implies that more States with various interests are involved in 
negotiations.  Consequent to the growing norm, a specific link between IHL, IHRL 
and arms transfer has been advocated by some scholars. Arms sale to a State, 
recognized to abuse human rights of its citizens and being in a state of civil war, has 
been questioned, as it may violate international law.
138
  Based on the arguments 
above, this thesis analyses the influence of IHL and IHRL in the context of arms 
control to see how and to what extent this is reflected in the texts of arms control 
treaties. 
 
 
2. Structure  
 
The thesis will be organised in eight chapters which are described in the following 
sections.  
 
Chapter I: Overview of the small arms issue. This introductory chapter explains 
important definitions frequently used in the research, among other things, small arms 
and light weapons; civilian or non-combatant; non-State actor; conventional arms; 
                                               
134 Ibid, at 4. It argues that: ―The State remains the fundamental purveyor of security. Yet it often fails 
to fulfill its security obligations – and at times has become a source of threat to its people. That is why 
attention must now shift from the security of State to security of the people.‖   
135 Commission on Human Security Human Security Now (New York, Commission on Human 
Security, 2003) at 28. 
136 Theodor Meron The Humanization of International Law (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2006) at 247.  
137 Ibid, at 247-281.  
138 Stephanie L Kotecki ―The Human Rights Costs of China‘s Arms Sales to Sudan: A Violation of 
International Law on Two Fronts‖ (2008) 17 Pac Rim L & Pol‘y J 209 at 222. 
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human security; and arms control and disarmament.  This chapter also describes the 
importance of the topic, the methods, and approaches employed in the thesis. 
 
Chapter II: Small Arms, Human Security, and Armed Conflict. The chapter describes 
the impact on human lives of the excessive availability of small arms, particularly the 
impact on civilians. Small arms are weapons of first choice in armed conflicts either 
intra-State or inter-State. An intra-State conflict with asymmetric methods of war 
favours the employment of small arms for their portability and light weight. This part 
explains why the easy access to small arms promotes and prolongs conflicts. Hence, 
conflict, and its relation to the availability of small arms is discussed.  
 
Most parts of the world have been affected, to various extents, by the free 
proliferation and wide availability of small arms. This chapter shows the 
humanitarian impact of the wide availability of small arms on people‘s lives in 
various countries to illustrate that the problem caused by small arms is indeed a 
global issue. The particular impact of small arms from the human security perspective 
is analysed, such as the role of the weapons in forced displacement, as well as small 
arms relationship with crime, public health and development.   
 
Chapter III: Arms Control and Humanitarian Law. The thesis examines the rationale 
for the adoption of the existing conventional arms treaties from the St Petersburg 
Declaration (1868) which bans the use of the explosive projectile and establishes the 
principle and  norm; the Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907);
139
 the Convention on 
the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which 
May be Deemed Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Certain 
Conventional Weapons Convention or CCWC, 1980);
140
 to the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions (2008).
141
 The thesis then argues that humanitarian concern as 
shown in some of the treaties is one important rationale in banning and regulating 
                                               
139 Hague Convention IV with three Declarations (1899), reprinted in (1907) 1 Am J Int‘l  L Supp 153; 
Hague Convention IV respecting the Laws and Customs of war on Land (1907), printed in (1908) 2 
Am J Int‘l L 90.  
140 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (1980), 1342 UNTS 137. 
141 Conventions on Cluster Munitions (2008), MTDSG Chap XXVI(6); CCM/77. 
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certain weapons. However, the humanitarian rationale alone, perhaps, is not sufficient 
to encourage States to find a legal instrument to control the trade of small arms.    
 
Chapter IV: State Responsibility and its Association with Small Arms. In an 
interdependent world, a State has a responsibility to act in accordance with norms 
embraced by the international community of States. This chapter evaluates the State 
responsibility by scrutinizing related documents, including the emerging 
responsibility to protect (RtoP) and International Law Commission‘s (ILC) Articles 
on State responsibility, to identify a link between the RtoP, ILC‘s Articles and small 
arms. All the discussion on concepts and norms in both humanitarian and human 
rights law is seen with the view to finding a way to control small arms.  
 
Chapter V: International Efforts in Restricting the Uncontrolled Circulation of Small 
Arms. The chapter discusses the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the control of 
small arms in existing international instruments, both legally and politically binding 
instruments. The particular documents discussed are the 2001 UNPoA,
142
 the 2005 
United Nations International Tracing Instruments,
143
 and the United Nations Security 
Council resolutions on arms embargoes. Limitations of each instrument are analysed 
to describe why the world is still not able to control the proliferation of small arms.    
 
Chapter VI: Regional Response to Small Arms: The regional mechanisms are 
analysed in order to discover a comprehensive view of the efforts of the international 
community to regulate small arms. The thesis examines how the small arms issue is 
tackled regionally. Some regional mechanisms are more advanced than others, such 
as the established mechanisms in Europe or newly adopted mechanisms in Africa and 
South America. In discussion, the research reveals the different approaches regional 
organizations take in responding to the issue.           
 
Chapter VII: Challenges and Opportunities in Establishing a Legally Binding 
Instrument to Regulate Small Arms. This chapter investigates the challenges and 
                                               
142 United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illcit Trade in Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (2001) (UNPoA),UN Doc A/CONF.192/15. 
143 International Tracing Instrument (2005), UNGA Decision 60/519 of 8 December 2005. 
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opportunities of the current international efforts to adopt the Arms Trade Treaty, 
focusing on how the IHL and IHRL increasingly influence the arms control process. 
It observes the discussion in the United Nations from both political and legal 
perspectives and explores the likely future of international legal instruments dealing 
with the small arms trade. It discusses the balance between rights and responsibility 
vis-a-vis small arms.  The right to self-defence, enshrined in article 51 of the Charter 
of the United Nations, implies that the right to acquire weapons for self-defence is a 
legitimate right for a sovereign State under international law. On the other hand, it 
has to be noted that a State has a responsibility to protect and respect the rights of its 
population.
144
 
 
The chapter analyses elements of a prospective mechanism to control the arms trade 
that is being discussed in the United Nations. The central challenge is how to have an 
international legal mechanism which is effective enough to tackle the problem, 
concurrently, well accepted by States.  The behaviour of exporting and importing 
countries is analysed. The position of the Security Council five permanent members 
(P5), in particular, is examined which may reflect the prospect of having a legal 
instrument to control the small arms trade.  
 
Chapter VIII: Conclusion. As the last chapter, the conclusion is drawn based on the 
analysis and findings in the previous chapters. The conclusion is a restatement of 
research and the questions. The thesis conclusion shows to what extent IHL and 
IHRL influence the efforts to control small arms; and how the contemporary 
principles of State responsibility demand that States regulate the small arms trade.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
144 Individual State‘s commitment to the responsibility to protect was adopted in an Outcome 
Document of 2005 World Summit of the United Nations General Assembly. Some of the United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions also recognize of individual State‘s responsibility to protect.  
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Chapter II: 
Small Arms, Human Security and Armed Conflict 
 
 
A. Introduction  
 
This chapter describes the multifaceted impacts of small arms
145
 on human lives. It 
starts by assessing the enhanced military technology in the weapons which decide the 
fate of a war and bring more deaths. The chapter continues to identify the link 
between violence, armed conflicts, human rights violations, and small arms to 
highlight the impact of small arms from the perspective of human security. The 
linkage between small arms and human security is to demonstrate the statement that 
the wide availability of small arms needs to be strictly controlled because of their 
potential impact on human security. Although small arms can be fundamental in 
situations of self-defence, the impact of their use can also result in human rights 
violations; this may justify the trend towards a greater influence of human rights 
considerations in arms control negotiations.    
      
Small arms are continuously designed to improve their lethality and performance. 
The newest small arms kill more effectively. The search for more effective weapons 
continues as industrialized countries are involved in intense competition to achieve 
military technology improvement and devote enormous amounts of funding to 
military research projects.
146
 The advanced weapon technology raises a central issue 
with regard to small arms; the advanced capability of military weaponry means more 
efficiency in causing death, or, simply more deaths. Whilst these weapons are meant 
to target at opposing combatants, if they are wrongfully used against civilians they 
may be contrary to the efforts to protect civilians as is stated goal of humanitarian 
laws.
147
  
 
 
 
                                               
145 References throughout the thesis to ―small arms‖ include light weapons as well, unless noted 
otherwise as defined in Chapter I. 
146 Jack M Beard ―Law and War in Virtual Era‖ (2009) 103 Am J Int‘l L 409 at 411. 
147 Ibid, at 409.  
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B. Small Arms and Human Security 
1. Small arms development   
 
All small arms began with the invention of gunpowder. Gunpowder was initially 
invented in China and introduced into Europe in the thirteenth century.
148
  
Gunpowder was used for limited military purposes as early as the tenth century, 
before cannons were invented.
149
 This invention raised the idea of having portable 
handheld small cannon which became known as firearms. The first written reference 
found was from the town of Perugia, Italy, which in 1364, ordered 500 bombards 
which were to be portable and fired from the hand.
150
 These handheld portable 
cannons were later claimed as the early form of pistol. The cannon and small arms are 
the same in mechanical principle, the weapon must be charged with propellant and 
projectile, it must be directed towards the target, and it must be discharged by igniting 
the propellant charge.
151
 All advances in small arms have been derived from attempts 
to make this process rapid, effective and efficient.
152
  
 
The efficiency of firearms has improved over the years through continuous research 
in military technology. More than ever, military technology has a propensity to 
decide the fate of a war. Not long after the introduction of gunpowder in Europe at 
the end of the 1400s, Europeans started to make firearms in great quantity and variety 
as they produced a range from enormous cannons to handheld arquebuses.
153
  In 
1364, small arms in the form of the hand gun were introduced and improved, and 
towards the end of the fifteenth century had become the first true infantry firearm.
154
 
Gunpowder became a reliable ammunition and was specifically used in the fifteenth 
                                               
148 Kenneth Chase Firearms: A Global History to 1700 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2003) at 31. Chase argues that it was also Chinese who invented the firearms and the European who 
perfected them. 
149 Ibid.   
150 WY Carman A History of Firearms; From Earliest Times to 1914 (London, Routledge and Kegan 
Ltd, 1963). Carman explains that the weapons are most likely to have been mounted on wooden 
supports or shaft. The specimens preserved in Berne and Prague had yet another improvement—the 
gun was made with a hollow section at the touch-end so that the wooden stock could actually fit into 
the metalwork.  
151 James H Willbanks Machine Guns: An Illustrated History of Their Impact (Santa Barbara, 
California, Abc-clio, 2004) at 5. 
152 Ibid.  
153 Max Boot War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History (New York, Gotham 
books, 2006) at 22. 
154 JFC Fuller Armament and History: The Influence of Armament on History from the Dawn of 
Classical Warfare to the End of the Second World War (New York, De Capo Press, 1998) at 85-86. 
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century as demonstrated by Charles VIII of France when he and his army, in the fall 
of 1494, with the help of better artillery, successfully invaded Italy.
155
   
 
By the end of the fifteenth century, the rifle had been invented.
156
 In the eighteenth 
century, rifles were used by military personnel in wars. States by then needed to 
produce weapons on large scale and started building arsenals. The first State-
sponsored arsenal was built in the 1600s, 154 miles south of Moscow, by the order 
Tsar Boris Godunov at Tula.
157
  
 
The main objective of firearm development has consistently been military 
effectiveness in reliability, speed and accuracy of firing. Research was conducted to 
achieve the objective by improving firearm performance overall. The major 
developments and refinement of small arms took place in Europe. The matchlock 
mosquetes (muskets) fielded by Spanish infantry were introduced first in France and 
then England.
158
  One of the earliest forms of this weapon, known as the wheel lock, 
was invented in Germany around 1517.159 The development continued in Europe as 
the next major improvement came from Spain. In the beginning of seventeenth 
century, the Spanish developed the miquelet (or Spanish lock), which combined the 
simplicity of matchlock with the spark ignition of the wheel lock.160 Around the same 
period, the Dutch developed a similar design known as snaphance.161 
 
The early firearms were not easy to use. In Italy in the sixteenth century, to use the 
wheel lock pistol was a challenge, apart from difficulty in loading, this handgun 
                                               
155 Max Boot War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History (New York, Gotham 
Books, 2006) at 4-25. The French modern enhanced artillery breached the castle and fortress wall in 
only hours, something had not known to Italians before. 
156 WY Carman A History of Firearms; From Earliest Times to 1914 (London, Routledge and Kegan 
Ltd, 1963). A Zurich inventory of 1544 lists a rifled gun. The Viennese collection of weapons has 
several dated between 1550 and 1560 and rifles dated 1616 in Paris museum. 
157 Joe Poyer Kalashnikov Rifles and Their Variations (3rd ed, California, North Cafe Publications, 
2009) at 1. In 1712 Tsar Peter the Great turned the then small village of Tula into a complex of the first 
State-owned arsenals. By 1810, by order of Tsar Alexander I, the other great arsenal was established at 
Izhevsk.    
158 James H Willbanks Machine Guns: An Illustrated History of Their Impact (Santa Barbara, 
California, Abc-clio, 2004) 10-19. 
159 Ibid.  
160 Ibid.  
161 Ibid. 
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weighed 1.02 kg and was 394 mm long.
162
 The next improvement was marked by the 
invention of a scent-bottle lock in Scotland around 1800, which enabled the weapon 
to fire instantly without the normal delay between the firing of the priming charge 
and the main charge.
163
 The invention of a new type of bullet by a French army 
officer in 1849 led to widespread adoption of the rifled musket.
164
   
 
The advance in technology, the designs, and techniques that began with the early 
cannons and resulted in the modern infantry rifles provided the foundation of the 
development of the automatic weapons or machine guns to follow.
165
 In 1718, the 
first portable weapon was introduced; called ―defence‖ it could discharge many 
bullets and be quickly reloaded.
166
 The first patent using the term ―machine gun‖ was 
issued in the United States in 1829 which was followed by the invention of a rapid 
fire weapon in 1871 which fired 300 or 400 rounds per minute.
167
 
 
In the early use of the newly invented weapons, trained soldiers were required to load 
ammunition into the firearms known as muskets. It was a case of one shot then 
reload, hence there was no continuous shooting from a musket. By 1692, the 
Europeans had invented fixed cartridges and rifled pistols which enabled soldiers to 
fire and reload rapidly.
168
 Firearms became important tools of warfare by the 
twentieth century and firearms were widely used by soldiers as primary weapons in 
World Wars I and II, which together with other improved weapons, contributed to the 
unprecedented number of human casualties.  
 
The commencement of modern small arms era was in second part of the nineteenth 
century, recognized by the development of a robust metallic cartridge which enabled 
                                               
162 Chris McNabb The Great Book of Guns: An Illustrated History of  Military, Sporting, and Antique 
Firearms (Thunder Bay Press, 2004) at 16. 
163 James H Willbanks Machine Guns: An Illustrated History of Their Impact (Santa Barbara, 
California, Abc-clio, 2004) at 10-19. 
164 Ibid. 
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 Ibid, at 19. 
166 John Ellis The Social History of the Machine Gun (The John Hopkins University Press, 1986) at 13. 
167 James H Willbanks Machine Guns: An Illustrated History of Their Impact (Santa Barbara, 
California, Abc-clio, 2004) at 30-40. 
168 JFC Fuller Armament and History: The Influence of Armament on History from the Dawn of 
Classical Warfare to the End of the Second World War (De Capo Press, 1998) at 86. 
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a fast firing weapon and high velocity of ammunition.
169
 The basics of modern small 
arms had been established by the end of the century, and by the end of World War I 
in 1918 the technological revolution was complete.
170
 Since then, small arms and 
their ammunition have been the subject of gradual refinement with very few new 
operating principles.
171
  
 
Although small arms era began in mid-nineteenth century, it became firmly 
established in 1911 as the year in which the semi-automatic pistol was finalized and 
the United States Army adopted the new pistol.
172
   The modern era of modern small 
arms can be traced from the time of their increasingly common use as primary 
weaponry in warfare. The industrial revolution greatly accelerated the development of 
small arms, leading to more effective and efficient weaponry.
173
 
 
The invention of gunpowder, and subsequently guns, changed the history of the 
world. It significantly changed the way people fight a war in terms of military tactics, 
and increased the human casualties of war. The invention of gunpowder paved the 
way to the development of more advanced weapons such as bombs, explosives, 
cannons, grenades, and small arms, which in some instances led to new expression of 
brutality and a horrendous scale of killings in armed conflicts.  
 
Max Boot describes the enhanced effectiveness of firearms in 1915 compared to a 
century previously: 
  
A Napoleonic battalion in 1815 armed with 1,000 flintlock muskets could 
fire 2,000 rounds a minute to a range of one hundred yards. A century later, 
a battalion armed with 1,000 magazine rifles and four machine guns could 
fire 21,000 rounds a minute to a range of 1,000 yards. This meant that, in a 
bayonet assault, a comparable unit could expect to receive two shots per 
soldier in 1815 and two hundred shots per soldier in 1915.
 174
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By the 1970s, as experienced in the War in Indochina, an assault rifle such as the AK-
47 could fire 600 rounds a minute.
175
 This means that a battalion with 1,000 AK-47s 
would be capable of firing 600,000 rounds per minute, compared to the 21,000 
rounds per minute in 1915.  
 
All types of small arms - such as pistols, rifles, and machine guns - continue to be 
improved. The machine gun made its initial appearance in the American civil war 
from 1861-65 and since then has developed rapidly.
176
 During World War I, the 
machine gun was the most important weapon, and all warring parties used it.
177
  The 
machine gun continued to be one of the most important weapons in World War II. 
Today, with the improved capability, the machine gun is universally used in military 
operations in armed conflicts. 
 
The enhanced military warfare technology results in many deaths in an armed 
conflict. For instance, there were 54,470 British casualties killed, wounded and 
missing on 1 July 1916, which was the first day of the battle of the Somme in World 
War I in France.
178
 In the battle of Somme alone, a total 1.3 million were killed and 
wounded.
179
 This demonstrated the unprecedented number of casualties that occurred 
in any single battle. Advanced weaponry, artillery, and small arms technology 
including repeating rifles and machine guns, made it possible for armies to carry out 
unprecedented destruction.
180
 As the fighting at Somme showed, the enhanced 
weaponry not only resulted in more deaths but also helped extend the scale of 
combat.
181
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After the Cold War ended in 1991, new armed conflicts began in many countries as 
ethnic-nationalism rose.
182
 The nature of armed conflict has shifted from 
predominantly international to non-international in character (also generally referred 
to as inter-State and intra-State), often involving a wide variety of actors: 
governments, rebel groups, militias and criminal organizations who use small arms as 
weapons of choice. One of the important characteristics of all conflict-related deaths 
in these intra-State armed conflicts is that a large proportion of victims are 
civilians.
183
  
 
There is a distinction in analysing inter-State conflicts and intra-State conflicts. Inter-
State conflicts involve large, organized and well-disciplined national forces which 
observe the international laws including humanitarian laws, while intra-State conflicts 
may involve small, diverse, and often ill-disciplined groups relying on small arms to 
fight their enemies with very little observation of humanitarian law.
184
    
 
Small arms are the primary weapons of choice for the parties involved in intra-State 
conflicts, mainly because they need to fight mobile wars in difficult terrain.
185
 Small 
arms are not only portable, easy to use, and deadly, but also cheap. In Southern 
Africa, where small arms are widely available, a used Kalashnikov AK-47 rifle can 
be bought for as little as US$15, the same price as a bag of maize.
186
  In conflict 
zones such as Afghanistan which are flooded with weapons, the price of a used AK-
47 is even lower, i.e. as cheap as US$10 and slightly more expensive at US$40, in 
Cambodia.
187
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As the enhanced military warfare technology results in more destruction, it inevitably 
also causes more human casualties. New heights of weaponry destructiveness were 
reached in World War II, as fatalities caused by multiple weapons amounted to fifty-
five million deaths, with more civilians being killed than in any other armed 
conflicts.
188
 While in World War II the civilian casualties were killed mainly by 
bombs, in the recent conflicts - in particular internal armed conflicts - small arms play 
a greater role in causing civilian deaths, as armed conflicts are fought primarily with 
small arms.
189
  
 
There are at least two important consequences of the improvements in technology of 
small arms. Firstly the use of small arms helps in making an armed conflict more 
violent as killing is much faster and easier with improved modern weapons. The total 
deaths in World Wars I and II demonstrate the effectiveness of weapons technology, 
including small arms. Secondly, there is a strong likelihood that small arms are used 
against civilians, particularly in the intra-State conflicts or civil wars.
190
 The armed 
conflicts in the modern era, such the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995) and 
the war in Iraq that started in 2003, showed increased intensity of violence against 
civilians. The war in Iraq, discussed below, further demonstrates the role of small 
arms in the violent death of civilians in war.         
 
A research report from the Iraq Body Count suggested that the total number of 
civilian deaths from violence in Iraq from the war starting in 2003 up to June 2011 is 
between 101,658 and 111,068.
191
 The research group suggested that a gap in the 
reporting of civilian casualties may imply that the number could be even bigger. 
When looking at the weapons used in the violence causing civilian deaths, from 
2003-2010, on average deaths per day from suicide attacks and vehicle bombs were 
9.9; while deaths per day from gunfire/executions in the same period of time were 
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22.6.
192
 This number of civilian deaths per day from gunfire is much larger, more 
than double the rate of deaths from suicide attack and vehicle bombs, reflecting the 
major role small arms play in the civilian deaths from violence. 
 
In the war in Iraq, wide availability and proliferation of small arms in the hands of 
many actors have helped to cause high civilian casualties. This uncontrolled 
proliferation is a threat to civilians. For the destruction they caused, small arms are 
actually the main concern of the developing and least developed States, greater than 
their concern about WMD.
193
   
 
 
2. Early attempts to control small arms 
 
From a historical perspective, there has been limited or no success for efforts to create 
a convention on the trade of arms. The early measures to control firearms have to do 
with chivalry as firearms enable a commoner to kill a king, which made Henry VIII 
(1491-1547) prohibit ownership of firearms to anyone with an income of less than 
100 pounds per year.
194
  The same policy to limit firearms to the nobility only was 
adopted by many countries although they were still willing to trade them 
internationally.
195
  
 
The early international measures to control the arms trade include the 1890 
Convention Relative to the Slave Trade and Importation into Africa of Firearms, 
Ammunitions, and Spirituous Liquors.
196
 As the title suggests, the purpose of the Act 
was limited to making an end to slavery, thus the arms transfer was not the main 
purpose of the Act. Another multilateral attempt at armaments limitations was 
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suggested by Russia in the 1899 Hague Conference, but did not get much support in 
the final act.
197
   
 
The following effort resulted in the adoption of the 1919 Convention for the Control 
of Trade in Arms and Ammunition,
 198
 which was intended to restrict flows of arms 
into Africa, but failed to get sufficient ratifications. Six years later, in 1925, States 
again convened to regulate the international arms trade and adopted the 1925 Geneva 
Convention for the Supervision of International Trade in Arms and Ammunition.
199
 
The Convention distinguishes five categories of arms; (a) arms exclusively designed 
and intended for land, sea and air warfare; (b) arms capable of use both for military 
and other purposes; (c) war vessels and their normal armament; (d) aircraft 
(assembled or dismantled) and aircraft engines; and (e) gunpowder, explosives and 
arms not covered by the first two categories.
200
 
 
The Convention‘s purpose was not to reduce the legitimate international arms trade, 
but rather to prevent illicit traffic.
201
 The purpose of the Convention to prevent illicit 
trade of arms, together with the five categories of arms distinction, implies that the 
regulation it tried to achieve is based more on military and security than humanitarian 
concerns.   
 
The 1925 Geneva Convention on Arms Trade, however, has never come into force. 
Many of the arms-importing countries refused to sign the Convention, mainly 
because of the imbalanced approach of the treaty which needed export licensing by 
governments, while no supervision for arms production was provided for.
202
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No attempts to control arms trade achieved their purpose for the trade continued. 
Controlling arms trade has been difficult in the past because of, inter alia, domestic 
industry, power, political influence, jobs, and tax revenue,
203
 which are still the valid 
causes of difficulties in controlling the arms trade in the present time. 
 
The contemporary attempts to control small arms proliferation in the new century 
have been boosted by the success of the Mine-Ban Convention (1997), and civil 
society has started supporting a campaign for a regulation on the small arms trade.  In 
2001, the global meeting organized by the United Nations to negotiate the issue of 
illicit trade of small arms sparked optimism that finally the world would be able to 
have a global legal mechanism to control small arms trade. That hope has not yet 
materialized. The meeting was not able to adopt a legal document and had to be 
satisfied with political agreement of the United Nations Program of Action instead. 
The case of small arms is very different from that of anti-personnel mines which are 
well accepted as cruel and indiscriminate weapons attracting a worldwide outcry to 
ban them. Small arms have different characteristics, the weapons are central tools of 
defence, and indispensable in an armed conflict, and for a country to defend itself. A 
modern war can be fought without deploying anti-personnel mines, but is highly 
unlikely without small arms. 
 
The strong resistance from countries to agreement on a strict regulation on small arms 
trade is predictable, taking into account how it is regarded as a main means of self-
defence. The complexity of the issue of small arms, is, perhaps best described by the 
words of Jan Egeland, former head of the United Nations Organization for 
Coordinating Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA): 
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We are not talking about arms which are prohibited, but ordinary weapons 
which most people agree are needed by public authorities to defend 
themselves and maintain order. It is thus not a question of mobilizing 
against an indiscriminate, particularly cruel weapon of limited military 
value, as was the case with anti-personnel landmines. We are getting into a 
much more sensitive area when it comes to the issue of small arms because 
of the way it relates to State security and national sovereignty. Nor are the 
economic stakes inconsiderable.
204 
 
 
The recent and current negotiations on small arms indeed reflect the complexity of 
the issue which includes the States‘ diverse interests in security and economics. The 
conflicting interests among States are, so far, still too wide to bridge and they bring 
too much difficulty for them to agree on how to deal with the wide availability of 
small arms. 
 
 
3. Small arms and culture of violence  
 
Violence in intra-state wars is more intense than in inter-state wars, where the 
proportion of civilian war victims is estimated at 75 per cent and even more in some 
cases.
205
 In this context, the excessive availability of small arms arguably facilitates 
the armed violence and contributes to the civilian casualties.  
 
For their natural characteristics, particularly the concealable and transferable factors, 
small arms have a large civilian market base and hence are very difficult to police 
across borders.
206
  The availability and easy-to-use factor means small arms play a 
crucial part in many areas of armed violence. The intra-State wars provide an 
environment where excessive violence and high casualties
207
 are most likely to occur, 
and are difficult and less likely than inter-State wars to end in a negotiated 
settlement.
208
  It is in the heat of violence that conflicts are worsened to the point 
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where crimes against humanity or genocides are more likely to take place. Unless 
carefully decommissioned, small arms problems will continue long after the conflict 
ends. 
  
A wide availability of weapons helps to form a culture of violence in society. In many 
parts of the world, particularly in areas of prolonged armed conflict, small arms are 
the symbol of power, position, pride and manhood.
209
 In neighbouring Pakistani and 
Afghanistan cities in the 1980s, Russian-made AK-47 rifles seemed to be owned by 
almost every male.
210
 This situation, the ―Kalashnikov culture,‖ encourages 
widespread violence, affecting and involving children.
211
 On 4 January 2002, the first 
American soldier was shot and killed in the Afghanistan‘s war by a fourteen-year old 
Afghan boy armed with an AK rifle.
212
 That boy is a perfect example of a product of 
violence in the conflict-torn Afghanistan society.  
 
This culture of violence is conditioned by Afghanistan being one of the most 
weaponised countries on Earth, with at least 10 million small arms in circulation.
213
 
As the war continues there as the thesis is being written, the weapons continue 
flowing through military importation and illegal acquisition by combatants. 
Afghanistan has been in constant conflict for a long time, and that has broken down 
law and order and the people would not know law other than law of the gun.      
 
Small arms may contribute to the reality that more than two-thirds of African 
countries have experienced violent transitions of government.
214
 This may suggest 
that the culture of violence may make a partial contribution, as this legitimizes the use 
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of weapons to resolve disputes, polarizes social relations among races, classes and 
sexes, and creates further demand for small arms.
215
  
    
As a large number of small arms in existence are illegal or unlicensed, there is no 
exact figure for the total number in current circulation. The Small Arms Survey in 
2011 estimated that around 900 million small arms were in circulation.
216
 Since the 
current world population is seven billion, this means one weapon for every eight 
people.
217
 The number of small arms is increasing as producers of small arms keep 
producing and supplying the world with these weapons, and there is no effective 
international legally binding agreement controlling small arms. Meanwhile, other 
sources suggest a slightly different figure as discrepancies cannot be avoided, because 
the trade of small arms is not transparent. 
 
There are about 1200 companies in at least 90 countries which are involved in some 
aspect of small arms production.
218
  Developed countries are still among the top 
producers of small arms and include the US, Italy, Brazil, Germany, Belgium, 
Austria, Russia, and China.
219
 The value of the global trade in small arms and their 
ammunition is estimated at more than US$7 billion per year in authorized trade 
alone,
220
  and it is more difficult to assess the value in unauthorized trade. 
   
The supply of small arms continues flowing because the demand continues. This 
demand has three dimensions: demand by the defence and security sectors, demand 
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by non-State groups, and micro-level demand by individuals.
221
The nature of 
demands by the State and non-State actors, or individuals is well portrayed in the 
following paragraph:  
 
State demand is conditioned by a number of independent variables like 
defense policies, procurement and budgetary constraints, civilian control of 
the defence sector, force structures and mobilization strategies, and historical 
precedents. On the other hand, there is also demand from non-State actors 
during ongoing conflicts. This includes arming before and during the 
outbreak of violence, sustaining stocks during cease-fires, and the use of 
weapons as a bargaining tool during the post-conflict period.
222
       
 
The supply of weapons is not only obtained by new procurement but, in many cases, 
also by obtaining recycled weapons from previous conflicts. Studies indicate that 
small arms can remain operational up to 40 years and some weapons are still usable 
even though they are over 60 years old.
223
  The case of weapons left over from war 
time in Southeast Asia is a classic example of how recycled weapons are re-utilized. 
 
While there is no authoritative figure, a vast number of small arms continue to 
circulate in several Southeast Asia countries long after open conflict has ended. 
Because of their durability, many of the small arms in current circulation came from 
the Cold War period or conflicts within that time frame. Vietnam and Cambodia 
inherited some two million firearms and 150,000 tons of ammunition after the US 
withdrawal in 1975.
224
 Among them were 800,000 M-16 rifles and 100 self-propelled 
guns.
225
   These weapons may have found their way to other armed conflicts around 
the world. Reports show that some weapons recovered in buy-back programmes in El 
Salvador had been used in Vietnam, Uganda, and Angola.
226
 Similar reports confirm 
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that AK-47s and M-16s used by combatants in Vietnam‘s war have resurfaced in 
Nicaragua 30 years later.
227
 Meanwhile, various ethnic conflicts occurring in Africa 
since the late 1980s were fed and prolonged by the inflow of cheap small arms from 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Eastern Europe.
228
 How a region responds to the threat of 
small arms is discussed in Chapter VI of the thesis.  
 
South America also inherited small arms from various armed conflicts in the Cold 
War era.  Small arms flooded Latin America during civil wars in many Central 
American countries in the 1980s. After decades of uncontrolled proliferation, up to 80 
million small arms are circulating throughout the region.
229
 According to the World 
Health Organization estimation, gunshots kill between 73,000 and 90,000 people 
each year in Latin America, while guns are the leading cause of deaths among Latin 
Americans between the ages of 15 and 44.
230
  
 
The excessive availability of small arms is not only a threat during armed conflicts 
but also after the conflicts end. This premise applies to South America, as gun 
violence in many South American countries actually increased after war ended. For 
example, El Salvador, which experienced one of Latin America‘s most violent civil 
wars from 1980 to 1992, had the highest percentage of homicides caused by firearms 
with an increase from 55 per cent in 1990-1995 to 75 per cent in 1999.
231
 Brazil is 
another country heavily affected by a culture of violence. Brazilian cities in the 1990s 
became the most violent places due to the unrestricted gun culture combined with 
organized crime and police corruption.
232
   
 
Other South America and Caribbean countries such as Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Colombia, Guatemala, and Panama experience the same humanitarian, 
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social, and economic consequences of the wide availability of small arms. Guatemala, 
for example, suffers from social problems and armed violence which hinder its 
development. The highest homicide statistic in 2006 occurred in Guatemala City, 
with 110 homicides among 100,000 inhabitants, with 85 per cent of the killings 
caused by small arms.
233
 
 
Such impacts also obstruct economic development. The Inter-American Development 
Bank (IADB) estimates that almost a quarter of Central American countries‘ annual 
GDP (14.2%) is spent addressing the increasing violence.
234
 Yet weapons continue to 
stream, mostly from the United States, into El Salvador and the rest of Central 
America.
235
  
 
 
C.  Armed Conflict and Small Arms  
1.  Armed conflict 
 
Armed conflicts have occurred and been recorded as long as human civilization. 
Humans have been waging war, as discovered in written evidence about 3000 years 
ago, whenever they have something to fight for. Armed conflicts have been fought 
with various weapons and methods of war, from spears and crossbows used by the 
knights on horses to missiles and rocket used by current combatants on fighter jets or, 
increasingly, UAVs. Parties to armed conflicts try to defeat their enemies by using the 
most deadly weapons they could have, including with what we know today as 
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) such as chemical, and biological weapons. The 
twentieth century also saw the addition of the deadly nuclear weapon to the WMD 
arsenal. However, among the weapons used in armed conflicts, small arms are the 
most common means of warfare. 
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In the history of civilization, the world has experienced many small and large scale 
armed conflicts. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) defines an armed 
conflict as: 
 
[A] contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory 
where the use of arms force between two parties, at which at least one is a 
government of a State, results in at least 25battle-related deaths.
236
 
   
This UCDP definition is State-based conflict as opposed to non-State conflict, ―in 
which none of the warring parties is a government‖.237 The definition reveals that a 
case needs to meet at least three criteria of armed conflict, the incompatibility, the 
identity or level of organization of a party, and the minimal number of deaths.
238
       
 
The UCDP divides armed conflicts into three categories based on the number of 
deaths during the year, namely; minor armed conflict, intermediate armed conflict, and 
war.
239
 Minor armed conflict causes less than ―1,000 battle-related deaths during the 
course of the conflict‖, intermediate armed conflict causes more than ―1,000 battle-
related deaths recorded during the course of the conflict, but fewer than 1,000 in any 
given year‖, and war causes ―more 1,000 battle-related deaths in any given year‖.240 
Later, this categorization has been simplified into two, namely; minor armed conflicts, 
and war.
241
        
 
Describing who is involved, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program divides conflicts 
according to the types of armed conflict:  
  
 InterState armed conflict occurs between two or more States. 
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 Internationalised internal armed conflict occurs between the government 
of a State and internal opposition groups, with intervention from other States 
in the form of troops.  
 Internal armed conflict occurs between the government of a State and 
internal opposition groups.
242
     
 
International humanitarian law, as shown by Geneva Conventions and its Protocols, 
distinguishes armed conflicts into international and non-international armed conflicts. 
The ICRC identifies the involvement of State as an important element in international 
armed conflicts that are ―opposing two or more States‖, but that it may not exist in 
non-international armed conflicts, which are ―between governmental forces and non-
governmental armed groups, or between such groups only.‖243 The type of a war, 
whether international or non-international, may not be easy to identify when the 
application comes to the wars, such as in Iraq or Afghanistan, which were 
international armed conflicts in the beginning turned into non-international at later 
stages. The ICRC does not entertain the idea of another type of armed conflict existing 
in between, as ―legally speaking, no other armed conflict exists‖ but underlines that ―a 
situation can evolve from one type of armed conflict to another‖.244  
 
The ICRC proposes the following definitions, after an analysis on the IHL treaties, 
jurisprudence, and doctrine, that: 
 
1. International armed conflicts exist whenever there is a resort to armed force 
between two or more States. 
2. Non-international armed conflicts are protracted armed confrontations 
occurring between governmental armed forces and the forces of one or more 
armed groups, or between such groups arising on the territory of a State [party 
to the Geneva Conventions]. The armed confrontations must reach a minimum 
level of intensity and the parties involved in the conflict must show a minimum 
of organisation.
245
      
 
Definition of non-international armed conflict is clarified to distinguish it from 
―situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic 
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acts of violence‖.246 This is particularly significant as governments have the 
responsibility to defend national unity and maintain law and order, by all legitimate 
means.
247
    
 
In its decision, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
has used the general term of armed conflict to refer to both international and non-
international armed conflict. The ICTY states in the Tadic case that: 
 
[An] armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force 
between States or protracted armed violence between governmental 
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a 
State.
248
     
 
The ICTY continues by stressing that international humanitarian law applies to such 
armed conflicts.
249
 The criteria for the existence of an armed conflict in the Tadic case 
have been consistently applied in subsequent jurisprudence.
250
  
 
Many of the United Nations reports and the Security Council resolutions use the generic 
term of ―armed conflict‖ to refer to either minor armed conflicts or wars.251 Some reports 
of the UN Secretary-General simply use ―conflict‖.252 In armed conflicts, both 
international and non-international, small arms are indispensable weapons for 
combatants, which bring the relevance of the discussion of armed conflict to the issue of 
small arms.       
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2. Wide availability of small arms promotes armed conflict  
 
The relationship between small arms and intra-state conflicts is an obvious one. As a 
rule, small arms are portable and therefore the rebels or parties in the conflicts are 
extremely mobile and able to shift the locale of the conflict with comparative ease.
253
  
High civilian casualties usually occur during long, violent intra-State armed conflicts, 
in which small arms are widely used. Some intra-State armed conflicts, in countries 
such as Colombia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Angola, Liberia, Sudan, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Sri Lanka and the Philippines, have not ended or 
only ended after 20 years of conflict.
254
 These long-lasting armed conflicts are ideal 
places to generate violence that becomes vicious cycles. Most people in the regions 
where the conflict occurs, watch, feel and experience violence first hand and become 
accustomed to it. Violence affects all, including children. Children living in areas of 
armed conflict grow up knowing nothing but violence,
255
 and this may create further 
vicious cycles of the culture of violence.    
 
Among armed conflicts, an armed ethnic conflict is the ultimate lethal form of mass 
violence with the highest number of casualties.
256
 An ethnic conflict and easy access 
to small arms is a deadly combination which would be likely to result in mass 
violence, particularly in developing countries. The role of small arms here is to speed 
up and cause more civilian casualties from violence. As studies suggest, the violence 
associated with the wide availability of, and easy access to, small arms predominantly 
takes place in low-income countries.
257
 The low income countries face greater risk of 
armed violence. The UNDP indicates that half of the countries with the lowest human 
development indicators are in, or emerging from, armed conflict.
258
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The unregulated aspect of the small arms trade that makes the weapons easily 
accessible is one of the primary factors in fuelling conflicts and making violence 
likely to break out.
259
 Wide availability of small arms makes it possible for militias, 
rebels, militant groups, and criminal gangs to field well-equipped combatants and 
resort to conflict rather than dialogue.
260
And conversely, widespread weapons for 
governments without respect for human rights can be used to subdue civilian 
populations. The main concern in this situation is the increase in crime, human rights 
abuses, and human suffering.
261
   
 
To deal with such problems, many parties or countries in armed conflicts are targeted 
with arms embargoes by the Security Council. However, as many reports suggest, the 
arms embargoes (as discussed in Chapter V) sanctioned by the United Nations have 
failed to stop the flow of weapons to conflict areas.
262
  The wide availability of small 
arms ensures the warring parties in conflicts always find alternative sources of 
weapons, including from the black market. Reports mention a continued violation of 
arms embargoes. For example, the arms embargo against Somalia has not stemmed 
the flow of weapons into the country, as arms are entering from Yemen and 
neighbouring Ethiopia.
263
  Other reports suggested a violation of the United Nations 
arms embargo against the Democratic Republic of Congo occurred as large quantities 
of up to 200 tons of arms from the Balkans and Eastern Europe flowed to the 
country.
264
   
 
An analysis on small arms relative to conflicts suggests that small arms inevitably 
promote conflicts as the weapons are the key ingredients in shaping the opportunity 
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structures of combatants.
265
 In other words, with weapons in hand, conflicting parties 
are encouraged to believe that they could win the war. Armed conflict is the end 
product of the combination of the opportunity to pursue interest by force, injustice, 
limited or absent rule and order, easy availability of arms, and a culture of violence.  
 
Available data indicates that most contemporary conflicts take place in the 
underdeveloped or developing parts of the world. Between 1945 and 1999, there were 
127 intra-State wars occurring in 73 States with a conservative estimate of the total 
deaths amounting to 16.2 million as a direct result of these conflicts.
266
 From 1989 to 
2008, most attacks that caused civilian deaths took place in the regions of Sub-
Saharan Africa, Central and South Asia, and Middle East and North Africa.
267
 This 
matches the picture that these regions were flooded with small arms. Looking at the 
main party responsible for civilian deaths, in 1989 it was governments who were 
responsible, but data in 2008 showed this had changed, and it was now non-State 
armed groups who were the perpetrators.
268
  
  
International humanitarian law determines to protect civilians in armed conflicts 
through international instruments. The efforts to protect civilians, however, are more 
difficult to carry out in an intra-State conflict as the parties are often less observant of 
international law. Because of this, to a certain extent, many intra-State conflicts are 
characterized by high numbers of civilian casualties, and the use of non-combatants 
as instruments and objectives of warfare.
269
  
 
There are various factors that motivate a group to become involved in an armed 
conflict. One of them is self-determination which continues to be an important 
motivation for some groups seeking control over government for autonomy, or 
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territory for secession.
270
  Studies of conflicts reveal that the causes of an intra-State 
conflict are numerous and could be either one or combinations of the following 
factors, deprivation, ideology, economic, ethnicity, religion, and poverty.
271
  These 
factors alone are not sufficient to lead a group of people into an armed conflict to 
settle their differences if they do not have the instruments to fight a war. This is 
where the easy access to small arms plays a crucial role in instigating an armed 
conflict. Generally, although there are many exceptions, the more weapons that are 
available in a society, the more likely they are to be used.
272
   
 
While States may obtain small arms from a legal international market, it is generally 
more difficult for armed non-state actors to procure the weapons through lawful 
channels. This forces the armed non-state actors to go to the black market to gain 
weapons where brokers and arms dealers can obtain and supply significant quantities 
of used military hardware at affordable prices.
273
  
 
A few years before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a chaotic 
situation in its allied Eastern Europe countries. Soldiers and army commanders sold 
their AK-47s to raise cash. For example, the East German National People‘s Army, in 
Hungary, Bulgaria, and Ukraine began selling hundreds of thousands or perhaps 
millions of weapons to the highest bidders.
274
 When the Albanian government fell in 
1993, criminals looted State arsenals and took up to a million weapons.
275
  The legal 
transfer of small arms may also contribute to the illegal market through uncontrolled 
cascading, where newly purchased weapons replacing the old models which are then 
released into the black markets.
276
  When a modern military force modernizes its 
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arms, it updates and replaces obsolete models, then its government is most likely to 
pass much of the old stock on to the global arms market at cheap prices.
277
  
 
Another problem identified is the lack of discipline and poor military/police stockpile 
management systems in certain countries. The once-legal weapons in government 
institutions may leak into the black markets and to non-state actors, or armed 
criminals. For example, in Northern Kenya, 40 per cent of 7.62x39 mm ammunition 
in the illicit market came from the Kenyan armed forces.
278
 In addition, the new 
supply of weapons sometimes involves dubious players in international arms supply 
chains, and lack of accountability of governments involved, leading to diversion of 
weapons to armed groups and illicit markets.
279
  
 
Armed conflicts may provide opportunities for acts of violence, genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity to occur. Most recorded crimes against 
humanity, including massacres in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, took place 
with armed conflicts as the backdrop. The wide availability of small arms helps in 
making the mass killings easier. An armed conflict creates a violent environment that 
may lead to a worse situation where gross human rights violations can take place. The 
wide availability, easy access, and enhanced technology of small arms, combined 
with a lack of respect for humanitarian law are the contributing factors facilitating 
human rights violations.
280
  
 
Small arms and their impact on human life are global issues. No part of the world 
escapes the impact of the flood of small arms. However, the most affected countries 
happen to be developing countries such as many countries in Africa, Asia, or Latin 
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America. The worst affected by small arms are countries in Africa such as Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, Mozambique, South Africa, Rwanda, and Uganda.
281
  
 
Even after the situation in such armed conflict zones became well known to the 
outside world, facts show that the weapons kept flowing to the African countries 
including those which were in the middle of conflict, despite the clear danger that the 
weapons might be potentially used by a regime to suppress its people. While the 
practice of sending weapons to countries in armed conflicts or countries on the brink 
of armed conflict may be seen as unacceptable, particularly from a moral point of 
view, it is not regulated by any international law. This situation highlights the 
absence of an internationally legal instrument that could prevent those transfers of 
arms to conflict zones.  
 
A classic example was when China shipped weapons to Zimbabwe in May 2008, 
showing that in transfer of arms no consideration was given to potential civilian 
casualties or human rights violation. Despite Zimbabwe‘s high record of human 
rights abuses, a Chinese cargo ship, An Yue Jiang made its way to Zimbabwe 
transporting tonnes of arms and ammunition.
282
 In response to the public protest to 
such shipment and the refusal of port workers to unload the weapons, the South 
African authorities initially let the ship dock and said that they ―could do nothing to 
stop a perfectly legal and properly documented transaction between two sovereign 
States‖.283 A similar response came from a Chinese official claiming that such trade is 
―perfectly normal‖.284 It underlines the differences between public moral perception 
on the ―wrongness‖ of transferring weapons to Zimbabwe, a country in political 
uncertainty and on verge of civil war, and on the other hand the cold reality that there 
is no international legal instrument to prevent such shipment.   
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The Cold War was one of the reasons for the flood of small arms into Latin America. 
Both the United States and the Soviet Union supplied their Latin American allies with 
large quantities of weapons through proxy arms dealers.
285
 The Soviet Union and 
their Warsaw Pact allies sent weapons to Cuba which then went to Sandinistas in 
Nicaragua, while the United States provided its Central American allies, like the 
counter-revolutionary Nicaraguan Contras, with weaponry.
286
   Due to the long life 
span of small arms, a large number of these weapons may still be in circulation. 
In Jamaica, small arms were responsible for the increase of gun-related murders 
accounting for 77 per cent of the murders in 2009.
287
 The guns, which mainly 
originated from the US, were used in 66 per cent of robberies in the same year.
288
 In 
Bogota, Colombia, one of the most violent countries in the world, 40 per cent of 
deaths due to an external cause can be attributed to small arms.
289
 Observing regions 
flooded with small arms, it is not a coincidence that regions most affected by violent 
crime and with the highest homicide rates are Southern Africa, Central America and 
South America, with homicide rates of between 25 and 35 per 100,000 people.
290
  
 
 
3. Threat of small arms post-armed conflict 
 
An armed conflict, at some point, will stop when the warring parties agree to make 
peace. After the fighting ends there will be a programme for disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR). There is a crucial process 
to ensure the DDR process is a relative success, since a failure of DDR would be 
likely to result in a new war. Small arms, the weapons of choice in most armed 
conflicts, are a target of decommissioning in a DDR programme. 
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The first step in the DDR is a disarmament process. In a post-conflict situation, 
disarmament means to disarm the non-state forces, which may be small quantitatively 
but can be the most important for domestic security.
291
   In a peace agreement, the 
parties agree on the number of weapons to be officially handed in. The number of 
weapons in the disarmament process after the peace agreement ―is best for symbolic 
disarmament designed to reassure former enemies of peaceful intentions, not for the 
sustainable removal of large quantities or proportions of lethal equipment‖.292  
Facts from post-armed conflict situations have shown that in the disarmament 
process, only a fraction of weapons are successfully collected from the estimated total 
arsenal. Disarmament in Angola in 1991-1992 collected 32,731 weapons (15%) from 
the 214,862 estimated total arsenal; Colombia in 2003-2006 collected 36 per cent; 
and Nepal in 2007 collected 11 percent.
293
 When the war ended in Mozambique, out 
of 5 to 10 million weapons, the United Nations only managed to collect 170,000 
small arms.
294
 More weapons were still in the hands of individuals or went to black 
markets and were transported to other countries. In general, disarmament outcomes in 
45 DDR programmes showed only a 14 per cent proportion collected, even though 
there were cases where weapons collected were more than the estimated total arsenal; 
for example, in Afghanistan in 2003 as much as 130 per cent was collected, and 
Solomon Islands in 2002-2004 where 164 per cent of the estimated total was 
collected.
295
  The success rate of over 100 per cent of the total number estimated 
further emphasizes the difficulties in getting correct figures of weapons in circulation 
when there is no transparent arms trade. 
There are reasons for the low total of collected weapons as the bulk of the weapons 
remain in the hands of ex-combatants. One is the cautious action of combatants in 
anticipating the resumption of armed conflict. If that happens, and they have handed 
over all their weapons, they would find themselves in a very vulnerable position. 
                                               
291 Small Arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 159. 
292
 Ibid, at 175.  
293 Ibid, at 184-185.  
294 Larry Kahaner AK-47: The Weapon That Changed the Face of War (New Jersey, John Wiley & 
Son, 2007) at 100. 
295 Small Arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 184-
185. 
68 
 
Another reason is that the combatants have little faith in the DDR programme or that 
the truce will last. This is why a DDR programme is measured not by the weapons 
collected, but by security outcomes.
296
 A DDR programme is successful if the 
security in general is considered good, although the weapons collected are only a 
fraction of the estimated number.   
 
The next steps of the DDR programme are the demobilization and reintegration of 
combatants. While the demobilization is relatively easy, the process to reintegrate ex-
combatants into society is a more tricky process. When the ex-combatants try to live 
back in society, they usually possess no civilian skills to support their life. They are at 
risk of feeling marginalized and isolated.  The reintegration process is to give ex-
combatants the skills needed to survive as civilians. The failure of integrating ex-
combatants into civilian life would easily tempt them to remain as combatants and 
unearth their small arms. This situation, combined with failed disarmament, makes 
the truce fragile. 
 
 
D. Impacts of Small Arms Excessive Availability 
1. Forced displacement  
Observing the impact of small arms from a human security perspective requires its 
assessment beyond the armed conflict situation. The excessive availability of small 
arms affects many aspects of human security ranging from human rights, through 
social cost, to economic development. This thesis takes a few examples out of many, 
of the impact of small arms contributing to forced displacement, harm to women and 
children, obstruction of development and human rights violations.    
 
Small arms play an important role in the human rights violation of forced 
displacement. Forced displacement has been exercised by parties in armed conflict to 
gain political benefit. Small arms greatly contribute to forcing people out of their 
homes at gun point, leaving their village, farms, cattle and belongings. Forced 
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displacement, to which the wide availability of small arms may contribute, is an 
important indicator of human insecurity.
297
  
 
The widespread availability of small arms combined with the lack of respect for IHL 
and IHRL have increased the duration, incidence, and the lethality of armed conflicts, 
causing rampant and widespread displacements of people.
298
 In the UNHCR report, 
more than six million Sudanese refugees/IDPs were only willing to return to their 
homes if there was real security. What they feared most was not tanks or 
sophisticated missiles but armed groups and militias armed with small arms.
299
  The 
continuing conflicts in places such as Sudan, Chad, Liberia, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, and Zimbabwe increased the number to 12.7 million internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) on the African continent in 2007.
300
 
 
Recent conflicts have resulted in an increase in IDPs and not refugees.
301
 There are 
several reasons for this. The IDPs are absorbed in a larger territory in a way that was 
the case in West African countries in 1990s; going across the border may not be safer; 
and the neighbouring countries perhaps apply less liberal asylum policies.
302
 Tanzania 
and Kenya have learned from their past experiences, that absorbing refugees means 
also absorbing some social service cost and an inflow of small arms, consequences 
which destabilize security of the regions around the camps.
303
 
 
Armed conflicts drive people who are worried about their safety away from their 
homes, lands, towns, jobs, families, properties, and villages. With lack of respect for 
humanitarian law as background in conflicts, small arms are effective weapons to 
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threaten and intimidate displaced persons during the displacement and force these 
people into refugee camps. These people may experience harassment, fatal and non-
fatal injuries, physical and psychological trauma. Many refugees and internally 
displaced persons continue to be at risk from armed threats in so-called safe areas, as 
small arms are easily available and commonly used to intimidate, assault and kill, 
even within refugee and IDP camps.
304
 Report suggests, for example, refugees in 
camps at Dadaab and Kakuma in Kenya, on the borders of Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia 
and Central Africa are subjected to armed violence on a daily basis.
305
  
 
The continued widespread availability of, and easy access to, small arms has direct 
implications for conflicts and contributes to the increasing number of refugees and 
IDPs. The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
showed that the number of IDPs and refugees under UNHCR‘s care rose by 2.5 
million in the course of one year, reaching an unprecedented figure of 27.1 million by 
the end of the reporting period.
306
  By the end of 2007, the total number of refugees 
under UNHCR responsibility had risen from 9.9 to 11.4 million and the total IDPs 
from 24.4 to 26 million.
307
   
 
The remaining small arms, combined with poor implementation of the DDR process, 
particularly the integration of ex-combatants into society, may allow conflicts to re-
ignite. Even if a new war is avoided, small arms continue to act as instruments for 
other forms of violence such as criminal activities, disruption of development 
assistance, and interference with efforts to deliver food, medicine, and supplies to 
children in dire need of relief.
308
 Refugees are often afraid to return home because 
weapons are still in the hands of former combatants, and public facilities such as 
schools do not function well.
309
 Furthermore, small arms proliferation and the 
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ICRC <www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/small-arms-paper-250506.htm>. Last accessed 
on 2 February 2011.  
305 Robert Muggah and Peter Batchelor Development Held Hostage: Assessing the Effect of Small 
Arms on Human Development (UNDP, 2002) at 31.  
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(2002) 281 at 281. 
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insecurity this causes may minimize job opportunities, resulting in increased poverty 
and hardship.310 
 
2.  Obstruction to development 
 
Excessive availability of small arms may impede development and create a burden on 
public service costs. Small arms related problems may divert much needed funds and 
hinder development or redevelopment in a post-conflict society. This is the particular 
problem faced by developing countries in post-armed conflict situations widely 
affected by a flood of small arms. The most harmful effect of the weapons is their 
impact on the vulnerable and making unstable regions weak economically.
311
 
 
The uncontrolled proliferation of small arms feeds and fuels conflicts. Armed 
conflicts and violence are predominantly concentrated in the developing and least 
developed countries, reducing and even reversing economic development. In 1998, 
armed violence cost Latin America an estimated 12 per cent of its GDP in lost human 
capital, investment and capital flight.
312
 The use of small arms in violence, and armed 
criminals has a destructive impact on economy and threatens to commercial activity. 
For instance, in South Africa in 2000/2001, violence and armed conflict forced the 
government to spend more on law and order (US$ 1,96 billion) and less on social 
services (US$ 1,56 billion).
313
    
 
Small arms are a public health problem, even when linked not to conflict but to crime, 
as they clearly fit the criteria for public health issues: they are preventable and are the 
cause of widespread death, injury and suffering.
314
 Armed violence caused by the 
widespread availability of small arms places enormous pressure on a health service as 
                                               
310 Ibid.    
311 CJ Chivers ―Small Arms, Big Problems: The Fallout of the Global Gun Trade‖ (2011) 90 Foreign 
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312 Small Arms Survey 2001: Profiling the Problem (New York, Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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Gun Violence‖ <www.iansa.org/issues/public_health.htm>. Last accessed on 15 March 2009. 
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it diverts scarce resources that should be available to serve the people. A study in the 
US reveals, that for males, the injuries caused by gunshot caused the greatest burden 
on medical costs, accounting for 52 per cent.
315
 For both males and females, firearms 
injuries cause the highest loss of productivity of all types of violent trauma.
316
 A 
study by the Small Arms Survey in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, found that the average 
medical cost of a single gunshot wound was $4,500, almost three times the cost of a 
stab wound.
317
 Gun violence extracts almost $90 million in health costs in Brazil and 
$40 million in Colombia, while productivity losses are estimated at $10 billion and $4 
billion for these countries, respectively.
318
 
  
The easy access to small arms leads not only to deaths but also non-fatal injuries 
during armed conflicts, assaults, or accidents which will be a burden to public health 
and social cost.  These weapons also often have mental health consequences for 
victims and their families. In more specific accounts, small arms cause a substantial 
burden on the health sector especially in surgery, prolonged hospitalization, and long 
term disability which is very costly.
319
 
 
3. Impact of small arms excessive availability on the vulnerable   
 
In any armed conflicts, women and children are in the most vulnerable position. They 
suffer the most either directly or indirectly as gun violence may also be associated 
with gender perceptions of masculinity.
320
 Sometimes, even refugee camps are not 
safe places for women and children.
321
  Women and children are the disproportionate 
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victims of conflicts. The presence of small arms hinders people, particularly women 
and children, in the provision of basic needs.322 Women are often forced to endure 
rape and other sexual abuse and violence, as well as abductions and forced slavery, 
including prostitution at the point of a gun, when IHL and IHRL are ignored.
323
  
 
Many armed conflicts use the services of child soldiers. Reports state that between 
3000 and 4000 children took part as combatants in the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia, a thousand other child soldiers were also involved in the Colombian 
conflict, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, and Uganda.
324
 The age of a child soldier could be 
as young as seven.
325
 A report said that in Sierra Leone during the civil war from 
1991 to 2001, as many as 80 per cent of all combatants were between seven and 
fourteen.
326
 The activities to recruit children to take part in armed conflict violate 
rules of international laws, which, inter alia, established by the Fourth Geneva 
Convention of 1949 Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War
327
 and 
international human rights instruments.
328
 
 
The important point to relate small arms and child soldiers is the fact that small arms 
are very easy to operate. This encourages war lords or parties in armed conflicts to 
recruit children and train them to be soldiers. In the civil war in Liberia between 1989 
and 1992, Charles Taylor recruited a large number of child soldiers for his rebel 
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Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005) at 216-223. 
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2007) at 88. 
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forces.
329
 Charles Taylor‘s child soldiers under 18 were among an estimated 300,000 
child soldiers involved in later conflicts.
330
 
 
The familiarity of child soldiers with the weapons was described by a former child 
soldier in Northern Uganda as he told how he learnt to live on the run and use 
weapons: ―I especially knew how to use an AK-47 twelve-inch, which I could 
dismantle in less than one minute. When I turned 12 they gave me an RPG, because I 
had proved myself in battle.‖331  
 
In the period 1995-2005, about two million children were killed by conflict, 12 
million were made homeless, six million injured or disabled, and at least 300,000 at 
any given time were actively involved in armed conflict.
332
  
 
The child soldier problem is most critical in Africa, where children as young as nine 
have been involved in armed conflicts.
333
 The use of child soldiers, however, is not 
unique to Africa. Children are also used as soldiers in various Asian countries and in 
parts of Latin America, Europe and the Middle East.
334
 Most of the time, children are 
recruited not to play non-combat roles, but to become soldiers. In addition, they are 
also used as spies, messengers, porters, servants, or to lay or clear anti-personnel 
mines, and of those children, girls are particularly at risk of rape and other sexual 
abuse.
335
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4. Small arms facilitate human rights violations 
 
The widespread availability of and easy access to small arms make them weapons of 
―mass destruction‖ of the poor336 and this availability of small arms helps facilitate 
human rights violations. Small arms contribute to human rights abuses in many ways: 
the enhancement of the power of abusive forces to suppress individuals and groups; 
and their use against civilians in armed conflicts. Small arms are employed in a wide 
variety of human rights abuses, including extrajudicial executions, forced 
disappearances and torture.
337
 
 
Small arms played a major role in facilitating genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia, as 
researchers have argued that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the 
Hutu government and Tutsi exiles between 1990 and 1993 expanded the conflict and 
increased human rights abuse in Rwanda.
338
  
 
The widespread availability of small arms also ―[helped] the Hutu extremists carry 
out their slaughter on a horrendous scale‖ during the genocide in 1994.339  Although 
the genocide in Rwanda was predominantly carried out by knives, axes and blades, 
small arms played an important role in preparing for the event to come to fruition. In 
January 1994, three months before the conflict, the government bought assault 
weapons and distributed them to civilians as part of a civilians‘ self-defence 
programme.
340
 When the genocide took place, small arms were used to force the 
victims to gather. Militia men with guns also set up check points to sort the Tutsis 
from the Hutus. ―It is often noted that although the majority of killings in the 
                                               
336 Graca Machel The Impact of War on Children (London, Hurst & Company, 2001) at 119; Noel 
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Rwandan genocide were committed with knives, axes and blades, guns were needed 
to round up the victims and keep them surrounded before killing them‖.341 
 
The army‘s policies and plans might have indicated the possibility of ethnic violence. 
In 1991, the plan to arm civilians was disclosed by Colonel Sylbain Nsabimana, 
Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Army. The plan was to arm at least one person in 
every ten households.
342
  The preparation, training, and arms distribution were carried 
out in 1993.
343
  Among the arms distributed were Kalashnikovs, machine guns, 
grenades, and large quantities of bullets, as well as machetes.
344
 The weapons were 
then distributed to a young male in each of the lowest administrative units.
345
 During 
that time, the Rwandan army also trained and armed civilian militias, and just prior to 
the start of the massacres, peacekeepers estimated that 85 tonnes of weapons had 
been distributed throughout the country.
346
 More than a dozen countries helped to 
fuel the war with the majority of weapons being provided by France, apartheid-era 
South Africa and Egypt.
347
 
 
The sourcing of some weapons and their transport to Rwanda was organized by a 
Kenyan-based company that brokered the delivery of seven large cargoes of small 
arms worth $6.5 million in London, using the off shore company, MilTec 
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Corporation.
348
 They worked with another United Kingdom air cargo broker in 
Windsor to arrange secret charter flights from Tirana and Tel Aviv in 1994.
349
 The 
arms deliveries to the Rwandan armed forces arrived as they were carrying out the 
genocide in Rwanda and continued even during the time when the mass killings were 
being reported daily by the international news media.
350
 This shows the crucial roles 
small arms played in the preparation of the Rwandan genocide.   
 
Likewise, small arms played a role in the Bosnia genocide. A survivor of a mass 
execution, on 14 July 1995, told the ICTY hearing that Serb soldiers armed with 
rifles, separated men from their family, gathered and transported them from 
Srebrenica to a different place before they were shot.
351
 The witness told the Tribunal 
as recorded: 
 
Two soldiers opened the back of the truck and the prisoner and the other 
men were taken off and told where to stand up and to keep quiet...As 
soon as the truck left, the soldiers opened fire on the men standing up in 
the row...As he lay still, he saw the TAM truck returned and another 
group of prisoners arrived. They were taken off, lined up in four rows, 
and shot. The witness saw this happening over and over again as he lay 
there.
 352
   
  
Civilians often become targets of killings using small arms. ICTY, in its judgment of 
the case Vlastimir Dordevic, recounts when Kosovan Albanians who were not 
participating in conflict,
353
 were forced out of their village and shot by small arms:  
 
They carry AK47 rifles and had long knives in scabbards attached to their 
belts...The group of police approached the 14 people...[and] a policeman 
shout ―shoot‖. The police then opened fire on the group...of the 14 people 
who were shot at in the Belaja River, 10 were women and children 
[footnotes omitted].
354
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In the next chapter, the thesis examines the contemporary concept of State 
responsibility in relation to small arms. As the use of small arms in armed conflicts 
may lead to acts which are against the international humanitarian laws and human 
rights laws, it is significant to examine the concept of the responsibility of the State to 
protect, relative to the control of small arms so as to help prevent the crimes against 
humanity, and human rights violations from happening. Such analysis offers an 
insight as to what degree the concept of State responsibility could apply to the issue 
of small arms.  
 
 
D. Summary 
 
The impact of small arms is multi-dimensional, ranging from human security to 
socio-economic development. From the perspective of human security, small arms 
are closely associated with forced displacements, crimes against humanity and 
facilitating war crimes and genocide. The excessive availability of small arms can 
also fuel conflicts and undermine human rights and humanitarian law. The genocides 
in Rwanda and Bosnia demonstrate how small arms could contribute to the 
perpetration of atrocities and crimes against humanity. The wide availability of small 
arms in post-conflict situations, apart from being a threat to peace, can be a threat to 
women and children as the most vulnerable in the society.    
 
The weapons may also impede the social reconstruction and economic redevelopment 
and in post-conflict situations.  Small arms related problems may create a burden on 
public service costs and divert much needed funds. As illustrated, small arms‘ 
involvement in violence and criminal activities in Latin America and Africa has 
caused their governments to lose billions of dollars in human capital, investment, 
capital flights and increasing fund on law and order.   
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Chapter III: 
Arms Control, Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law 
 
 
A. Introduction  
 
A series of conventional weapons treaties will be analysed in the thesis of this chapter 
to identify the humanitarian rationale, the connection and influence of international 
humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL), if any, to the 
adoption of an arms control treaty.  Small arms fall under the category of 
conventional weapons, hence the analysis focuses on conventions or documents 
related to conventional weapons. Reference to humanitarian law and human rights 
law in each treaty is noted to identify the development of the influence of IHL and 
IHRL on arms control over the years. For this purpose, the thesis studies rationales in 
related conventions such as the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration,
355
 the 1899 and 1907 
Hague Conventions,
356
 the 1980 Certain Conventional Weapons Convention,
357
 the 
1997 Mine Ban Convention, and the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions.
358
 
 
The rationales in these treaties will show whether the reasons and rationales to 
prohibit, ban, or control weapons may also apply to regulation of the proliferation of 
small arms. As will be discussed, some conventions control or prohibit the use of 
weapons based on humanitarian reasons because they cause unnecessary suffering 
and are indiscriminate in nature. One of the purposes of IHL is to protect civilians.
359
 
The humanitarian rationales, namely indiscriminate and superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering, reflect the principles of humanitarian law of distinction 
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between civilian and combatants, and proportionality.
360
 Hence, it is a subject of 
discussion that the proliferation of small arms should not endanger the effort of 
protecting civilians.     
 
The rationales of a convention are usually revealed in its preamble. The preamble of a 
treaty also typically explains its background, and reasons for being, although there is 
no legal requirement to do so.
361
 The paragraphs in the preamble provide the ―context 
for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty‖.362 Hence, reading the preamble 
paragraphs of conventional weapon treaties is helpful to gain a comprehensive 
understanding of their rationale, purpose, and context.  
 
 
B. Humanitarian Rationales in Several Arms Control Treaties 
1.  Rationales 
 
―Humanity‖ as one of the important reasons informing the prohibition of certain 
weapons has been evident since the adoption of the 1868 St Petersburg 
Declaration.
363
  The later international conventions, particularly the conventions 
adopted after the Second World War, demonstrate that ―humanity‖ is one of the 
reasons for controlling certain weapons.  It is also worth noting that humanity and 
humanitarian reasons are increasingly cited and referred to in arms control 
conventions or documents adopted after the end of the Cold War. 
 
When Henry Dunant (1828-1910) witnessed the result of the battle of Solferino in 
1859, he noticed that suffering makes no distinction between the wounded of the 
                                               
360 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law 
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363 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes 
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victors and those of the vanquished.
364
 The suffering of the wounded convinced 
Dunant that there is a common humanity for all, irrespective of side.
365
 ―Humanity‖ 
in this discussion is used to describe the principles of humanity as the desire to avoid 
unnecessary suffering to humans, in counter-measures to the military necessity in 
armed conflict.
366
  The prohibition of certain means of warfare and rules of the 
conduct of war, known as the law of armed conflict, has been the matter of the 
balance between ―the requirement of humanity‖ and ―military necessity‖.367  
 
Human rights are fundamental rights inherent to all human beings which are essential 
for life as a person as ―[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment‖.368 Every human person is expected to be treated humanely 
because each human person has the same human rights.
369
 The Charter of the United 
Nations has several references to human rights in its articles; inter alia, articles 1(3) 
and 55(c).
370
 The most important recognition of human rights was established by the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights which has, since then, been providing 
the authoritative articulation and respect for human rights of individuals.
371
 By 
examining the existing humanitarian law treaties, it is evident that human rights law 
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has had a major influence on the formation of customary rules of international 
humanitarian law.
372
 Humanitarian concern relates to the injury and suffering 
experienced by victims of armed conflicts. Hence, the prohibition of weapons causing 
unnecessary suffering is one of the fundamental principles of international 
humanitarian law.
373
   
 
Military operations in armed conflicts may bring collateral damage to the people in 
terms of civilian casualties as reported in World War II, where civilian casualties 
outnumbered military.
374
 It was the large civilian cost in World War II that provided 
impetus for further codifying the laws of war as set forth in the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, which include the principle of distinction between civilians and 
combatants in time of war.
375
  The concern for civilian protection was furthered in 
additional Protocols I and II, the International Tribunals as well as the Rome 
Statute.
376
 
 
2. Arms control and international humanitarian law  
 
After two devastating world wars, the international community of States realized that 
in order to avoid further tragedies of human suffering and to help those who were 
suffering in armed conflict, they needed to create a new international mechanism.
377
 
This realization led to the establishment of the United Nations, where its charter 
defines the respect for humanity as ―to re-affirm faith in fundamental human rights, in 
the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women of 
nations large and small‖.378  
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377 Paul Gordon Lauren The Evolution of International Human Rights (University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2003) at 160 
378 Charter of the United Nations (26 June 1945), 1 UNTS XVI. 
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Supplementing the international order set by the United Nations was a raft of new 
international humanitarian law codified in the Geneva Conventions. Humanity is the 
basis of the Geneva Conventions‘ concerns to treat the wounded and sick 
(Convention I and II)
379
 and the necessity to protect civilians in time of war 
(Convention IV).
380
 The particular reference to the Fourth Geneva Convention in 
protecting civilian lives is pertinent in the discussion because armed conflicts are 
fought mostly with small arms as primary instruments of war. Respect for the lives of 
civilians enshrined in the Fourth Geneva Convention demands that the international 
community strictly apply it in armed conflict as civilians increasingly become the 
predominant victims in an armed conflict. Article 1, common to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and the Protocol I, requires all States to have a solemn obligation to 
―respect and ensure respect‖381 for humanitarian law. This implies that not only do 
States have to respect the law, but they also have a responsibility to ensure respect by 
others.  
 
In the case of a serious violation occurring, a collective willingness to ensure respect 
for international humanitarian law might be enforced by various measures, by the 
United Nations Security Council,
382
 or imposed as moral pressure by the resolutions 
of the General Assembly or the Human Rights Council.
383
 The measures include the 
adoption of a resolution to call a perpetrator to abide by the law, offer good offices of 
Secretary-General, dispatch observer missions, or launch peace keeping operations.
384
  
 
                                               
379 Geneva Convention I (1949), 75 UNTS 31; Geneva Convention II (1949), 75 UNTS 85. 
380 Geneva Convention IV (1949), 75 UNTS 287.  
381 Geneva Conventions have the common wording of article 1: ―The High Contracting Parties 
undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances‖. A similar 
sentence also exists in the article 1 (1) of the Additional Protocol I (1977, 1125 UNTS 3): ―The High 
Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for this Protocol in all circumstances‖. 
382 Based on the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council may take measures to maintain 
international peace and security based on Chapter VII which include imposing an economic or arms 
embargo, and the use of force. In exercising its mandate, for example, the Security Council authorized 
the creation of International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to try those responsible for the genocide and crimes against 
humanity.   
383 The United Nations General Assembly and Human Rights Council resolutions are not legally 
binding but have a moral force as they reflect the opinion of the majority of States.  
384 Alexandra Boivin ―Complicity and Beyond: International Law and the Transfer of Small Arms and 
Light Weapons‖ (2005) 87(859) IRRC at 476. 
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In essence, humanitarian law is a part of laws of armed conflict which protect 
civilians in time of war and avoid needless suffering among combatants.
385
 It seeks to 
protect persons who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities and 
restricts the means and methods of warfare.
386
 Hence, the definitions of ―arms 
control‖ and ―international humanitarian law‖, suggest that the arms control is 
agreement dealing with military capability in terms of restricting the use of weapons, 
while international humanitarian law regulates the laws of war to limit the impact of 
armed conflict.   
 
Protecting civilians, one of the main noble ideas of the Fourth Geneva Convention, is 
in conformity with the effort to restrict the proliferation of small arms, as the weapons 
kill mainly civilians. States parties to the Geneva Conventions reaffirmed the 
responsibility to respect international humanitarian law, stressed the importance of 
humanitarian consideration in arms transfer and undertook to "make respect for 
international humanitarian law as one of the fundamental criteria on which arms 
transfer decisions are assessed" and were encouraged to incorporate such criteria in 
national laws and policies, as well as regional and global norms.387 
 
Humanitarian law has been raised in the discussion related to arms control, such as on 
legal status of the use of a weapon. For example, in the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ 
on the Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, many States invoked the 
consideration of international humanitarian law, including Additional Protocol I of 
1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
388
 In examining the possible prohibition by 
international humanitarian law, the Court drew an example by treating the nuclear 
weapon the same way as a poisoned weapon and inspected the second Hague 
                                               
385 Richard L Williamson Jr ―Hard Law, Soft Law, and Non-Law in Multilateral Arms Control: Some 
Compliance Hypothesis‖ (2003) 4(1) Chi J Int‘l L 59.  
386 ―ICRC Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law‖ (2004) ICRC 
<www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/humanitarian-law-factsheet/$File/What_is_IHL.pdf>. 
Last accessed on 8 July 2011. 
387 ―The Development of An International Arms Trade Treaty‖, ICRC statement dated 18 March 2008 
<www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/small-arms-statement-180308> . Last accessed 29 June 
2012. 
388 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion (1996) ICJ Reports 226, at 
241, para 27. 
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Declaration (1899), the Hague Convention IV (1907), and the Geneva Protocol 
(1925).
389
   
 
The Court does not find that the use of nuclear weapons can be regarded as 
specifically prohibited on the basis of the above-mentioned instruments.
390
  However, 
it does acknowledge that ―[t]he pattern until now has been for weapons of mass 
destruction to be declared illegal by specific instruments‖.391 By this, the Court refers 
to the prohibition of the use of other weapons of mass destruction, namely chemical 
by the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) and the Biological Weapons 
Convention (1972).
392
 
 
The citation of international humanitarian law in the discussion of the use of 
weapons, such as demonstrated by the ICJ Advisory Opinion above, suggests that 
particular weapons, because of the humanitarian concerns of the inherent 
indiscriminate nature or unnecessary suffering they cause, are considered as being 
against humanitarian law and may need to be prohibited.
393
  
 
 
3. Arms Control and International Human Rights Law 
 
International human rights law has been developing progressively since the end of 
War World II. Mention of human rights is made in the preamble of the Charter of the 
United Nations (1945) that the peoples of the United Nations determined to ―reaffirm 
faith in fundamental human rights‖.394 The same commitment is repeated in article 
                                               
389 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion (1996) ICJ Reports 226, at 
248. 
390 Ibid, at 248, para 56. 
391 Ibid, at 248, para 57. 
392 Ibid. 
393 Besides weapons of mass destruction namely the 1972 Biological Weapons Conventions (1015 
UNTS 163) and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (1974 UNTS 45), the prohibition of certain 
conventional weapons has already been codified in the Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions 
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects (1980), UNTS, vol 1342, I-22495. 
394 Charter of the United Nations (1945), preamble paragraph 2, printed in International Instruments of 
the United Nations (New York, United Nations, 1997) at 405; Charter of the United Nations (1945), 
reprinted (New York, United Nations, 1997). 
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1(3) and meant as one of the purposes of the establishment of institution ―in 
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights‖.395 This is an open promise and 
acknowledgement of existence of such rights by States. A series of international 
human rights conventions have since been adopted which further reflect States‘ 
acceptance of human rights.
396
   
 
Internationalization of international human rights ―has brought agreement, at least in 
political-legal principle and in rhetoric,‖ that human rights are of international 
concern, and have become a proper subject for diplomacy and international law.
397
 As 
international law is the subject of international law and politics, which derives 
principally from contemporary international agreements which States undertake to 
recognize,
398
 then the international human rights law may also influence States in 
adopting or negotiating arms control treaties.  
 
The reference to human rights law was also invoked in the ICJ‘s case on the Legality 
of the Use by A State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (requested by the WHO) 
as some countries argued the use of such weapon is in contrary to human rights law, 
in particular, to the right to life.
399
 The same argument to arms control and human 
rights in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (by the request of the 
UN General Assembly) was restated in the written comments by States to the ICJ.
400
  
 
                                               
395 Charter of the United Nations (1945), art 1(3), printed in International Instruments of the United 
Nations (New York, United Nations, 1997) at 405. 
396 Among others, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the Convention against Torture and other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984). All are reprinted in International 
Instruments of the United Nations (New York, United Nations, 1997).    
397 Louis Henkin The Age of Rights (1990) at 17. 
398 Ibid, at 17-19. 
399 Legality of the Use of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (request of an ICJ Advisory Opinion by 
the WHO), written statement of the Government of the Solomon Islands, 9 September 1994, at IIB; 
written statement of the Government of Nauru, 20 September 1994, vol I, at 48-51; written statement 
of the Government of Mexico, 9 June 1994, at 8-9. Documents are available at ICJ <http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=e1&case=93&code=anw&p3=1>.  Last accessed 20 April 
2012.   
400
 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (request of an ICJ advisory opinion by the UN 
General Assembly), written statement of the Government of Solomon Islands, 19 June 1995, at IIB; 
written statement of the Government of Egypt, communication dated 20 June 1995, at 15-16; written 
statement of the Government of Malaysia, 19 June 1995, at 13-14. The statements are available at ICJ 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=e1&case=95&code=unan&p3=1>. Last 
accessed 23 April 2012. 
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The arguments invoke the applicability of human rights law in discussing the use of 
weapons, in particular the application of article 6 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights that stipulates that every human being has an inherent right 
to life.
401
 The Court observes that the protection of the Covenant of Civil and 
Political Rights, in particular respect for the right to life, ―does not cease in times of 
war...In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of  one‘s life applies also in 
hostilities.‖402 However, whether the loss of life because of the use of certain weapon 
in warfare is contrary to the article 6 of the Covenant to be determined by the 
applicable of lex specialis, as the Court is of the view that it ―can only be decided by 
reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of 
the Covenant itself‖.403 
   
Further application of the link between arms transfer and human rights has been 
adopted by the member States of the European Union in their common position on 
arms exports,
404
in which the human rights situation in a receiving State is a 
precondition to execute an arms export. The member States are asked to respect the 
human rights in the country of final destination, and will ―deny an export licence if 
there is a clear risk‖ such transfer of military equipment might be used for internal 
repression.
405
 Participating States in the Wassenaar Arrangement agree to take into 
account the situation of human rights in the recipient country, and avoid exporting 
small arms if there is a clear risk that the weapons might ―be used for the violation or 
suppression of human rights and fundamental freedoms‖.406  
 
                                               
401 Convention on Civil and Political Rights (1996), UNGA res 2200A (XXI), art 6 (1). 
402  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion (1996) ICJ Reports 226 at 
240, para 25. 
403 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion (1996) ICJ Report 226 at 240, 
para 2: see also, L C Green ―Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law and Threats to National 
Sovereignty‖ (2003) 8 J Conflict & Sec L 101 at 102-103. Green states that ―it may well be argued that 
the protection of human rights as such is a matter of universal concern constituting lex generalis, while 
humanitarian law in the sense of its concern with armed conflict is a constituent part of this amounting 
to les specialis.‖ 
404 EU Common Position (2008 /944/CFSP of 8 December 2008), OJ L335. 
405
 Ibid, art 2(2)(a). This common position was adopted to replace the 1998 EU Code of Conduct of 
Arms Export. Available at European Union External Action 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/08675r2en8.pdf>. Last accessed 19 April 2012. 
406 Best Practice Guidelines for Export of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) (adopted at the  
1992 plenary and amended at the 2002 Plenary 2007), at I.1 (i), and 2 (i). Available at 
<http://www.wassenaar.org/guidelines/index.html>. Last accessed 19 April 2012.  
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Based on the paragraphs above, the IHL and IHRL are closely related, intertwined, 
with discussion of arms control. It is confirmed by the references to IHL and IHRL in 
discussion of the legality of the use of nuclear weapons by the ICJ and their inclusion 
in the criteria in arms trade by the European Union as well as the Wassenaar 
Arrangement. It is then logical that the discussion on small arms in this thesis 
inevitably also involves IHL and IHRL. 
 
   
4. Civilian protection  
 
The distinction between civilians and combatants is one of the fundamental principles 
of international humanitarian law recognized by civilized nations.
407
 The effort to 
distinguish between civilians and combatants was set forth in St Petersburg 
Declaration, which states that ―the only legitimate object which States should 
endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the 
enemy‖.408  
 
In order to protect civilians, the principle of distinction is enshrined in articles 48, 51, 
and 52 of Additional Protocol I to Geneva Conventions which require that all parties 
to armed conflict must at all times distinguish between combatants and civilians, and 
attacks must not be directed against civilians and civilian objects.
409
 ―[T]he Parties to 
the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and 
combatants and between civilian objects and military objects....‖410  In addition, 
―[t]he civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection 
against dangers arising from military operations‖411 and ―shall not be the object of 
                                               
407 Marco Sassoli and others How Does Law Protect in War? Cases, Documents ad Teaching 
Materials on Contemporary Practice in International Humanitarian Law (Geneva, ICRC, 1999) at 
112. 
408 St Petersburg Declaration (1868), (1907) 1 Am J Int‘l L Sup 96, preamble para. 
409 Additional Protocol I (1977), 1125 UNTS 3, art 48; 51; and 52.  
410 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (1977), 1125 UNTS 3, art 48. 
411 Ibid, art 51(1). 
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attack‖.412  Since distinction between combatants and civilians must be made, 
discriminate attacks are prohibited by article 51(4) Additional Protocol I.
413
 
 
The Protocol I in article 57(2)(a)(iii) further provides civilian protection by asking 
parties in armed conflicts to refrain from launching attacks "which may be expected 
to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, 
or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated."
414
 As armed conflict inevitably victimizes 
civilians, the Protocol I acknowledges that any attack in armed conflict, even with 
cautious execution, may still cause collateral damage.
415
 
 
Parties to an armed conflict should be able to respect principles of humanitarian law 
in armed conflict not of an international character, including the respect for those who 
are not taking part in the hostilities. As insisted by the Protocol II, ―[a]ll persons who 
do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities...are entitled to 
respect for their person, honour and convictions and religious practices.‖ 416 The 
importance of these rules is that, in time of war, the parties involved in an armed 
conflict must make a distinction between combatants and non-combatants. With 
regards to small arms, the uncontrolled proliferation of small arms may make the 
distinction very difficult.    
 
With civilian protection in mind, one must set a clear definition. The thesis, as stated 
in Chapter I, uses the definition set forth in article 50 of Additional Protocol I.
417
 
There are some other definitions. For example, the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia defined civilians as ―persons who are not, or no longer, 
                                               
412 Ibid, art 51(2). 
413 Ibid, art 51(4); see Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 37. 
414 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (1977), art 57(2). 
415 Thomas M Franck ―On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International Law‖ (2008) 102 Am J 
Int‘l L 715.  
416 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (1977), art 4(1). 
417 Additional Protocol I (1997), art 50. 
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members of the armed forces‖.418 Defining civilian in modern, particularly in 
asymmetric, war seems more problematic, and triggers a discourse of redefining the 
meaning of protected persons with the focus on who are soldiers or combatants as 
legal targets of killing, instead of who are not combatants.
419
  
 
Civilian protection may be regarded as one of the central reasons for the control or 
prohibition of certain weapons for there are concerns regarding the impact of 
weapons on civilians who are not taking an active role in the combat.
420
  The parties 
involved in war should be able to differentiate between combatants and civilians or 
those who are taking no active part in the combat as the Fourth Geneva Convention, 
Protocol I and II demand, both in international armed conflicts
421
 and non-
international armed conflicts.
422
  
 
The prohibition on targeting civilians is also emphasized in Protocol II and Protocol 
III of the CCWC, the Mine-Ban Treaty, and the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court.
423
 Similarly, States Parties to the recent Convention on Cluster 
Munitions (2008) promise to base themselves on principles and rules of humanitarian 
law ―that the parties to a conflict shall at all times distinguish between civilian 
population and combatants‖.424           
 
 
 
 
                                               
418 Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaskic, judgement, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, no IT-95-14-T, 3 March 2000, at 60. 
419 Claire Finkelstain, Jens David Ohlin, and Andrew Altman (eds)Targeted Killings: Law and 
Morality in an Asymmetric World (Oxford University Press, 2012); also Alexander Gillespie A History 
of the Laws of War (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011) vol 1 at 247-248.  
420 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva 
Convention) (1949), art 3, demands parties to the Convention protect persons taking no active part in 
the hostilities. The definition of civilians and civilian populations is further explained in the article 50 
of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (1997).    
421
 Additional Protocol I (1977), 1125 UNTS 3, art 48 and 51. 
422 Additional Protocol II (1977), 1125 UNTS 609, art 13. 
423 Amended Protocol II to the CCWC, art 3(7); Protocol III to the CCW, art 2 (1); Mine-Ban Treaty, 
preamble para 11; Rome Statute, art 8(2)(b). 
424 Convention on Cluster Munitions (2008) (signed 3 December 2008, entered into force 1 August 
2010), UNTS I-47713.  
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5. Indiscriminate weapons, methods and means of war 
 
Article 35 (1) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions explains the rules 
regarding the use of methods of warfare:
 
 
 
In any armed conflicts, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose 
methods and means of warfare is not unlimited.
425
 
 
This clearly indicates that the methods and means of warfare are actually limited, as 
not all weapons and methods of warfare could be applied in the hostilities. The terms 
method and means of warfare have overlapped in meaning, although historically the 
terms have different interpretations. Hays Parks explains the subtle differences of the 
terms:  
 
Method of warfare is one of two historic phrases in the law of war. 
Although neither phrase has an agreed definition, means of warfare 
traditionally  has been understood to refer to the effect of weapons in their 
use against combatants, while method of warfare refers to the way weapons 
are used in a broader sense.
426
 
 
From the small arms perspective, the above-mentioned explanation may imply that 
lawfulness of small arms as means of war have never been disputed, it is the method 
or the way weapons are used that could be problematic. The easy access of weapons 
may facilitate the application of method of warfare that is against human rights law 
and humanitarian law. The method of the use of weapons is particularly problematic 
when the weapons are used against civilians. Small arms are discriminate weapons 
therefore are legitimate means of warfare. However, when they are used against 
civilians, children and other non-combatants then this method of the use is against 
IHL and IHRL. The easy access and easy availability of small arms undermine 
respect to international humanitarian law and thus become the concern of IHL.       
  
                                               
425 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (1977), art 35 (1). 
426 W Hays Parks ―Travaux Preparatoires and Legal Analysis of Blinding Laser Weapons Protocol‖ 
(1997) 1997 Army Law 33 at 33. 
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Humanity limits the methods and means of warfare in accordance with general 
principles of international humanitarian law which include the principles of necessity, 
proportionality, and the prohibition of the use of weapons causing superfluous injury 
and unnecessary suffering.
427
 Armed conflict, carried out by the method of 
indiscriminately attacking civilians and civilian population is unlawful, as article 51 
(4) of the Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions elaborates:  
 
Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited.  Indiscriminate attacks are: 
(a) Those which are not directed at a specific military objective; 
(b) Those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be 
directed at a specific military objective; or 
(c) Those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which 
cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in 
each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians 
or civilian objects without distinction.
 428
 
  
 
Observing humanitarian law and humanity applies to all use of weapons. There are 
weapons which cannot be directed a specific military target and are by nature 
indiscriminate thus are prohibited by the above-mentioned article. State practice 
establishes the prohibition of the use of indiscriminate weapons as a norm of 
customary international law applicable in international and non-international armed 
conflicts as set forth in many military manuals and the UNGA resolutions.
429
.   
 
The prohibition of the use of indiscriminate weapons was reaffirmed in the Statute of 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
 
Employing weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare which 
are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering or which 
                                               
427 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 46, 237 ; Marco Sassoli, Antoine A Bovier, Laura Olson, 
Nicolas A Dupic and Lina Milner How Does Law Protect in War? Cases, Documents and Teaching 
Materials on Contemporary Practice in International Humanitarian Law (Geneva, ICRC, 1999) at 
112. 
428 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), (1977), 1125 UNTS 3, art 51(4). 
429
 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 245, referring to the military manuals of Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, Columbia, Ecuador, France, Germany, Israel, South Korea, New Zealand and others; see 
UNGA res 1653 (XVI); UNGA res 3032 (XXVII); 38/66; UNGA 39/56; UNGA res 40/84; UNGA res 
43/67; UNGA res 45/64; UNGA res 46/40; UNGA res 47/56;UNGA res  48/79; UNGA res 49/79; 
UNGA res 50/74; UNGA res 51/49; UNGA res 52/42; UNGA res 53/81; UNGA res 54/58.   
93 
 
are inherently indiscriminate in violation of the international law of armed 
conflict, provided that such weapons, projectiles and material and methods 
of warfare are the subject of a comprehensive prohibition...[emphasis 
added].
 430
      
 
Following the logic of the rationale of the unlawfulness of indiscriminate weapons, 
all types of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical, and biological, have the 
characteristic of being indiscriminate in their application and therefore are argued to 
be unlawful. Specific international treaties on the WMD confirm this unlawfulness, 
the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention prohibit 
the use, development, and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons.
431
 
However, there is no prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons in the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
432
    
In rendering its advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, in 1996, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) based its opinion on 
humanitarian law, advising that:
 
 
 
A threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the 
requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict 
particularly those of the principles and rules of international humanitarian 
law....
433
  
 
This view, therefore, supports the argument that weapons which kill indiscriminately 
or have an indiscriminate effect in their application are not compatible with 
international humanitarian law.  
                                               
430 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), 2187 UNTS 90, art 8 (2)(b)(xx); the ICC 
review conference in Kampala, Uganda in 2010 amended article 8 (2)(e) to add certain weapons to 
elements of crimes and extended the jurisdiction of the Court to the conduct which took place in armed 
conflict not of an international character (Res RC/Res.5, 10 June 2010).  
431 Chemical Weapons Convention (1993), 1974 UNTS 45; the Biological Weapons Convention 
(1972), 1015 UNTS 163. 
432 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (signed 1 July 1968, entered into force 5 
March 1970), 2187 UNTS 90; see also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion [1996] ICJ Report 226, at 266, para 105(2)(E) which may open to the possibility of the use of 
nuclear weapons  as ―the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very 
survival of a State would be at stake.‖ 
433 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion [1996] ICJ Report 226, at 
266, para 105(2)(D).  
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Humanity is a strong reason for prohibiting weapons which inflict superfluous injury 
or unnecessary suffering on their victims. States parties to Additional Protocol I agree 
that ―[it] is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods of 
warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.‖434 
Previously, such a rule was set forth in the 1899 Hague Convention II, as it was 
prohibited to ―employ arms, projectiles, or material of a nature to cause superfluous 
injury‖.435   
 
Conventional arms control treaties generally cite the principles of humanity as the 
reason for prohibiting certain weapons and these principles, in essence, reflect the 
desire to protect humans from certain weapons considered inhumane. The weapons 
which in nature fit the character of indiscriminate or cause superfluous injury and 
unnecessary suffering, hence are also known as ―inhumane weapons‖.436  
 
 
6. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of war, of Explosive Projectile 
under 400 Grammes Weight (St Petersburg Declaration) (1868)  
 
The link between arms control and humanitarian law can be observed in the early 
period of international arms control by examining each convention agreed by 
participating States. In the conventions, whether there has been the link between arms 
control to IHL or/and IHRL is researched. The 1868 St Petersburg Declaration is one 
of the first international conventions that restricts the use of particular conventional 
weapons based on humanitarian considerations.
437
 The treaty was signed in St 
Petersburg, 11 December 1868 by all major powers at that time, including Austria, 
                                               
434 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (1977), art 35 (2). 
435 Hague Convention II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1899), annex art 
23(e); Printed in D Schlinder and J Toman The Laws of Armed Conflicts (Martinus Nihjoff Publisher, 
1988) at 69-93.  
436
 Zdzislaw  Lachowski and Svenja Post ―Conventional Arms Control‖ in SIPRI Yearbook 2009: 
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press, 2009) at 435. The 
―inhumane‖ term to refer to the use of certain weapons is controversial as it suggests that other 
weapons are ―humane‖. 
437 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes 
Weight (adopted 11 December 1868), (1907)1 Am J Int‘l Supp 95.  
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Belgium, Denmark, France, Bavaria, Great Britain, Greece, the Netherlands, Russia, 
Italy, Ottoman, and Sweden.
438
  
 
The Declaration set a rule of avoiding superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering 
based on humanity rationale. It gives a picture of the balance between military 
necessity and humanity as the Declaration states in its preamble ―[t]hat the only 
legitimate object … is to weaken the military forces of the enemy‖.439  The St 
Petersburg Declaration establishes the principle of military necessity, which suggests 
that the parties in the hostilities cannot harm their enemies unnecessarily.
440
  The 
concern for humanity in the Petersburg Declaration demonstrates one of three 
preconditions for an international arms control negotiation: documented humanitarian 
harm, widespread public concerns, and declining military utility.
441
    
 
The explosive projectile referred to by the Declaration was a bullet which would 
explode on contact with a soft substance.
442
 The humanitarian concern in the treaty to 
prohibit the use of explosive projectiles under 400 grammes is explicitly reflected in 
the following wording found in the text of the Declaration: 
 
[T]he necessities of war ought to yield to the requirements of humanity… 
[t]hat this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which 
uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death 
inevitable; That the employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary 
to the laws of humanity.
443
   
 
                                               
438 Ibid. 
439 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes 
Weight (adopted 11 December 1868), (1907)1 Am J Int‘l Supp 95, second consideration paragraph. 
440 Bonnie Docherty ―The Time Is Now: A Historical Argument for A Cluster Munitions Convention‖ 
(2007) 20 Harvard Human Rights Journal 53.   
441 Ibid.  
442 ICRC introduction on the ―Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive 
Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight <www.icrc.org>. Last accessed on 29 October 2009; see also 
Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law (New 
York, Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 272.   
443 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes 
Weight (adopted 11 December 1868), (1907)1 Am J Int‘l Supp 95; reprinted in M Cherif Bassiouni A 
Manual on International Humanitarian Law and Arms Control Agreements (New York, Transnational 
Publishers, 2000). 
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The main point of the quotation is that the unnecessary suffering caused was not 
considered in conformity with considerations of humanity.
444
 Hence, the parties 
agreed to: ―engage mutually to renounce...the employment by their military or naval 
troops of any projectile of a weight below 400 grammes, which is either explosive or 
charged with fulminating or inflammable substances‖.445 The projectile was not more 
effective than the ordinary bullet, but caused superfluous injury and unnecessary 
suffering beyond what was required to render a soldier hors de combat.
446
 The use of 
explosive projectiles under 400 grammes had no significance in winning a war from 
military strategy‘s point of view, therefore it was understandable the countries could 
be brought together to sign the treaty.  
     
The significance of the St Petersburg Declaration is not only that it is the first 
multilateral formal agreement in modern history to prohibit a certain weapon in war, 
but also it establishes a number of fundamental principles which set the subsequent 
development of humanitarian law.
447
 Those principles establish that the only 
legitimate objective of war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy, and the use 
of weapons which uselessly aggravate suffering is unjustified.
448
 The principles 
established by the St Petersburg Declaration, over 140 years ago, demonstrate that 
there should be a limitation of means of war.  
 
 
 
                                               
444 Stuart Maslen Commentaries on Arms Control Treaties: The Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2004) vol I at 65. The prohibition of certain weapons on the basis of 
humanity is actually not new, the prohibition of the use of weapons inflicting superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering dates back to ancient time. The Indian Book of Manu declares that arrow with 
hooked spikes, which after entering human flesh would be difficult to remove, are unlawful. See S 
Oeter ―Methods and Means of Combat‖ in D Fleck (ed) The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed 
Conflict (New York, Oxford University Press, 1995) at 113. 
445 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes 
Weight (adopted 11 December 1868), (1907)1 Am J Int‘l Supp 95. 
446 Louis Maresca and Stuart Maslen (eds) The Banning Anti-Personnel Land Mines: The Legal 
Contribution of the International Committee of the Red Cross (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2000) at 10. 
447 Ibid, at 15. 
448 Speech by Jakob Kellenberger, president of the ICRC, International Conference on IHL dedicated 
to the 140th Anniversary of the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, St Petersburg, 24 November 2008 
<www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/st-petersburg-declaration-281108>. Last accessed on 5 
October 2009. 
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7. Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907) 
 
Like the St Petersburg Declaration, the first Hague Peace Conference of 1899 was 
initiated by the Czar of Russia, Nicholas II, with the purpose of ―seeking the most 
effective means of ensuring to all peoples the benefits of a real and lasting peace, and, 
above all, of limiting the progressive development of existing armaments‖.449 The 
Conference ran from 18 May 1899 to 29 July 1899, where 26 governments were 
present, including those from outside Europe such as the United States, China, Japan, 
and Mexico.
450
  The second Hague Conference was held in 1907 and resulted in the 
laws of war declarations, which dealt with naval war in particular, and did not 
specifically relate to arms control. 
 
When Tsar Nicholas II invited the other major powers to the first Hague peace 
conference in 1899, his main purpose was to seek an arms control agreement to 
reduce soaring budget costs of armament.
451
 Besides the limitation on the armament 
and war budget, the conference sought prohibitions on certain types of arms and 
military practices, revision and extension of the codified laws and customs of war, 
and other methods for preventing war.
452
 However, the historic conference could only 
agree on a few of its many ambitious goals. It could not support the Russian proposal 
that each country freeze its troop strengths for a five year period and set up its naval 
budget for a three year period.
453
 The proposals particularly did not sit well with the 
United States which had just emerged victorious from a war against Spain.
454
   
 
The negotiations of 1899 nevertheless produced an arms control convention, out of 
four conventions, which prohibited the launching of projectiles from balloons, the use 
of gas and expanding bullets. These four 1899 Hague Conventions are:
 
 
 
                                               
449 ―Final Act of the International Peace Conference, The Hague, 29 July 1899‖ ICRC    
<www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/145?OpenDocument>. Last Accessed on 30 October 2009. 
450 ICRC introduction to ―Final Act of the International Peace Conference, The Hague, 29 July 1899‖ 
ICRC    <www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/145?OpenDocument> Last Accessed on 30 October 2009. 
451 Devlev F Vagts ―The Hague Conventions and Arms Control‖ (2000) 94(1) Am J Int‘l L 31.  
452 Michael O Wheeler ―A History of Arms Control‖ in Jeffrey A Larsen (ed) Arms Control: 
Cooperative Security in A Changing Environment (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002) at 21. 
453 Devlev F Vagts ―The Hague Conventions and Arms Control‖ (2000) 94(1) Am J Int‘l L 31. 
454 Devlev F Vagts ―The Hague Conventions and Arms Control‖ (2000) 94(1) Am J Int‘l L 31. 
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(I) Convention for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes;  
(II) Convention regarding Laws and Customs of War on Land;  
(III) Convention for the Adaptation of Maritime Warfare of Principle of 
Geneva Convention of 1864; and  
(IV) Three Declarations: 
1. To prohibit the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons or 
by other similar new methods; 
2. To prohibit the use of projectiles, the only object of which is the 
diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases; 
3. To prohibit the use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human 
body, such as bullets with a hard envelope, of which the envelope does not 
entirely cover the core or is pierced with incisions.
 455
  
 
It is the Fourth Convention which consists of three declarations that is the particular 
subject of the present analysis, for it is an arms control convention which prohibits 
the use of certain weapons. Meanwhile, the Convention II provides general reference 
to the laws and customs of war on land. Prohibition and limitation of the means of 
war are found in article 23 of the annex, which prohibits the States parties ―to employ 
poison or poisoned arms‖ and ―projectiles, or material of a nature to cause 
superfluous injury‖.456  The term ―superfluous injury‖ later became the term which is 
often quoted in describing an inhumane cause of injury to its victims.
457
 
 
The three Declarations have common references to the St Petersburg Declaration, 
stating that they were ―inspired by the sentiments which found expression in the 
                                               
455 Hague Declaration (IV,1) to Prohibit, for the Term of Five Years, the Launching of Projectiles and 
Explosives from Balloons, and Other Methods of Similar Nature (1899), reprinted in (1907) 1 Am J 
Int‘l L Sup 153; the Hague Declaration (IV, 2) Respecting the Prohibition of the Use of Projectile 
Diffusing Asphyxiating Gases (1999), reprinted in (1907) 1 Am J Int‘l L Sup 159; the Hague 
Declaration (IV, 3) Respecting the Prohibition of the Use of Expanding Bullets (1899), reprinted in 
(1907) 1 Am J Int‘l L Sup 155;  M Cherif Bassiouni A Manual on International Humanitarian Law 
and Arms Control Agreements (New York, Transnational Publishers, 2000) at 97-101. See ICRC 
―Final Act of the International Peace Conference, The Hague, 29 July 1899‖ 
<www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/145?OpenDocument>. Last accessed on 15 September 2009.   
456
 Hague Convention (II) regarding Laws and Custom of War on Land (1899), art annex 23 (a, e); 
printed in D Schindler and J Toman The Laws of Armed Conflicts (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988) 
at 69-93. 
457 See Louis Maresca and Stuart Maslen (eds) The Banning of Anti-Personnel Landmines: The Legal 
Contribution of the International Committee of the Red Cross 1955-1999 (Cambridge University 
Press, 2000) at 9-10. 
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Declaration of St Petersburg‖.458 The Declarations, therefore, explicitly share the 
sentiment of humanity which is the basis of the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration in 
prohibition of the use of a particular weapon. The importance of the St Petersburg 
Declaration (1868) and The Hague Conventions (1899) from the perspective of 
rationale used is that they have confirmed standards for making humanity a reason to 
prohibit certain types of arms in arms control agreements; something that would be 
used in later treaties. 
 
The Declaration (IV,1) prohibits, for the term of five years, the launch of projectiles 
and explosives from balloons,
459
 which was later renewed by the 1907 Hague 
Convention (IV).
460
  It is also worth noting that Declaration (IV, 2)
461
 prohibits the 
use of chemical weapons by banning the use of asphyxiating or deleterious gases, a 
predecessor of a more extensive prohibition of chemical and biological weapons 
which was addressed by the Geneva Protocol of 1925.
462
 The prohibition of the use of 
chemical and biological weapons in the 1907 Hague Convention and 1925 Protocol 
was later improved and revised with the adoption of the current CWC (1993)
463
  and 
the BWC(1972).
464
 
 
The Declaration (IV, 3) prohibits the expanding bullet, also known as dum-dum 
bullet.
465
 The British designers in India created the bullet with a soft metal nose that 
                                               
458 Hague Convention IV (Declaration 1, 2, and 3) (1899), common preamble para; printed in M Cherif 
Bassiouni A Manual on International Humanitarian Law and Arms Control Agreements (New York, 
Transnational Publishers, 2000) at 97-101. 
459 Declaration (IV,1) to Prohibit, for the Term of Five Years, the Launching of Projectiles and 
Explosives from Balloons, and other Methods of Similar Nature, adopted 29 July 1899, reprinted in 
(1907) 1 AM J L Supp 153  
460 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land with Annexed 
regulations (concluded 18 October 1907), reprinted (1908) 2 Am J Int‘l L Supp 90.  
461 Hague Convention (IV,2)  respecting the Prohibition of the Use of Projectile Diffusing 
Asphyxiating Gases, adopted 29 July 1899, reprinted (1907) 1 Am J Int‘l Supp 159. 
462 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 1925.         
463 Chemical Weapons Convention (signed 13 January 1993, entered into force 29 April 1997), 1974 
UNTS 45. 
464
 Biological Weapons Convention (concluded 10 April 1972, entered into force 26 March 1975), 
1015 UNTS 163. 
465 Hague Convention (IV,3) respecting the Prohibition of the Use of Expanding Bullets, adopted 29 
July 1899, reprinted in (1907) 1 Am J Int‘l L Supp 155 ; see Devlev F Vagts ―The Hague Conventions 
and Arms Control‖ (2000) 94(1) The American Journal of International Law 31. The expanding bullet 
is called ―Dum-Dum‖ after the British arsenal near Calcutta where the bullet was first made; see also 
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expands after the bullet penetrates its target.
466
 Similarly to the 1868 St Petersburg 
Declaration, the humanitarian concern for the unnecessary suffering the weapon 
caused is the main rationale for the prohibition of the expanding or dum-dum bullet. 
The same sentiment of humanity of the declaration continues inspiring the recent 
arms control negotiations as shown by the 1980 Certain Conventional Weapons 
Convention,
467
 the 1997 Mine Ban Convention,
468
 and the 2008 Convention on 
Cluster Munitions.
469
   
 
The prohibition of the use of asphyxiating gas set forth in the 1899 Hague 
Convention (IV, 2) is confirmed in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (1998) to be a serious violation of international law.
470
 Likewise, the 
prohibition of the use of expanding bullets has been listed as a war crime in article 
8(2)(b)(xix) of the Rome Statute: 
 
(b) Other serious violations of the laws applicable in international armed 
conflicts...namely, any of the following acts:... 
(xix) Employing bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, 
such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core 
or is pierced with incisions.
471
 
     
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
ICRC‘s information on ―Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullet‖  
<www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/170?OpenDocument>. Last accessed on 1 November 2009.  
466 Ibid; see also allegedly the modern use of similar bullet, Annabel Ferriman ―Palestinian Territories 
Face Huge Burden of Disability‖ (2002) 324 (7333) British Medical Journal 320. Report in the British 
Medical Journal shows the injuries lead to permanent disability inflicted by the fragmented bullet by 
Israeli M-16s. The Journal reports that the bullet ―often breaks into pieces after penetration, ripping up 
muscle and nerve and causing multiple internal injuries, much like the internationally banned dum-
dum bullet‖. The British army found it superior to the ordinary hard-covered bullet and valued it for 
use against non-European adversaries. 
467 Convention on the Prohibition or Restrictions of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be 
Deemed Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (concluded 10 October 1980, entered 
into force 2 December 1983), 1342 UNTS 137. 
468 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel 
Mines and on their Destruction (signed 3-4 December 1997, entered into force 1 March 1999), 2056 
UNTS 211. 
469
 Convention on Cluster Munitions (opened for signature 3 December 2008, entered into force 1 
August 2010), MTDSG chapter XXVI (6). 
470 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), art 8(2)(b)(xviii); see discussion of the use 
of chemical weapons in Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 259.   
471 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), 2187 UNTS 90, art 8(2)(b)(xix). 
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a. Martens clause   
 
The principles of humanity as the basis of regulating certain types of arms made a 
breakthrough in the 1899 Hague Convention II regarding laws and customs of war. 
The second preamble paragraph of the Convention II stresses the ―desire to serve, 
even in the extreme hypothesis, the interests of humanity and the ever increasing 
requirement of civilization‖.472  The sentiment of humanity and civilian protection is 
reflected in the well accepted wording of Martens clause that states: 
 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High 
Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the 
Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under 
the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they 
result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws 
of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience.
 473
 
 
The Martens clause in the preamble of this Convention then went on to become a key 
principle in international humanitarian law, particularly in prohibiting weapons, and 
is a reference in Nuremburg jurisprudence, the International Court of Justice, human 
rights bodies, and modern humanitarian law and disarmament treaties.
474
 The Martens 
Clause, with slightly different wording, is referred to by the 1977 Protocol I to the 
Geneva Conventions,
475
 the 1980 CCWC,
476
 the 1997 Mine-Ban Treaty,
477
 and the 
                                               
472 Hague Convention (II) regarding Laws and Custom of War on Land (1899), printed in D Schindler 
and J Toman The Laws of Armed Conflicts (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988) at 69-93.  
473 Hague Convention (II) regarding Laws and Custom of War on Land  (1899), preamble para 8; 
printed in D Schindler and J Toman The Laws of Armed Conflicts (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988) 
at 69-93; See also, Theodor Meron The Humanization of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2006) at 17. 
474 Theodor Meron The Humanization of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006) at 16.  
475 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (1977), 1125 UNTS 3, art (2). The wording 
here says: ―In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and 
combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived 
from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience‖. 
476 Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which 
May be Deemed Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (1980), 1342 UNTS 137, 
preamble para 5. The parties ―[confirm] their determination that in cases not covered by this 
Convention and its annex Protocols or by other international agreements, the civilian population and 
the combatants shall at all times remain under the protection and authority of the principles of 
international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the 
dictates of public conscience‖. 
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2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions.
478
 Today, it is commonly believed that the 
clause ―has the status of general international law‖, which provides protection to 
civilians and combatants in cases not covered by specific international agreements.
479
 
 
The second peace conference in 1907 resulted in 14 Conventions and a Declaration, 
which also dealt with naval war in particular. These include the Convention 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Convention IV), which was 
animated by desire to serve, even in extreme case, ―the interests of humanity‖.480 The 
Convention IV refers to principle rules reflecting and repeating humanitarian 
concerns that ―[t]he right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not 
unlimited‖ (article 22) and to forbid the use of ―arms, projectiles, or material 
calculated to cause unnecessary sufferings‖ (article 23.e).481 Meanwhile, Declaration 
(XIV) of the Hague conference in 1907 on the Prohibiting the Discharge of 
Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons, renewed the same prohibition imposed by 
the 1899 Hague Declarations which by then had expired. 
 
Both the Hague Conventions 1899 and 1907 affirm the previous humane concerns 
enshrined in the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration by prohibiting the use of weapons 
which inflict unnecessary suffering or/and cause excessive injury.
482
 The same 
reiteration of humanitarian concern is shown by acknowledging that the means of 
warfare is not unlimited.
483
  
 
                                                                                                                                      
477 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel 
Mines and on their Destruction (1997), 2056 UNTS 211, preamble para 8. Its wording says: ―Stressing 
the role of public conscience in furthering the principle of humanity…‖.   
478 Convention on Cluster Munitions (signed 3 December 2008, entered into force 1 August 2010), 
UNTS CN 776.2008, preamble para 11. The States parties, ―[r]eaffirming that in cases not covered by 
this Convention and by other international agreements , civilians and combatants remain under the 
protection and authority of the principles of international law, derived from established custom, from 
the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience‖. 
479 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session, 2 May-22 July 
1994, United Nations, GAOR A/49/10, at 317.  
480 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land with Annex Regulations 
(concluded 18 October 1907, enter into forced 26 January 1910), preamble para 2, printed in (1908) 2 
Am J Int‘l L Supp 90. 
481 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land with Annex Regulations 
(concluded 18 October 1907, enter into forced 26 January 1910), printed in (1908) 2 Am J Int‘l L Supp 
90. 
482 Ibid, art 23 (e). 
483 Ibid, art 23(e). 
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8. Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed Excessively Injurious or to 
Have Indiscriminate Effects (Certain Conventional Weapons Convention – 
CCWC) (1980) 
 
The principle of humanitarian law prohibiting weapons causing unnecessary suffering 
was applied to later conventions. The world was in the middle of the Cold War and 
had experienced two world wars and many armed conflicts when the first Expert 
Meeting on Weapons That May Cause Unnecessary Suffering or Have Indiscriminate 
Effect was held in Geneva in 1973 to start negotiations on the restriction on certain 
conventional weapons.
484
 Since the Second World War, mines and booby traps had 
been commonly used in armed conflicts, including the deployment of anti-personnel 
mines in the war in Vietnam.
485
 Several attempts to address the issue of anti-
personnel mines and certain weapons were responded to by some States with 
reluctance before they finally agreed on the 1980 CCWC. The CCWC was built up 
from the diplomatic conference 1974-1977 which negotiated the Additional Protocols 
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
486
 For the indiscriminate effect, superfluous injury 
and excessive unnecessary suffering the weapons caused, they were restricted or 
prohibited by the Convention. These weapons are also known as ―inhumane 
weapons‖.487   
 
The Convention prohibits and restricts the use of certain conventional weapons, as its 
name suggests. It serves as an umbrella for five protocols to prohibit the use of 
certain weapons which inflict excessive injury and are indiscriminate: the Protocol on 
Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I, 1980);
488
 the Protocol on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II, 1980, 
                                               
484 Louis Maresca and Stuart Maslen (eds) The Banning of Anti-Personnel Landmines: The Legal 
Contribution of the International Committee of the Red Cross 1995-1999 (Cambridge University 
Press, 2000) at 19.  
485 Stuart Maslen Commentaries on Arms Control Treaties: The Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Oxford 
University Press, 2004) vol  I at 15. 
486
 David Kaye and Stephan A Solomon ―Current Development: The Second Review Conference of 
the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons‖ (2002) 96 Am J Int‘l L 922. 
487 See, Lachowski, Zdzislaw and Svenja Post ―Conventional Arms Control‖ in SIPRI Yearbook 2009: 
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford, 2009) at 435. The term ―inhumane‖, 
however, is not welcomed by others for it suggests that some other weapons are ―humane‖. 
488 Protocol I on Non-Detectable Fragments (1980), 1342 UNTS 137. 
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amended 1996);
489
 the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restriction on the Use of 
Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III, 1980);
490
 the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons 
(Protocol IV, 1995);
491
 and the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V, 
2003).
492
 To be bound by the Convention, a State party needs to ratify, accept, 
approve, or accede to at least two out of five protocols.
493
 As articles in the 
Convention contain only general provisions, the prohibitions and restrictions are 
regulated separately in each protocol.  
 
The Convention states that one of the purposes of the prohibitions and restrictions of 
the use of certain conventional weapons is meant to protect civilians, as reflected in 
its preamble. Paragraph two of the preamble states “[f]urther recalling the general 
principle of the protection of the civilian population against the effects of 
hostilities‖.494  The Convention then stresses the importance of the principle of 
international humanitarian law, and, in the third paragraph of the preamble, that the 
means of warfare is not unlimited: 
 
Basing themselves on the principle of international law that the right of the 
parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not 
unlimited, and on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed 
conflicts of weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a 
nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.
 495
 
 
Paragraph five of the preamble repeats the Martens clause, with slightly different 
wording:  
 
Confirming their determination that in cases not covered by this 
Convention and its annexed Protocols or by other international agreements, 
the civilian population and the combatants shall at all times remain under 
the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived 
from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the 
dictates of public conscience.
 496
 
 
                                               
489 Protocol II (1980, as amended 3 May 1996), 2048 UNTS 93. 
490 Protocol III (1980), 1342 UNTS 137. 
491
 Protocol IV  (1995) on Blinding Laser Weapons, 1380 UNTS 370. 
492 Protocol V (2003) on Explosive Remnants of War, 2399 UNTS100 (Doc.CCW/MSP/2003/2).  
493 CCWC (1980), 1342 UNTS 137, art 4. 
494 Ibid, preamble para 2. 
495 Ibid, preamble para 3. 
496 Ibid, preamble para 5. 
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The Convention‘s title itself reflects the humanitarian reasons for its adoption, as also 
evidenced by the word ―humanity‖ in preamble paragraph 5. The Convention was 
adopted in the middle of the Cold War period, when the concept of human rights was 
not as widely accepted as it has become today. And although it does not use the 
words ―human rights‖, paragraph 6 of the Convention recognizes the right to live in 
peace, which, it can be argued is a human right.
497
  
 
In current practices, the States Parties to the Convention convene annual meetings 
and evaluate the overall progress in a review conference every five years.  The first 
review conference was held in 1995 and 1996, the second in 2001, and the third in 
2006. The second review conference in 2001 amendment to article 1, as proposed by 
the United States, was to make the Protocols apply in non-international conflict.
498
  
 
A more significant progress was made in the second review conference, which tried 
to expand the discussion on the small-calibre weapons system proposed by 
Switzerland, which had been working to update the prohibition of expanding bullets 
prohibited by the 1899 Hague Declaration.
499
 The proposed protocol from 
Switzerland was concerned with small-calibre ammunition ―which does not 
correspond to the narrow technical definitions found in the Hague Declaration but 
which nonetheless produces similar wounds, owing to a high initial deposit of energy 
when it enters the human body‖.500 It implies that the principle of humanity enshrined 
in the Hague Declaration is still relevant as a standard for the new type of weapon. 
However, the conference did not manage to adopt the proposed protocol in the second 
review conference (2001) or third review conference (2006).  
 
Realizing that the Convention needed further promotion for its universality, the third 
review conference in 2006 reached three concrete agreements, namely to establish a 
compliance mechanism, in which any party could seek help on issues regarding 
                                               
497 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), art 3 states that ―[e]very one has the right to life, 
liberty and security of person‖. 
498 Louis Maresca ―Second Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons‖ 
(2002) 845 IRRC 255; the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference of the CCWC (UN Doc 
CCW/CONF/II/2) 
499 Ibid. 
500 Ibid. It refers to a modern bullet that works like dum-dum bullets. 
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implementation; to create a plan of action to promote the universality of the 
convention and its protocol; and to set up a sponsorship programme.
501
 
Understandably, this was an effort to encourage States parties, signatories, and States 
not party to adhere more to the values of the convention and its protocols. As of 31 
July 2012, the Convention has attracted more accessions and currently has 115 States 
Parties.
502
 The plan of action to promote the universality combined with the 
sponsorship programme would attract more attention to the convention and convince 
more States to accede to its protocols. However, the number of parties to the 
convention and its protocols remains relatively low compared to other arms control 
treaties, although the convention has been in force more than 25 years ago.
503
   
 
Article 8(2)(a) on review and amendments of the convention, facilitates new 
proposals from any State Party to propose ―new additional Protocols relating to other 
categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing Protocols.‖504 The 
article provides the further creation of new additional protocols if the States Parties 
agree to have them.  Two protocols, namely the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of 
War (2003) and the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (1995) were adopted after 
the Convention came into force on 2 December 1983. The addition of two protocols 
makes the convention currently consist of five protocols. 
 
 
a. Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I) (1980) 
 
The full text of the Protocol on Non-detectable Fragments is only one article which 
says that ―[i]t is prohibited to use any weapons the primary effect of which is to injure 
                                               
501 Zdzislaw Lachowski and Martin Sjogren ―Conventional Arms Control‖ in SIPRI Yearbook 2007: 
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (New York, Oxford University Press, 2007) at 
621. The sponsorship programme is to fund delegations from developing countries to attend the 
meeting and report the implementation or initiative to accede/ratify the convention.    
502 CCWC (1980), 1342 UNTS 137, as of 6 May 2012.     
503 As of 31 July 2011, the United Nations Treaties Series data shows that there are 115 States parties 
to the Convention; Compare to other arms control conventions such as the 1993 Chemical Weapon 
Convention (188 States parties), the 1997 Mine Ban Convention (160 States parties), or the 1972 
Biological Weapons Convention (165 State parties), the number of States parties to the 1980 CCW is 
relatively low. Information on status of multilateral conventions available at 
http://treaties.un.org/Home.aspx?lang=en. Last accessed 7 May 2012. 
504 CCWC (1980), 1342 UNTS 137, art 8.  
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by fragments which in the human body escape detection by X-rays.‖505  The 
reasoning behind the prohibition was that the injury caused by the non-detectable 
fragments would make it very difficult to treat the resulting wounds that caused 
unnecessary suffering, with no military utility.
506
      
 
The prohibition of the use of weapons not-detectable by X-ray is contained in 
numerous military manuals, even before the adoption of the Protocol.
507
  There is no 
record of the existence and use of this type of weapons although the ability to produce 
them has long been available.
508
 State practice establishes this prohibition as a norm 
of customary international law and, hence, facilitates the adoption the Protocol 
without controversy.
509
 Previously applied for international armed conflict, the review 
conference in the 2001 extended the application of the Protocol to the non-
international armed conflicts.   
 
 
b. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-
Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) (1980, amended in 1996) 
 
Because of their indiscriminate nature, mines, particularly anti-personnel mines, have 
been the target of control. Many rules in the Protocol II, which applies to anti-vehicle 
mines and anti-personnel mines, are aimed at obviating the indiscriminate effects of 
mines.
510
  Article 8 of the Protocol prohibits the ―indiscriminate use of weapons‖ to 
which it applies ―which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life‖.511 
However, the Protocol still allows the use of mines as long as they are detectable 
(article 4), have self-destruction and self-deactivation mechanisms according to 
                                               
505 Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restriction on the Use 
of certain Conventional Weapons, 1980, art 1.   
506 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law 
(New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005) vol I, at 277. 
507 Ibid, at 275.  
508 Ibid, at 276-277. 
509
 Ibid. 
510 Protocol II as amended in 1996, 2048 UNTS 93, art 3(5), art 3(6), art 4, art 6(2), and art 6(3); Jean-
Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law (New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 2005) vol I, at 280.  
511 Protocol II as amended in 1996, 2048 UNTS 93; UN Doc CCW/CONF.1/16 (Part I), art 3(8) and 
3(8.c). 
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technical annex (article 5), or have a well-recorded mine location (article 6).
512
The 
Protocol has no provision to address issues of production limitation, stockpiling 
destruction, or victim assistance and support. 
 
The limited restrictions on the issue of the use of mines in the Protocol II, particularly 
in relation to anti-personnel mines which have not yet adopted a total ban on the use,  
even after it was amended, created ―wide spread dismay‖ among the States parties to 
the CCWC after the review conference in May1996.
513
 Although the amended 
version of the Protocol II agreed in 1996 has answered some concerns of the scope 
and application much further than in the original Protocol II, many were of the view 
that the amended Protocol II still fell short of the total prohibition of anti-personnel 
mines they wanted.
514
 There was a view among States parties that the prohibition of 
anti-personnel mines would never be achieved under the CCWC framework and, 
therefore, an alternative forum was necessary to address the issue.  
 
For booby-traps, the Protocol II and amended Protocol II prohibit the use if their 
nature or employment violates the legal protection accorded to a protected persons or 
object.
515
 Nevertheless, booby-traps are still the subject to general rules on conduct of 
hostilities, particularly the principle of distinction and the principle of 
proportionality.
516
   
 
 
  
 
c. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary 
Weapons (Protocol III) (1980)  
 
The discussions in the preparatory conference on the convention on certain weapons 
indicated that a large number of States advocated a total prohibition of the use of 
                                               
512 Protocol II as amended in 1996, 2048 UNTS 93; UN Doc CCW/CONF.1/16 (Part I). 
513
 Stuart Maslen Anti-Personnel Mines under Humanitarian Law: A View from the Vanishing Point 
(Intersentia-Transnational Publishers, 2001) at 77. 
514 Ibid. 
515 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law 
(New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005) vol I, at 278. 
516 Ibid, at 279. 
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incendiary weapons.
517
  Several others did not subscribe to a total ban, although they 
did urge strict restrictions to avoid civilian casualties which were later reflected in the 
Protocol III.
518
   
 
The Protocol provides the definition of incendiary weapon as ―any weapon or 
munition which is primarily designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injury to 
persons through the action of flame, heat, or combination thereof‖.519  The Protocol 
underlines the possible indiscriminate effect of incendiary weapons on civilians and 
civilian objects. Hence, article 2(1) urges the parties in armed conflict to make 
distinction between civilian population/objects and military objectives, and further 
prohibits attack on civilians: 
 
It is prohibited in all circumstances to make the civilian population as such, 
individual civilians or civilian objects the object of attack by incendiary 
weapons.
520
 
 
 
The next sub-article 2(2) and 2(3) deals with the prohibition to set military objectives 
within a concentrated area of civilians, which again stresses the principle of 
distinction between civilians or civilian objectives and military objectives: 
 
It is prohibited in all circumstances to make any military objective located 
within a concentration of civilians the object of attack by air-delivered 
incendiary weapons.
 521
 
 
 
 
The Protocol continues by stressing:  
 
It is further prohibited to make any military objective located within a 
concentration of civilians the object of attack by means of incendiary 
weapons other than air-delivered incendiary weapons, except when such 
military objective is clearly separated from the concentration of civilians 
and all feasible precautions are taken with a view to limiting the incendiary 
effects to the military objective and to avoiding, and in any event to 
                                               
517
 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law 
(New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005) vol I, at 287. 
518 Ibid.  
519 Protocol III (1980), 1342 UNTS 137, art 1(1). 
520 Ibid, art 2 (1).  
521 Ibid, art 2 (2). 
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minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to 
civilian objects.
 522
   
 
It is also worth noting that the Protocol repeatedly states the prohibition of the use of 
incendiary weapons against civilians, but does not rule out the use of such a weapon 
against military objective. The fact that the Protocol III does not include the 
prohibition of the use against combatants ―does not mean, however, that the use of 
incendiary weapons against combatants is lawful in all circumstances‖.523 Some argue 
that incendiary weapons may not be used against combatants in a way that that would 
cause unnecessary suffering.
524
 
 
 
d. Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV) (1995) 
 
The Protocol prohibits the use of blinding laser weapons specifically designed to 
cause permanent blindness to the eye, and the parties to the Protocol undertake to not 
transfer such weapons.
525
 There was no record that blinding laser weapons had been 
employed in armed conflicts before the adoption of the Protocol in 1995 despite a 
report that some countries had laser weapons programmes.
526
 The Protocol 
demonstrates that humanitarian law could pre-empt the non-existent but unwanted 
development of a blinding laser weapon which is considered inhumane.
527
 One 
delegate stated at the adoption of the Protocol that ―this is the first time in human 
history that a kind of inhuman weapon is declared illegal and prohibited before it is 
actually used‖.528     
 
                                               
522 Ibid, art 2 (3). 
523 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law 
(New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005) vol I, at 290. 
524 Ibid. 
525 Protocol IV (1995) to the CCWC, 1380 UNTS 370, art 1. 
526 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law 
(New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005) vol I, at 293; see also, James M Strong ―Blinding 
Laser Weapons and Protocol IV: Obscuring the Humanitarian Vision‖ (1996-1997) 15 Dick J Int‘l L 
237 at 245. 
527 ―Symposium of the Blinding Laser Weapons‖ (1996) 18 Loy LA Int‘l & Comp L J 703.  
528 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law 
(New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005) vol I, at 293. The US, although not a party to the 
Protocol IV, withdrew the anti-personnel lasers it was about to deploy.     
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The prohibition of the use of laser weapons is ruled out as ―the effect of laser beam is 
not indiscriminate‖ so that any legal case against them ―rel[ies] on superfluous injury 
or unnecessary suffering‖.529 As commentators argue, in the balance between military 
interests and humanitarian considerations, blindness caused by a laser beam must be 
described as unnecessary suffering.
530
   
 
The prohibition of the use of laser weapons adds another total ban of certain weapon 
to the 1980 CCWC, the other is the Protocol I on Non-Detectable Fragments.
531
  
Article 1 of the Protocol affirms:  
  
It is prohibited to employ laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole 
combat function or as one of their combat functions, to cause permanent 
blindness to unenhanced vision, that is to the naked eye or to the eye with 
corrective eyesight devices. The High Contracting Parties shall not transfer 
such weapons to any State or non-State entity.
532
  
 
 
Article 1 prohibits the deployment of blinding laser weapons but does not mention 
the prohibition of the production of such weapons. The possibility of transfer of laser 
weapons to non-party States or non-States actors is prevented by the prohibition of 
transfer in the last sentence of article 1.       
 
 
The Protocol insists the States Parties take precautions in the use of laser equipment 
as article 2 states:  
 
In the employment of laser systems, the High Contracting Parties shall take 
all feasible precautions to avoid the incidence of permanent blindness to 
unenhanced vision.
533
   
 
                                               
529 Bengt Anderberg and Ove Bring ―Battlefield Laser Weapons and International Law‖ (1988) 57 
Nordic J Int‘l L 457 at 459; but see counter arguments in W Hays Parks ―Travaux Preparatoires and 
Legal Analysis of Blinding Laser Protocols‖ [1997] Army Law 33 at 33-34. Parks describes another 
perspective arguing that ―[b]linding is not a new battlefield phenomenon, and blinding by laser was not 
viewed as worse than other, lawful mechanisms for causing blinding, other injury, or death to 
combatants‖.   
530 Bengt Anderberg and Ove Bring ―Battlefield Laser Weapons and International Law‖ (1988) 57 
Nordic J Int‘l L 457 at 467. 
531 Protocol I (1980) to the CCWC, 1342 UNTS 137.  
532 Protocol  IV (1995) to the CCWC, 1380 UNTS 370, art 1.  
533 Protocol  IV (1995) to the CCWC, 1380 UNTS 370, art 2.  
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Laser weapons may not kill combatants; however, blinding weapons would have 
huge psychological impact on troops because there is no treatment and the individual 
would be permanently blind.
534
 Furthermore, a maimed soldier would be a heavy 
burden to the unit as the person would require on average, 40 personnel in the medic 
chain.
535
 Blinding as ―a method of warfare is a superfluous injury and a cause of 
unnecessary suffering, both of which are prohibited under existing international 
law‖.536 The prohibition of laser weapons highlights again the principle of 
international humanitarian law that the means of warfare is not unlimited.
537
  
 
 
e.  Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V) (2003) 
 
The public acknowledgement of the humanitarian impact of explosive means of war 
does not stop at anti-personnel mines; the unexploded ordnances as remnants of war 
similarly have disastrous consequences for civilians.  The humanitarian concern for 
the explosives abandoned after the war ends is expressed in the first paragraph of the 
Protocol: ―Recognizing the serious post-conflict humanitarian problems caused by 
explosive remnants of war‖[emphasis in original].538 The discussion under the 
Protocol V covers the issue of unexploded artillery shells, cluster munitions, hand 
grenades, bombs and mortar shells.
539
  
 
Article 1 on general application and scope of application reiterates the concerns and 
implies the problems faced by civilians after armed conflict ends, as:  
 
                                               
534 Marshal John ―Blinding Laser Weapons‖ (1997) 31 British Medical Journal 1392.  
535 Ibid. 
536 Burrus Carnahan M ―Unnecessary Suffering, The red Cross, and Tactical Laser Weapon‖ (1996) 
18(4) Loy LA Int‘l & Comp L J 703 at 705; James M Strong ―Blinding Laser Weapons and Protocol 
IV: Obscuring the Humanitarian Vision‖ (1996-1997) 15 Dick J Int‘l L 237 at 264.  
537 Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (1977), art 35(1). The wording of ―the means of 
warfare is not unlimited‖ is reiterated in arms control agreements such as the Mine Ban Convention 
and the Convention on Cluster Munitions.    
538 Protocol V (2003) to the CCWC, 2399 UNTS 100, preamble para 1.   
539 ICRC, Introduction to Protocol V to the CCWC 
<http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/610?OpenDocument>. Last accessed 11 July 2011.  
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High Contracting Parties agree to comply with the obligations specified in 
this Protocol, both individually and in co-operation with other High 
Contracting Parties, to minimise the risks and effects of explosive remnants 
of war in post-conflict situations.
 540
 
 
The Convention‘s review conference in 2006 and the events afterwards, showed that 
the entry into force of the Protocol V and the discussion of the cluster munitions issue 
under this Protocol, did not satisfy some States which sought the prohibition of 
cluster munitions to address humanitarian concerns.
541
 States were of the view that 
the success of negotiations on the prohibition of cluster munitions under the CCWC 
framework was doubtful, since some major influential countries, such as the US and 
Russia, opposed any further restrictions on the weapons causing problems in post-
conflict situations.
542
 The inability of the CCWC to produce a comprehensive, legally 
binding prohibition of cluster munitions drove some countries to take the issue of 
cluster munitions out of the CCWC and establish another forum with the aim to have 
a binding instrument to ban cluster munitions.
543
 Later, cluster munitions were 
discussed in a separate forum leading to the adoption of the Cluster Munitions 
Convention. 
 
 
8. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Mine Ban 
Convention) (1997) 
 
The Mine Ban Convention was adopted after the traditional forum to discuss the issue 
was regarded as unsuccessful in banning anti-personnel mines.  While the negotiation 
on the restriction of anti-personnel mines in the 1995/1996 review conference of the 
CCWC did not progress to the level many expected, the number of victims of the 
weapons kept increasing. In the time of negotiation, in Bosnia alone, it was estimated 
                                               
540 Protocol V (2003) to the CCWC, 2399 UNTS 100, art 1.  
541
 Zdzislaw Lachoswski and Martin Sjogren ―Conventional Arms Control‖ in SIPRI Yearbook 2007: 
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (New York, Oxford University Press, 2007) at 
620. 
542 Ibid. 
543 Norway then took an initiative to hold a conference in February 2007 to negotiate a legally binding 
instrument on cluster munitions. 
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that three to six million anti-personnel mines were scattered around the country.
544
 
Additionally, an estimated 1,600 victims each month (or 19,200 a year) were killed or 
wounded by anti-personnel mines around the world.
545
 The drop in the number of 
victims to 3,956 new casualties in 2009, the lowest after the adoption of the 
Convention, is one of the success indicators.
546
 
 
 
a. Process 
 
The adoption of the Mine Ban Convention (and later also the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions) was initiated by several countries with wide support from civil society, 
which was of the view that the issues of anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions 
were not adequately addressed in the existing mechanism.
547
 The dissatisfaction with 
the process to have a binding instrument to ban the use of anti-personnel mines 
brought the countries together in Ottawa, Canada in 1997 to sign a Convention which 
banned the use of the anti-personnel mines.
548
   
 
The proponents of a total ban on anti-personnel mines could not accept a treaty which 
did not ban the weapons totally, even with the consequence that the main producers 
and users would stay outside the treaty. Hence, although the convention successfully 
attracted as many as 160 countries,
549
 the major producers such as the US, China, and 
Russia, are not parties and still stay outside the convention.  
 
In the negotiation of the Mine Ban Convention process, the US at one point indeed 
joined the process but withdrew at a later stage because its conditions to sign the 
treaty were not acceptable to others, particularly on the geographical exception for the 
                                               
544 Jim Wurst ―Inching Toward a Ban‖ (1996) 52(2) Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 10 at 10. 
545 Ibid.  
546 Landmine Monitor 2010 (Canada, International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 2010) at 1. The 
number represents new casualties to landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) recorded in 
2009.  
547
 Ibid, at 77. More than 40 States, with support from ICBL and ICRC, were disappointed with the 
fact that the amended Protocol II of the CCW fell short of the total prohibition of anti-personnel mines. 
548 The signing of the Convention in Ottawa gives the Convention an informal name of Ottawa 
Convention. 
549 Mine Ban Convention (1997), 2056 UNTS 211; as of 31 July 2012, see the status of the Convention 
at the United Nations Treaty Series.  
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use of anti-personnel mines in South Korea and its proposal for a change of 
definition.
550
  
 
The process to ban anti-personnel mines, culminating in the signing ceremonies in 
Ottawa 3-4 December 1997, has two important implications to note.  First, there was 
wide civil society support to stop the use and production of anti-personnel mines to 
avoid further casualties of the weapons. The ICBL and activist Jody Williams shared 
the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997 for their efforts to ban anti-personnel mines and it was 
also recognition of the civil society role. Second, the process of the negotiation was 
finalized outside the United Nations framework.
551
  
 
As in other conventions, the rationales and backgrounds of the Mine Ban Convention 
can be seen from its preamble. Civilian protection is one of the goals the convention 
seeks. The first preamble paragraph of the convention affirms the States Parties‘ 
commitment to stopping civilian casualties and suffering:  
 
Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-
personnel mines, that kill and maim hundreds of people every week, mostly 
innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct 
economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of 
refugees and internally displaced persons….552  
 
The preamble of the convention continues quoting the humanitarian reason in 
paragraph 8, ―[s]tressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of 
humanity‖. The convention then notes that the suffering caused by anti-personnel 
mines is indiscriminate:  
 
Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of 
the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not 
unlimited... on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and 
combatants.
 553
 
 
                                               
550 Stuart Maslen Anti-Personnel Mines under Humanitarian Law: A View from the Vanishing Point 
(Intersentia-Transnational Publishers, 2001) at 84. 
551
 The adoption of the 1997 Mine Ban Convention was marked as the first multilateral treaty 
negotiated outside the UN mechanism since the formation of the United Nations.  
552 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel 
Mines and on Their Destruction (1997). The Convention consists of 11 preamble paragraphs and 22 
articles.  
553 Mine Ban Convention (1997), preamble para 11. 
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The convention suggests that the use of anti-personnel mines is against the principle 
of humanity and humanitarian law, as they discriminately maim the victims, hence 
their use violates the principle of international humanitarian law since distinction 
between civilians and combatants cannot be made.  
 
Anti-personnel mines are the weapons which kill and maim their victims 
indiscriminately,
554
 and worse, they still pose a threat to civilians when the armed 
conflicts end and are a hindrance to reconstruction and economic development. The 
Mine Ban Convention provides the definition of ―anti-personnel mine‖ as:  
 
A mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a 
person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines 
designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle 
as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are 
not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.
 555
 
 
The 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, production and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (the Mine Ban 
Convention) is considered one of the success stories of arms control conventions.  Its 
success can be seen from many aspects; the fact that 121 States came to sign the 
Convention was an unprecedented number; the decreasing trend of total anti-
personnel mines stockpiling; and the pace at which the convention came into force. 
The Convention was opened for signing on 3 December 1997 and quickly came into 
force on 1 March 1999 after the fortieth State submitted its instrument of 
ratification.
556
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
554 Nigel Vinson ―The Demise of Anti-Personnel Mine: A Military Perspective‖ (1998) 143 Royal 
United Service Institute for Defense Studies Journal 18. 
555 Mine Ban Convention (1997), 2056 UNTS 211, art 2(1). 
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117 
 
b. Implications 
 
The Mine Ban Convention is unique, for it is regarded as a hybrid of disarmament 
and humanitarian law.
557
  The articles of the convention ask the States Parties to 
undertake obligations such as not to use or produce, and to destroy the anti-personnel 
mines stockpiles which are disarmament measures. On the other hand, the convention 
is also based on principles of fundamental humanitarian law.
558
 In addition to these 
prohibitions, the Mine Ban Convention is also the first convention which regulates 
the matters of victim assistance, an issue of assisting to reintegrate victims into 
society.
559
 
 
From the beginning, the negotiations departed from the traditional conservative arms 
control processes. One of several aspects that make it different from typical arms 
control processes is the considerations; humanitarian considerations are the main 
purpose of the treaty, above the more strategic, political and military concerns.
560
  It 
was unprecedented in a multilateral treaty process after World War II and the creation 
of the UN. These two characteristics are a new formula for the arms control 
negotiation with strong support from a few governments dissatisfied with the existing 
status quo and large support and pressure from civil society.  
 
 
10. Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) (2008) 
 
As with the anti-personnel mines, the major cluster munitions users and producers 
opposed the total ban the treaty sought, thus it was more convenient to discuss the 
issue of cluster munitions in the framework the Certain Conventional Weapons 
                                               
557 Stuart Maslen Commentaries on Arms Control Treaties: The Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2004) vol 1 at 63. 
558 Ibid. Maslen further states that the Convention could be described as a disarmament law treaty with 
a humanitarian, rather than a military or security purpose.  
559 Mine Ban Convention (1997), 2056 UNTS 211, art 6 (7e). 
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Convention (CCWC) where they had more room to avoid the total ban clause.
561
 
Unlike the process in the CCWC where all major powers participated, the convention 
on cluster munitions was negotiated without the presence of some major powers, 
namely China, Russia, and the US, in the whole process.
562
  
 
The US refusal to engage in the negotiation of the CCM was mainly because the 
weapon was considered by the US to be an effective weapon in armed conflict,
563
  
and it does not make sense to ban effective weapons. The US quoted military and 
procedural concerns for its refusal to participate in the Oslo process and argued that 
amending the CCWC would be an appropriate means to address the problem of 
cluster munitions.
564
  
 
The series of armed conflicts involving the massive use of cluster munitions have 
driven States and civil society alike to find an answer to the threat of the weapons. In 
the war in Iraq in 2003, for example, the United States and United Kingdom used at 
least twelve thousand clusters containing two million sub-munitions, leaving 
thousands of unexploded sub-munitions, threatening civilians.
565
 In a similar 
scenario, during the one-month war against Hezbollah in 2006, Israel launched about 
four million sub-munitions into Southern Lebanon.
566
 Many of those remaining 
unexploded sub-munitions are a danger to civilians and will take years to clean out. 
 
The negotiation process and signing of the Convention on Cluster Munitions 
replicated the Mine Ban Convention. It started from world-wide concern about the 
effects of the use of cluster munitions.567  In the negotiation of a possible new 
                                               
561 Under the CCWC, landmines issue is under the Protocol II (mines, booby trap, and other devices) 
and cluster munitions issue under the Protocol V (explosive remnants of war). However, neither 
Protocol provides a total ban on the use of mines and cluster munitions. 
562 From Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions, 22-23 February 2007, to Dublin Diplomatic 
Conference, 19-30 May 2008 China, Russia, and the US were not present. 
563 Joseph Anzalone ―The Virtue of A Proportional Response: The United States Response against the 
Convention on Cluster Munitions‖ (2010) 22 Pace Int‘l Rev 183 at 184.  
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 Ibid.  
565 Bonnie Docherty ―The Time is Now: A Historical Argument for a Cluster Munitions Convention‖ 
(2007) 20 Harvard Human Rights Journal 53. 
566 Ibid. 
567 Convention on Cluster Munitions (signed 3 December 2008, entered into force 1 August 2010); See 
Final Document of the Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a Convention on Cluster Munitions, 
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instrument on cluster munitions in the CCWC framework, it had proven difficult to 
balance military and humanitarian considerations as it was considered as being ―tilted 
too much toward military considerations‖.568 
 
Following the failure of the cluster munitions issue under the CCWC, working with 
other like-minded States and civil societies, in February 2007, Norway launched an 
initiative, known as Oslo Process.
569
 The Oslo Process set out to create an 
international treaty by the end of 2008, which it fulfilled. This becomes the most 
recent example of the adoption of an arms control convention based on humanity or 
humanitarian reasons. As with the process of the Mine Ban Convention, it is also a 
departure from the traditional arms control framework, which is based more on 
security, moving toward more humanitarian considerations.
570
 The preamble 
paragraphs of the Convention expressly quote the humanity, human rights, and 
humanitarian principles as background and rationale.
571
 
 
Based on humanitarian concerns, the Convention prohibits the use, transfer, and 
production of cluster munitions, particularly the indiscriminate effect of the weapons 
on civilian victims.
572
 The Convention requires States parties to destroy existing 
stockpiles, and make provision to assist survivors and clearance of contaminated 
areas.
573
  The process and the adoption of the CCM closely follow the process and 
plan of the implementation adopted by the Mine Ban Convention, which included 
                                                                                                                                      
Dublin 19-30 May 2008 (CCM/78), Part II. Available at 
<http://www.clustermunitionsdublin.ie/pdf/CCM78_Rev15July2009.pdf>. Last accessed 8 May 2012.  
568 United Nations Disarmament Yearbook 2008 (Office for Disarmament Affairs, New York, 2009) 
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Document of the Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a Convention on Cluster Munitions, 
Dublin 19-30 May 2008 (CCM/78), Part II. 
572 Ibid, preamble para 3. 
573 Ibid, art 3, 4, and 5. 
120 
 
launching an international campaign to ban cluster munitions and the inclusion of 
civil societies in the process, preparation, and negotiations of the treaty.
574
   
 
As in other treaties, there are contrasting opinions and arguments. One commentator, 
for example, argues that the adoption of the CCM which bans the use of the weapons 
is unrealistic at this time and hence will keep the important big countries outside the 
convention.
575
 In the view of Frank Tempesta, there are two reasons why the cluster 
munitions should not be removed from the CCWC; firstly, because the CCWC 
discussions involve more countries, so are more inclusive, with more participating 
States including great powers; secondly, the Convention‘s physical requirements, 
such as requiring a minimum weight and a maximum number of sub-munitions, will 
instead force military to use larger unitary bombs with greater explosive power, 
causing more collateral damage.
576
  However, this opinion does not take into account 
that for years the CCWC has been at stalemate on the issue of cluster munitions and 
has not projected any possible prohibition of the use of cluster munitions in its 
work.
577
  
 
The CCM takes into account the respect for human rights and ensures victims caused 
by cluster munitions get assistance as reflected in the preamble paragraph 9 which 
says ―to ensure and promote the full realization of all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of all persons with disabilities‖.578 Preamble paragraph 17 further states 
―[s]tressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity‖.579 
The States Parties of the convention are also committed to ―[b]asing themselves on 
                                               
574 Civil societies participated actively in series of meetings in the process toward the adoption in 
Dublin 30 May 2008. Those civil societies are recorded as observers in the Final Document of the 
Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a Convention on Cluster Munitions, Dublin 19-30 May 
2008 (CCM/78).  
575 Frank Tempesta ―Finding an Effective, Practical Solution to Unexploded Ordnance‖ Jane’s Defense 
Weekly (12 August 2009) at 23. 
576 Ibid; see also, Daniel Joseph Raccuia ―The Convention on Cluster Munitions: An Incomplete 
Solution to the Cluster Munition Problem‖ (2011) 44 Van J  Transnat‘l L 465.   
577 Zdzislaw Lachoswski and Martin Sjogren ―Conventional Arms Control‖ in SIPRI Yearbook 2007: 
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press, 2007) at 620. 
578 CCM (2008), preamble para 9. 
579 CCM (signed 3 December 2008, entered into force 1 August 2010), UNTS no I-47713, preamble 
para 17. 
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the principles and rules of international humanitarian law‖,580 as a clear indication of 
the IHL approach in the convention.  
 
 
 
C. Summary 
 
Humanitarian law and human rights law have been invoked in the considerations of 
arms control in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries as has been observed in the 
treaties negotiations and discussion of arms controls.  IHL have a major development 
role in setting up international mechanisms towards protecting civilians in time of 
war. Controls, prohibitions, and restrictions of the use of weapons use humanitarian 
rationales by identifying whether weapons cause unnecessary suffering or are 
indiscriminate in nature. Protection of civilians demands that a distinction be made 
between civilians and combatants, and such distinction cannot be made if 
indiscriminate weapons are used in armed conflict.       
 
Having examined the conventions, Table III.1 below shows the main rationales in 
each convention.  
 
Table III.1:  
Humanitarian rationale in prohibition/restriction of the use of 
conventional weapons  
 
 Indiscriminate  Superfluous Injury/ 
unnecessary 
suffering 
 (1868) St Petersburg 
Treaty 
 ×   
(1980) Certain 
Conventional Weapons 
Convention (CCWC) 
    
 Protocol I to CCWC on 
Non-                      
Detectable Fragments 
×   
Protocol II to CCWC on 
Mines, Booby Traps and 
other Devices 
  × 
                                               
580 CCM (signed 3 December 2008, entered into force 1 August 2010), UNTS no I-47713, preamble 
para 20. 
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Protocol III to CCWC on 
Incendiary Weapons 
  × 
Protocol IV to CCWC on 
Blinding Laser Weapons 
×   
Protocol V to CCWC on 
Explosive Remnants of 
War 
  × 
(1997) Mine Ban Convention   × 
(2008) Convention on 
Cluster Munitions 
  × 
 
 
The table above indicates the rationales of multilateral arms control treaties on 
conventional arms as stated in their preamble paragraphs.  Humanitarian reasons are 
the most frequently cited rationales found in the treaties of arms controls as a 
principle in adopting an arms control treaty.  From those treaties, some lessons could 
be learnt. As clearly demonstrated by the Mine Ban Convention and the Convention 
on Cluster Munitions, humanity could be a strong and valid rationale to regulate, 
restrict or prohibit the use of particular types of weapons. Each of these Conventions 
demonstrates that:  
 
a.  Human rights values, in terms of preventing indiscriminate impact on human 
development, have started to become a rationale used in arms control treaties; 
and 
 
b.  The process of their adoption shows that the process of adoption of an arms 
control treaty may be held outside the traditional forum of arms control. The 
diversion of the negotiation outside the traditional forum takes place when the 
traditional forum fails and a majority of like-minded States decide to set up a 
new specific forum to accommodate the concerns unresolved by the traditional 
forum. 
 
As several conventions show, humanitarian law principles, such as prohibition of the 
use of weapons indiscriminate in nature, and causing excessive injury or unnecessary 
suffering, have been used as rationales to prohibit the use of weapons. It will then be 
123 
 
a question of whether such rationales could also be applied to limit the proliferation 
of small arms. Here two things are encountered: first, small arms, basically, are not 
indiscriminate weapons; second, humanitarian law if it is to apply to  small arms, 
applies in time of war, meanwhile small arms are threat to civilians at all times. This 
may justify a broader approach than humanitarian law when discussing or negotiating 
small arms issues, viewing the problem from a human rights perspective.  
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Chapter IV: 
State Responsibility and its Association with Small Arms 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
States have power to set policy on production, export, import and transfer of small 
arms through State control. However, once a State claims to respect international law 
by becoming party to various international treaties,
581
 it has a responsibility to ensure 
that the small arms under its control do not undermine respect for international law. 
State responsibility with regards to transfer of small arms is viewed by this thesis 
through the development of international law on State responsibility, namely by 
inspecting the traditional and temporary interpretations of the concept of State 
responsibility.  
 
Although the uncontrolled availability of small arms may facilitate conflicts, crimes, 
and violations against human rights, the weapons themselves are considered, prima 
facie, legitimate instruments of defence, in as much as the right to self defence for a 
sovereign State is guaranteed by the UN Charter.
582
 Small arms are not considered an 
illegal type of weapon. In this context, it is logical to analyse States‘ shared 
responsibilities to protect individuals and societies from atrocities which are 
facilitated by the uncontrolled availability of small arms.  
 
The thesis will examine the State responsibility with regard to small arms and link it 
with the work of the International Law Commission (ILC) on Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
583
 and the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP).
584
 The 
thesis examines these doctrines to find how they may support the hypothesis that it is 
                                               
581 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaty (done 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 
1155 UNTS 331, art 2 (g), which states:  ―‘Party‘ means a State which has consented to be bound by 
the treaty and for which the treaty is in force‖.  The Convention also notes at preamble para 2 that the 
pacta sunt servanda rule is universally recognised. 
582 Charter of the United Nations (26 June 1945), 1 UNTS XVI, art 51.  
583
 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (adopted by General Assembly 
A/RES/56/83 of 12 December 2001); reprinted in Yearbook of the International Law Commission 
2001 (New York and Geneva, United Nations, 2007) vol 2, part 2. 
584 ICISS The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (Ottawa, International Development Research Centre, 2001); also, 2005 World 
Summit Outcome, A/Res/60/1 of 16 September 2005), para 138-140.  
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the responsibility of a State to protect population as a whole. Small arms, or all types 
of weapons in general, are transferred with the purpose of enabling the recipients to 
engage in armed conflict. Despite the threat by small arms to human security (as 
shown in Chapter II), the current mechanism to hold States responsible through 
development of international law has been described as ―slow, weak, and 
ineffectual‖.585 The thesis analyses the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts and the RtoP to discover what link they may have to small arms 
transfer. In the process, the discussion will identify the elements of IHL and IHRL in 
the State responsibility in the context of small arms.  
 
 
B.  State Responsibility and Small Arms 
1. Traditional State sovereignty  
 
State responsibility in the traditional sense, is State-centred and the understanding of 
State responsibility lays emphasis on a State‘s conduct relative to another State.586 
While the thesis holds the view that States are the primary actors in international 
relations and a primary subject of international law,
587
 it acknowledges the fact that 
the concept of State responsibility is not static but evolves dynamically. The 
traditional view of State responsibility dictates that international law empowers a 
sovereign State to exercise exclusively absolute jurisdiction within its territorial 
borders, and that other States and multilateral actors have the corresponding duty not 
to interfere in a State‘s internal affairs.588  
 
The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 was identified as laying the foundations for the 
principle of State sovereignty and marked the start of traditional international law, 
based on principles of territoriality and State autonomy.
589
 The Peace of Westphalia 
changed international relations by recognising practices which had not existed before 
in many respects, for example, the theory of a single overall power ruling Europe 
                                               
585 Theresa A DiPerna ―Small Arms and Light Weapons: Complicity ‗with A View‘ Toward Extended 
State Responsibility‖ (2008) 20 Fla J Int‘l L 25 at 26. 
586 Theodor Meron The Humanization of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006) at 248.  
587 Guido Acquaviva ―Subjects of International Law: A Power-Based Analysis‖ (2005) 38 Vand J 
Transnat‘l L 345 at 352-355.  
588 Christopher C Joyner ―The Responsibility to Protect‖ (2007) 47(3) Va J Internat‘l L 693. 
589 Harold Hongju Koh ―Why Do Nations Obey International Law?‖(1997) 106(8) Yale L J 2607.  
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through a unified set of rules, broke away to one which recognised a multitude of 
sovereigns, theoretically equal, who could determine the rules for themselves within 
the realms of their own territorial sovereignty.
590
   
 
Sovereign States functioned as the main actors, while other players, such as non-
governmental organizations, played minor roles.
591
 The relations between sovereign 
States were based on equality among them.
592
 Thus, other States should not interfere 
as sovereignty is characterized by the power of a State over its territory. The Charter 
of the United Nations affirms the sovereignty of its members and shall not ―intervene 
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction‖593 as a key rule in 
traditional relations between States.
594
 This principle of non-intervention together 
with other principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity were later enshrined in 
the United Nations Charter that guides the contemporary international relations 
among States, as the ―Organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign equality 
of all its Members‖ and that all members should refrain ―from the threat of use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State‖.595 
 
The State system in the Westphalian model seemed to emerge as the answer to the 
problem of order and violence in seventeenth century Europe.
596
 However, it might 
not be very much help in the face of new challenges in twenty-first century world. 
The Westhapalian model has been challenged by many who argue that the world‘s 
interdependence and globalization (economic, ecological, social, and human rights) 
make absolute sovereignty impractical in current geopolitics and the national 
                                               
590 Wyndham A Bewes ―Gathered Notes on the Peace of Westphalia of 1648‖ in The Grotius Society, 
Problems of Peace and War: Papers Read before the Society in the Year 1933 (New York, London, 
Wildy&Sons and Oceana Publications, 1962) at 68. 
591 Harold Hongju Koh ―Why Do Nations Obey International Law?‖(1997) 106(8) Yale L J 2607. 
592 Vladimir R Idelson ―The Law of Nations and the Individual‖ in The Grotius Society, Transactions 
for the Year 1944: Problems of Peace and War (New York, London, Wildy&Sons and Oceana 
Publications, 1962) vol 30 at 53.  Interestingly, in the same presentation, Idelson states that ―if law 
were to prevail at all for mankind, States could not be regarded as absolutely sovereign‖.  
593
 Charter of the United Nations, 1 UNTS XVI, art 2 (7). 
594 LC Green ―Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law and Threats to National Sovereignty‖ 
(2003) 8 J Conflict & Sec L 101 at 102.  
595 Charter of the United Nations, 1 UNTS XVI, art 2(1, 4). 
596 Ramesh Thakur The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the 
Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 77. 
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sovereignty actually has been always affected by current international structures.
597
  
This is particularly relevant today due to universal recognition of issues such as 
human rights as accelerated by the end of the Cold War or prohibitions of certain 
methods of warfare, establishment of international criminal court, the World Trade 
Organisation, which all show the traditional sovereignty challenged.
598
 Globalization 
and the common global risks faced by the world are often responded to by the active 
progressive involvement of non-State actors on many issues which facilitate 
international control of States and show the limits to national sovereignty.
599
 
Discussion about the role of civil societies, particularly on their involvement in 
campaigns to control the trade in small arms, is discussed in Chapter VII.    
 
The traditional view that relations between States are solely a bilateral issue does not 
fit with the reality that small arms transfers may, in some situations, destabilize 
countries and regions.
600
 The trade of small arms has many implications for human 
security beyond static national boundaries and sovereignty, which imply a need for 
international control.  
 
 
2. Human rights in contemporary international relations  
 
There is a tension between a world of sovereign States and a world striving for the 
universal recognition of a human rights norm that requires a State to treat its citizens 
with at least a basic level of human dignity.
601
 When a State becomes a party to a 
human rights treaty, it is agreeing to the values of that treaty and to be accountable 
regardless of what society that State is from. Human rights make no distinction ―on 
the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or 
                                               
597 Dieter Fleck ―National Sovereignty and International Responsibility: Legal and Policy Aspects‖ in 
Michael Bothe, Mary Ellen O‘Connell and Natalie Ronzitti (eds) Redefining Sovereignty: The Use of 
Force after the Cold War (Transnational Publishers, 2005) at 53. 
598
 Ibid. 
599 Ibid.  
600 Report of the UN Secretary-General on Small Arms (S/2008/258), 17 April 2008, at [4-9]. 
601 Stacy Humes-Schulz ―Limiting Sovereign Immunity in the Age of Human Rights‖ (2008) 21 Harv 
Hum Rts J  110; Also, Louis Henkin The Age of Rights (New York, Columbia University Press, 1990) 
at 13.  
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territory to which a person belongs‖.602 Some argue that human rights now have 
become a mainstream part of international law, and ―respect for human rights a 
central subject and responsibility of international relations‖.603 Thus, from a human 
rights perspective, the demands of human rights conventions and law know no 
borders and dictate how a government must interact with its citizens.
604
 
 
The classical understanding of State responsibility as bilateral in nature is, therefore, 
strained when applied to contemporary human rights and humanitarian norms.
605
 
Contemporary development in politics and international law puts more emphasis on 
respect for human rights, particularly reflected in the drafting of international 
agreements.
606
 The Charter of the United Nations emphasises that one of the purposes 
of the organisation is to achieve international cooperation ―in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights‖.607  States also have pledged themselves to 
achieve ―the promotion of universal respect for and the observance of human rights 
and fundamental freedom‖.608  A series of international conventions on human rights 
adopted by States and the establishment of the Human Rights Council strengthen the 
challenge to the traditional sovereignty.      
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a reminder that ―disregard and 
contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts‖ and that ―freedom from 
fear‖ is one of the highest aspirations of people.609  The same respect for human 
rights is echoed by the Declaration of the Right of Peoples to Peace, that ―life without 
                                               
602 Universal Declaration of Human Rights , UNGA res 217A, adopted 10 December 1948, art 2(2). 
603 ICISS The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (Ottawa, International development Research Centre, 2001) at [6-1.25]. 
604
 Stacy Humes-Schulz ―Limiting Sovereign Immunity in the Age of Human Rights‖ (2008) 21 Harv 
Hum Rts J 110.  
605 Theodor Meron The Humanization of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006) at 248. 
606 Louis Henkin The Age of Rights (New York, Columbia University Press, 1990) at 25. 
607 Charter of the United Nations (26 June 1945), 1 UNTS XVI, art 1(3).  
608 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948, UNGA res 217A), preamble 
para 6. 
609 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNGA res 217A of 10 December 1948), preamble para 2; 
―Freedom from fear‖ should be enjoyed by human beings is echoed by the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966), 993 UNTS 3, preamble para 3; 
Also the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966), 999 UNTS 
171, preamble para 3. 
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war serves as the primary international prerequisite for the material well-being...and 
for the full implementation of the rights and fundamental human freedoms‖.610    
 
Human rights are universal in nature regardless of nationality, race, background, and 
skin colour. Human rights interests know no national borders, as in international 
practice now, States have a deep interest in the way other States treat their own 
citizens.
611
 Arguably, contemporary norms of human rights and humanitarian law 
influence the understanding of State responsibility. It is reflected in the definition of 
State responsibility itself which has shifted from bilateralism to community interests 
(multilateralism).
612
 Furthermore, it is a fallacy to say that there was ever such a 
system of sovereign States with absolute domestic jurisdiction, as on the contrary, 
States have always been subject to external normative influences.
613
  This is to say, 
multilateralism is only natural as there has never been an absolute sovereign State 
which has an absolute jurisdiction over its people and territory free from outside 
influences.   
 
In the twenty-first century, sovereignty does not mean authority without limit. The 
fundamental meaning of sovereignty should be conceived as the pre-eminent 
requirement for the government of a State to exercise responsibility for, not only 
control over, its actions.
614
  This understanding of sovereignty entails that 
responsibility must be motivated by the supreme duty of a government to protect its 
population.
615
 The international situation further emphasises the importance of 
government to protect its population, in particular in the post-World War II era 
because of the holocaust; and the post-Cold War where there were violent ethnic 
conflicts and civil wars. Much of this determination to protect civilian population is 
                                               
610 Declaration on the Right of People to Peace (UNGA res 39/11, 12 November 1984), preamble para 
4. 
611 Anthony D‘Amato ―Trashing Customary International Law‖ (1987) 18 American J Int‘l L 101 at 
102-5. 
612 Theodor Meron The Humanization of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006) at 248. 
613
 Duncan B Hollis ―Private Actors in Public International Law: Amicus Curiae and the Case for the 
Retention of State Sovereignty (2002) 25 B C Int‘l & Comparative L Rev 235 at 249.  The Peace of 
Westphalia, seen as the landmark of sovereignty, itself included derogations from this principle.  
614 Christopher C Joyner ―‘The Responsibility to Protect‘: Humanitarian Concern and the Lawfulness 
of Armed Intervention‖ (2007) 47(3) Va J Int‘l L 693. 
615 Ibid.  
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reflected in the Genocide Convention,
616
 the Fourth Geneva Convention,
617
 and the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
618
 which all show affirmation ―that 
the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must 
not go unpunished‖.619     
 
Scholars have been trying to explain a standard of State responsibility and identify 
the existence of an international standard of justice in traditional law of State 
responsibility.
620
 There is a standardized fundamental justice that obliges a State to 
have a system of law and administration in a standard accepted by civilized 
nations.
621
 The world has been adopting new standards of protection of human rights 
since the end of World War II by adopting the Charter of the United Nations which 
includes an undertaking for promoting respect for human rights as one of its 
purposes.
622
 This was followed by the adoption of the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and other international instruments on human rights.
623
  
 
The growing respect for human rights reflects the slow transition of sovereignty from 
being State-centred to becoming people-centred. The international treaties adopted 
after the Cold War emphasise people-centeredness by the increasing respect for 
humanity shown in the prosecution of the perpetrators of gross human rights breaches 
in  international courts, which is made permanent by the 1998 Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court.
624
 Traditionally, States have been reluctant to 
internationalize the process of accountability for serious violation of humanitarian 
                                               
616 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNGA res 260 A (III),  9 
December 1948).  
617 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva 
Convention) (1949).  
618 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 1998), 2187 UNTS 90. 
619 Ibid, preamble para 4. 
620 Y Matsui ―The Transformation of the Law of State Responsibility‖ in Rene Provost (ed) State 
Responsibility in International Law (Hants, Ashgate, 2002) at 7.  
621 Ibid, at 14. 
622 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, art 3, states ―promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights‖ is one of the organization purposes. 
623
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNGA res 217A, 10 December 1948); other human rights 
instruments include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (concluded 16 December 
1966, entered into force 3 January 1976), 993 UNTS 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (concluded 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976), 993 UNTS 3. 
624 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 
2002), 2187 UNTS 90. 
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law, given that the jurisdiction, such as in the 2008 Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, has been always been considered one of the core components of what 
constitutes State sovereignty.
625
    
 
Linking the human rights element in international relations, State sovereignty as the 
basis of the small arms transfer has a limit because the arms trade may have far 
reaching implications beyond a country‘s border,626 which may undermine the respect 
for human rights. Hence, dealing with the trade of small arms needs a multilateral 
approach. In a new paradigm of State responsibility, small arms transfer by a 
sovereign State should take human rights into consideration.
627
  The responsibility to 
protect acknowledges that this responsibility is primarily a State concern.
628
 
Prevention of an armed conflict is, first and foremost, the responsibility of sovereign 
States and the failure to prevent conflict can have wide international consequences.
629
  
The responsibility of arms-exporting States towards the victims of small arms beyond 
their borders may have far-reaching international implications,
630
  in particular when 
the small arms are used to violate international law.    
  
Civil society and supporters of the restriction of small arms transfer find new 
momentum with the emerging norm in international law from the State responsibility. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in its official statement cites 
the State responsibility in supporting the elaboration by the United Nations to find 
common standards of a comprehensive, legally binding Arms Trade Treaty.
631
 The 
ICRC‘s support reasons that international standards for responsible conventional 
                                               
625 Manuela Melandri ―The Relationship between State Sovereignty and the Enforcement of 
International Criminal Law under the Rome Statute (1998): A Complex Interplay‖ (2009) 9 Int‘l Crim 
L Rev 531.   
626 Report of the UN Secretary-General on Small Arms (S/2008/258), 17 April 2008, at [4-9]. 
627 Although some regional groupings such as the European Union have put human rights as criteria of 
arms transfer (the EU Code of Conduct 1998), there is no international agreement which has achieved 
the inclusion of human rights as a criteria in arms transfer. 
628 Ramesh Thakur The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the 
Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 251. 
629 The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (Ottawa, International Development Research Centre, 2001). 
630 Alexandra Boivin ―Complicity and Beyond: International Law and the Transfer of Small Arms and 
Light Weapons‖ (2005) 87(859) IRRC 467 at 496. 
631 ICRC position on an Arms Trade Treaty, official statement, 1 October 2009   
<www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/weapons-statement-011009>. Last accessed on 6 October 
2009. 
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arms transfer (including small arms and ammunition) are demanded by the States‘ 
responsibilities in international law and international humanitarian law.
632
   
 
State responsibility may provide a sound doctrinal grounding for the prohibition in 
arms transfers and a basis to prevent States from licensing weapons transfers to 
abusers of human rights and humanitarian law.
633
  In situations where there are no 
prohibitions affecting the transfer of weapons, where the country of destination is not 
subject to an arms embargo, some argue, international law may nonetheless prohibit a 
State from transferring weapons because of the way in which the weapons will be 
used in the recipient State.
634
      
 
 
3. Human rights and sovereignty 
 
Acquiring weapons is the exercise of a State‘s right to self-defence in order to protect 
its sovereignty.  The State is central to the discussion of international law on 
sovereignty because public international law, at least, is configured around the 
State.
635
 It now becomes essential to discuss the sovereign State‘s right to acquire 
weapons when it meets its responsibility as a member of the international community. 
 
Sovereignty is a fundamental principle in international law and modern international 
relations as enshrined in the UN Charter.
636
 As sovereignty and the modern system of 
international law grew, the concept of national and territorial integrity was also 
formulated.
637
 The concept of modern sovereignty was then developed in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries which viewed sovereignty as omnipotent and 
indivisible.
638
  Bodin, for example, held the view that ―sovereign authority is the 
                                               
632 ICRC position on an Arms Trade Treaty, official statement, 1 October 2009   
<www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/weapons-statement-011009>. Last accessed on 6 October 
2009. 
633 Alexandra Boivin ―Complicity and Beyond: International Law and the Transfer of Small Arms and 
Light Weapons‖ (2005) 87(859) IRRC 467 at 469.  
634
 Ibid.    
635 Gerry Simpson ―The Guise of Sovereignty‖ in Trudy Jacobsen, Charles Samford, and Ramesh 
Thakur (eds) Re-envisioning Sovereignty: The End of Westphalia? (Ashgate, 2008) at 59.  
636 Charter of the United Nations (26 June 1945), 1 UNTS XVI, art 2(1) and 2(7).  
637 Charles Chaterjee International Law and Diplomacy (Routledge, 2007) at 36.  
638 Ibid, at 48. 
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defining characteristic of a State, and that sovereignty is both unconditional and 
unified‖.639 Bodin‘s view regarding unified sovereignty was supported by Hobbes.640  
 
Sovereignty in a legal sense, as the traditional view suggests, is an absolute control 
within a State territory, although de facto control by the government is a question of 
degree.
641
 The establishment of the United Nations, the Nuremburg or Tokyo war 
crimes trials, the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the 
holding of political leaders accountable for crimes of State (in Nuremburg and Tokyo 
Judgments, supplemented by the Genocide Convention),
642
 challenged a central tenet 
of the Westphalian ethos, which holds that whatever takes place within the territory 
of a State is a matter of sovereign right and not subject to external view.
643
 Some 
further important events mark major acknowledgment of the importance of 
strengthening the norm of international relations and show that State sovereignty is 
not absolute.
644
 Even internally, the authority of a State is constrained and regulated 
by constitutional power-sharing arrangements.
645
 The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights as an international human rights protection system, in particular, has in 
some instance penetrated the wall of rigid State sovereignty.
646
In this regard, the 
current international structure of international relations accommodates a forum, such 
                                               
639 Deborah Baumgold Contract Theory in Historical Context: Essays on Grotius, Hobbes, and Locke 
(Brill, Leiden, 2010) at 55. 
640 Ibid, at 59. 
641 Joseph S Nye Jr Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History (7th 
ed, Longman, 2009) at 168.  
642 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNGA res 260 A (III), 9 
December 1948); the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Nurmburg Charter, signed in 
London, 8 August 1945), available at <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/imt.asp>; and the 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Charter, adopted in Tokyo, 19 
January 1946). 
643 Richard Falk ―International Law: Amid Power, Order and Justice‖ in Charles Webel and Johan 
Galtung (eds), Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies (Routledge, 2007) at 333. 
644 See Neil Walker ―Late Sovereignty in the European Union‖ in Neil Walker (ed) Sovereignty in 
Transition (Hart Publishing, 2003) at 6-7.  Walker addressed the incoherence and normative 
shortcoming of the concept of sovereignty by defining it as ―the discursive form in which a claim 
concerning the existence and character of a supreme ordering power for a particular polity is 
expressed, which supreme ordering purports to establish and sustain the identity and status of the 
particular polity qua polity and to provide a continuing source and vehicle of ultimate authority for the 
juridical order of that polity.‖ 
645 The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty  (Ottawa, International Development Research Centre, 2001) at [12-2.7]. 
646 Denise Garcia Small Arms and Security: New Emerging International Norms (New York, 
Routledge, 2006) at 198. 
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as the United Nations Human Rights Council to assess the human rights situations in 
all the UN member countries.
647
  
 
Initial important support for the concept of sovereignty as responsibility came from 
then British Prime Minister Tony Blair who argued that sovereignty should be re-
conceptualized since the traditional model of sovereignty did not fit into a globalised 
world.
648
 Blair argued that ―[w]e cannot turn our backs on conflicts and the violation 
of human right rights within other countries‖.649 The statement reaffirms that 
interconnectedness among countries creates international responsibilities.
650
  
 
A sovereign State has an international obligation as a responsible member of the 
international community. The responsibility of a sovereign State when it joins the 
United Nations implies the readiness to act as a responsible member of the 
international community: 
  
On the one hand, granting membership of the UN, the international 
community welcomes the signatory State as a responsible member of the 
community of nations. On the other hand, the State itself, in signing the 
Charter, accepts the responsibilities of membership flowing from that 
signature. There is no transfer or dilution of State sovereignty. But there is a 
necessary re-characterization involved: from sovereignty as control to 
sovereignty as responsibility in both internal function and external 
duties.
651
 
 
The acceptance by the international community of the notion of the responsibility to 
protect, as shown by the adoption of the principle of responsibility to protect in the 
2005 World Summit Outcome Document and the United Nations resolution,
652
 is the 
acceptance of a newly embraced norm. Together with the ILC‘s Articles, the concept 
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of RtoP requests States to protect the international community as a whole by 
addressing both the root causes and direct causes of an armed conflict.
653
 Sovereignty 
entails the responsibility to protect the population, including from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity as agreed by the 2005 World 
Summit.
654
 When the State is unable or unwilling to fulfil this responsibility or is 
itself the perpetrator, the responsibility to protect shifts to the international 
community to act in its place.
655
 
 
The rationale for conceiving sovereignty as responsibility is increasingly being 
justified by the escalating influence that human rights norms exert as they are 
accepted as genuine components of human security.
656
 The rights of people within a 
State now go beyond national boundaries, as there is a shared responsibility of the 
international community to respect basic human rights. The principle of sovereignty 
as responsibility suggests that the legitimacy of a government rests upon the extent to 
which it respects the rights and duties of its citizens.
657
 An international small arms 
agreement negotiated among States could involve core aspects of sovereignty, 
particularly on something such as monitoring a restriction on arms trade if gross 
violations of IHR and/or IHL occur, and sanctions for non-compliance, that often 
make States reluctant to delegate powers to supranational bodies enforcing the 
implementation of the agreed treaty.
658
  
 
There is a natural link between rights and responsibilities. It is often easy to obtain 
agreement about people‘s rights, but the question of who is responsible for protecting 
or meeting those rights is more problematic.
659
 When there is an agreement of certain 
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rights, there should be a responsibility to ensure that the rights agreed upon are 
respected. States then need to work together to protect the people‘s human rights 
beyond national jurisdiction. It is in this context of multilateralism that the small arms 
trade is discussed, to prevent such weapons being used to violate human rights. 
 
Sovereignty, in its new norm, entails responsibility including the responsibility of a 
State to protect its citizens.
660
 State sovereignty which does not allow any 
intervention in the internal affairs of a State is in conflict with the moral imperative of 
upholding human rights worldwide, which would require necessary intervention for 
their protection.  
 
For many, it is rather difficult to understand the commitment of major powers to 
protect human rights in situations where little or no geo-political or economic interest 
is involved.
661
  Critics argue that the impetus of promotion by the British government 
and other leading western States of ethical foreign policy may actually lie in the 
domestic sphere and the search for enhancing political legitimacy.
662
 Regardless of 
the motive, the norm of the RtoP has been embraced by the world leaders in the 
World Outcome Document which may have a significant contribution to shaping 
international relations.   
 
 
C. ILC‘s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts  
 
The International Law Commission (ILC) was formed in 1948 and started its annual 
session in 1949
663
 with the objective to promote ―the progressive development of 
international law and its codification‖.664 In its early work, State responsibility was 
one of the 14 subject topics selected for codification.
665
 The ILC work on State 
responsibility began in 1956, was focused on State responsibility for injuries to aliens 
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661 David Chandler ―Rhetoric without Responsibility: The Attraction of ‗Ethical‘ Foreign Policy‖ 
(2003) 5 BJPIR 295 at 310. 
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and their property, which was part of the International law of diplomatic 
protection.
666
  
 
After slow progress, in 1963 the ILC approved an inter-sessional subcommittee 
recommendation to redraw the boundaries of the topic so as to focus on general rules 
of general application concerning State responsibility, this would include, among 
others, human rights and disarmament.
667
 In 2001, it was decided by the ILC to 
amend title of the subject of State responsibility into ―Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts‖.668 In 2001, after long years of discussion, the ILC 
eventually adopted the final Draft Articles of Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (hereinafter the Articles).
669
  
 
The Articles as adopted in 2001 reflect the nature of general application of State 
responsibility and make distinction between the primary and secondary rules. The 
emphasis of the Articles is on the secondary rules of State responsibility, that is, ―the 
general conditions under international law for the States to be considered responsible 
for wrongful actions or omissions‖.670 The Articles do not deal with the function of 
the primary rules, that is, ―the content of the international obligation breach of which 
gives rise to responsibility‖.671  A commentator, in addition, explains that primary 
rules are the substantive obligations of States in the numerous subject areas of 
international law; and secondary rules are those that elaborate what it means for a 
State to be legally accountable for violations of these duties.
672
 
 
The Articles determine the principles which govern the responsibility of States for 
internationally wrongful acts, and define the rules that place obligations on States, the 
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violation of which may generate responsibility.
673
 State responsibility is pre-
eminently an area of international law developed by State practice and international 
judgments, of which numerous examples are referred to in the ILC‘s commentary on 
the Articles.
674
  
 
The ILC‘s work has been welcomed by the international community as it develops 
further international law in this area. The Articles developed a new fundamental norm 
and marked a change in paradigm as the work of the ILC on State responsibility is 
well accepted and widely cited by the ICJ and other tribunals, even when the Articles 
was provisionally adopted.
675
 The International Court of Justice (ICJ), for example, 
cites the ILC‘s works on State responsibility in Gabcikova-Nagymaros Project676 and 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea cites it in The M/V “Saiga” (No 2) 
(Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea).
677
 This makes it important to analyse 
whether the State responsibility as drafted by the ILC may cover the State 
responsibility to regulate the transfer of arms. 
 
The first three articles of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts set three basic principles: the responsibility of a State for its 
internationally wrongful acts, elements of an internationally wrongful act of a State, 
and characterisation of an act of a State as internationally wrongful.
678
 A State can be 
held accountable for any internationally wrongful acts under article 1 of the Articles 
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which hold that ―[e]very internationally wrongful act of a State entails the 
international responsibility of that State‖.679 The commentary of the Articles explains 
that whether there has been an internationally wrongful act depends on two things: 
first, ―on the requirement of the obligation which is said to have been breached,‖ and 
second, ―on the framework conditions for such an act‖.680 The Articles do not define 
when exactly a State will be in breach of international law, and that has to be 
determined by applying the primary rules (the law of treaties, customary international 
law, and other sources of international law) to the facts of each case.
681
  
 
The second principle of elements of an internationally wrongful act of a State is 
described in article 2:  
 
There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an 
action or omission: 
(a) is attributable to the State under international law; and  
(b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.682   
 
The third principle states that the ―characterization of an act of a State as 
internationally wrongful is governed by international law‖.683 If it is contrary to 
national law, the Articles explains that such ―characterization is not affected by the 
characterization of the same act as lawful by internal law.‖684     
 
Taking into account the basic principles in articles 1, 2 and 3, if there has been an 
internationally wrongful act in transfers of small arms, it should fulfil the 
wrongfulness required by these principles as well as the requirement of the obligation 
of international law which has been breached either by an action or omission. The 
Articles do not ―specify the content of the obligations laid down by particular primary 
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rules‖ and leave the matter ―for the law of treaties to determine whether a State is a 
party to a valid treaty, whether the treaty is in force for that State‖.685   
    
In relation to the humanitarian problems created by the excessive availability of small 
arms, one can examine and link the issue of small arms to the Articles. Being general 
in character, the Articles apply to the whole field of international obligations of 
States.
686
A transfer of small arms which leads to a mass killing could raise State 
responsibility under the Articles as the sending State either by action or omission, 
could be held responsible for internationally wrongful acts if there is an agreement in 
law of treaties as premier rules, showing that there ―is a breach of an international 
obligation by a State when an act of that State is not in conformity with what is 
required of it by that obligation‖.687 State responsibility for an international obligation 
may arise from provisions stipulated in a treaty or all other sources of international 
obligations.
688
 State responsibility may also arise from breaches of obligation to the 
international community as a whole.
689
  
 
State is not an abstract entity. Transfers of small arms which help the commission of 
internationally wrongful acts are carried out by State organs and persons. The Articles 
explain that the ―conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State 
under international law‖690 and a State organ ―includes any person or entity which has 
that status in accordance with the internal law of the State.‖691 The Articles explain 
further the status of a person or entity which is not a State organ but is empowered by 
the State to exercise elements of government authority ―shall be considered an act of 
the State under international law, provided the person or entity is acting in that 
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capacity in the particular instance.‖692  This is intended to take into account situations 
where former State corporations have been privatized but retained regulatory 
functions.
693
 Thus, the acts of persons or entities of private companies in transfers 
within arms trade which are not State organs but nonetheless authorized to exercise 
governmental authority are considered act of the State. In other words, the transfer of 
small arms by persons or entities which are not State organs but are empowered by 
the State, does not excuse the State from being responsible in the case that leads to 
the commission of internationally wrongful acts. 
 
With transfer of small arms leading to an act of internationally wrongness in mind, 
article 16 stipulates that a ―State which aids or assists another State in the commission 
of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing 
so‖.694 However, one clause states that, the aiding State is internationally responsible 
if that State ―does so with knowledge of the circumstances of internationally 
wrongful acts‖.695 This is something that might be difficult to prove as an aiding State 
may not know that the second State will use the weapons in the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act.    
 
In the light of the article 16, it can be said that a State supplying small arms to 
another State which is known to use the weapons to do an internationally wrongful 
act, can be held responsible for ―relatively minor infringements as well as the most 
serious breaches of obligations under peremptory norms of general international 
law‖.696 Commentary on the Articles explains that States have a responsibility to 
prevent certain conduct by another State, ―[a] State may be required by its 
international obligations to prevent certain conduct by another State, or at least to 
prevent the harm that may flow from such conduct―.697 Commentary on the Articles 
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further shows that State practice supports assigning international responsibility to a 
State which assists another State in the internationally wrongful act.
698
      
 
Following the previous argument, one may argue that it is an international obligation 
for a State to prevent a weapons transfer in order to prevent certain conduct by 
another State in doing an internationally wrongful act, such as serious violation of 
IHL/IHRL. The Articles demand States maximize the law‘s capacity in using the ILC 
principle to hold responsible those who are responsible for assisting the commission 
of human rights violations and other internationally wrongful acts.
699
 With regard to 
small arms, using the reasoning of the Articles, there should be a clear standard to 
prevent the flow of small arms to the end-users who are more likely than not to use 
the weapons in wrongful acts.
700
 Based on article 16 of the ILC‘s Articles on State 
responsibility,
701
 a State transferring to a recipient State which later uses the arms to 
commit internationally wrongful acts may be held accountable for having a 
supporting role. However, there are limits to the scope of responsibility of article 16; 
the first, the assisting State must have knowledge of the circumstances that make the 
conduct of the receiving State unlawful; secondly, the supply of weapons must be 
given with the view to facilitating the commission of the wrongful act; thirdly, the act 
must be such that it would have been wrongful had it been executed by the assisting 
State itself.
702
     
 
Apart from the work of the ILC on State responsibility, there is also an emerging 
State responsibility to protect (RtoP). The responsibility to protect when linked to the 
issue of small arms, may serve as the basis to argue that the responsibility to protect 
requires States to be responsible in the arms trade.  
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D. Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) 
 
The growing norm of respecting universal human rights requires a State to protect the 
human rights of, not only its own citizens, but all human beings regardless of their 
citizenship, race, national, or other status.
703
 The concept of responsibility to protect 
emerged after genocide in Rwanda (1994) and the act of ethnic cleansing in the 
Srebrenica, Bosnia (1995) to which the international community failed to respond in 
time. There were about 800,000 people massacred within only three months in 
Rwanda in 1994 due to the slow reactions of the international community.
704
                                                                                  
 
In 2000, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, in his report to the 
General Assembly challenged the international community to find a consensus on the 
basic question of sovereignty.
705
 This is, in part, to address a dilemma on the inability 
of the international community to address humanitarian crises in the face of State 
sovereignty. In answering the challenge, the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), was established. The Commission 
worked for one year to present a report. The term ―Responsibility to Protect‖ was first 
formally introduced in the 2001 report by the ICISS.
706
 The RtoP has basic principles 
which state that ―State sovereignty implies responsibility‖ and consists of elements of 
the State responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react, and the responsibility to 
rebuild.
707
   
 
The RtoP provides the last resort for the international community to intervene with 
two primary considerations; the first is the presence of serious human rights abuses 
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among parties in the war; the second is the inability or unwillingness of the national 
government to stop the atrocities.
708
 The intervention of the international community 
based on this norm hence may be against the national wish and has further broad 
implications, namely the change of the traditional definition of an international 
security threat, which means an issue previously regarded internal now can be 
considered a threat to international security.
709
 While the controversy around the RtoP 
focuses mainly on the intervention and sovereignty, the thesis stresses the element of 
prevention and seeks to show that the prevention in the RtoP supports an argument of 
the need of a standard in the global trade of small arms. The cases of genocide in 
Rwanda and ethnic cleansing in Srebrenica mentioned above both took place in an 
intra-State war context where small arms may have played a role in facilitating the 
atrocities. 
 
State sovereignty, territorial integrity and the principle of non-intervention are the 
basis on which the United Nations treats its members.
710
 However, it was intra-State 
conflicts, such as in Rwanda and Yugoslavia which caused great casualties and 
serious abuse of human rights which may have altered the understanding of the role 
of individual human beings in State-based sovereignty. This presents a difficult 
challenge to the United Nations to reconcile its principle of member States‘ 
sovereignty with the mandate to maintain international peace and security.
711
 
 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter allows the Security Council to intervene on an issue if 
it is considered a threat to international peace and security. The RtoP offers the 
Security Council the possibility to intervene, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
on an issue which has traditionally been regarded as domestic and not a threat to 
international peace and security after the threshold criteria has been fulfilled.
712
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The most important aspect of the responsibility to protect is prevention, to prevent 
things before they happen. The ISISS states that its first and most important goal is to 
save lives and hence the responsibility to prevent is the ―single most important 
dimension of the responsibility to protect‖.713 Despite this recognition of the 
importance of the element of prevention, not much attention is paid to the prevention 
aspect, particularly in terms of a collective international responsibility.
714
 Later, with 
the input of civil society, the ICISS developed a recommendation that more emphasis 
should be placed on the prevention of conflict/protection of civilian aspects of the 
report.
715
  
 
The RtoP does not provide an explicit link between arms transfer and the State 
responsibility to protect. Nevertheless, drawing the association of the responsibility to 
protect with the uncontrolled spread of small arms and putting the element of 
prevention in the RtoP as priority,
716
 States are indirectly requested to control the 
circulation of the weapons in order to prevent them being used in crimes against 
humanity or creating any ―other man-made crises which put populations at risk.‖717  
 
1. Response to the RtoP  
 
After the introduction of the RtoP by the ICISS in 2001, there was positive 
acceptance by many States as it was adopted in the 2005 World Summit organized by 
the United Nations. The world leaders agreed on a document which includes three 
paragraphs related to the responsibility to protect under the sub-title ―responsibility to 
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity‖.718  Paragraph 138 of the World Summit Outcome states that:  
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Individual State has responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. And this 
responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their 
incitements, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that 
responsibility and will act in accordance with it....
719
 
 
The following paragraph 139 acknowledges that the international community has 
responsibility to take collective action ―to help to protect populations‖720. The world 
leaders also pledge that:  
  
We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to 
helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting 
those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.
721
  
 
One of the key points in paragraph 138 is that the States explicitly acknowledge the 
acceptance of responsibility and undertake to act in accordance with it. Following the 
acknowledgment by the world‘s leaders in the World Summit Document, the United 
Nations Security Council later endorsed the relevant paragraph of the World Summit 
Document in its resolution 1674 on 24 April 2006.  The endorsement of both the 
United Nations General Assembly and Security Council reflects the broad level of 
acceptance of the RtoP by governments. The Security Council affirms the 2005 
World Summit Outcome in which governments recognized that ―development, peace 
and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing.‖722 As the 
thesis will show in the next section, although in many cases the RtoP is referred to by 
States and by the UN resolutions, some States show resistance to the RtoP.    
 
The world leaders‘ acceptance of the RtoP may have great implications in 
international relations. If the responsibility to protect does emerge full-fledged as an 
accepted norm of international law, it will generate a revolution in consciousness to 
protect population in international relations.
723
 The essential leitmotif of the 
responsibility to protect maintains that each individual State has the responsibility to 
protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes 
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against humanity.
724
 Sovereignty should mean that the people are protected from 
these atrocities and there is a common responsibility to prevent these events from 
happening. The prevention is applied so as to impose the responsibility to protect 
long before the carnage begins.
725
  
 
The level of acceptance of or resistance to the RtoP is reflected in how it is referred to 
as a concept, norm, or doctrine. The language used to describe the RtoP is ―norm‖ or 
―emerging norm‖, and ―doctrine‖ by those who regard it as having high status in 
international law, and ―concept‖ or ―idea‖ by those who have reservations or 
disapprove of it.
726
 Apparently, the resistance is grounded in fear that the RtoP will be 
a legal obligation and concern for its breadth.
727
   
 
The RtoP encompasses legal and normative values and is understood differently as an 
evolving trend, a political commitment and emerging norm.
728
 The acceptance of the 
RtoP as reflected in the 2005 World Summit Outcome is simply because it is a 
materialisation of a norm which has long existed and is anchored in ―well established 
principles of international law‖.729 As a commentator points out, the RtoP has a 
similar source to the 1899 Hague Convention and its Martens clause of the principle 
of ―laws of humanity, and the requirement of public conscience‖, as well as other 
human rights conventions.
730
 Similarly, some States have the same opinion that the 
                                               
724 Ibid. 
725 Ibid.  
726 Jeremy Sarkin ―Why the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as a Doctrine or (Emerging) Norm to 
Prevent Genocide and Other Massive Human Rights Violations is on the Decline: The Role of 
Principles, Pragmatism and the Shifting Patterns of International Relations‖ (2009) 47 Politorbis 51 at 
57; see also a debate in the General-Assembly over the UN Secretary-General report on the 
implementation of the RtoP which shows various terms such as doctrine, concept, norm, idea are used 
by States in describing the RtoP (official records of the General Assembly, A/63/PV.96-101). The term 
―concept‖ is now also used by the proponents of the RtoP; that may reflect a situation where the RtoP 
is not welcome by all.   
727 Jeremy Sarkin ―Why the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as a Doctrine or (Emerging) Norm to 
Prevent Genocide and Other Massive Human Rights Violations is on the Decline: The Role of 
Principles, Pragmatism and the Shifting Patterns of International Relations‖ (2009) 47 Politorbis 51 at 
57. 
728
 Hitoshi Nasu ―Operationalizing the ‗Responsibility to Protect‘ and Conflict Prevention: Dilemmas 
of Civilian Protection in Armed Conflict‖ (2009) 14 J Conflict & Security L 209 at 209.  
729 Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (A/63/677), 12 January 
2009, at 5, para 3.  
730 Jeremy Sarkin ―Why the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as a Doctrine or (Emerging) Norm to 
Prevent Genocide and Other Massive Human Rights Violations is on the Decline: The Role of 
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RtoP is not new and is ―firmly based in international law, including international 
human rights and humanitarian law‖.731  It is in its implementation into a policy and 
operational readiness in current international relations that the RtoP faces 
challenges.
732
           
 
In 2009, in seeking clarification on implementation to ―give doctrinal, policy, and 
institutional life‖ to the RtoP, the UN Secretary-General presented a report to member 
States for their consideration.
733
 The debate on the report is productive and shows 
support from the majority of States to the report on implementation of the RtoP, 
although some concerns can still be heard.
734
      
 
The RtoP inevitably faces challenges of interpretations based on State interests. Some 
governments show their resistance to the RtoP and worry about its use and 
consequence to State sovereignty. For example, in the Security Council debate, the 
Russian Federation cited its action in intervening into Georgia in 2008 as being an act 
of responsibility to protect, to protect Russian civilians and the intervention itself was 
a role of a peacekeeper.
735
   
 
The UN General Assembly later adopted a short resolution on the RtoP consisting of 
two operational paragraphs, which take note of the report of the Secretary-General 
and decide ―its consideration of the responsibility to protect‖.736 Debate on this 
resolution reflects States‘ view towards the RtoP in which some fear that the RtoP 
may undermine State sovereignty. Although the resolution is not successful to 
                                                                                                                                      
Principles, Pragmatism and the Shifting Patterns of International Relations‖ (2009) 47 Politorbis 51 at 
56; see, the Hague Convention (II) regarding laws and Custom of War on Land (1899).  
731 Statements of De Klerk (Netherlands), McKay (New Zealand) at the General Assembly debate, July 
2009 (A/63/PV.97-98). Others (for example, Switzerland) emphasise that although the RtoP covers 
numerous existing international law obligations, it remains a political concept and does not in itself 
constitute a norm.  
732 Report of the Secretary General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (A/63/677), 12 January 
2009, at 1.  
733 Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (A/63/677), 12 January 
2009, at 4, para 2.  
734
 Official records of the General Assembly, A/63/PV.96-101. Cuba, Venezuela, Yemen, and Pakistan 
are known for their negative comments on the RtoP. 
735 Statement of Vitaly Churkin of the Russian Federation in the Security Council meeting on the 
agenda ―The Situation in Georgia‖, New York, 8 August 2008 (S/PV.5952).   
736 A/RES/63/308 of 14 September 2009. The resolution does not use the terms ―concept‖ or ―norm‖ in 
its language, and simply refers to the ―RtoP‖.  
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outlining practical implementation at this stage, it secures a follow up consideration 
of the RtoP.   
 
2. RtoP and its linkage with small arms 
 
Despite intervention and sovereignty argument dominating the discussion on the 
RtoP, the 2001 ICISS report covers other new security issues. There is an 
acknowledgement of the marked security phenomenon of the proliferation of armed 
conflicts within States since the end of the cold war.
737
 The report touches the issue of 
small arms in acknowledging that these internal conflicts are made more complex and 
lethal,‖in particular by the proliferation of cheap, highly destructive weapons‖,738 
which results in increased vulnerability for civilians as they are often deliberately 
targeted.
739
 The ICISS report on the RtoP identifies that these internal conflicts are 
fuelled by arms transfers originated in the developed world which in turn will have 
global destabilising effects in forms of refugee flows, terrorism,  spread of infectious 
disease, and organized crime.
740
 
 
The Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes (2004) 
embraces the RtoP to meet global threats and challenges.
741
  The report identifies the 
threat of intra-State conflict and suggests that the UN give more attention to 
―developing international regimes and norms to govern some of the sources and 
accelerators of conflict‖, which include arms control and disarmament regimes.742 
The report makes two recommendations for States in relation to the issue of small 
arms: to encourage the States to conclude the negotiations on legally binding tracing 
and marking and report accurately on all elements on the UN register of conventional 
arms.
743
         
                                               
737 ICISS The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa, International Development Research Centre, 2001) at 
4, para 1.16. 
738 Ibid, at 4, para 1.18. 
739 Ibid, at 4, para 1.19. 
740
 Ibid, at 4, para 1.20. 
741 Report of the Secretary-General‘s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes A More 
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (United Nations, 2004). 
742 Ibid, at 35, para 89. 
743 Ibid, at 36, para 96 and 97; the negotiations in the UN on marking and tracing concluded in 2005 
(UNGA decision 60/519, 8 December 2005) but failed to adopt a legally binding instrument.   
150 
 
 
Security Council resolution 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed 
conflict reaffirms the acceptance of the provision of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 
2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect.
744
  
The acceptance of the responsibility to protect is encouraged by the regrettable fact 
that ―civilians account for the vast majority of casualties in situations of armed 
conflict‖.745 Most important is that the resolution is concerned with, and 
acknowledges, the effects of the use of small arms on civilians affected by armed 
conflict.
746
  By now, the Security Council resolution 1674 (2006) has provided a link 
between the civilian protection in armed conflict, the responsibility to protect, and the 
use of small arms that may affect civilians.  
 
The responsibility to protect should be able to regulate the acquisition and prevention 
of the diversion of legally acquired weapons to illicit markets.
747
 It further reaffirms 
understanding that responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, as agreed by the heads of government 
in 2005,  should include the stricter control of small arms trade as such weapons are 
recognized to facilitate those crimes occurrence.         
  
A State might, by now, think about the State responsibility to protect in engaging in  
small arms trade to prevent the weapons from being used to commit or facilitate the 
commission of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity.
748
 The RtoP does not merely focus on humanitarian intervention, the 
concept is wider and more far-reaching and stresses the element of prevention, as 
opposed to intervention, as the most important element.
749
 The responsibility to 
prevent a conflict and protect civilians, then is compatible with the need to regulate 
                                               
744 SC res 1674 (2006), preamble para 4; References to the RtoP are also in SC res 1755 (2007); SC res 
1828 (2008). 
745 SC res 1674 (2006), preamble para 4; SC res 1706 (2006), preamble para 2, the Security Council 
recalled its earlier reaffirmation of the provisions.  
746 SC res 1674 (2006), preamble para 5. 
747
 Statement of Briz Gutierrez of Colombia, on the responsibility to protect at the Security Council 
open debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, New York, 28 June 2006.   
748 The commitment of the world governments in 2005 Summit Outcome Document (A/Res/60/1) cites 
the four atrocities in this order, genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.   
749 Alex J Bellamy Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (Polity Press, 
Cambridge,  2009) at 98. 
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the free flow of small arms as the weapons encourage conflicts and put civilians in 
danger, either directly or indirectly.
750
  
 
As the United Nations is still searching to implement the RtoP into a practical policy, 
the point of protecting civilians has become familiar ground for adoption of the 
Security Council resolution 1970 (2011), which imposed an arms embargo, asset 
freeze, and use of force against Libya. In the preamble paragraph, it mentions the 
need to recall ―the Libyan authorities‘ responsibility to protect its population‖.751 The 
reference to ―the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan 
population‖ was reiterated in the SC resolution 1973 (2011) which authorized the use 
of force after Libya failed to fulfil the responsibility and comply with the resolution 
1970 (2011).
752
  France, co-sponsor of the resolution, argues that the resolution 
provides ―means to protect the civilian populations in Libya‖ and stresses the 
importance of swift action for the Council does not have ―much time left‖.753 The 
statement of the UK after the voting reiterates the justification of the resolution 
adopted which is to end violence and to protect civilians.
754
   
 
The link between the issue of small arms and the RtoP started to emerge among 
scholars. For example, Stephanie LK Koorey mentions RtoP briefly in the discussion 
of States‘ engagement in response to the proliferation of small arms.755 She is of the 
                                               
750 The association of the concept of responsibility to protect with small arms is relatively new. There 
are limited references on the association. International NGOs, such as the ICRC, have been trying to 
convince States to have a responsible arms trade in its statements on the small arms issue. The ICRC‘s 
position on the Arms Trade Treaty, for example, supports an international standard in conventional 
transfer based on ―States‘ responsibilities under international law‖ 
www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/weapons-statement-011009. Last accessed on 18 October 
2009. See also the ICRC statement, 9 October 2009 at the United Nations General Assembly, on 
agenda ―General and complete disarmament-Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of 
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects‖ www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/united-nations-statement-091009. 
Last accessed on 18 October 2009. 
751 UNSC res 1970 (2011) of 26 February 2011. 
752 UNSC res 1973 (2011) of 17 March 2011. 
753
 Statement of  France in the Security Council meeting, 17 March 2011 (official records of the 
Security Council S/PV.6498).  
754 Statement of  the UK in the Security Council meeting, 17 March 2011 (official records of the 
Security Council S/PV.6498). 
755 Stephanie LK Koorey ―‘Orphans‘ and Icons: Small Arms Control and Armed Groups in Southeast 
Asia‖ (PhD Thesis, Australian National University, 2008) at 333. 
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view that the concept of RtoP within the spectrum of humanitarian response, may be 
a useful means for dealing with small arms control when States accept the doctrine.
756
  
 
 
E. Summary 
 
A sovereign State, as the heads of States agreed in 2005 world summit, has 
responsibility to protect its citizens from, inter alia, genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Sovereignty where responsibility for the 
arms transfer is concerned, means transfer of arms must be done in a responsible 
manner. In this context, the issue of small arms is discussed in view of the fact that 
the wide availability of small arms may greatly facilitate the above-mentioned 
atrocities. Therefore, it is expected that a sovereign State is capable of keeping its 
people safe from the excessive flow of small arms and also of helping other countries 
in avoiding it. In other words, a sovereign State has the responsibility to protect its 
people from the impacts of the wide availability of small arms by fulfilling its 
responsibility to regulate the flow of these weapons.  
 
The ILC‘s Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
provide a new progressive contemporary interpretation of State responsibility, as a 
State may be held responsible for in assisting internationally wrongful acts. The 
Articles are complemented by the emerging norm of the RtoP in efforts to prevent 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The RtoP 
stresses the importance of the prevention element; that the protection starts before the 
crimes take place. It is to prevent the atrocities before they happen. The RtoP and the 
ILC‘s Articles support the effort to regulate the trade of small arms as control on their 
trade serves as a preventive element in avoiding atrocities. 
 
Sovereignty implies responsibility as States have a responsibility towards the 
international community and must behave in accordance with acceptable human 
rights and humanitarian norms.  A situation where there are no global restrictions on 
                                               
756 Stephanie LK Koorey ―‘Orphans‘ and Icons: Small Arms Control and Armed Groups in Southeast 
Asia‖ (PhD Thesis, Australian National University, 2008) at 333. 
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small arms transfers, so that these weapons are widely available, is not in conformity 
with the principles of State responsibility and respect for human rights.  
 
The norm of the RtoP to restrict small arms trade in order to prevent them from being 
used in crimes against humanity needs to be widely well accepted by States to make 
it a strong legal argument. The RtoP association with the small arms issue is found 
when protection of civilians is in question. As small arms mainly kill civilians, it is 
the State responsibility to protect all civilians from the danger of small arms 
proliferation. In practice, the link between the responsibility to protect civilians and 
small arms has been shown, among other things, in the Security Council resolutions 
related to the protection of civilians in armed conflict. It is in this understanding of 
protecting civilians, that the States have a responsibility to strengthen the control of 
small arms trade. 
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Chapter V: 
International Efforts to Restrict the Uncontrolled Circulation of 
Small Arms 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
Transfer of weapons from a political perspective is potentially a foreign policy tool, 
as was the practice during the Cold War era. The Soviet Union armed its allies and 
the US did the same, including supporting the mujahidin who fought the Soviet 
occupation in Afghanistan in the 1980s with several hundred thousand tons of 
weapons, including small arms.
757
  The availability of arms may change the political 
security balance in a region and change the political situation within a country. 
History provides some examples. One of those, the sudden availability of weapons in 
the Republic of Georgia in 1991, altered the dynamics of political interaction leading 
to militarization of politics and the use of force to settle disputes.
758
  
  
A flow of arms to a certain region poses a threat to the established balance of power. 
This was demonstrated in 2006 when Venezuela signed a deal with the Russian 
Federation to supply the former with 100,000 of the popular Kalashnikov assault 
rifles.
759
 The move was clearly stated by the Venezuelan President as being in 
anticipation of the perceived threat of a possible US invasion.
760
 The deal attracted 
criticism and a strong reaction from the US government which was of the view that 
the deal would not be good for the region and expressed concerns that the weapons 
might even leak to leftist guerrillas in the region.
761
 
 
                                               
757 Larry Kahaner AK-47: The Weapon that Changed the Face of War (John Wiley&Sons, Inc, New 
Jersey, 2007) at 66. The US reportedly supplied as many as four hundred thousand AKs to the 
Mujahedeen in Afghanistan during Soviet invasion in Afghanistan; Milton Bearden ―Afghanistan, 
Graveyard of Empires‖ (2001) 80 Foreign Aff 17 at 20-21. 
758 Damien Rogers Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control: Theory, Politics, Security (Ashgate, 
2009) at 62.  
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 ―Russia in Arms Talk with Chavez‖ BBC News, Wednesday, 31 May 2006 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5033768.stm>. Last accessed 13 October 2010.  
760 Ibid.   
761 ―Venezuela‘s One-man Arms Race Triggers Alarm in US‖ Sydney Morning Herald,  25 March  
2005 <www.smh.com.au/news/World/Venezuelas-oneman-arms-race-triggers-alarm-in-
US/2005/03/24/1111525293452.html>. Last accessed 14 October 2010.  
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There are many State interests implicated in small arms trade, either economic or 
political-security, which will be affected once there is a treaty to regulate arms trade. 
Some States rely heavily on their defence industry, and arms trade also has a more 
strategic military value beyond economic benefits. In a traditional view, arms trade is 
more a political than an economic issue, although the circumstances after the end of 
the Cold War may have changed the motive more towards economic considerations. 
With the world spending over US$1 trillion a year,
762
 the global arms trade involves 
significant value estimated to be worth around US$60 billion per year.
763
 Annual, 
authorised, small arms trade alone exceeds US$6 billion.
764
  Economic interest is, 
arguably, one of strong reasons behind the reluctance of States to transparently 
regulate small arms trade. Those who benefit from it do not want any international 
binding instrument that would cut the economic advantage the (small) arms industry 
generates.
765
  
    
Major arms producers are also major world powers, which are in a clear conflict of 
interest in controlling or restricting the arms trade. Weapons are, and have been, 
inherently a political issue because States garner diplomatic and strategic benefits 
from State-sponsored weapons sales or transfer.
766
 This rightly implies that the 
weapons trade is about power, legitimacy, and strategic interests as well as about 
money and diplomacy, and all of these may weaken the efforts to regulate and 
diminish the trade.
767
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Trends show that some developing countries now have been able to develop their 
small arms industry and are exporting their weapons to other developing countries.
768
 
This creates more players in the small arms trade which means that more States with 
investment in the arms industry are at risk from the existence of an international 
regulation.  
 
Against this backdrop, this chapter analyses the nature of the discussion of small arms 
in the international system, particularly in the framework of the United Nations, both 
in the Security Council and the General Assembly. Efforts of the international 
community to adopt or formulate instruments to regulate small arms are probed and 
examined to identify how far the world‘s governments have progressed in this issue 
and why the instruments adopted have not been working well in restricting the arms 
trade. The chapter emphasises the United Nations‘ work to promote transparency in 
small arms transfer in the absence of an existing international legal instrument 
regulating the trade of small arms.  
 
Conventional arms disarmament in the United Nations started in 1947 when the 
Security Council created a commission to deal with the effort to reduce conventional 
arms.
769
  During the Cold War era, the issue of small arms was not considered a main 
issue as, in this period, the world‘s attention focused on the higher profile issue of 
weapons, particularly weapons of mass destruction. The situation changed in the late 
1990s when the world found that it had an excessive supply of small arms piling up 
from the Cold War. Only then did the world start to focus on the problem of small 
arms. This was marked by the emergence of multilateral discussions in the United 
Nations General Assembly under the topic of international arms transfer.
770
 The early 
resolution focused on small arms entitled ―Assistance to States for curbing the illicit 
                                               
768 Michael E Smith International Security: Politics, Policy, Prospects (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) at 
129. 
769 UNSC resolution S/RES/18 (1947).   
770
 In 1991 the issue of small arms did not stand alone and was discussed under the title ―International 
arms transfers‖ (A/Res/ 46/36 H of 6 December 1991); Sporadic effort, albeit not exclusively on small 
arms, did take place before 1990s to stop sales of weapons to a certain area, for example, the Tripartite 
Declaration between the United States, Britain, and France. See, Alexander Gillespie A History of the 
Laws of War: The Customs and Laws of War with Regards to Arms Control (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
2011) vol 3, at 46-47.   
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traffic in small arms and collecting them‖, was adopted in 1994.771  Subsequently in 
1995, the UN General Assembly adopted a proper small arms focused-resolution 
entitled ―Small arms‖.772 At a later stage, the Security Council was also involved in 
the discussion of small arms as a proper subject and acknowledged the importance of 
finding a solution to curb and restrict these weapons.
773
 Apart from sanctioning an 
arms embargo, which generally includes small arms, the involvement of Security 
Council mainly takes the form of the discussion of the Secretary-General‘s periodic 
report, started in 2002, on small arms.
774
   
 
Although limited in terms of effectiveness in restricting the uncontrolled small arms 
proliferation, the international community of States has adopted a series of 
instruments which the thesis will examine.  Those documents are, among other 
things, the Firearms Protocol,
775
 the UNPoA,
776
 the International Tracing Instrument 
(ITI),
777
 and the UN Register.
778
 These documents will be examined to ascertain their 
purposes and rationales, and how they have been implemented. Analysis of the 
documents will reveal their strengths and their shortcomings and help to explain why 
the contemporary instruments adopted do not help much in restricting the 
proliferation of small arms, although they do provide benefit in setting a norm and 
serving as a basis for the subsequent control effort. The issue of small arms is also 
dealt with by the General Assembly, where its deliberation keeps the issue alive, and 
on the radar of the governments.  
  
                                               
771 UNGA resolution A/RES/ 49/75 G of 15 December 1994. 
772UNGA resolution A/RES/50/70 B of 12 December 1995. 
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778 UNGA Resolution 46/36 L of 9 December 1991.  
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With regard to the Security Council involvement in the issue of small arms, the 
development of the discussion can be followed through two tracks. The first is the 
arms embargo as a legal mechanism imposed by the Security Council which binds all 
the UN members; the second is the discussion of the Secretary-General‘s report on 
small arms to the Security Council.  The report prepared by the Secretary-General 
provides recommendations on small arms that member States may take up. In 
addition, the report describes at what stage the progress to combat small arms 
proliferation is, and shows the development, challenges, and key areas of focus.  
 
 
B. Small Arms in the Security Council  
 
1. Arms embargo   
  
The Charter of the United Nations states that the purpose of the world body is to 
maintain peace and security, and to implement that purpose by taking effective 
―collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace‖.779 The 
Charter gives power to the Security Council and the responsibility to maintain peace, 
and take necessary measures to control situations which are considered threats to 
international peace and security.
780
  
 
In performing its primary responsibility, the Security Council may use its powers, 
which include applying economic sanctions and measures not involving the use of 
force, governed by Chapter VII (action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches 
of the peace, and acts of aggression), to deal with threats to international peace and 
security.
781
 In general, sanctions imposed by the Security Council could be an arms 
or/and economic embargo, where members of the United Nations are prohibited from 
becoming involved in military, trade and economic activities with the targeted 
                                               
779 Charter of the United Nations (26 June 1945), 1 UNTS XVI, art 1(1).  
780 Charter of the United Nations (26 June 1945), 1 UNTS XVI, art 24.   
781 Charter of the United Nations (26 June 1945), 1 UNTS XVI, chp VII. 
159 
 
government or entity.
782
 If all other options are considered inadequate, the next option 
is the use of force.
783
  
 
The wording used in a resolution represents the legal weight of each resolution. 
While all Security Council decisions are legally binding, a sanction through a 
Security Council Resolution is of two types, voluntary and mandatory; the wording 
specifies the type. The Security Council voluntary resolution uses the wording ―calls 
upon all States,‖ while the mandatory resolution states ―decides that all States shall‖ 
in key operative paragraphs.
784
  The use of the phrase ―calls upon all States‖ is more 
symbolic and political than ―decides that all States shall‖ which implies a legal 
obligation.
785
  For instance, the Security Council Resolution 1904 (2009) on 
economic and arms embargo against the Al-qaida, Osama  bin Laden, and the Taliban 
states: ―Decides that all States take the measures as previously imposed by paragraph 
4(b)...with respect to Al-qaida‖ [emphasis in original].786 
 
On the other hand, resolution 1882 (2009) on children and armed conflict uses a 
different wording: “Calls upon those parties listed in the annexes of the Secretary-
General‘s report on children and armed conflict‖ [emphasis in original].787 Despite 
different wording in the Security Council resolutions, there is general agreement that 
the resolutions adopting sanction measures are binding.
788
 Hence, all the Security 
Council resolutions on arms embargo are considered mandatory.  
 
Economic embargoes are seen as creating unwanted effects of downgrading the lives 
of ordinary people, hence, arms embargoes are considered ―smarter‖ and preferable to 
                                               
782 Charter of the United Nations, art 41 explains that the ―Security Council may decide what measures 
not involving the use of armed forces are to be employed to give effect to its decisions...‖ 
783 Charter of the United Nations (1945), art 42. 
784 Damien Fruchart and others United Nations Embargoes: Their Impact on Arms Flows and Target 
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economic because they target the elite or armed force, and limit humanitarian 
impacts.
789
  
 
A decision to impose an arms embargo is taken after the Security Council has been 
convinced that a situation is a threat, and imposing a sanction is necessary. Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations guides the Council in its action with respect 
to threats to peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. The Security 
Council, firstly, ―shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken‖.790  After deciding that there is a threat to peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression, the Security Council then calls on the parties to 
comply with their obligations under the Charter to settle their dispute by peaceful 
means.
791
 Whenever the tension continues, the Security Council under article 41 
decides on non-military enforcement measures. The imposition of an arms embargo is 
one of the non-military enforcement measures.792   
 
The arms embargo‘s main purpose is to deny access of parties in conflict to weapons, 
thereby inducing military stalemates and preventing conflicts from escalating.
793
 It is 
in this context arms embargoes have a role in controlling the trade of small arms. A 
supply restriction incorporated in a Security Council arms embargo can serve as a 
potentially powerful tool to address the issue of illicit trade of small arms.
794
 Some 
arms embargoes are implemented with the support of Security Council sanctions 
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committees to oversee their implementation by reaffirming, recalling, or reiterating 
the demand that States enforce the embargoes.
795
       
 
There is a stark contrast in the use of arms embargoes during and after the Cold War. 
Until 1990, the United Nations rarely imposed arms embargoes. There were only two 
arms embargoes imposed by the Security Council in the period 1945 to 1990, on 
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) on 16 December 1966, and South Africa on 4 November 
1977.
796
 Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the sanction on Rhodesia was a 
combination of economic and arms embargo, in which States were to prevent export 
and import of Rhodesian product such as asbestos, iron ore, tobacco, sugar, meat 
products; and any activities that were ―calculated to promote the sale or shipment to 
Southern Rhodesia of arms, ammunition of all types, military aircraft, military 
vehicle, and equipment‖.797  The Security Council imposed an arms embargo as the 
arms acquisition by South Africa was considered ―a threat to maintenance of 
international peace and security‖ and ― decide[ed] that all States shall cease forthwith 
any provision to South Africa of arms and related materiel of all types‖[emphasis in 
original].
798
  
 
The end of the Cold War changed the Security Council‘s considerations on imposing 
non-military measures in many situations and arms embargo, as a means to change 
the behaviour of a targeted country/entity, is now a more preferred form of sanction 
and its use drastically increased after the end of the Cold War. In comparison to only 
two arms embargoes in the period 1945-1990, in 2010 alone there were 10 active 
arms embargoes in place, including a prohibition against transfer of small arms to 
targeted States and entities.
799
 The increasing number of embargoes is mainly because 
the five permanent States in the Security Council (P5), now sometimes find it easier 
to agree on imposing arms embargoes (assuming there are no direct interests to any of 
the P5) compared to the time of the Cold War when the P5 was involved in fierce 
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ideological competition among themselves and the veto right was likely to be used 
when any party pushed the agenda on embargoes. As the result of this geo-political 
change, many of the armed conflicts, which were traditionally considered within 
domestic jurisdiction, now can be recognized as constituting a threat to international 
peace and security.
800
  
 
Under article 41, the Security Council has imposed various arms embargoes in 
various situations which include imposing comprehensive sanctions, among others,   
on Somalia (1992), the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPEL), Libya (1992), 
Rwanda (1992), the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1996), Sierra Leone (1997), 
Afghanistan (1998), Eritrea and Ethiopia (2000),  Iran (2006), and Libya (2011).
801
 
Most arms embargoes sanctions are to prohibit the sale, transfer or supply of arms, 
ammunition, military equipment, goods and related services to target States, armed 
groups, entities, or individuals. An example of such arms embargoes is the Security 
Council resolution 733 (1992) which: 
 
Decides, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that all 
States shall, for the purpose of establishing peace and stability in Somalia, 
immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of 
weapons and military equipment to Somalia until the Council decides 
otherwise; ....
 802
 
   
Since small arms are the weapons of choice in most conflicts, they constitute the 
majority of transfers which were impacted upon by the embargoes.
803
 Therefore, any 
violation of an embargo is most likely to involve non-compliance on transfer of small 
arms, as this fact is underlined and acknowledged, among others, by the Security 
Council Resolution 1519 (2003) of April 2003. Under the circumstances, the 
resolution 1519 (2003) established a Monitoring Group which ―focus[es] on the on-
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going arms embargo violations including transfer of ammunition, single use weapons, 
and small arms‖.804  
 
The recent arms embargoes imposed by the Security Council describe the effort to 
force a change in the target behaviour and prevent transfer of weapons. Imposing an 
arms embargo with the main purpose of stopping the flow of arms and easing the 
violence, however, has its limitations. The arms embargo imposed on the former 
Yugoslavia by Security Council resolution 713(1991), for example, did not work well 
to stop the flow of arms as the weapons kept coming to the warring parties through 
the use of covert government supplies or the black market.
805
 Reports suggest the 
arms embargo was repeatedly violated by some countries, based on ideological, 
political, and economic reasons, or they assisted others to violate it.
806
   
 
Arms embargoes work best in situations of military parity between conflicting 
parties, or in situations where neither of the parties has access to external military 
hardware. However, in the event of one of the parties being weaker than the other, an 
embargo ensures a one-sided military victory.
807
 Arms embargoes tend to favour the 
warring factions that have access to government military ordnance and industries, 
while making it very difficult for those on the other sides to organise and defend 
themselves.
808
  For example, the arms embargo against the former Yugoslavia by 
resolution 713 (1991) may have been effective in restricting the flow of arms to 
Bosnian forces, but many argued it was ―fundamentally unjust because it locked in 
place the pre-war balance of power, unfairly disadvantaged the Bosnian forces, and 
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thereby unnecessarily prolonged the conflict‖.809 In addition, in a situation where the 
conflict is dependent on home-grown weaponry, an externally sanctioned arms 
embargo has little or no relevance to reducing the armed conflict.
810
  Then it can be 
argued the same limited impact of an arms embargo would apply to a country which 
was already flooded with weapons before the embargo imposed. 
811
    
 
 
2. Ineffectiveness of arms embargoes 
 
An analysis of arms embargoes by the UN indicates the ineffectiveness of the 
sanctions imposed as they had little impact on targets with a low rate of compliance, 
as well as raising the issue of fairness.
812
 There are repeated violations of the arms 
embargoes, in particular the continuing transfer of small arms, as the United Nations 
Secretary General admitted in his report, investigations of arms embargo violations 
have exposed international networks involved in the illicit trade and brokering of 
small arms.
813
 The stark examples of how a long-imposed arms embargo is 
ineffective can be seen in the case of Somalia.  The arms embargo imposed on the 
country since 1992 does not reduce the availability of small arms there, and in 
contrast ―the quantity and diversity of small arms available in Somalia are greater 
than at any time since the early 1990s‖.814   
 
There are several points of concern on arms embargo implementation; first, there 
have been too many weapons available in the market.
815
 The sanction in many cases 
fails because the target country or entity can choose from a wide range of sellers in 
the international market place and it is virtually impossible to secure universal 
                                               
809 Mark Bromley United Nations Arms Embargoes, Their Impact on Arms Flow and Target 
Behaviour: A Case Study: Former Yugoslavia, 1991-96 (SIPRI, 2007) at 15-16.  
810 Amalendu Misra Politics of Civil Wars: Conflict, Intervention and Resolution (London, Routledge, 
2008) at 140. 
811 Report on Monitoring Group on Somalia, UN Doc S/2010/91 of 10 March 2010. The report 
suggests that the embargo on Somalia does not reduce the arms availability.  
812
  Report of the Secretary-General on Small Arms to the United Nations Security Council 
(S/2008/258) of  17 April 2008 at para 15.  
813 Ibid.  
814 Ibid.  
815 Around 1,000 companies, in 100 countries, produce 7.5 to 8 million small arms a year as cited by 
the Report of the Secretary-General on Small arms (DOC S/2008/258, 17 April 2008) at 4, para 10.  
165 
 
participation as well as to police the compliance even of countries that have agreed to 
participate.
816
  The weapons are available in the grey and black markets to supply the 
demand from warring parties.  
Second, arms embargoes are difficult to enforce and monitor, although, theoretically, 
they are legally binding documents. Furthermore, the implementation of arms 
embargoes depends on States‘ implementation and national jurisdiction, which means 
that national courts have jurisdiction over arms embargo violations only where an 
embargo has been incorporated into the domestic legal system.
817
  When domestic 
law fails to address brokering activities, arms brokers who play a central role in 
providing weapons in armed conflicts are left untouched, although they have violated 
international law.
818
  
 
The situation of impunity enjoyed by arms brokers leads to proposal that the ICC may 
serve as an effective forum to prosecute the arms brokers supplying arms to 
governments or non-State actors that commit war crimes.
819
  The arms brokers‘ 
impunity was illustrated by activities of an arms broker, who has never been indicted, 
who against the arms embargo imported via Seychelles, Zaire, into Rwanda in 1994 
tons of arms, included AK-47 rifles, 82-mm and 60-mm mortar shells, and 37-mm 
and 14.5-mm ammunition.
820
   
 
Despite the arms embargoes shortfalls, the Security Council still continues imposing 
arms embargoes as the chosen measure because the imposition of arms embargoes, at 
the very least, will show a strong message of disapproval to a target State or armed 
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group and an indication of political will to take punitive action by the international 
community.
821
 The political pressure, nevertheless, would further add to the isolation 
of the targeted State. 
 
Third, there is virtually no sanction for violations of an arms embargo.  The Sanction 
Committee, established by the Security Council is to monitor and verify an arms 
embargo is not being violated, has difficulties because there is no fixed mechanism in 
place to make it work. The non-compliance has not been sanctioned although there is 
voice that suggests the United Nations should impose secondary sanctions on those 
non-compliant countries, for example, a SIPRI‘s report on arms embargoes suggests, 
the Security Council should target the States and non-State actors implicated in the 
violations of an arms embargo by at least practicing ―naming and shaming‖.822 In 
practice, it may mean the non-compliant countries and/or entities are explicitly 
mentioned in the related report and meetings.  
 
Fourth, arms embargoes have limitations in reducing the existing weapons. Before an 
arms embargo is adopted, parties in a (potential) armed conflict might have been 
stockpiling many weapons. Therefore, an arms embargo will not reduce the 
availability of weapons procured before an arms embargo is imposed.  A Security 
Council arms embargo does not have any mechanism for collecting and destroying 
the existing weapons, so the parties in conflicts have no difficulties in waging war. 
An arms embargo, as an international instrument designed to exercise control over 
arms proliferation, is often proven ineffective because the focus is on how to stop 
weapons flowing to conflicts and there are no provisions on how to disarm and 
remove weapons that already exist.
823
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Investigating several cases of arms embargoes may help explain why countries do not 
comply with the Security Council resolutions. Besides the Security Council arms 
embargo, regional groupings and individual States may have policies to impose their 
own embargo on certain target States/entities. For example, the European Union and 
the US imposed an arms embargo on Myanmar.
824
 Nevertheless, the ineffectiveness 
of the arms embargo persists.  
 
The failure of an arms embargo to be an effective instrument to stem the flow of arms 
is also because of the political compromise in the Security Council in deciding what a 
threat to international security is. Many States and armed conflicts do not attract  
arms embargoes because of neglect or conflict of interest among members of Security 
Council.
825
 This argument is strengthened by the fact that between 1990 and 2001, for 
example, there were only eight arms embargoes in place, despite there being fifty-
seven major armed conflicts in the same period.
826
 This adds to difficulties in the 
implementation of arms embargo; non-compliance, monitoring, and the virtual 
absence of secondary sanctions for non-compliance. The following sections illustrate 
two examples, Somalia and Yugoslavia that could explain the complexity and the 
failure in the implementation of arms embargoes.   
 
 
3. Examples of the failure and violation of arms embargoes  
(i) Somalia 
 
Internal armed conflict and widespread violence in Somalia started in 1991 when the 
regime of Muhammad Siyad Barre fell. Somalia, since then, has been a country 
without a central government because no effective central government has managed 
to take control of the country following the fall of Barre‘s government.  The 
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continuous inter-communal rivalry has brought the country into deep social 
disintegration with armed fighting and violence. With the absence of any State 
authority to impose law and order, Somalia has become a base for transnational crime 
and terrorists; meanwhile its ports and waters have been used for smuggling, illegal 
fishing, and waste disposal by pirate networks.
827
 The internationally recognized 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) remains dysfunctional, unpopular and only 
able to control limited territory in Baydhabo, in western Somalia.
828
 
 
For almost two decades, the situation in Somalia has shown no improvement, but 
rather, is becoming more complex. In the words of the 2010 report of the Monitoring 
Group established by the United Nations: 
 
The conflict remains a grim example of ―hybrid warfare‖: a combination of 
conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, as well as 
indiscriminate violence, coercion, and criminal disorder —compounded in 
the Somalia case by the interference of regional powers. Somalia‘s frail 
Transitional Federal Government has struggled ineffectually to contain a 
complex insurgency that conflates religious extremism, political and 
financial opportunism, and clan interests. Beneath a superficial ideological 
overlay, armed opposition groups have essentially degenerated into clan 
militias, manifesting the same kind of fluid alliances and fissile 
tendencies.829 
 
The Security Council imposed a general and complete arms embargo by adoption of 
resolution 733 (1992) on 23 January 1992, followed by several other resolutions, such 
as 1356 (2001), 1725 (2006), 1772 (2007), 1864 (2008), and 1916 (2010), which 
revised and outlined certain exemptions to the embargo on Somalia. The sanctions 
combine an arms embargo, a travel ban, and an asset freeze.  
 
The arms embargo imposed by resolution 733 (1992) consists of a territorial arms 
embargo as well as targeting arms transfers to individuals and entities.
830
 The 
measure on the territorial arms embargo states that ―[a]ll States shall immediately 
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implement a general and complete arms embargo on all deliveries of weapons and 
military equipment to Somalia until the Council decides otherwise.‖831 Meanwhile, 
the targeted embargo states that ―Member States shall take the necessary measures to 
prevent the direct or indirect supply of weapons, military equipment...to the 
individuals or entities designated by the Committee.‖832 
 
Since 1992, when the Security Council imposed a general and complete arms 
embargo on Somalia, there has been no sign that the weapons have reduced in 
number. Instead, persistent low intensity armed conflicts demand a continuous supply 
of arms which are principally ammunition and small arms.
833
 The violations have 
involved a wide range of actors and organization networks as reports suggest that the 
weapons in Somalia originate from neighbouring countries and once were legal.
834
 
Meanwhile, Yemen, Ethiopia, and Eritrea are the main markets and transfers for 
arms.
835
 In addition, Uganda and the United States, that support the TFG, also 
contribute to the arms violations since the weapons they gave to the TFG later leaked 
into the black market.
836
  Fighting sides and war lords in Somalia undoubtedly benefit 
from the existence of a black market. Supply of arms in a black market may originate 
from leaked or diverted government arsenal or irresponsible transfers, among other 
things, demonstrated by the events in the end of the Cold War when millions of 
weapons from the stockpiles of Albania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Ukraine were looted or 
sold.
837
      
 
The widespread availability of small arms creates a condition where arms become 
part of a culture and habit. In Somaliland, Somalia, for example, 74 per cent of the 
households own small arms, mainly assault rifles and pistols.
838
 For a country trapped 
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in a long conflict, Somalia has been continuously flooded with small arms. The most 
common weapons in the country are assault rifles AKM (Russia), AK-Type 56 
(China), Heckler and Koch G-3 (Germany), SAR-80 (Singapore), and M-16 (USA), 
in which AK-Type 56 is the most common because it is relatively cheap 
(approximately US$ 350) combined with widely manufactured M43 ammunition.
839
 
 
The report indicates the non-compliance with the arms embargo by some States, 
namely Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, and United Arab Emirates, which play their 
parts in violating the arms embargo on Somalia.
840
 The reasons for non-compliance 
vary. Some States are not aware of their obligations under international law, 
apparently not well-informed on the latest Security Council resolution, while some 
others act intentionally.
841
  
 
(ii) Yugoslavia 
 
The conflict in Yugoslavia started in June 1991 when Croatia and Slovenia declared 
their independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
842
 Serbs living 
in Croatia, supported by the Yugoslav People‘s Army, opposed the declarations and 
armed conflict broke out.
843
  The Security Council imposed an arms embargo by 
adopting resolution 713 (1991) on 25 September 1991 which decided under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations ―that all States shall, for the purposes of 
establishing peace and stability in Yugoslavia, immediately implement a general and 
complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment‖.844 Despite 
the embargo, the conflict escalated and continued until the peace accord agreed to in 
1995. 
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Besides the violations of the arms embargo, there were several factors contributing to 
the ineffectiveness of the measure. The arms embargo imposed on Yugoslavia was 
ineffective because the target was largely self-sufficient in its military production; 
and moreover, the actors in the armed conflicts had procured sufficient quantities of 
weapons before the embargo was adopted.
845
 Serbian forces did not suffer much from 
the embargo as they enjoyed well-stocked armouries and supplies from a domestic 
arms industry, thus gaining a military advantage over their opposing forces.
846
 
 
History seemed to repeat itself five years later when Kosovo pushed for its own 
independence from the Serbs, and a conflict between Kosovo and the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) broke out in late 1995-1996.
847
 The crisis attracted 
international attention as the situation worsened. An arms embargo was again 
imposed, this time on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Security Council 
adopted resolution 1160 (1998) on 31 March 1998 which stated that: 
 
All States shall, for the purposes of fostering peace and stability in Kosovo, 
prevent the sale or supply to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including 
Kosovo, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag 
vessels and aircraft, of arms and related material of all types, such as 
weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment and spare parts 
for the aforementioned, and shall prevent arming and training for terrorist 
activities there.
 848
 
 
As with the previous 1991 arms embargo, this arms embargo could not be 
implemented effectively. While under arms embargo, both the FRY and Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) still managed to gain access to sources of weaponry. 
Reportedly, the FRY was able to procure weapon technologies and components 
illegally from Israel; meanwhile the KLA acquired arms supplies originating from 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Switzerland, and the US with help from the 
Kosovar Albanian diaspora.
849
  Deals between FRY and Israel formed part of a group 
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of 16 embargo violating transactions, with a combined value of US$2 million.
850
 The 
KLA had arms purchased by its supporters in Switzerland and the USA and these 
were smuggled into Kosovo.
851
 Similarly to the Somalia case, there were many non-
compliant countries willing to violate the embargo and the availability of arms on the 
black market contributed to the ineffectiveness of the arms embargo.   
 
The Security Council may continue imposing arms embargoes even after evidence of 
ineffectiveness in their implementation. The decision to impose an arms embargo is 
inevitably influenced by political considerations and interests of the Security Council 
member States. After all, the Security Council is a political body, hence its acts are 
based on political considerations.
852
  As the arms embargo is based on political 
considerations and the perceived general interests of international peace, the Council 
may even impose an arms embargo on a State exercising the right of self-defence.
853
 
Perceived international peace, interests and political considerations may explain the 
change of understanding of threat, as the Security Council‘s decision to impose 
embargoes in a selected internal armed-conflict indicates that the internal armed-
conflict may now constitute ―a threat to international peace and security‖.854  
 
As the previous section suggests, arms embargoes alone will be unable to restrict the 
proliferation of small arms or to significantly reduce the total number of weapons. 
The measure intended to alter the targeted entities or individuals behaviour and in 
turn to maintain order is often ineffective. The conflict situations in Somalia and 
Yugoslavia show that arms embargoes have proven ineffective in limiting targeted 
entities‘ ability to wage war.855   
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4. Reports of the Secretary General on small arms 
 
In addition to the arms embargo decisions which assumedly have a direct effect on 
small arms circulation, another involvement of the Security Council on the issue is 
when it considers the report on small arms prepared by the Secretary-General. The 
first reports of the Secretary-General on small arms submitted to the Security Council 
in 2002
856
, 2003
857
 and 2005
858
 were based on the requests by the President of the 
Security Council. The Security Council decided to address the issue of small arms on 
a more regular basis in 2007, requesting the Secretary-General to submit a report 
containing analysis, observations, and recommendations on the issue of small arms 
on a biennial basis starting in 2008.
859
 The issue of small arms has since become a 
regular agenda item for discussion in the Security Council. 
 
(i) 2002 report 
 
The first report of the Secretary-General on small arms was relatively short, with only 
seven pages, containing 12 recommendations to the Security-Council for 
consideration. The short report was made to provide the Security Council with ―ways 
and means in which it could contribute to dealing with the question of illicit trade in 
small arms and light weapons in situations under its Consideration‖.860 The report 
listed facts and figures about small arms, including the estimated number of victims 
killed by the weapons. The Secretary-General report noted, that the arms embargoes‘ 
purposes, inter alia, were to control the proliferation of small arms, but continued by 
stating that the measures, because of lack of a monitoring mechanism, ―did not play a 
significant role in eradicating the illicit traffic in small arms.‖861  
 
The report identified the repeated violations of the Security Council arms embargoes 
by taking the example of trafficking of small arms into Sierra Leone and Liberia and 
                                               
856
 S/2002/1053 of 20 September 2002. 
857 S/2003/1217 of 31 December 2003. 
858 S/2005/69 of 7 February 2005. 
859 Security Council Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2007/24) of  29 June 2007. 
860 Report of the Secretary-General on Small Arms (S/2002/1053) of 20 September 2002 at para 2. 
861 Ibid, at para 10. 
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indicated the problem of proliferation of the weapons was far from solved.
862
 In its 
recommendations, the report requested States ―to enforce all Council resolutions on 
sanctions, including those imposing arms embargoes…and to bring their own 
national legislation into compliance with the Council‘s measures on sanctions.‖863 
This point of recommendation implies the difficulties for States in implementing an 
arms embargo when their domestic legislation does not provide criminalization 
provisions on arms embargo violations.  
 
Another point of the recommendations in the report requested the Security Council to 
―consider coercive measures against Member States that deliberately violate arms 
embargoes declared in respect of specific conflict areas.‖864 Later, violations of the 
arms embargo by Liberia on transfer of arms to Sierra Leone, forced the Security 
Council to adopt resolution 1478 (2003) as a punishment to Liberia for its non-
compliance. The resolution 1478 has become one of the first examples of a secondary 
sanction to non-compliance. 
 
Member States of the Security Council generally welcomed the Report and stressed 
their support of the recommendations in the open debate on the issue.
865
 Some States, 
point out the responsibility of ensuring that the Security Council makes progress in 
consideration of the issue of small arms with clear goals,
866
 the importance of the 
DDR programme,
867
 the need to urge the Security Council to be more active in 
examining the issues of small arms,
868
 and the practical solution of a strict export and 
import control to fight illicit trade.
869
   
 
 
 
                                               
862 Ibid, at [12]. 
863 Ibid, recommendation 5.  
864 Ibid, recommendation 11. 
865 UN Doc S/PV.4623, verbatim record of the 4623rd meeting, 11 October 2002.  
866
 Statement of Colombia, UN Doc S/PV.4623, verbatim record of the 4623
rd
 meeting, 11 October 
2002. 
867 Statement of France, UN Doc S/PV.4623, verbatim record of the 4623rd meeting, 11 October 2002. 
868 Statement of Mexico, UN Doc S/PV.4623, verbatim record of the 4623rd meeting, 11 October 2002. 
869 Statement of the United States of America, UN Doc S/PV.4623, verbatim record of the 4623rd 
meeting, 11 October 2002. 
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(ii)  2003 report 
 
The second report was submitted to monitor the development of implementation one 
year after the first report was issued. This report was prepared based on the Security 
Council President‘s request to the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the 
implementation of all recommendations contained in his first report on small arms.
870
 
 
Again, the Secretary-General acknowledged that arms embargoes proved to be very 
difficult to enforce. On the point that all Member States of the United Nations should 
enforce the arms embargoes and bring their legislations into compliance with 
measures on sanctions (recommendation 5 of the 2002 report), the report suggested 
the Council consider ―steps that could assist Member States in their implementation 
of the mandatory measures‖.871 With the possibility of the Council considering 
coercive measures against States that deliberately violate arms embargoes, the report 
underlined that ―primary responsibility for the implementation of the sanctions 
regimes, including arms embargoes, rests with the Member States.‖872 This is to say, 
any possible sanction against those involved in the violations is for the member States 
to decide.   
 
 
(iii) 2005 report 
 
The 2005 report was to provide the Security Council with further up-dates on the 
implementation of the 12 recommendations contained in the first report of the 
Secretary-General on small arms in 2002.
873
 With regards to the point that all 
Member Countries of the United Nations should enforce the arms embargoes and 
bring their legislation into compliance with measures on sanctions (recommendation 
5 of the 2002 report), the report refers to three aspects in the implementation of an 
arms embargo. Those three aspects are the legal measures to criminalize breaches of 
                                               
870 Secretary-General on Small Arms (S/2003/1217) of 31 December 2003 at para 1. 
871 Report of the Secretary-General on Small Arms (S/2003/1217), 31 December 2003 at para 14. 
872 Ibid, at para 50. 
873 Report of the Secretary-General on Small Arms (S/2005/69) of 7 February 2005 at para 1. 
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the arms embargo; various safeguards to prevent nationally produced weapons and 
ammunition from being diverted; and the formulation of a normative framework to 
guide decisions regarding arms transfers.
874
 The report highlights the decision by the 
Council requesting all States to submit reports on the implementation of certain 
resolutions and to put in writing their reasons for not reporting.
875
 
 
With regard to the possibility of the Council considering coercive measures against 
States that deliberately violate arms embargoes (recommendation 11 of the 2002 
report), the report explains that the monitoring groups established by the Council 
have been working to monitor and assess the implementation of arms embargoes.
876
  
Concerning the persistent violations, the Council has decided to request the 
monitoring group and group of experts to provide a list of those who continue to 
violate the arms embargoes on Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo for 
possible further measures by the Council.
877
  
 
(iv) 2008 report 
 
In April 2008, as requested by the Security Council President, the Secretary-General 
submitted his report on small arms under a new regular biennial report on small 
arms.
878
 The report consisted of 17 pages with 13 new recommendations which was 
in contrast to the short 12 paragraphs of the 2002 report.  In the report, the Secretary-
General laid particular emphasis on reducing armed violence; fostering cooperation 
among national authorities; enhancing synergy among the UN bodies; improving the 
monitoring of arms embargoes; developing standardization of end-user certificates; 
drawing attention to destruction of surplus ammunition stockpiles; and building 
capacity.879  
                                               
874 Ibid, at para 14. 
875 UNSC res 1526 (2004) of 30 January 2004, concerning Al-Qaida and Taliban, demands States 
submit reports on the implementation of the resolution. The obligation to submit reports is explained in 
paragraph 16 of the Report of the Secretary-General on Small Arms (S/2005/69), 7 February 2005. 
876
 Report of the Secretary-General on Small Arms (S/2005/69) of 7 February 2005 at para 53. 
877 Ibid, at para 54-55. 
878 Security Council Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2007/24) of 29 June 2007. However, there was no 
Secretary-General report on small arms in the year 2010 if it was to be on biennial basis. The following 
report was issued in April 2011. 
879 Report of the Secretary General on Small Arms to Security Council (S/2008/258) of 17 April 2008. 
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The report underlined key steps that could improve the effort to combat the wide 
availability of small arms, including the cooperation among national authorities as a 
vital point in enhancing capacity building. This comes from understanding that the 
enactment of a national law on small arms will not have much impact if States do not 
work together. The report also reflected the absence of a standardized end-user 
certificate to prevent small arms from falling into the wrong hands. 
 
The report notes the connection between small arms and armed conflict. It indicates 
that a normative framework is needed for guidance; that the ―recurring problem 
concerning the proliferation of small arms... is the absence of a normative framework 
for all States to guide decisions regarding arms transfer.‖880 The United Nations 
recognizes that in many cases the arms embargoes do not stop proliferation of small 
arms, which is, in part, because of the absence of clear guidelines for the United 
Nations members in the area of arms transfers.
881
  Hence, it implies that the 
monitoring will not ensure the effectiveness of arms embargoes if a practical 
guideline on arms transfer is not available for States to refer to.   
 
 
(v)  2011 report 
 
The 2011 report
882
 brought the Security Council up to date on a number of topics 
from the previous 2008 report that required its particular attention, such as trade and 
brokering, marking, stockpile management, and armed violence. The report continued 
to underline the essential focus on an inclusive approach to small arms in which 
security, crime, human rights and development intersected.
883
 With regard to the 
development of the implementation of the UNPoA, the report acknowledged the 
                                               
880 Report of the Secretary-General on Small Arms to the United Nations Security Council 
(S/2008/258) of 17 April 2008 at para 16.  
881 Report of the Secretary-General on Small Arms to the United Nations Security Council 
(S/2008/258) of 17 April 2008. 
882 The 2011 report dated 5 April 2011 was issued three years after the last 2008 report, which means a 
year behind schedule. The Security Council, through a statement by its President dated 29 June 2007 
(S/PRST/2007/24), requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on a biennial basis beginning in 
2008. There is no explanation found in the report regarding the delay of submission of this report.    
883 Report of the Secretary-General on Small Arms of 5 April 2011 (S/2011/255) at 1. 
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progress made in the third and fourth biennial meetings which succeeded in 
producing action-oriented outcomes. The report made six recommendations with a 
focus on the tracing of small arms and weapons collection programmes.  
 
The 2011 report did not particularly raise a new topic or new proposal but reported 
the facts on the development of the effort to control small arms for the attention of the 
Council. A matter-of-fact report gave the Council a focus to follow up. Meanwhile, 
the recommendations offered a priority of areas that required the attention of the 
Security Council in discussing the issue of small arms.     
   
In summing up all reports, it can be said that a regular report from the Secretary-
General ensures the issue of small arms exists in the Security Council and keeps the 
Council paying proper attention to the danger the weapons pose to international peace 
and security. The discussion of the reports, including the proposed recommendations, 
gives a clear picture of the urgency of the problem and provides practical policy in 
combating the small arms problems to be implemented by States based on the 
recommendations.  Regular reports on small arms provide an opportunity for the 
Secretary-General to report to the Council of the development and updates of 
previous recommendation implementation. 
 
The Secretary-General‘s reports identify what the Security Council could do to make 
arms embargo implementation more effective in restricting small arms flow to armed 
conflicts. From the first report in 2002, it is noticeable that specific policies suggested 
to the Security Council on steps that may improve the implementation of arms 
embargoes with regard to small arms, have helped the Security Council to realize the 
significance of small arms in arms embargoes. Some recommendations have been 
followed, such as having a list of those who continue violating the arms embargoes 
for possible further measures for the non-compliance.   
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B. Small Arms in the General Assembly  
 
The General Assembly is another principal organ of the United Nations where most 
discussion and negotiation on small arms takes place. Discussion with regard to the 
issue of small arms occurs in the context of its functions and powers to ―discuss any 
questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought 
before it by any Member of the United Nations‖.884 Although General Assembly 
resolutions have only political and moral weight, they more broadly reflect the views 
of the international community which need to be respected as these are the opinion of 
the world‘s governments. One of the first resolutions to address the issue of small 
arms was in 1994 under the title of assistance to member States in curbing the illicit 
small arms and collecting them, which welcomed the initiative of Mali to curb and 
collect small arms in the Saharo-Sahelian subregion.
885
  In the following year, the UN 
General Assembly started to adopt proper small arms resolution entitled ―Small 
arms‖ (50/70B of 12 December 1995) which implicitly recognized that the issue of 
small arms was the problem not only of Africa but also of the world. Notably, the 
resolution 50/70B requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report with assistance 
from a panel group of governmental experts.
886
 Since then, there have been a number 
of General Assembly resolutions concerning small arms over the years.  Most of them 
are a repeated commitment or continuation of certain matters agreed in the previous 
General Assembly. 
 
The General Assembly adopts resolutions to affirm the common agreement among 
countries on ideas concerning particular issues. The continuous resolutions help 
establish growing norms on particular subjects. In the case of small arms, the General 
Assembly has adopted several resolutions that are continuously renewed every year. 
For instance, the GA resolution  56/24U, 29 November 2001, on Assistance to States 
for Curbing the Illicit Traffic in Small Arms and Collecting Them, and resolution 
56/24V, 24 December 2001, on Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All 
                                               
884 Charter of the United Nations, art 11(2).  
885 UNGA res 49/75G of  15 December 1994. Another related resolution 49/75 M of 15 December 
1994 on measures to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional weapons was also adopted but it 
failed to indicate small arms as particular weapons that need to be urgently addressed.   
886 UNGA res 50/70B of 12 December 1995. 
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Its Aspects.  These two resolutions, which have been adopted continuously in the 
following years, reaffirm the concerns about small arms and admit that proliferation 
and circulation of small arms ―impede development, constitute a threat to populations 
and to national and regional security‖.887  Although they have no legal weight, unlike 
the Security Council resolutions, the continuous adoption has shown the agreed 
commitment on the necessity to regulate the trade in small arms, reflecting a norm.  
 
It is also relevant to observe the voting behaviour of States with regard to the small 
arms resolutions to see the policy, or the trend of policy in the area. The smooth 
consensus on wording in the resolution negotiation on a strict regulation may indicate 
that the majority of States are ready to have more than a merely politically binding 
resolution of the General Assembly. On the other hand, the long debate or 
inconclusive discussion may indicate the difficulties in adopting a more binding 
document. The resolution A/RES/65/64 on 8 December 2010 on Illicit Trade in Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects shows a voting pattern of the UN 
member States where the majority of countries are in favour of the general substance 
of the resolution. However, following the process and closely examining the 
compromised sentences will show that the text has been already watered down to get 
most countries support. Thus, even the majority support in a General Assembly 
resolution does not automatically reflect that the member States would then be ready 
to have a legally binding instrument. There are many reasons which cause States to 
act differently when it comes to the choice to have a legal instrument which would be 
legally binding on them. 
 
A series of the General Assembly resolutions provide a forum for new ideas and 
proposals with regard to the effort to control small arms proliferation. As the issue of 
small arms is the concern of the majority of member States, the General Assembly 
keeps the issue alive and up-dates the development of the effort to control these 
weapons.  
 
                                               
887 UNGA res 56/24U of 29 November 2001, preamble paragraph 1. 
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With respect to the issue of small arms, probably the most significant role of the 
General Assembly is that, through its resolutions, it decides to convene meetings, 
conferences, and groups to discuss, negotiate, or prepare a report on the issue. The 
General Assembly resolutions decide the UN Register, groups of governmental 
experts meetings, conferences and other meetings related to small arms.  For 
example, the role of the General Assembly is significant in keeping the UNPoA 
process. When the UNPoA biennial meetings could not decide to hold a review 
conference in 2006, the decision to organize the conference was made by a General 
Assembly resolution.
888
 Similarly, the decision to convene a meeting on an arms trade 
treaty in 2012 was made by a General Assembly resolution.
889
 
 
 
1. United Nations Register and the inclusion of small arms 
 
A General Assembly resolution that has important link to small arms is resolution 
46/36 L of 6 December 1991 entitled Transparency in Armaments, which encourages 
States to submit reports on their imports and exports of conventional arms in one 
calendar year. The resolution requires member States to take action on a regular basis 
and provide information on their transfer of conventional weapons. The report on the 
UN Register would help the process of confidence building measures and promote 
transparency in armament among States, because States would be aware of each 
other‘s intentions with regard to armaments. On its development, the UN Register 
continues to encourage the member States to include the transfer of small arms in 
their reports
890
 although the effort to include small arms as additional category of the 
UN Register has, so far, not succeeded. 
 
The report in the UN Register, as decided by the resolution 46/36 L in 1991, is 
submitted on a voluntary basis. Started in 1992, the number of the States which have 
submitted their report was promising with China, the UK, France, Russia, and the US 
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889 UNGA res 64/48 of 2 December 2009. 
890 UNGA res 66/39 of 2 December 2011, operative para 4. 
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doing so.
891
 The submission by the all permanent members of the Security Council 
(P5), which are also the main arms producers, is nothing but positive in showing a 
willingness to be transparent in their arms transactions covered by the UN Register. 
The overall reports have a fluctuating trend reflecting inconsistent reporting from the 
United Nations Member States. In the first year (1992), there were 95 governments 
submitting reports, up to 123 in 2003, but the number fell to 79 in 2008, 76 in 2009, 
72 in 2010, and 84 in 2011.
892
 The exact reason for the erratic submission is 
unknown, perhaps partly because the report is on a voluntary basis or because of the 
technical difficulties in filling the forms. The United Nations secretariat tries to 
address this issue by organizing several regional workshops aimed at raising 
awareness about the UN Register among the officials in the regions, including 
information sessions on filling in the forms.
893
  
 
i. Purpose of arms register 
 
The preamble paragraphs of the resolution 46/36 L of 9 December 1991 state the 
purpose of the resolution is ―to work towards easing tensions‖, more openness and 
promote transparency in military matters.
894
 The following preamble paragraph 
underlines the importance of ―confidence-building measures, including transparency 
and exchange of relevant information on armaments‖, which is ―likely to reduce the 
occurrence of dangerous misperceptions about the intentions of States and to promote 
trust among States.‖895  
 
From the need to have confidence building, the preamble paragraph 7 of the 
resolution 46/36 L rightly mentions that the illicit trade of arms may cause 
―destabilizing and destructive effects...particularly for the internal situation of 
                                               
891 Reports from States can be accessed at the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs 
<http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Register/>.  
892 United Nations Register on Conventional Arms <http://disarmament.un.org/UN_REGISTER.NSF>.  
Last accessed 31 July 2012; see temporary list submission for calendar year 2011 in the Report of the 
Secretary General, A/66/127 of 12 July 2011.   
893 United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, Report of Secretary-General (A/65/133), 15 July 
2010.  
894 UNGA res 46/36 L of 9 December 1991, preamble para 2. 
895 Ibid, preamble para 3; see also Paul Holtom and Mark Bromley Implementing An Arms Trade 
Treaty: Lessons on Reporting and Monitoring from Existing Mechanism (SIPRI, 2011) at 5.    
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affected States and the violation of human rights.‖896 The citation of human rights is 
significant to reaffirm the common understanding that the uncontrolled spread of 
arms may promote violence and undermine respect for human rights, which may 
trigger further instability. 
 
The adoption of the resolution on the UN Register started a regular voluntary report 
submission on transfer of conventional weapons by States and a move to encourage a 
greater transparency from States in global arms transfers.  The resolution seeks 
transparency of the global conventional weapons trade by calling on all countries to 
report their conventional arms procurement annually, and requests States to inform of 
their arms transfers and procurements through national production in accordance with 
the categories of weapons agreed.
897
 
  
Initially, the resolution 46/36 L above and its annex do not include the report of the 
imports and exports of small arms because the weapons are not part of the seven 
categories. The resolution, as stated in paragraphs 8 and 10, however, is open for the 
expansion of further categories of the conventional weapons reported.
898
 Pursuant to 
this, in the following years, there have been many discussions on whether to include 
small arms. 
 
ii. Categories of weapons and efforts to include small arms 
 
As explained in the annex ―Register of Conventional Arms‖ of the resolution 46/36, 
there are seven (7) categories of conventional weapons which are requested to be 
reported by the Member States. The seven categories of conventional weapons are 
Category I: battle tanks; Category II: armoured combat vehicles; Category III: large 
                                               
896 Ibid, preamble para 7. 
897 UNGA res 46/36 L of 9 December 1991. The operative paragraph 9 reads: “Calls upon all Member 
States to provide annually for the Register data on imports and exports of arms‖; and the operative 
paragraph 10 reads: ―Invites Member States, pending the expansion of the Register also to provide to 
the Secretary-General, with their annual report on imports and exports of arms, available background 
information regarding their military holdings, procurement through national production and relevant 
policies‖. 
898 UNGA res 46/36 L of 9 December 1991. 
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calibre artillery systems; Category IV: combat aircraft; Category V: attack 
helicopters; Category VI: warships; Category VII: missiles and missile launchers.
899
  
 
It was more than ten years later, in 2003, that Member States for the first time were 
requested to fill a supplemental form for the procurement of small arms as 
background information, in addition to the other seven categories.  The proposal to 
include small arms as a supplemental report first appeared when the group of 
governmental experts in its report noted that interested States could provide voluntary 
information on transfers of small arms with their annual submissions.
900
 Several 
countries, like the UK, Netherlands, Montenegro, and Sweden, have reported the 
procurement of small arms since 2003 in the background information. The inclusion 
of information on small arms transfers was further encouraged by the decision to have 
―the optional standardized reporting form, as adopted by the 2006 group of 
governmental experts‖.901 As it is optional, the majority of countries opt to not report 
it.   
 
The need for transparency in the transfers of small arms was tabled for following 
meetings. As decided at the 2006 meeting, the group of governmental experts in 2009 
discussed the category expansion proposal to include the report on small arms as 
category VIII in the Arms Register, although in the end, the group failed to achieve 
consensus.
902
 That means that further efforts to include small arms in the Register 
have to wait for the next group of governmental experts triennial meeting.  If the new 
category is included, it would greatly help in making the small arms transfer 
transparent, to foster trust among countries.  
 
iii. Follow up and implementation of the UN Register 
 
Although the UN Register works on a voluntary basis, the majority of the United 
Nations Member States actually submit their reports.  The UN Register has received 
                                               
899 UNGA res 46/36 L of 9 December 1991. 
900 Paragraph 107 of the report on the continuing operation of the United Nations Register of 
Conventional Arms and its further development. UN Doc. A/58/274 of 13 August 2003. 
901 UNGA res 61/77 of 6 December 2006. 
902 Jeff Abramson ―UN Conventional Arms Register Falters‖ (2009) 39(7) Arms Control Today at 27.  
185 
 
reports from 173 countries since its inception through the adoption of resolution 
46/36 L of 9 December 1991.
903
  The number of governments submitting reports with 
background information is far less. There were reports from 95 governments in 1992 
(44 with background information), 94 governments in 1993 (39 with background 
information), and 117 governments in 2005 (30 with background information).
904
 
Following the adoption of standardized reporting forms in 2006, 36 out of 113 
countries provided the report on small arms.
905
 The number that provided background 
information increased to 48 out of 91 countries in 2007, and 53 out of 80 countries in 
2008.
906
 The latest data submission for the calendar year 2011 showed, from 84 
countries, 48 provided background information on small arms transfer.
907
 The 
generally increasing positive trend in general background information is constructive 
because more submissions would eventually create a greater transparency in small 
arms transfer and procurement.  
 
At this juncture, the UN Register is the only mechanism to promote transparency in 
the procurement of small arms. The limited data about procurement and the small 
arms transfer can be retrieved from reports with background information. The 
inclusion of the supplemental report on the exports and imports of small arms, albeit 
not an official category in the Arms Register, has revealed some parts of the transfer 
on the small arms trade in background information submitted by States. Whilst the 
UN Register has limited implication on small arms trade transparency, it is a step in 
the right direction of bringing some light into this area. Furthermore, the possibility 
of small arms being an official category has great potential to help bringing more 
transparency in the small arms trade.    
                                               
903 Office for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, New York 
<http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Register/>.  Last accessed on 31 July 2012. 
904 United Nations Register on Conventional Arms <http://disarmament.un.org/UN_REGISTER.NSF>. 
Last accessed on 15 July 2011. 
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906  ―Fact Sheet on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms‖ (2008) Office for Disarmament 
Affairs, United Nations, New York 
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907 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs 
<http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Register/>. Last accessed 31 July 2012.  
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D. International Instruments related to Small Arms 
1. United Nations Programme of Action   
 
In July 2001, Member States of the United Nations gathered in New York to convene 
a meeting on small arms as a response to concerns of the international community on 
the impact of small arms on human security in general.  The end result of the 
conference is the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit 
Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UNPoA).
908
 This 
programme, so far, is one of the most unified and comprehensive international efforts 
in trying to tackle the problem of small arms. The meeting presented a great chance 
for the world to be finally able to regulate small arms trade; a chance that was missed 
as the meeting failed to adopt a legal instrument and ended up instead with only the 
political document of a programme of action.   
 
The UNPoA focuses on the concerns about the impact of small arms and their 
widespread availability in conflict and post-conflict situations. The focus on small 
arms in conflict-related situations is shown by underlining the importance of the DDR 
program in Part II (20) which states that the programme is to ―develop and 
implement, including in conflict and post-conflict situations, public awareness and 
confidence-building programmes on the problem and consequences of the illicit 
trade‖ in small arms.909  The problems around small arms trade are indeed 
multifaceted and addressing only the illicit part is not adequate. Hence, the term 
―illicit‖ trade in the long title of the conference is understood as the easier of many 
aspects of the small arms trade for States to start focusing on.
910
 While it is 
considered the easiest part, addressing illicit trade would only partly touch the real 
issue because many illegal arms, in reality, start out as legal arms which then are 
misused or diverted to unauthorized individuals or parties.
911
  
                                               
908 UN Doc A/CONF.192/15 
909 UN Doc A/CONF.192/15. 
910Lora Lumpe ―Aiming for Prevention: Approaches to Controlling Availability Existing International 
Efforts‖ (paper presented to IPPNW Conference Aiming for Prevention: International Medical 
Conference on Small Arms, Gun Violence, and Injury,  Helsinki, Finland, 28-30 September 
2001)<www.ippnw.org/ResourceLibrary/Hels/Lumpe.pdf>. Last accessed on 5 February 2010. 
911 Denise Garcia Small Arms and Security: New Emerging International Norms (Routledge, 2006) at 
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a. Rationales 
 
The UNPoA consists of four parts; Part I (Preamble), Part II (Preventing, combating 
and eradicating), Part III (Implementation, international cooperation and assistance), 
and Part IV (Follow-up).
912
 Part I (preamble) consists of rationales, background and 
purposes of the document that will be examined further. Parts II and III consist of 
detailed measures for States to put in place, adopt, establish, and implement at 
national, regional, and global level to combat the illicit trade of small arms. Many of 
the UNPoA follow-up meetings contain reports of individual States on the progress of 
the measures recommended.    
 
The preamble of the UNPoA describes what problems small arms may cause, such as 
their relation to humanitarian and socio-economic consequences, and their potential 
as a threat to security. The preamble also acknowledges that small arms may 
exacerbate violence and undermine respect for international law: 
 
Gravely concerned about the illicit manufacture, transfer and circulation of 
small arms…which have a wide range of humanitarian and socio-economic 
consequences and pose a serious threat to peace, reconciliation, safety, 
security, stability and sustainable development…913 
    
The UNPoA also recognizes that the illicit trade in small arms ―sustains conflicts, 
exacerbates violence, contributes to the displacement of civilians, [and] undermines 
respect for international humanitarian law‖.914 Paragraph 13 in the preamble 
reconfirms the notion that it is States‘ main responsibility to control and prevent 
small arms from being diverted into the wrong hands. The participating States to the 
conference believe ―that Governments bear the primary responsibility for preventing, 
combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms….‖915 In the same way, the 
States recognise that ―the international community has a duty to deal with this issue, 
and [acknowledges] that the challenge posed by the illicit trade in small arms and 
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 UN Doc A/CONF.192/15. 
913 2001 United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (A/CONF.192/15), preamble para 2. 
914 2001 United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (A/CONF.192/15), preamble para 3. 
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light weapons in all its aspects is multifaceted…‖.916   When States recognize that it is 
their responsibility to prevent illicit trade, this arguably implies that it is also States‘ 
responsibility to ensure that the arms transferred do not subsequently become illicit.   
 
Concern for humanity is shown in the preamble to the UNPoA on small arms, 
demonstrated by the concerns regarding excessive accumulation and uncontrolled 
spread of small arms ―which have a wide range of humanitarian and socio-economic 
consequences‖.917 The UNPoA continues stressing the importance of the humanity 
rationale in paragraph 4, which is ―[d]etermined to reduce human suffering caused by 
the illicit trade in small arms‖.918 The preamble part of the UNPoA provides some 
humanitarian grounds reinforcing the humanitarian raison d'être in regulating the 
small arms trade and reiterates the argument of scholars and civil society that small 
arms sustain conflict and undermine respect for international humanitarian law
919
 as 
earlier exemplified in nearly every conflict zone in which the IHL is not observed.   
 
The preamble paragraphs of the UNPoA indicate the recognition of several important 
points with regards to small arms. The first, human security is recognized as the 
rationale for regulation of small arms trade beyond war and armed conflict as it 
relates to a greater socio-economic problem as small arms availability is entwined 
with stability, security, economic development, culture, and the public health 
sector.
920
 The second, there is a recognition ―that the Governments bear the primary 
responsibility‖ in preventing and combating illicit trade in small arms.921 This has 
serious implications with regard to State responsibility in small arms transfers, as it 
arguably may also mean that States are responsible for the consequences the weapons 
have caused.  
 
 
                                               
916 Ibid, para 15. 
917 2001 United Nations Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (A/CONF.192/15); A/RES/56/24V on 24 December 2001. 
918 Ibid.  
919 Ibid, para 5. 
920 United Nations Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms 
and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UN PoA 2001), A/CONF.192/15, preamble para 2, 5, and 4.  
921 Ibid, preamble para 13. 
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b. Measures to control illicit trade of small arms 
 
The UNPoA lists measures suggested to be adopted by countries. Part II: Preventing, 
combating and eradicating the illicit trade consists of various practical measures, 
States are requested and recommended to take in order to prevent, eradicate, and 
combat the illicit trade in small arms at the national level; at the regional level; and at 
the global level.
922
  At the national level, States are requested: 
 
To put in place, where they do not exist, adequate laws, regulations and 
administrative procedure to exercise effective control over the production of 
small arms... and over the export, import, transit or retransfer of such 
weapons, in order to prevent illegal manufacture of and illicit trafficking in 
small arms and light weapons, or their diversion to unauthorised 
recipients.
923
  
 
States are required to identify groups or individuals engaged in illegal manufacture, 
trade, transfer and take action under appropriate national law.
924
 Part II also requests 
States to adopt and implement the necessary legislative measures to establish as 
criminal offenses under domestic law, the illegal manufacture, possession, and trade 
of small arms.
925
  
 
The UNPoA recognizes opportunistic non-State actors, groups, or individuals that 
may be involved in particular aspects of illegal small arms trade. Hence, the States 
are requested to identify and take action under national law against groups and 
individuals engaged in illegal manufacture, trade, stockpiling, transfer and possession 
of small arms.
926
 The measures to control illicit trade of small arms also include the 
application of appropriate and reliable marking, accurate records, adoption of 
adequate national legislation on small arms brokering, and the use of authenticated 
end-user certificates.
927
  
                                               
922 UN PoA (2001), A/CONF.192/15. 
923 UN PoA (2001), A/CONF.192/15, part II, para 2.  
924
 Ibid, part II, para 6. 
925 2001 United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. General Assembly document (A/CONF.192/15), 
part II, para 3. 
926 Ibid, part II, para 6. 
927 Ibid, part II, para 7, 9, 12, and 14. 
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In addition to the acknowledgment of State responsibility and duty in controlling 
illicit trade of small arms in the preamble (Part I), the operative paragraphs (Part II) 
include a reference to State responsibility to prevent the diversion of the weapons. 
The programme recommends States to have strict national regulations that ―are 
consistent with the existing responsibilities of States under relevant international law, 
taking into account in particular the risk of diversion of these weapons into illegal 
trade‖.928 This underlines State responsibility under international law, particularly the 
element of prevention, so that the weapons are not being used in genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and other crimes against humanity.
929
  
 
Further questions may arise from reading the text: What is the existing mechanism of 
international law to regulate or prevent the diversion of weapons into illegal trade? 
And, what incentives are there for them to do so? The reality is that, apart from the 
Security Council arms embargo, there is no legal instrument to control small arms 
trade.  
 
Realising that the campaign against the illicit trade of small arms cannot be fought by 
a single State alone, the participating States at the conference indicated the need to 
cooperate at the regional and global level.
930
 At the regional level, the UNPoA 
encourages States: 
 
To encourage negotiations, where appropriate, with the aim of concluding 
relevant legally binding instruments aimed at preventing, combating and 
eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its 
aspects, and where they do exist to ratify and fully implement them.
931
  
 
This thesis, in the next chapter, shows how States in regional groupings respond to 
the issue of small arms. 
                                               
928 Ibid, part II, para 11. 
929
 As codified in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered 
into force 1 July 2002), 2187 UNTS 90. 
930 A/CONF.192/15, part II and III. 
931 2001 United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. General Assembly document (A/CONF.192/15), 
part II, para 25. 
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Another measure to combat the illicit trade of small arms is to establish moratoriums 
on transfer and manufacture of small arms as suggested in paragraph 26, Part II of the 
UNPoA.  Those moratoriums on transfer would be likely to reduce the arms transfers 
and manufacture in the affected region. Finally, the States are encouraged, at the 
regional level, to support ―national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 
programmes, particularly in post-conflict situations.‖932 This is another wording that 
shows the focus of the UNPoA on conflict and post-conflict situations where a strong 
programme of DDR is needed.  
 
At the global level, States undertake to cooperate with the United Nations system to 
ensure the effective implementation of arms embargoes and to provide, on a 
voluntary basis, national reports on implementation of the Programme of Action 
(paragraphs 32 and 33, part II). This becomes the basis for the United Nations 
Member States‘ voluntary submission on the implementation of the UNPoA. 
 
c. Implementation and follow-up 
 
Part III of the UNPoA, entitled ―Implementation, international cooperation and 
assistance‖, recognizes the need for close cooperation between States and 
acknowledges, again, ―that primary responsibility for solving the problems associated 
with the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects falls on all 
States.‖933  The reiteration of State responsibility, on international cooperation in part 
III, is relevant to demonstrate that the State responsibility is beyond the border of an 
individual State. A sovereign State is, in theory, morally obligated towards other 
States and other human beings.
934
  This particular part of the UNPoA consists of the 
encouragement for States, in a position to do so, to render assistance, including 
                                               
932
 Ibid, part II, para 30. 
933 United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. General Assembly document (2001), the UN General 
Assembly (A/CONF.192/15), part III, paragraph 1.  
934 Patrick Capps Human Dignity and the Foundations of International Law (Hart Publishing, 2009) at 
196. 
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technical and financial assistance where needed, to support the implementation of the 
UNPoA.
935
   
 
In part IV, the States agreed to convene a review conference in five years‘ time to 
review progress made in the implementation of the Programme of Action; to convene 
a meeting of States on a biennial basis to consider national, regional, and global 
implementation of the Programme of Action; and to undertake a United Nations study 
―for examining the feasibility of developing an international instrument to enable 
States to identify and trace in a timely and reliable manner illicit small arms‖.936   The 
undertaking of the States to have an instrument to identify and trace small arms has 
led to the adoption of the International Tracing Instrument by the General Assembly 
in 2005. 
937
 
 
States have been submitting reports voluntarily on the implementation of the Program 
of Action as requested by the resolution 56/24 of 12 December 2001. To assist States 
in submitting reports, the Office for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations 
prepares a template and guidelines for the report.
938
 The UNPoA text does not 
indicate whether the report is to be submitted on an annual or biennial basis; however, 
since the follow-up meeting of the UNPoA is held on a biennial basis, it appears that 
most States opt to submit biennially although some of them indeed do so annually.  In 
2003, as many as 99 States submitted their implementation reports, increasing to 105 
in 2005, and 109 in 2008.
939
 It is worth noting that the P5 countries are among those 
who submitted their reports. The reports submitted by States about the 
implementation reveal the effort that has been made by individual countries to 
regulate small arms in accordance with the points suggested in the UNPoA. It also 
                                               
935 United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (2001), the UN General Assembly document 
(A/CONF.192/15), part III, para 3. 
936
 Ibid, part IV, para 1, 
937 UNGA Decision 60/519 of 8 December 2005. 
938 The form can be found at theUNODA 
<http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Register/Forms/>. Last accessed 21 June 2012. 
939 United Nations Programme of Action Support System: PoA-ISS < http://www.poa-
iss.org/poa/poa.aspx>. Last accessed on 25 January 2010. 
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serves as a confidence building measure, in addition to promoting norms through the 
multilateral mechanism of the United Nations.
940
   
 
As a follow-up, the United Nations held the first review conference (RevConf) of the 
implementation of the UNPoA in 2006 to review the implementation of the UNPoA 
in the previous five years. States came to the meeting to report the actions they had 
taken so far in fulfilling their political undertakings to combat the small arms trade. 
The 2006 review conference was still filled with contrasting, divided positions, 
particularly on the issues of civilian possession and prohibition of transfer to non-
state actors, with some arguing for the right to bear arms or moral obligation to help 
people against their oppressive government. Some are of the view that the 
international regulation of small arms trade may undermine the right to bear weapons. 
In the opening of the RevConf, even the UN Secretary-General tried to clarify the 
perception of the UNPoA by including in his statement that the UNPoA is not 
―intended to deny law-abiding citizens their right to bear arms in accordance with 
their national traditions‖ and it is ―directed toward illegal weapons and not legal 
ones.‖941  
 
Despite the reassuring statement from the Secretary-General, the United States 
delegation responded to that statement by stating that the United States will not agree 
to any provisions restricting civilian possession, use or legal trade of firearms 
inconsistent with its laws and practices.
942
  
 
However, since the change of government in Washington to the Obama 
administration, the US position has been assertive, accommodating, and engaging in 
small arms related processes such as in the UNPoA meetings and the preliminary 
                                               
940 Denise Garcia Small Arms and Security: New Emerging International Norms (New York, 
Routledge, 2006) at 43. 
941 United Nations Secretary-General Statement in the opening of the UNPoA RevConf, New York, on 
26 June 2006. 
942 Statement by Robert G. Joseph, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International 
Security, at the United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the 
Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in All Its Aspects, New York, 27 June 2006 
<www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/pdf/arms060627usa-eng.pdf>. Last accessed on 25 January 2010. 
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negotiations as preparation towards the 2012 conference on an arms trade treaty.
943
 It 
helps the UNPoA process to focus on encouraging States to implement the suggested 
points at national, regional, and global levels. 
 
d.  Missed chance to regulate the small arms trade   
 
The failure of the 2001 conference to adopt a legally binding document to regulate 
the illicit trade on small arms has disappointed many. Two main factors were seen as 
the reasons. First, the discussion to regulate small arms trade took place within a strict 
arms control and not a human rights framework.
944
 Hence the debate on the issue 
went to a more political point of view and did not view the problem from the human 
security perspective shared by many delegates and civil society. Second, major 
influential powers, in particular the US, did not provide their leadership in combating 
the unrestricted circulation of small arms and instead stood in the way. The position 
of the European Union, and the African countries in the conference was positive 
towards having a global legal document on small arms but the hope that the 
conference would lead to negotiating a treaty was not fulfilled.  
 
The conference‘s result disappointed many. Those who were upset were mostly small 
arms affected countries and civil society which described the conference as having 
―represented  a dramatic missed opportunity, both for the emerging transnational 
legal process of global small arms regulation and for the United States as a potential 
leader of the process‖.945 The disappointment of many countries, in particular the 
countries in Africa which are worst affected by small arms, is not only of not being 
able to have a legal document, but also on the policy of the United States on avoiding 
                                               
943 US support to an ATT reversing the vote in the UNGA from against in 2006 and 2008 to in favour 
in 2009. See also Remarks on Arms Trade Treaty by Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary for Arms 
Control and International Security, US Department of State, 18 February 2010 
<http://www.state.gov/t/us/136849.htm>. Last accessed on 27 September 2011. 
944 Harold Hongju Koh ―Commentary: World Drowning in Guns‖ in Thomas J Biesteker and others 
(eds) International Law and International Relations: Bridging Theory and Practice (Routledge, 2007) 
at 64-65. 
945 Ibid, at 65.   
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the discussion on transparency in civilian possession on small arms and prohibiting 
transfer to non-state actors.
946
  
 
The UN Secretary-General, in his 2008 report on small arms, added his voice to the 
disappointment and listed the factors that have impeded the progress of the UNPoA 
implementation.  Those factors are, among others, that the UNPoA is not a legally 
binding instrument; Member States tend to view UNPoA through specific lens, 
overlooking the nexus between security and development; the UNPoA does not 
include ammunition; the document lacks measurability and specific numerical targets; 
and it does not provide concrete procedures for operational information exchange 
among States‘ law enforcements authorities.947 The Secretary-General‘s statement 
thus summed up that the points the States could not agree on at the 2001 Conference 
were among the main factors impeding the implementation of the programme.  
 
The Program of Action itself, while it is only a political document, provides a forum 
where dialogue and discussion on aspects of small arms can occur on a regular basis 
and therefore norms continue being disseminated among States.  The UNPoA related 
meetings, together with UNGA resolutions on small arms are perhaps the most 
significant factors in keeping the issue alive and opening up further possibility for 
having more effective regulation to control the small arms trade. 
 
e. Latest developments 
 
The inability of the UNPoA to adopt a more productive outcome was mainly because 
of the resistance of major powers and once the major powers, particularly the US, 
adopted a policy of more engagement, the meetings of the UNPoA started showing 
progress. The last two meetings in 2008 and 2010 on the follow-up of the 
implementation of the UNPoA showed promising progress. In both meetings, States 
                                               
946 Statement by the President of the Conference on Small Arms, Ambassador Camilo Reyes 
Rodriguez after the adoption of the UN Programme of Action, New York, 21 July 2001. He stated that 
―Africa had agreed only with the greatest of reluctance to the deletion of proposed language addressing 
these vital issues relating to the illicit trade in small arms‖. 
947 Report of the Secretary-General on Small Arms. S/2008/258, 17 April 2008. 
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produced action-oriented outcomes that provided guidance for national, regional and 
international efforts and cooperation.
948
  
 
The biennial meeting of States in June 2010 produced practical outcomes in which 
important points of implementation, ―The way forward‖, are specified.949 Those 
points with specific way forward plans are on the establishment of sub-regional or 
regional mechanisms, international cooperation and assistance, strengthening of the 
follow-up mechanism, and the implementation of the ITI.
950
   The outcome of the 
meeting was later endorsed by the General Assembly as it encouraged all States to 
implement ―the measures in the section of the report entitled ‗The way forward‘‖.951 
The meeting prepared a well planned second review conference for the 
implementation of the UNPoA in 2012 and no State apparently tried to block the 
process, as had been the case in the 2006 review conference. This change can be 
attributed to a better implementation of the UNPoA.  
 
 
2. Firearms Protocol (2001) 
 
The Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their 
Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the Firearms Protocol) was 
signed in 2001.
952
 It was adopted to complement the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) and therefore its implementation is 
viewed as being to combat transnational organized crime.  
 
                                               
948 Report of Secretary-General on Small Arms, 5 April 2011 (S/2011/255) at 14.  
949 Report of the Fourth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme 
of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All 
Its Aspects,  New York, 14-18 June 2010 (A/CONF.192/BMS/2010/3). 
950
 Ibid.  
951 UNGA resolution (65/64) on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, of 8 
December 2010, operative paragraph 4.  
952 Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and 
Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime (adopted 31 May 2001, entered into force 3 July 2005), 2326 UNTS 208.  
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The UNGA resolution 55/255 of 31 May 2001 on the Protocol provides insights into 
the way States in the United Nations think about it. Again, the resolution reflects the 
concerns of States that a regulation on firearms could undermine a State‘s right to 
self-defence as it reaffirms  ―the inherent right to individual or collective self-defence 
recognized in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, which implies that 
States also have the right to acquire arms with which to defend themselves‖.953 
 
The resolution 55/255 also reaffirms another right, namely ―the right of self-
determination of all peoples, in particular peoples under colonial or other forms of 
alien domination or foreign occupation, and the importance of the effective 
realization of that right‖.954 Hence, the preamble paragraphs underline two rights,   
the right of self-defence and the right of self-determination, that States think very 
important and up hold those rights against any possibility that may jeopardize them. 
Citing these rights in the resolution may reflect a situation where States do not want 
the provisions in the Protocol undermine the rights of self-defence and self-
determination.    
 
 
a. Purpose 
 
The purpose of the Protocol is stated in article 2 as being to ―promote, facilitate and 
strengthen cooperation among States parties in order to prevent, combat and eradicate 
the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components 
and ammunition.‖955 The Protocol includes ammunition as a part that needs to be 
tackled in the combat against illicit firearms. The inclusion of the issue of 
ammunition is reassuring, since the UNPoA was not able to agree on the ammunition 
issue when the participating countries negotiated the document.   
 
The protocol is the first international legal instrument to criminalize firearms 
traffickers and demand States parties establish national legislation in criminalizing 
                                               
953 UNGA res 55/255 of 31 May 2001, preamble para 4. 
954 Ibid, preamble para 4. 
955 Ibid, art 2.  
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arms traffickers.
956
 With regard to the illegal trade, article 5 requires each State party 
to ―adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as 
criminal offences 957   
 
Some of the conduct that is required to be criminalized by the Protocol includes illicit 
manufacturing, illicit trafficking, and falsifying or altering the marking.
958
 The 
Protocol lists steps to be taken by States parties to prevent illicit trade of firearms. 
These steps are on record-keeping (article 7) and marking (article 8) as well as on 
ensuring  all information on export, import, transit, licences and authorizations, 
quantity, marking, and identification be well kept. The Protocol demands States parties 
establish requirements for export, import, transit licensing and authorization systems 
which require both exporting and importing States have export and import licensing 
authorization.
959
  As for the arms brokers, the Protocol indicates that ―States Parties 
that have not yet done so shall consider establishing a system for regulating the 
activities of those who engage in brokering‖.960  
 
 
b. Protocol‘s focus  
 
The significant importance of the Protocol is that it is the first international legal 
document which sets required steps for States parties to adopt to control the illicit 
trade of firearms and to prevent illicit trafficking. The Protocol provides a legal basis 
for a State to adopt legislation to criminalize aspects of illicit firearms trade but it 
does not say in what situation transfer between States must not be conducted, for 
example, as where it would endanger people in the importing State. Neither does the 
Protocol give any hints to avoid regional instability caused by arms transfer.  
 
                                               
956 Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and 
Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime (2001), 2326 UNTS 208, art 5. 
957
 Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and 
Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime (2001),2326 UNTS 208, art 5. 
958 Ibid.  
959 Ibid, art 10. 
960 Ibid, art 11.  
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The Protocol works on the assumption that State-to-State transfer cannot be impeded 
at all times as article 4 (2) states:   
 
This Protocol shall not apply to State-to-State transactions or to State 
transfers in cases where the application of the Protocol would prejudice 
the right of a State Party to take action in the interest of national security 
consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.
961
  
 
The Protocol thus focuses on combating organized crime and works based on two 
important assumptions, transfer of firearms in the Protocol will not apply to 
government sales; and the protocol is considered as law enforcement and not arms 
control. 
962
  The Protocol has a different focus in combating crime in reference to the 
issue of firearms, which was specifically adopted to control organized crime. Hence, 
it puts aside the aspects of humanitarianism and human security or even arms control, 
thus facilitating the Protocol‘s easy adoption.963  
 
 
3.International Tracing Instrument (2005)  
 
On many occasions, the country of origin of a weapon cannot be identified because it 
has no clear marking system. Having a clear marking on the weapons would enable 
the tracing of the country of origin, manufacturer, and the end-user of the weapons. 
The endeavour to have an international instrument on standardized marking resulted 
in the adoption by the General Assembly of an International Instrument to Enable 
States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and 
Light Weapons (ITI) on 8 December 2005.
964
  
                                               
961 Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and 
Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime (2001), 2326 UNTS 208, art 4(2). 
962
 Wade Boese ―UN General Assembly Adopts Illicit Firearms Protocol‖ (2001) 31(6) Arms Control 
29 at 29.   
963 S Neil MacFarlene and Yuen Foong Khong Human Security and the UN: A Critical History 
(Indiana University Press, 2006) at 198. 
964 International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, 
Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (UNGA decision 60/519 of 8 December 2005).  
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The preamble of the instrument indicates that the need to trace and identify small 
arms is ―required in the context of all forms of crimes and conflict situations‖,965 as 
well as stressing that all aspects relating to the small arms issue should be ―addressed 
in a coordinated and comprehensive manner‖.966 The instrument tries to fill the 
absence of any standardized international mechanism on the marking of small arms. 
This is, in part, a response to some concerns that lethal weapons, such as small arms, 
are difficult to trace because there is no worldwide system to record the information 
on the sale and transfer of small arms.
967
 Without a worldwide standardized tracing 
system, a small arms exporting country can easily claim ignorance about any 
weapons which have ended up in the wrong hands.
968
  
 
Provided weapons are marked in compliance with the ITI, small arms proliferation 
could be traced to collect the information on the manufacturer, country of origin, and 
the end-users of the weapons. In this way, the parties involved in diverting the 
weapons could be held responsible. Observing the provisions in the instrument, the 
preamble states that the main purposes are to ―enable States to identify and trace, in a 
timely and reliable manner, illicit small arms‖; and ―to promote and facilitate 
international cooperation and assistance in marking and tracing‖. 969 The instrument 
ensures in its provisions not to undermine the right of States to acquire weapons in 
self-defence, which, understandably accommodates States‘ concerns that the 
regulations on small arms would jeopardize the right to self-defence:  
This instrument does not restrict the right of States to acquire, manufacture, 
transfer and retain small arms and light weapons for their self-defence and 
security needs...in a manner consistent with the Charter of the United 
Nations.
970   
 
                                               
965 International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, 
Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (UNGA decision 60/519 of 8 December 2005), preamble para 2. 
966 Ibid, preamble para 8. 
967 Thalif Deen ―Disarmament: A Non-Binding Pact to Control Small Arms Is Finalized‖ Global 
Information Network  (New York, 1 August 2005).  A joint report released by IANSA, Oxfam, and 
Amnesty International  entitled ―Lethal arms vanishing without trace‖ concluded that  it is more 
difficult to trace an AK-47 than a genetically modified tomato or a suitcase. 
968 Ibid.   
969 International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, 
Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (2005), General Provision, para 1 and 2. 
970 Ibid, para  3. 
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As the paragraph above also shows, self-defence is the concern of countries in 
discussing small arms. The instrument demands States have:  
  
...unique marking providing the name of the manufacturer, the country of 
manufacture and the serial number, or maintain any alternative unique user-
friendly marking with simple geometric symbols in combination with a 
numeric and/or alphanumeric code, permitting ready identification by all 
States of the country of manufacture; and encourage the marking of such 
additional information as the year of manufacture, weapon type/model and 
calibre.
971
 
 
 
Many States came to the meeting on marking and tracing negotiation with the hope to 
have a legal instrument on tracing and marking. The countries affected by the wide 
spread of small arms in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean, as 
well as European Union member countries made their positions known, they 
preferred a legal document.
972
 Staunch opposition from the US, Israel, Egypt, and 
Japan delivered a major blow to the effort to have a legal instrument on tracing and 
marking.
973
 Efforts to regulate the trade aspect of small arms again did not result in a 
much-needed legally binding instrument.  
 
Discussion of the implementation of the ITI takes place within the framework of the 
UNPoA process such as in the biennial meeting or review conference of the 
UNPoA.
974
 In practice, since the adoption of the ITI in 2005, developments related to 
the instrument have included the report on the ITI implementation by States. Until 31 
December 2010, in response to the demand of report submission every two years, as 
many as 66 countries have submitted reports on the implementation of the 
instrument.
975
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E. Summary  
 
Small arms are always part of arms embargoes imposed by the Security Council. The 
number of arms embargoes increased significantly after the Cold War as the P5 
countries have found it relatively easier to agree on imposing an arms embargo when 
there is no more ideological rivalry among them as there was in the Cold War. The 
Security Council resolutions to impose an arms embargo are based on Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations regarding responsibility to maintain international 
peace and security, which means that the Security Council has to agree that a 
particular country or conflict or entity or individual targeted by the arms embargo is a 
threat to international peace and security. An arms embargo imposed by the Security 
Council represents unified efforts by the international community to control the 
circulation of weapons to specific targeted entities/individuals. An armed conflict 
usually precedes, or serves as a prerequisite to adopting an arms embargo, although it 
is not always the case. However, after having experienced the imposition of many 
arms embargoes, the United Nations found that, for various reasons, in many cases 
such arm embargoes were rather ineffective to stop the flow of small arms.
976
  
 
The Security Council resolutions on arms embargoes bear legal responsibility; 
however, States would not be able to fully comply with the resolution in the 
implementation if they did not have national capacity to enforce them. The violations 
occur, in part, because States do not have the means to fully comply with the 
resolutions and not because they intend to defy or violate them. Thus States will have 
difficulty in implementing arms embargoes if there is no international legal arms 
transfer regime which States must adhere to and incorporate into their national 
legislation to begin with. Therefore, it is reasonable that an international legal 
instrument regulating the small arms trade is needed to enforce and complement any 
Security Council resolution on arms embargoes.   
 
                                               
976  Report of the Secretary-General on Small Arms (S/2008/258), 17 April 2008, at [5-15]. 
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Arms embargoes have been repeatedly violated for economic, ideological, and 
political reasons. This is acknowledged by the United Nations in many of the 
Sanctions Committees reports. In many cases, an arms embargo is ineffective because 
it is merely symbolic and difficult to enforce. In its relation to small arms, a failure 
can have several reasons, such as difficulties in monitoring and enforcement, 
excessive availability of small arms, lack of sanctions for violations, and lack of 
control over existing weapons.  
 
Apart from arms embargoes, there are other efforts to control small arms under the 
UN framework, such as the 2001 UNPoA, the 2001 Protocol on Firearms, and the 
2005 International Tracing Instrument. These instruments, while not effective enough 
in controlling small arms proliferation, have been a step forward in establishing 
global awareness and norms. Another instrument in pursuing transparency in global 
armament is the UN Register, adopted to encourage countries to submit voluntary 
reports on seven categories of arms transfer.  The UN register, however, does not   
include small arms, as the negotiation to add small arms as the eighth category has 
not yet been successful.  
 
As one of the most consolidated efforts by the world to regulate small arms trade, the 
conference to combat illicit trade of small arms in 2001 was considered as a missed 
opportunity as it failed to adopt a legal document. The debate in the negotiation of 
small arms in the UNPoA revolves around ―illicit‖ trade and no one disagrees that the 
illicit trade should be stopped. The debate can be extended to how to stop legal trade 
to prevent the weapons that might be used in internationally wrongful acts.  The 
UNPoA, nevertheless, has demonstrated that the rationale of humanity in its preamble 
can be a reason to regulate weapons as well as explicitly acknowledged the view that 
it is State responsibility and duty to control the circulation of small arms under 
relevant international law.  
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Chapter VI: 
Regional Response to Small Arms 
 
A. Introduction 
 
This chapter will describe the responses of regional organizations to the threat of the 
uncontrolled proliferation of small arms. The thesis examines regional organizations‘ 
response to the issue of small arms with their regional policy and how they apply it. 
For the purpose of examining regional response to the issue of small arms, the thesis 
has chosen regional organizations in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas. A 
comparison is made to see how, and to what extent, each regional institution responds 
to the threat of small arms with considerations of IHL and IHRL.     
 
The world has been working to negotiate an international common standard on arms 
trade, although so far has not been able to adopt a legally binding treaty. In the 
absence of a legally binding instrument to regulate the transfer of the weapons at a 
global level, a regional approach could offer an alternative in providing legal 
instrument or normative guidelines.
977
 To some extent, arguably, regional and sub-
regional instruments or normative frameworks ―have been proven useful in 
preventing the transfer of arms to areas of conflict or repressive Governments‖.978  
 
As seen in Chapter II, practically no region is free from the impact of the wide 
availability of small arms, with various degrees of impact from their use. In response 
to the threats of small arms, some regional and sub-regional organizations have 
moved far in dealing with small arms, including adopting legally binding instruments, 
while some others have not been able to do so.   Regions with different security 
challenges, levels of economy and political institutions may have different responses 
to the same threat of small arms. Each regional organization also has its distinctive 
institutional characteristics which partly explains the way it behaves and responds to 
an issue.  
                                               
977 As recommended by the 2001 UN Programme of Action (A/CONF.192/15),  part II, para 24-31. 
978 Report of the Secretary-General on Small Arms to the United Nations Security Council, 
S/2008/258, 17 April 2008, para 15. 
205 
 
B. Africa 
 
Africa, with around 100 million small arms in circulation,
979
 perhaps is the best 
example to describe a region facing a challenge to deal with the wide availability of 
small arms, violence and prolonged armed conflicts.
980
 Prolonged armed conflicts, 
such as that in Somalia, affect the neighbouring countries as the weapons spread 
across porous borders. Reports indicate that small arms in Kenya come from Somalia, 
Sudan, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda.
981
  Taking as indicators the high rate of 
violence and on-going armed conflict, each country with high violent crime rates 
engaging in a war or in a post-armed conflict situation may have millions of small 
arms.
982
 
 
With regard to the small arms issue, Africa has found that consensus is much more 
difficult to achieve at the international level than at the regional level as there are 
always countries to block the negotiation.
983
 Being the most affected by the 
proliferation of small arms, the African countries‘ determination to control small 
arms is reflected in their regional policies on the issue.  
 
The adoption of four legally binding sub-regional instruments in Africa is an 
important step toward restricting the uncontrolled proliferation of small arms in the 
continent. It will take some time to fully measure the success of the implementation 
of the legally binding instruments adopted. However, the establishment of 
regional/sub-regional legal instruments has been by itself a success as they allow 
African governments to create national commissions and give each government the 
                                               
979 Hugh McCullum ―Small Arms: The World‘s Favorite Weapons of Mass Destruction‖ (2007) 5(1) 
AfricaFiles.  
980 As acknowledged by the preamble paragraphs of sub-regional instruments: the 2001 SADC 
Protocol, the 2006 ECOWAS Convention, and the 2004 Nairobi Protocol. 
981 Manasseh Wepundi and others Special Report, Availability of Small Arms and Perceptions of 
Security in Kenya: An Assessment (Geneva, Small Arms Survey, 2012) at 56, 58,  in Kenya, the 
conservative estimate suggests there may be 530,000 to 680,000 illicit small arms. 
982
 Small Arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War (Cambridge, 2009) at 166, as in South Africa alone, it 
was estimated 5,590,000 guns in circulation are in civilian hands; Denise Garcia Small Arms in Africa: 
Legal Indicators (Ibrahim Index of African Governance, 2008) at 6, suggests in West Africa, it is  
estimated approximately 8-10 million illegal weapons are in circulation. 
983 Denise Garcia Small Arms in Africa: Legal Indicators (Ibrahim Index of African Governance, 
2008) at 3. 
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ability to implement and monitor the initiative as set forth by the instruments.
984
 
Furthermore, regional legal instruments provide guidelines for States to observe and 
set up regional norms of small arms transfer.  
 
One indicator of the positive effect of the regional instruments is a closer cooperation 
among the countries to combat the proliferation of small arms as required by the legal 
instrument.
985
 To foster cooperation among law enforcement agencies, African 
countries also established a coordination mechanism among regional police chiefs 
and established the control of small arms in their programmes.
986
 The countries 
bound by the same legal instrument tend to work more closely in order to combat 
illegal proliferation, such as the cooperation between South Africa and 
Mozambique.
987
 The two countries, which belong to Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), organized a joint operation to stem movement of illegal 
firearms across their common borders.
988
  
 
 
1. Bamako Declaration 
 
The vast destruction by armed conflicts and violence experienced by African 
countries, in which small arms played a great part, steers African countries to actively 
push the issue of small arms on the international agenda. The African countries of the 
Organisation of African Unity (since 2002 replaced by the African Union) think of  
playing an active part and present a strong united voice and it is for that purpose they 
adopted a common agenda on small arms which they declared in Bamako in 2000.
989
 
                                               
984 Denise Garcia Small Arms in Africa: Legal Indicators (Ibrahim Index of African Governance, 
2008) at 7. 
985 Southern African Development Community Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and 
Other Related Materials (adopted on 14 August 2001, entered into force in 8 November 2004), art 
11(2). 
986 Elli Kytomaki and Valerie Yankey-Wayne Five Years of Implementing the United Nations 
Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Regional Analysis of National Reports 
(United Nations Publication, 2006) at 28-29. 
987 Noel Stott ―Small Arms Proliferation in Southern Africa: Reducing the Impact of ‗Real Weapons of 
Mass Destruction‘‖ (2007) 5(3) AfricaFiles . 
988 Ibid.  
989 Bamako Declaration on An African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and 
Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (2000). Available at 
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The Bamako Declaration reflects the priority and determination of African countries 
to deal with the issue of small arms as they acknowledge that the proliferation of 
small arms ―continues to have devastating consequences for stability and 
development‖.990 The Declaration recognizes the link with IHL as the illicit 
proliferation of small arms ―sustains conflict, exacerbates violence...and threatens 
international humanitarian law‖.991  It then moves further to make reference to human 
rights as the proliferation of small arms ―jeopardises the respect for fundamental 
human rights and hinders economic development‖.992  The African countries agree 
that the issue of small arms should be addressed through, inter alia, ―the observance 
of human rights‖ 993 and ―the respect for international humanitarian law‖.994 
 
Bamako Declaration is not a legally binding instrument but demonstrates the 
determination of a collective effort by countries in Africa to deal with destruction 
caused by small arms.
995
  Adopted in 2000 before the UN Conference on small arms, 
there are many similar elements in the Bamako Declaration also found in the 2001 
UNPoA, which may be the result of the African contribution to international effort 
addressing small arms.
996
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
<http://www.armsnetafrica.org/content/bamako-declaration-african-common-position-illicit-
proliferation-circulation-and-trafficking>. Last accessed 2 July 2012. 
990 Bamako Declaration on An African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and 
Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (2000), at V(1). Available at 
<http://www.armsnetafrica.org/content/bamako-declaration-african-common-position-illicit-
proliferation-circulation-and-trafficking>. Last accessed 2 July 2012. 
991 Bamako Declaration on An African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and 
Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (2000), at V(1.i). Available at 
<http://www.armsnetafrica.org/content/bamako-declaration-african-common-position-illicit-
proliferation-circulation-and-trafficking>. Last accessed 2 July 2012. 
992 Bamako Declaration on An African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and 
Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (2000), at V(1.v). Available at 
<http://www.armsnetafrica.org/content/bamako-declaration-african-common-position-illicit-
proliferation-circulation-and-trafficking>. Last accessed 2 July 2012. 
993 Ibid, at V(2.iii). 
994 Bamako Declaration on An African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and 
Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (2000), at V(2.ix). Available at 
<http://www.armsnetafrica.org/content/bamako-declaration-african-common-position-illicit-
proliferation-circulation-and-trafficking>. Last accessed 2 July 2012. 
995 Claudette Torbey ―The Most Egregious Arms Brokers: Persecuting Arms Embargo Violators in the 
International Criminal Court‖ (2007) 25 (2) Wis Int‘l L J 335 at 348. 
996 Claudette Torbey ―The Most Egregious Arms Brokers: Persecuting Arms Embargo Violators in the 
International Criminal Court‖ (2007) 25 (2) Wis Int‘l L J 335 at 348. 
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2. SADC Protocol 
Following the African countries‘ political declaration in Bamako on their common 
position on small arms, the sub-regional organisation of the Southern Africa 
Development Community in 2001 finalized the Protocol on the Control of Firearms, 
Ammunition and other Related Materials.
997
 With the adoption of this Protocol, the 
14 SADC countries are legally bound to ―enact legislation and take other measures to 
sanction criminally‖ the violation of the UNSC arms embargoes998 and incorporate 
into their national laws ―the coordination of procedures for the imports, exports, and 
transits of firearms shipments‖.999  The SADC Protocol also has specific provisions 
on marking and record keeping (article 9), public education and awareness 
programmes (article 13), as well as transparency and information exchange (article 
16).   
 
The SADC Protocol was adopted following the international momentum in the efforts 
to control small arms, particularly within the United Nations framework.
1000
  In terms 
of substance, the SADC Protocol is a regional response to a post-conflict situation 
where countries have to deal with the negative impact of the continuing threat of 
small arms, which obstruct their development and stability.
1001
       
 
 
3. Nairobi Protocol 
 
Another sub-regional progress in the combat against the proliferation of small arms is 
marked by the adoption of the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and 
                                               
997 Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on the Control of Firearms, 
Ammunition and Other Related Materials (adopted 14 August 2001, entered into force 8 November 
2004). States parties to the SADC Protocol are Angola, Botswana, Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. It is interesting to note that Zimbabwe, which is not known to have high respect for IHL 
and IHRL, is also a party this Protocol.   
998
 SADC Protocol on Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials (2001), art 5 (2). 
999 Ibid, art 5 (3.c).  
1000 See Chapter V. 
1001 Noel Stott ―Small Arms Proliferation in Southern Africa: Reducing the Impact of ‗the Real 
Weapons of Mass Destruction‘‖ Africafiles < http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=14228>. Last 
accessed 31 July 2012. 
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Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the 
Horn of Africa (2004).
1002
 In addition, regional centres on small arms were 
established, for example, the Nairobi Regional Centre on Small Arms, with the 
purpose to ―coordinate the joint effort by National Focal Points in Member States to 
prevent, combat and eradicate stockpiling and illicit trafficking in small arms‖.1003  
 
The countries in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa were concerned 
about the supply of small arms into the region, hence the Nairobi Protocol was 
adopted with the purpose to, among others, ―prevent the excessive and destabilising 
accumulation of small arms and light weapons in the sub-region.‖1004 Like the SADC 
Protocol, the Nairobi Protocol demands State parties adopt the necessary legislative 
or other measures to sanction criminally, ―under their national law the violation of 
arms embargoes‖ mandated by the UNSC or regional organisation.1005 This is a sub-
regional contribution to ensure the effectiveness of the implementation of the UNSC 
arms embargoes.   
 
To support an effective implementation of the Nairobi Protocol, Best Practice 
Guidelines were issued in 2005.
1006
 Some criteria are stated as guidelines in arms 
transfer with the considerations, among other criteria, of IHL and IHRL that ―States 
parties shall not authorise transfers which would violate their direct obligations under 
international law‖1007 including ―universally accepted principles of international 
                                               
1002 Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in 
the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (signed 21 April 2004, entered into force 5 May 2006). 
States parties to the Protocol are Burundi, Central Africa Republic, DRC, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. 
1003 Nairobi Regional Centre on Small Arms  <www.recsasec.org/about.htm>. Last accessed on 3 
March 2010. 
1004 Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in 
the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (signed 21 April 2004, entered into force 5 May 2006), 
art 2(b). 
1005 Ibid, art 3 (b). 
1006 Best Practice Guidelines for the Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi 
Protocol on Small Arms and Light Weapons (approved by the third Ministerial Review Conference, 
20-21 June 2005 in Nairobi). Available at 
<http://www.recsasec.org/pdf/Best%20Practice%20Guidlines%20Book.pdf>, last accessed 4 July 
2012.  
1007 Best Practice Guidelines for the Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi 
Protocol on Small Arms and Light Weapons (approved by the third Ministerial Review Conference, 
20-21 June 2005 in Nairobi) at 2.2.3 (a). Available at 
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humanitarian law‖. 1008 In addition, States parties shall not authorise transfers which 
are likely to be used for ―the violation and suppression of human and peoples‘ rights 
and freedoms‖.1009   
 
 
4. ECOWAS Convention 
 
In 2006, the African countries in the west part of the continent adopted the Economic 
Community of West African States Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, 
Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials (ECOWAS Convention).
1010
 The 
effort of this sub-region to stem the flood of small arms started in 1998 when the head 
of States of the 15 members of ECOWAS declared the moratorium on the weapons, 
known as the Bamako Declaration. Eight years later, the ECOWAS successfully 
transformed it into a legally binding regional convention.
1011
  
 
The ECOWAS Convention is important as it is the first convention related to small 
arms to explicitly put IHL as the basis to ban arms transactions, specifically article 
6(2): 
 
A transfer shall not be authorised if its authorisation violates obligations of 
the requesting States as well as those of Member States, under international 
law, including: …(b) universally accepted principles of international 
humanitarian law.
1012
       
 
                                                                                                                                      
<http://www.recsasec.org/pdf/Best%20Practice%20Guidlines%20Book.pdf>, last accessed 4 July 
2012.  
1008 Ibid, at 2.2.3 (a.vi).   
1009 Ibid, at 2.2.3 (b.i).   
1010 Economic Community of West African States Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, 
Their Ammunition and Other related Material (signed 14 June 2006, entered into force 20 November 
2009); States parties to the ECOWAS Convention are Benin, Burkina Faso, Café Verde, Cote d‘Ivoire, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and 
Togo.      
1011 ICRC ―Efforts at Tackling Arms Proliferation in West Africa Gain Momentum‖ (press release, 22 
May 2009) <www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/nigeria-weapon-news-220509>. Last access on 
26 February 2010. 
1012 Economic Community of West African States Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, 
Their Ammunition and Other related Material (signed 14 June 2006, entered into force 20 November 
2009), art 6(2). See also Zeray Yihdago The Arms Trade and International Law (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2007) at 214.  
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In arms transfer, the Convention demands the member States consider the possibility 
of the weapons used against humanitarian law and human rights, so that a transfer 
shall not be authorised if the arms are destined to be used for ―the violation of 
international humanitarian law or infringement of human and peoples‘ rights and 
freedoms‖.1013 The Convention demands the member States not authorise arms 
transfer if the weapons are used for ―the commission of serious violations of IHL, 
genocide or crimes against humanity‖,1014 or to ―worsen the internal situation in the 
country of final destination...or prolong armed conflicts‖.1015       
 
It is worth noting, the ECOWAS Convention was the first legally binding instrument 
of sub-regional organisation on small arms that departed from the traditional arms 
control-disarmament approach and invoked the consideration of IHL and IHRL.
1016
 
The inclusion of IHL and IHRL as criteria in the ECOWAS Convention was 
apparently inspired by the similar criteria in the EU Code of Conduct, taking into 
account that the integrated process of the convention‘s drafting was conducted with 
contributions from various actors including the EU and civil society.
1017
  
 
 
5. Central African Convention 
 
The latest sub-regional adoption of a legally binding instrument is the Central African 
Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition 
and all Parts and Components that can be used for their Manufacture, Repair and 
                                               
1013 Economic Community of West African States Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, 
Their Ammunition and Other related Materials (signed 14 June 2006, entered into force 20 November 
2009), art 6(3.a). 
1014 Economic Community of West African States Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, 
Their Ammunition and Other related Materials (signed 14 June 2006, entered into force 20 November 
2009), art 6(3.b). 
1015 Economic Community of West African States Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, 
Their Ammunition and Other related Materials (signed 14 June 2006, entered into force 20 November 
2009), art 6 (3.c) 
1016 Denise Garcia Small Arms in Africa: Legal Indicators (Ibrahim Index of African Governance, 
2008) at 3. 
1017 Ilhan Berkol ―Analysis of the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons and 
Recommendations for the Development of an Action Plan‖ (2007) Note d‘Analyse du GRIP, Brussels 
< http://www.grip.org/bdg/pdf/g1071en.pdf>. 
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Assembly on 30 April 2010 in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo.
1018
 The 
Convention is purposed to ―[p]revent, combat and eradicate‖ the illicit trade, 
―[s]trengthen the control‖ of manufacture, trade, and transfer, as well as ―[c]ombat 
armed violence and ease the human suffering‖ caused by illicit trade and trafficking 
of small arms.
1019
          
 
IHL and IHRL inclusion in considerations of transfers are explicitly stated in the 
Convention. The States parties agree that a transfer authorisation shall be denied by 
the competent national body if small arms ―are to be or might be used to commit 
violations of international human rights law or international humanitarian law‖.1020 A 
transfer authorisation shall also be denied if the weapons ―might violate an 
international arms embargo‖.1021    
 
The African regional common position in Bamako declaration and the three of four 
sub-regional legally binding instruments have identified directly the important link 
between IHL and IHRL and the transfer of small arms.
1022
 The legal instruments 
show that they were adopted not based solely on arms control but also beyond this to 
include considerations of humanitarian and human rights.  One important feature of 
the adoption of the legally binding instruments to control small arms by sub-regional 
organizations in Africa is that the instruments were adopted in response to the 
regional problem, not through the power plays and compromise found in a global 
negotiation.
1023
        
 
                                               
1018 Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition 
and all Parts and Components that can be used for their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly (adopted 
30 April 2010, not yet enter into force), UN Doc A/65/57-S/2010/534. Signed by eleven States namely, 
Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, and Sao Tome and Principe.     
1019 Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition 
and all Parts and Components that can be used for their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly (adopted 
30 April 2010, not yet enter into force), UN Doc A/65/57-S/2010/534, art 1. 
1020 Ibid, art 5 (5.b). 
1021
 Ibid, art 5 (5.c). 
1022 Nairobi Protocol does not have a reference to IHL and IHL in its articles but the Best Practice 
Guidelines of the Protocol have IHL and IHRL as transfer criteria. 
1023 Noel Stott ―Small Arms Proliferation in Southern Africa: Reducing the Impact of ‗the Real 
Weapons of Mass Destruction‘‖ Africafiles < http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=14228>. Last 
accessed 31 July 2012. 
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C. Europe  
1. EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports 
 
Countries in Europe and Africa represent a stark contrast in small arms cases, the 
former
1024
 are mostly the manufacturers or exporters and the latter are the importers. 
It is interesting to see how the European Union (EU) deals with small arms taking 
into account that significant profit, generated from small arms transfer, is enjoyed by 
its member countries.  It is known that under the EU framework, the European 
countries are the first to have taken steps to increase the coherence of policy on small 
arms through, inter alia, common export controls.
1025
 
 
As early as 1991, the EU had adopted common criteria which later developed into a 
code of conduct adopted by the European Union Council in 1998.
1026
 The Code of 
Conduct consists of eight criteria and 12 paragraphs of operative provisions. 
Recognising the special responsibility of arms exporting States,
1027
 the Code of 
Conduct states several purposes, among others, to:
 
 
 
Set high common standards which should be regarded as the minimum for 
the management of, and restraint in, conventional arms transfers by all EU 
Member States, and to strengthen the exchange of relevant information with 
a view to achieving greater transparency.
1028
   
 
The eight criteria of the Code of Conduct specifically state what the EU member 
countries are allowed to do and what they are not allowed to do in conducting arms 
exports, which include considerations of the regional stability and the situation in the 
                                               
1024 Small Arms Survey ranks top 15 small arms producer countries, namely Austria, Belgium, Brazil, 
Canada, China, Germany, India,  Italy, North Korea, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Switzerland, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States < http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/de/weapons-and-
markets/producers/industrial-production.html?0=>. Last accessed 4 July 2012.   
1025 Elli Kytomaki and Valerie Yankey-Wayne Five years of Implementing the United Nations 
Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Regional Analysis of National Reports 
(United Nations Publication, 2006) at 128. 
1026 European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (1998), the Council of the European Union 
(8675/2/98 REV2) <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/08675r2en8.pdf>. Last 
accessed 5 July 2012. 
1027 Code of Conduct (1998), preamble para 2. the Council of the European Union (8675/2/98 REV2) , 
preamble para 2. Available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/08675r2en8.pdf>. 
Last accessed 5 July 2012. 
1028 Ibid, preamble para 3. 
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recipient country. There are criteria that link the transfer of weapons to the respect for 
IHL, IHRL and internal situation in the buyer country.
1029
 The criteria specifically 
demand member countries consider the ―respect of human rights in the country of 
final destination‖1030   and compliance with international commitments, ―including 
under international humanitarian law‖.1031  
 
The Code of Conduct demands the exporting States consider the economic ability of 
the recipient State to buy weaponry, to avoid a large portion of the recipient State‘s 
budget being allocated to weaponry instead of economic development.
1032
 Each of the 
criteria is broken down into detailed considerations that an arms exporting State has 
to consider. The criteria are then supported by 12 operative provisions in which 
practical details in the operation of the Code of Conduct are further elaborated. The 
operative provisions, for instance, explain how the States will circulate through 
diplomatic channels, details of licences refused for military equipment in accordance 
with the Code of Conduct.
1033
 
 
In reality, having a framework and common criteria did not automatically free 
European countries from transferring weapons incompatible with the criteria. For 
example, at the time of the Rwanda genocide in the 1990s, reports mention that the 
Rwandan army acquired considerable quantities of weapons, mainly small arms, from 
European countries such as France and Bulgaria.
1034
  Likewise, a transfer from 
Bulgaria to Sierra Leone shows that the Code does not regulate the companies and 
individuals which facilitate arms transfers from Europe.
1035
 Another example was the 
                                               
1029 EU Code of Conduct (1998), criteria 2, 3, 6 and 8.  
1030 Code of Conduct (1998), preamble para 2. the Council of the European Union (8675/2/98 REV2), 
criteria 2. Available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/08675r2en8.pdf>. Last 
accessed 5 July 2012. 
1031 Ibid, criterion 6 (b). 
1032 Ibid, criterion 8. 
1033
 EU Code of Conduct (1998), point 3 of the operative provisions.  
1034 Camilla Waszink ―The proliferation of Small Arms: A Threat to International Human Rights‖  
(Small Arms Survey, 2001) 
<www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/w_papers_pdf/DP/DP_HumanRights.htm>. Last 
accessed on 8 May 2009.  
1035 Zeray Yihdego The Arms Trade and International Law (Hart Publishing, 2007) at 213.   
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transfer to the Sri Lankan government in 2009, while, at the same time, the EU was 
condemning its human rights violence.
1036
  
 
These examples indicate that there are still loopholes in the practice, lack of 
enforcement, and the absence of global criteria which certainly helped these things to 
occur. Furthermore, even though the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms 
Export provides a guideline in exporting arms, the document is, nevertheless, a 
political document.   As indicated by some critics, the Code of Conduct has some 
flaws in its practice including the failure to control transit and transhipment of arms, 
and export to embargoed destinations, breaching the criteria.
1037
 Events showed that 
as recently as 2009, the EU member countries still exported weapons to States that 
were likely to use the weapons wrongly, such as Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain and 
Libya.
1038
  
 
Following the Arab Spring in 2011, the question of the origin of the weapons used by 
the governments in violent response to anti-government protests leads to information 
about the arms sales from the EU worth billions of euros. Data indicates that, during 
1996-2010, the EU member States licensed arms exports to Algeria (1,551 million 
euros), Bahrain (188 million euros), Egypt (1,098 million euros), Libya (1,056 
million euros), Syria (9 million euros), Tunisia (138 million euros), and Yemen (213 
million euros).
1039
  This further questions the effectiveness of the implementation of 
the EU policy of the Code of Conduct in arms export.   
 
 
 
 
                                               
1036 Leigh Phillips ―While Condemning Sri Lankan Violence, EU Still Sells Arms to Government‖ 
(2009) EUObserver.com < http://euobserver.com/9/28155>. Last accessed on 3 August 2011. 
1037 Undermining Global Security: The European Union’s Arms Export (Amnesty International, 2004) 
at 5. 
1038 Kaye Stearman ―With Our Arms Wide Open‖ (2011) The European < http://www.theeuropean-
magazine.com/227-steermann/228-eu-arms-exports>. Last accessed on 3 August 2011. Stearman 
showed the increase of EU arms export to Middle East had soared from 4.9 billion Euro in 2008 to 6.9 
billion Euro in 2009;  Mark Bromley ―The Review of the EU Common Position on Arms Exports: 
Prospect for Strengthened Control‖ (2012) 7 EU Non-Proliferation Consortium 1 at 10.    
1039 Mark Bromley ―The Review of the EU Common Position on Arms Exports: Prospect for 
Strengthened Control‖ (2012) 7 EU Non-Proliferation Consortium 1 at 10.   
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2. Mechanism under OSCE 
 
No differently from other parts of the world, Europe has also experienced intra-State 
armed conflicts such as those in the Balkans. When the conflicts ended, the weapons 
reportedly went to criminals who were responsible for high levels of criminality in 
European countries.
1040
 Meanwhile, countries of the former Warsaw Treaty in South 
East Europe face another problem as the reduction of their armed forces following the 
end of the Cold War resulted in a huge surplus of weapons that are at risk of being 
diverted to the illicit market.
1041
 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) responded to the problem of small arms by assigning the Forum for 
Security Cooperation (FSC) to deal with aspects of security to develop documents 
regulating transfer of conventional weapons.
1042
  
 
The OSCE adopted the 2000 OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons
1043
 
and other documents with the purpose of effectively addressing the small arms 
problem, fostering transparency and confidence among the participating States, and 
helping to combat terrorism and organized crime.
1044
 The Forum of Security 
Cooperation later issued two important documents as guides for OSCE participating 
States dealing with small arms and ammunition, namely the OSCE Handbook of Best 
Practices on Conventional Ammunition released in 2008,
1045
 and the Handbook of 
Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons released in 2003.
1046
  
 
The preamble paragraph of the guidelines states that its objectives are to achieve ―(i) 
greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms; [and] (ii) the prevention of 
                                               
1040 Elli Kytomaki and Valerie Yankey-Wayne FiveYears of Implementing the United Nations 
Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Regional Analysis of National Reports 
(United Nations Publication, 2006) at 127. 
1041 Ibid, at 128. 
1042 OSCE, Forum for Security Cooperation <www.osce.org/fsc/item_11_13550.html>. Last accessed 
on 5 March 2010. 
1043 OSCE document on small arms (FSC Doc/1/00). 
1044 Zdzislaw Lachowski and Svenja Post ―Conventional Arms Control‖ in SIPRI Yearbook 2009: 
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press, 2009) at 453. 
1045  OSCE Handbook of Best Practices on Conventional Ammunition (2008) 
<http://www.osce.org/fsc/33371>. Last accessed on 5 July 2012. 
1046 OSCE Handbook of Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons (2003), decision no 5/03. 
Available at <http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/smallarms/OSCEhandbook.pdf>. Last accessed 5 
July 2012. 
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destabilising accumulations of such arms.‖1047  The OSCE Handbook provides 
guidance on national controls over manufacture of small arms, including guidance on 
licensing requirements and conditions; marking, record keeping, traceability;  
national procedures for stockpile management and security; national control of 
brokering activities, which includes international import certificate (IIC) and end-use 
documentation; guidance on export control of small arms, including the guidelines on 
end-user certificates;  the definition and indicators of a surplus of small arms; national 
procedures for the destruction of small arms; and guidance on small arms in the 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process.
1048
 The document 
published by the OSCE is comprehensive and covers many aspects of small arms 
transfer that member countries refer to for their arms transfer management. The 
implementation of the guide is considered high, although there is still some room for 
further improvement that may make it even better.
1049
  
 
In addition to efforts in regional organizations such as OSCE and EU, European 
countries also participate actively in arms control initiatives in the Wassenaar 
Arrangement which is more global in scope. The 40 countries participating in the 
Wassenaar Arrangement are not limited to Europe although they are dominant. Some 
other participating countries are from Asia, Africa and the Americas
1050
  In support of 
the global effort, the latest 2007 amendment contained the reiteration of commitment 
from the Wassenaar Arrangement participating countries to implement the 2005 
International Tracing Instrument.
1051
 
 
The OSCE guidelines of best practice in conducting small arms transfer are 
complementary to the EU Code of Conduct in arms transfer. The OSCE guidelines‘ 
particular focus on the best practice in small arms transfer is important, as at the time 
                                               
1047 First paragraph of the Wassenaar Best Practice Guidelines for Export of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons (SALW). Agreed at the 2002 Plenary and amended at the 2007 Plenary 
<www.wassenaar.org/publicdocuments/2007/docs/SALW_Guidelines.pdf>. Last accessed on 29 
March 2010. 
1048
 Handbook of Best Practice on Small arms and Light Weapons (OSCE, 2003).  
1049 Zdzislaw Lachowski and Svenja Post ―Conventional Arms Control‖ in SIPRI Yearbook 2009: 
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press, 2009) at 453. 
1050 Wassenaar Arrangement www.wassenaar.org/publicdocuments/2007/docs/SALW_Guidelines.pdf. 
Last accessed on 29 March 2010.  
1051 Ibid, point II.2. 
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of adoption, Europe had been experiencing a surplus of these weapons. Perhaps one 
of the most successful elements of the OSCE has been its programme to destroy 
millions of surplus weapons in Europe which prevents those weapons from being sold 
cheaply out of the continent. In the period from 2001 to 2007, OSCE participating 
States destroyed 7,685,424 pieces of small arms.
1052
      
 
 
D. Americas 
 
The Americas have long been familiar with internal armed conflicts and the region 
has been known to be flooded with small arms for decades. The presence of small 
arms creates problems in human security and societal development which keep the 
issue of small arms high on the political agenda at both national and regional 
levels.
1053
 Naturally, the easy access to small arms is identical with violence and 
crime, as experienced by countries such as Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
and Jamaica, which have the highest firearm homicide rates in the world.
1054
       
 
Regional institutions realise that circulation and availability of small arms in Latin 
America is closely linked with the drug trade and organised crime. The Organization 
of American States (OAS),
1055
 therefore, has made an effort to deal with the 
circulation of small arms and their connection with organized crime by the adoption 
of the 1997 Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and 
                                               
1052 OSCE, Forum for Security Cooperation,  Chairperson‘s Progress Report to the Sixteenth Meeting 
of the Ministerial Council: The Continuing Implementation of the OSCE Document on Small Arms 
and Light Weapons (Helsinki, 2008), MC.GAL/3/08/Rev.2,  at 8.  
1053 Elli Kytomaki and Valerie Yankey-Wayne Five Years of Implementing the United Nations 
Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Regional Analysis of National Reports 
(Geneva, UNIDIR, 2006) at 61. 
1054 Paul Herbert ―Latin America‘s Homicide Rate one of the World Highest‖ The Santiago Times 
(Chile, Thursday, 19 November 2009) 
<www.santiagotimes.cl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=17667:latin-americas-
homicide-rate-one-of-the-worlds-highest&catid=19:other&Itemid=142>. Last accessed 30 May 2010. 
1055 AOS member States are 35 independent States of the Americas, namely Antigua and Barbuda, 
Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica 
(Commonwealth of), Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, 
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Tobago, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of). The AOS website is 
available at <http://www.oas.org/en/default.asp>. Last accessed 5 July 2012.          
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Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Material 
(CIFTA).
1056
   
 
The Convention states its purpose as being ―to prevent, combat and eradicate the 
illicit manufacturing of and trafficking of firearms‖ as well as to ―promote and 
facilitate cooperation and exchange of information‖ among States Parties with a view 
to combating illicit manufacturing and trafficking in firearms.
1057
  The Convention 
shows the region‘s emphasis on the small arms linkage with transnational organized 
crime or drug trafficking in the provisions to regulate export, import, transit, 
manufacture, licence, and marking of fire arms. In doing so, the Member States also 
paid particular attention to the issue of sovereignty reflected in article III, which 
states that: 
 
1. States Parties shall carry out the obligations under this Convention in a 
manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial 
integrity of States and that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of 
other States.  
2. A State Party shall not undertake in the territory of another State Party 
the exercise of jurisdiction and performance of functions which are 
exclusively reserved to the authorities of that other State Party by its 
domestic law.
1058
 
 
This article indicates that the issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity were 
dominant in the discussion and are the concern of participating States. 
 
That uncontrolled proliferation of small arms may undermine socio-economic 
development is accordingly acknowledged by the Convention. In combating illegal 
manufacturing and trafficking of firearms, the Convention indicates the links to the 
socio-economic development ―due to the harmful effects of these activities on the 
                                               
1056 Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, 
Ammunition, Explosives, and Other related Materials (signed 1 January 1997, entered into force 1 July 
1998), 2029 UNTS 55. 
1057
 Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, 
Ammunition, Explosives, and Other related Materials (signed 1 January 1997, entered into force 1 July 
1998), 2029 UNTS 55, art II. 
1058 Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, 
Ammunition, Explosives, and Other related Materials (signed 1 January 1997, entered into force 1 July 
1998), 2029 UNTS 55, art III. 
220 
 
security...endangering the well-being of peoples, their social and economic 
development‖. 1059  
 
The aspects of marking, export, import, and transit licences or authorization are 
covered in the convention‘s provisions.1060 The issue of diversion of once legal 
firearms and record keeping is also dealt with.
1061
 The Convention is the first 
regional convention to regulate firearms and visibly become a model for the 2001 
Firearms Protocol. In terms of membership, the AOS member States are to include 
the big small arms producers such as the US and Brazil. The Convention, though, 
limits itself to combating illicit trafficking and manufacturing of firearms and does 
not deal with firearms transfer between States. However, the Convention draws 
criticism in the implementation for its limited ability to combat the threat of small 
arms because of State non-compliance and ineffective approaches, including the 
absence of a monitoring mechanism in the Convention.
1062
    
 
 
E.  ASEAN  
1. ASEAN security challenges  
 
Representing Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is chosen 
because of the high level of small arms circulation in the region.  
 
To some extent, almost all ASEAN countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, and Thailand, once experienced or are still involved in low scale armed 
conflicts with separatism and rebellions. The excessive presence of small arms leads 
to the argument that the proliferation of small arms in Southeast Asia has multiple 
effects, causing high levels of violent crime, fuelling insurgencies, intensifying 
                                               
1059
 Ibid, preamble para 1. 
1060 Ibid, art VI and IX. 
1061 Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, 
Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (1997), art XI. 
1062 ―Kierstan Lee Carlson ―Fighting Firearms with Fire in the AOS‖ (2010) 25 AM U Int‘l L Rev 614 
at 648. 
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communal conflicts, and impeding development.
1063
 Armed conflicts, sectarian 
conflict, and the activities of organized crime and drug trafficking have been 
recognized as facilitating the illicit trafficking of small arms in the region.
1064
 
 
In Philippines, low-intensity armed conflict in Mindanao has been fought since 1971 
involving the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Moro National Liberation Front 
(MNLF), and Abu Sayyaf group seeking a State free, and separated from Manila.
1065
  
Thailand also had armed conflict in its southern region as the government had to deal 
with the re-emergence of the Pattani conflict in 2004 which claimed 2400 lives and 
the armed conflict which has escalated since.
1066
 The three provinces in South 
Thailand,  Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, are located on the border with Malaysia 
which suggests the importance of securing the border from transnational arms 
trafficking.  
 
Reports suggest that, at the end of Indochina War (or Vietnam War, 1959-1975) in 
Cambodia and Vietnam, large quantities of weapons were left behind and later 
transported from Indo-China to criminals, guerrillas and separatist groups in other 
countries in Southeast Asia through the islands and sea routes.
1067
  In Myanmar, its 
                                               
1063 Katherine Kramer Legal Control on Small Arms and Light Weapons in Southeast Asia (Small 
Arms Survey, 2001) at 24. See also reports of violence in individual States of ASEAN, for example the 
2011 Human Rights Watch report on extra judicial killings with gunshots in Philippines 
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1064 Elli Kytomaki and Valerie Yankey-Wayne Five Years of Implementing the United Nations 
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(United Nations Publication, 2006) at 99. 
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Have 60,000 Weapons to Fight You‖ Philippine Daily Inquirer (Philippine, 8 October 2010), in which 
the MILF claimed to have 60,000 weapons which they acquired from their enemies, trade with gun 
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<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20100810-285998/MILF-to-AFP--We-have-
60000-weapons-to-fight-you>. Last accessed on 28 July 2011. 
1066 Neil J Melvin ―Conflict In Southern Thailand: Islamism, Violence and the State in the Patani 
Insurgence‖ (SIPRI, 2007) <http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP20.pdf>. Last accessed on 17 
March 2010. 
1067 Elli Kytomaki and Valerie Yankey-Wayne Five years of Implementing the United Nations 
Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Regional Analysis of National Reports 
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government has been fighting several armed groups for years where the parties 
involved use various conventional weapons like MANPADS, landmines and 
improvised explosive devices (IED) and, of course, small arms.
1068
  
 
The archipelagic geography of Southeast Asia, with long maritime and continental 
frontiers, makes the region vulnerable to illicit arms trade and trafficking as it is 
extremely difficult to monitor. For that reason alone, the ASEAN countries need 
close cooperation in outlining plans to combat the illicit trafficking of small arms. 
After all, small arms are regarded as having the most destabilizing effect among 
conventional weapons.
1069
 This is well known to the countries in the region and 
provides motivation to collectively find a way to address the problem. 
 
ASEAN underscores the importance of security and stability as preconditions to 
having a prosperous ASEAN community with the purpose to ―maintain and enhance 
peace, security and stability and further strengthen peace-oriented values in the 
region‖.1070  
 
Armed conflicts in Southeast Asia may also be either the destination or transit of 
unauthorized arms trade. As an illustration, the Thailand authority in December 2009 
                                                                                                                                      
(United Nations Publication, 2006) at 99; Alexander Gillespie A History of the Laws of War (Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2011) vol 3, at 47;  David Capie ―Regional Reintroduction:  Missing the Target? The 
Human Cost of Small Arms Proliferation and Misuse in Southeast Asia‖ in Searching for Peace in 
Asia Pacific (European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 2005) <http://www.conflict-
prevention.net/page.php?id=45&formid=72&action=show&articleid=674#author>. Last accessed 11 
March 2010; ―The M79 Grenade Launcher‖ The Nation (Thailand,  26 March 2010), US-made M-79 
grenade launchers, dating back to the war in Vietnam, are available in the black market along the Thai-
Cambodian border, smuggled into Thailand and can be bought for TBH 10,000 (or around US$ 336). 
1068 ―Armed Conflict Database‖ International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)  
<http://acd.iiss.org/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_ConflictSummary.asp?ConflictID=209>. Last 
accessed on 1 Mach 2010; David Capie Small Arms Production and Transfers in Southeast Asia 
(Australian National University, 2002) at 63-66. Capie states that the armed groups that fight the 
Mynamar government, such as the Kerenni Army (KA), Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and 
United Wa State Army (UWSA) acquire their weapons from smuggling across the border from 
Thailand and Cambodia and across the borders from India and Bangladesh. 
1069 Paul Holtom and Siemon T Wezeman ―Towards an Arms Trade Treaty‖ in SIPRI Yearbook 2007 
(Oxford University Press, 2007) at 431.  
1070 ASEAN Charter (adopted 20 November 2007, entered into force 15 December 2008), art 1(1). 
ASEAN comprises 10 States: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.  
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seized a cargo plane with 35 tonnes of weapons originating from Pyongyang which 
landed in Bangkok for refuelling en route to an unrevealed destination.
1071
  
 
All the conflicts in Southeast Asia are ideal markets for arms traffickers to supply 
arms, in particular small arms, as they are weapons of choice in intra-state armed 
conflicts, preferred for their portability and durability. Illegal arms transport 
combined with drugs are a lucrative business for traffickers. While discussing the 
transfer of arms and trafficking in ASEAN, it is also worth noting that several of the 
ASEAN member countries are also small arms producers which mean that some 
weapons in circulation may be regionally manufactured.  
 
 
2. ASEAN Response 
 
From a general perspective, since its establishment in 1967 ASEAN has successfully 
created a relatively stable peaceful region with its own values and organizational 
mechanism.
1072
  The ASEAN member countries view the issue of small arms in the 
context of transnational crime and discussion among them is with the purpose of 
combating transnational crime within the region.
1073
 This means ASEAN does not 
discuss and address the issue as a distinct subject that needs particular meticulous 
strategy. A problem arises in this approach, the inclusion of small arms in the agenda 
                                               
1071 ―North Korea Arms Plane: No Interference in Arms Smuggling Case: Suthep‖ The Nations 
(Thailand, 29 January 2010); Simon Tisdall ―North Korean Plane Carrying Smuggled Arms Seized in 
Thailand‖ The Guardian (UK, 13 December 2009) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/13/north-korea-arms-smuggling-plane>. It is not clear the 
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violation of the UN arms embargo, as North Korea has been under United Nations arms embargo and 
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reports that North Korea is estimated to get US$1billion a year from arms sales.  
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1073 Katherine Kramer Legal Control on Small Arms and Light Weapons in Southeast Asia (Small 
Arms Survey, 2001) at 2. 
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of combating transnational crimes can be overshadowed by more pressing issues such 
as human and drug trafficking.
1074
 
 
ASEAN, as a regional grouping, discussed the issue of small arms for the first time in 
the 1997 ASEAN ministerial meeting on transnational crime. It was in this meeting 
that the ASEAN member countries decided to put the discussion of small arms in the 
framework of transnational crime, as the weapons were associated closely with 
terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, trafficking of persons, and piracy.
1075
   
 
The region understands the importance of cooperation in fighting arms smuggling. In 
the ASEAN Declaration on the Prevention and Control of Transnational Crimes in 
Manila 1997, ASEAN stresses ―the need for sustained cooperation in addressing 
transnational concerns including the fight against terrorism, trafficking in people, 
illicit drugs and arms and piracy‖.1076 To fight the transnational crime mentioned, 
ASEAN established cooperation among related offices. For that purpose ASEAN 
convenes, at least once every two years, an ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 
Transnational Crime to coordinate activities of relevant ASEAN bodies, such as the 
ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matters (ASOD) and the ASEAN Chiefs of 
National Police (ASEANAPOL).
1077
  In operational terms, the arms smuggling in 
which small arms are discussed is on the agenda of the ASEANAPOL. 
 
While the meetings‘ reports show increasing understanding of the need to work in 
overcoming arms smuggling, the commitment is still very much on normative 
language. For example, the recommendation on arms smuggling as the result of the 
2004 meeting of the ASEANPOL employed the normative wording ―to encourage 
                                               
1074 Ibid. 
1075 Ibid. 
1076
 ASEAN Declaration on the Prevention and Control of Transnational Crimes in Manila, 
Philippines, 20 December 1997. Document is available at ASEAN Secretariat 
<www.aseansec.org/documents/DocSeriesOnTC.pdf>. Last accessed on 23 March 2010. 
1077 Operative Paragraph 2 of ASEAN Declaration on the Prevention and Control of Transnational 
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member countries to adopt effective arms control law.‖1078 The report of the meeting 
neither further directs members on what exactly to do in the implementation nor 
provides further guidelines.  
 
The meeting of the ASEANAPOL in the following year, again, used more normative 
wording when they agreed ―to encourage member countries‖ to enhance strict control 
over illegal firearms and explosives and ―conduct back tracking investigations to 
identify the source of manufacture‖ and to control entry and exit points.1079 However, 
this statement was not followed by practical measures to implement it. Almost similar 
language was repeated in the meetings in 2009,
1080
 and in May 2011, which reviewed 
the progress of cooperation, including the progress of an electronic database system 
in combating transnational crimes.
1081
  
 
Examining the joint communiqué of ASEAN meetings on arms smuggling, there is 
no clear acknowledgment that the State is responsible for preventing free circulation 
of arms. In the documents, ASEAN does not have any references to the need to 
respect human rights and acknowledge that excessive availability of small arms may 
cause, and be used for, suppression or violation of human rights.    
 
A series of ASEAN meetings since 1997 show that ASEAN has been dealing with the 
issue of small arms under a rigid framework of transnational organized crime and has 
never discussed it beyond a transnational trafficking context. Actually, small arms 
could also be discussed under human security or disarmament matters, as other 
regional organizations have done, where the issue can stand alone. ASEAN, 
therefore, has not linked the issue of small arms to IHL and IHRL.     
                                               
1078  Joint Communique of the 24th ASEAN Chiefs of Police Conference, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 16-20 
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accessed 6 July 2012. 
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The ASEAN countries have not been able to formulate an agreed regulation to 
systematically combat the proliferation of small arms in the region in functioning, 
focused practical action. But even within the transnational crime framework, ASEAN 
has not shown significant development in operational terms as the organisation does 
not address other aspects which include addressing the manufacturing, licencing, 
stockpiling, brokering, end-user certificate mechanism, and tracing and marking.  
   
Against the backdrop described above, some individual countries have organized 
regional meetings and workshops on small arms as a distinct topic.  For example, 
regional seminar on the implementation of the UNPoA in Bali, Indonesia, February 
2003; ASEAN Workshop on Small Arms Control in Cambodia, May 2007; and the 
recent workshop on the implementation of the UNPoA in Bali, Indonesia, March 
2010. Despite these sporadic efforts to discuss the issue of small arms beyond 
transnational crimes, that it is absent from ASEAN‘s official agenda suggests that the 
issue is not yet regarded as a top priority for the region.  
 
Because ASEAN does not have a regional convention on small arms, the ASEAN 
member countries‘ commitment to combating uncontrolled proliferation of small 
arms can be measured by examining their adherence to the 2001 Firearms 
Protocol,
1082
 the 2001 UNPoA national report, and their voting behaviour in the UN 
resolutions.   
 
Out of 89 countries that have ratified and thus become parties to the Firearms 
Protocol,
1083
 only two ASEAN countries, namely Cambodia (accession on 12 
December 2005) and Lao People‘s Democratic Republic (accession on 26 September 
2003), are parties to the Protocol.
1084
 The other eight ASEAN countries are not 
parties to the Protocol. With the limited adherence of the ASEAN countries to the 
                                               
1082 Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and 
Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime (adopted 31 May 2001, entered into force 3 July 2005) 
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Firearms Protocol and the absence of a regional convention to control small arms, the 
only applicable international legal instrument in the region is the arms embargo 
imposed by the Security Council. This low level of ratification is a paradox since 
ASEAN puts the issue of small arms under the framework of combating transnational 
organized crime, but still most of the ASEAN countries do not ratify the Protocol 
which is intended to deal with the firearms within the said framework. It may reflect 
how the individual countries of ASEAN do not rank the issue as a priority to be dealt 
with.  
 
Looking at the reports submitted by individual countries in implementing the UNPoA 
on small arms from the year 2003 to 2011 shows six countries submitted a report at 
least once: Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.
1085
 
However, four other countries Brunei Darussalam, Laos, Myanmar, and Singapore, 
have never submitted a report.
1086
 The non-existence of reports from Singapore is a 
disappointing sign as the Singapore assault rifle SAR-80 is one of the most common 
weapons found in Somalia.
1087
 The Singapore SAR-80, together with AK47s and 
G3s, was also among the types of weapons confiscated in Kenya between 2010-
2011.
1088
 
 
Another way of examining the ASEAN countries‘ position towards small arms is by 
examining their position on the negotiation in the General Assembly on an arms trade 
treaty. The voting behaviour of the ASEAN countries in all three General Assembly 
resolutions on the ATT indicates a majority support for the ATT which includes the 
support from Singapore. In the 2006 resolution, of all 10 ASEAN countries, seven 
voted yes, and one (Laos) abstained, while two (Myanmar and Vietnam) did not vote 
(absent).
1089
 The 2008 resolution showed increased support as Myanmar joined 
                                               
1085 United Nations Program of Action Implementation Support System: PoA-ISS <http://www.poa-
iss.org/PoA/PoA.aspx>. Last accessed 27 June 2012. 
1086
 United Nations Program of Action Implementation Support System: PoA-ISS <http://www.poa-
iss.org/PoA/PoA.aspx>. Last accessed 27 June 2012. 
1087 Report on Monitoring Group on Somalia dated 10 March 2010 (UN Doc S/2010/91) at 74. 
1088 Manasseh Wepundi and others Special Report: Availability of Small Arms and Perception of 
Security in Kenya: An Assessment (Geneva, Small Arms Survey, 2012) at 31.  
1089 UNGA resolution 61/89. 
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another seven ASEAN countries, meanwhile Laos and Vietnam were absent.
1090
 The 
resolution in 2009 showed a similar tendency to the previous resolution with all 
ASEAN member countries, except Laos and Vietnam (absent), supporting the 
resolution.
1091
 
 
Although Vietnam and Laos were absent from voting in the 2008 and 2009 
resolutions, it did not necessarily indicate they were in opposition to the ATT. In the 
past, the two countries have never been active in the negotiation of the ATT either. 
Their position more likely indicates that the two countries do not regard the issue as 
their priority. Hence, in general, it can be said ASEAN may be taken as a regional 
grouping that supports the ATT process, albeit rather weakly.         
 
As a regional organization, ASEAN has not yet done much to control the 
proliferation of small arms trade in the region, despite rhetoric in the ASEAN 
meetings. Decisions in ASEAN meetings are based on the agreement of all members 
on a consensus basis which might be one important reason in explaining the ASEAN 
way of addressing the issue of small arms.  Some scholars argue that there are several 
factors that make Southeast Asia vulnerable to the proliferation and the misuse of 
small arms: a high demand for arms, a ready supply of weapons, and institutional 
weakness of the States in the region.
1092
 Added to those factors is the long coastline 
of the countries in Southeast Asia which greatly facilitates the transport of arms 
trafficking. As a regional organization, ASEAN‘s response to the small arms problem 
may have an instrumental effect in shaping regional stability and the scale of intra-
state conflicts in some of its member countries. The ASEAN way of group consensus, 
secret dialogue and informal procedure
1093
 may have played important part in 
preventing ASEAN from placing the issue of small arms transfer onto the regional 
agenda.     
                                               
1090 UNGA resolution 63/240. 
1091 UNGA resolution 64/48. 
1092
 David Capie ―Regional Reintroduction:  Missing the Target? The Human Cost of Small Arms 
Proliferation and Misuse in Southeast Asia‖ (2005) Searching for Peace in Asia Pacific, European 
Centre for Conflict Prevention <http://www.conflict-
prevention.net/page.php?id=45&formid=72&action=show&articleid=674#author>. Last accessed 11 
March 2010.  
1093 Ibid. 
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E. Summary  
 
The most noticeable strong responses to combating the uncontrolled proliferation of 
small arms, in terms of enacting a regional legal instrument, are shown by Africa. A 
similar strong response is seen in the Americas, while a relatively less unified regional 
response is seen in Asia, particularly South East Asia. The EU was the first regional 
organisation to adopt a code of conduct with criteria and guidelines on arms export, 
although not in form of legally binding instrument.   
 
Regional responses to the threat of small arms vary as some regional organizations 
are more advanced and well-equipped in their responses than the others. Compared to 
other regional/sub-regional organizations, such as the European Union, the 
ECOWAS, and the OAS, ASEAN is still far behind in controlling the trade of small 
arms. Importantly, the instruments of the regional organizations in Europe and Africa 
have linked the issue of small arms to human security and view the issue from a 
broader perspective than arms control or an issue of trans-national organized crime. 
The sub-regional legally binding instruments, such as ECOWAS Convention and 
Central African Convention, have progressively departed from traditional arms 
control  by making explicit links to international humanitarian law and international 
humanitarian law in the provisions. The OAS and ASEAN, however, still put the 
issue under the agenda of law enforcement in the context of combating arms 
smuggling and do not link it with IHL and IHRL. 
 
ASEAN does not have a regional instrument that provides a clear guideline in small 
arms trade. The minimum response of ASEAN as a regional organization arguably is 
because it faces more pressing issues; and the difficulties in the organization 
mechanism to decide when it deals with a dividing issue. The small arms transfer 
continues illegally from one armed conflict to another in the region with little 
difficulty, contributing to escalation in crime and destabilization of the region. 
ASEAN still has not developed a clear, focused strategy on controlling the weapons 
by adopting a stronger unified policy.  
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Chapter VII: 
Challenges and Opportunities in Adopting an International Legal 
Instrument to Regulate Small Arms 
 
A. Introduction  
 
Arguably, the post-Cold War world offered a new environment for the international 
community of States to observe international law, particularly in the growing respect 
for international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL). 
Current effort to have an international legal instrument on small arms has focused on 
the inclusion of small arms in the negotiation towards an arms trade treaty (ATT). 
Hence, the thesis will examine whether the consideration of IHL and IHRL is well 
reflected in the negotiation of an ATT,
1094
that is to balance States‘ interests in arms in 
the name of self-defence and sovereignty, and their obligation to respect for IHL and 
IHRL.  
 
The thesis observes the negotiation process of the existing treaties on conventional 
arms control to reflect contemporary negotiation processes and proceedings which 
provide a picture of typical challenges. As the discussion is on conventional weapons, 
the thesis does not inspect the negotiation process of the conventions of weapons of 
mass destruction such as the Chemical Weapons Convention,
1095
 the Biological 
Weapons Convention,
1096
 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
1097
 although 
general reference is still useful to make.   
 
A treaty, to be successful, needs a widespread acceptance by States, which is 
reflected in the number of countries adhering to it. For an arms control treaty to be 
adhered to, there should be a fairly high degree of common interest among States in 
regulating or preventing the weapons the treaty is dealing with.
1098
 Based on the 
previous and current efforts to restrict arms, an analysis is made to describe in detail 
                                               
1094 UNGA res 61/89, 63/240, 64/48; Preparatory Committee Meetings in 2010-2011; and the 2012 
United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty. 
1095 Chemical Weapons Convention (1993), 1974 UNTS 45. 
1096 Biological Weapons Convention (1972), 1015 UNTS 163. 
1097 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968), 729 UNTS 161. 
1098 Michael E Smith International Security: Politics, Policy, Prospects (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) at 
135.  
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the challenges and opportunities of adopting a legal instrument regulating small arms 
trade, particularly by observing the process toward the diplomatic conference on the 
ATT in 2012 which failed to adopt a treaty. For the decision-making mechanism, 
consensus has been a favoured mechanism in shaping many, but not all, multilateral 
treaties.
1099
  Consensus is chosen in order to bring all countries on board, although 
apparently there is an obvious trade-off that there will be difficult compromises to be 
made to achieve a jointly agreed text.  
 
In all meetings on arms control, the issue of self-defence is always raised. References 
to self-defence are found in many documents on arms control or small arms such as 
the 2001 UNPoA,
1100
 the 2001 Firearms Protocol,
1101
 the 2005 ITI
1102
 and General 
Assembly resolutions related to small arms.
1103
 Early views from States, in response 
to the Secretary-General‘s request on an arms trade treaty, also link many references 
to self-defence.
1104
 Other difficult issues in the ATT negotiation, such as the inclusion 
of ammunition, transfer to non-State actors, and criteria with IHL and IHRL 
considerations are observed.  
 
An international treaty will not be much use if only a limited number of countries 
adopt and adhere to it. Hence, a treaty to be effective and able to match the 
aspirations of a wide range of countries, should be based on common concern. With 
regard to the Arms Trade Treaty, the thesis examines States‘ views on the elements, 
scope, criteria, and parameters submitted by States
1105
 and the negotiation from the 
early stages of the process marked by the adoption of the UN General Assembly 
                                               
1099 For example, the Rules of Procedure of the UN Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty state that the 
decision making is on the basis of consensus (A/CONF.217/L.1). See also A/RES/64/8 of 2 December 
2009, at operational para 5. 
1100 2001 UNPoA (A/CONF.192/15). 
1101 2001 Firearms Protocol, 2326 UNTS 208. 
1102 International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, In a Timely and Reliable Manner, 
Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (A/CONF.105/15;  adopted by the UNGA Decision 60/519 of 8 
December 2005).  
1103 For examples A/RES/64/8; A/RES/66/47.  
1104 Report by the UN Secretary-General: Towards an Arms Trade Treaty (A/62/278 (part I and II) of 
17 August 2007).  
1105 States views are compiled in the Secretary-General Reports. First report was in 2007 (A/62/278) 
and second report was issued in 2011 (A/66/166).   
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resolution 61/80 of 6 December 2006 to the collapse of the UN Conference on the 
Arms Trade Treaty in July 2012. 
 
The issue of self-defence, in the context of small arms, starts from the fact that small 
arms are the weapons which all countries have in their arsenals. Many States present 
the argument that the right to self-defence should be respected in negotiating 
conventional arms control, and small arms are common legitimate weapons to use in 
exercising such a right.
1106
 All countries seem to be in agreement in this. The issue is 
how to balance the right to self-defence with the need to have a responsible arms 
trade:  that is, not to authorise transfer which may be used in violation of international 
humanitarian law (IHL) and human right law (IHRL).
1107
 Some States, the African 
countries, for instance, took a strong position in support of an international legally 
binding instrument and became sound proponents and supporters for a strict legal 
regulation to restrict the proliferation of small arms.
1108
 As many African countries 
are the most affected by small arms, their view on the issue has considerable weight.      
 
 
B. Lessons Learned from Previous Treaties 
1. Initiative and involvement of civil society in arms control  
 
The treaties on arms control, particularly on conventional arms, show that 
participating States have to go through a long process before agreeing to negotiate a 
treaty. In a general sense, a treaty is initiated by a State or a group of States with an 
understanding that most States have a shared opinion that a convention is needed to 
address particular concerns on a specific kind of weapon. It is vital that the necessity 
to adopt a treaty is shared by as many States as possible in order for the convention to 
                                               
1106 Views of States on an ATT are found in the Secretary General Reports A/62/278 (Part I), A/62/278 
(Part II), A/62/278/Add.1, A/62/278/Add.2, A/62/278/Add.3. A/62/278/Add.4; Also A/66/166, 
A/66/166/Add.1, A/66/166/Add.2.   
1107 The inclusion of the IHL and IHRL in the criteria for arms transfer appears in the UNGA res 
61/89, 63/240, 64/48, and the Draft of the Arms Trade Treaty (A/CONF.217/CRP.1).  
1108 Statement of the African Group, 12 July 2010, before the first Preparatory Committee for the 
United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, New York, 12-23 July 2010. 
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be adhered to and that participating States think that their individual interest is better 
served by having a treaty.
1109
   
 
When countries convene to negotiate provisions and find an agreed document, at this 
point, support from key States, particularly from the major powers, is needed for a 
convention to be implementable. It was in this fashion that a diplomatic conference, 
initiated by Russia, was held in 1868 to adopt the St Petersburg Declaration.
1110
  
 
Another example was when the UN Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively 
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCWC)  was held in two sessions in 
Geneva in 1979 and 1980, after a series of the UN General Assembly Resolutions on 
the issue.
1111
 The Conference adopted the CCWC confirming the restriction for States 
to use means of warfare that cause unnecessary suffering, superfluous injuries, and 
are indiscriminate in nature. The CCWC, the Mine Ban Treaty, as well as the recent 
Convention on Cluster Munitions, reflect basic humanitarian law concepts on 
limitation of the methods and weapons used by the belligerents.
1112
   
 
The current general trend shows more involvement of civil society in dialogue and 
discussion on arms control issues both on WMD and conventional weapons. Using 
various well organized approaches, they have been trying to make their voices heard 
by governments. The combination of the NGOs, international organizations, research 
centres and specialized interest groups have formed a global arms control community 
                                               
1109 Guido Den Dekker The Law of Arms Control: International Supervision and Enforcement 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010) at 22. 
1110 St Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles under 400 
Grammes Weight (adopted by the International Military Commission, 11 December 1868), (1907) 1 
Am J Int‘l L Supp 95). The content of the St Petersburg Declaration is explained in the chapter II of 
the thesis. 
1111 Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
Which May be Deemed Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (concluded 10 
October 1980, entered into force 2 December 1983), 1342 UNTS 137; see, Stuart Maslen Anti-
Personnel Mines under Humanitarian Law: A View from the Vanishing Point (Intersentia-
Transnational Publishers,  2001) at 29-30. 
1112 See Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck  Customary International Humanitarian 
Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005) vol I, at 237-296; David Kaye and Steven A Solomon ―The 
Second Review Conference of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons‖ (2002) 96 Am 
J Int‘l L 922. 
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and make sure the issue of arms control is now widely reported and viewed.
1113
 These 
organizations, through their networks, form pressure groups on how the governments 
decide and position themselves in the arms control issue.  
 
It appears now that civil society, to some extent, as shown in the Mine Ban Treaty 
negotiation process, plays an initiating role that was previously only played by States.  
Civil society plays a role particularly in disseminating information so that the issues 
reach the wider public. Since 1990s, publication of the results of intensive research on 
small arms pushed the issue into the international security and arms control 
agenda
1114
 which helps governments to focus on this issue and negotiate an 
international framework.
1115
 The exposure, by the civil society, of the impact of small 
arms‘ excessive availability on people‘s lives further pushed small arms to becoming 
an agenda item attracting governments‘ attention.  
 
Something unique to conventional weapons, compared to the weapons of mass 
destruction, is that all processes to control conventional arms have always been 
through multilateral process. The 1868 Saint Petersburg Declaration, the 1980 
CCWC, the 1997 Mine Ban Convention, and the 2008 Convention on Cluster 
Munitions are examples of the multilateral route which all existing conventional 
weapons treaties took. It is assumed, because conventional arms are every body‘s 
weapons, they are owned by almost every country. Consequently, the negotiation to 
regulate conventional arms, internationally or regionally, involves many more States 
than to negotiate on weapons of mass destruction.   
  
The development of transportation modes and information technology provides 
greater opportunities for civil society to build global networks and intensify the close 
observation and involvement in arms control activities. Over the years, civil society 
has been increasingly more vocal and articulate in conveying opinions on the issue of 
arms control to influence public opinion which later may influence State policy. Non-
                                               
1113 Michael E Smith International Security: Politics, Policy, Prospects (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) at 
133. 
1114 Damien Rogers Postinternationalism and Small Arms: Theory, Politics, Security (Ashgate, 2009) 
at 90.      
1115 Ibid.      
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governmental organizations‘ voices or activities are covered, quoted, and reported by 
media.
1116
 The process of adoption of the 1997 Mine Ban Convention was marked 
particularly by the significant role that civil society could play in arms control. It was 
the first conventional arms control where civil society played a crucial role in the 
process, helped ensure the implementation by States parties and continued the 
campaign to persuade States to accede to it.
1117
  
 
The adoption of the Mine Ban Convention shows significant departure from the 
traditional arms control/disarmament process where the initiatives come only from 
States. Instead, impetus came from a loose coalition of concerned States and civil 
society/non-governmental organizations. Having no progress in the traditional 
disarmament forum, the Canadian Government initiated the then Ottawa Process in 
October 1996 with strong support from NGOs worldwide with persuasiveness so 
solid that ―many nations who were initially sceptical of the proposals, including 
France and Japan, were convinced otherwise.‖1118 The case of anti-personnel mines 
(APMs) and cluster munitions demonstrates that in the modern era of communication, 
public opinion matters and cannot simply be ignored. 
 
The campaign to ban the use of APMs involved cross-cultural actors from the NGO 
activists to high profile world figures. The campaign by the NGOs helped in 
exposing, to a wider public, the nature of anti-personnel mines as cruel indiscriminate 
weapons and that put additional pressure on governments to be a party to the treaty. 
The international movement to ban APMs is well organized with the establishment of 
an International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). The ICBL, a coalition of 
NGOs in the field of human rights and arms control, is perhaps the most noticeable 
                                               
1116 See for example, SIPRI‘s research result as cited  in Richard Norton-Taylor ―Global Protests Pose 
Fresh Challenge for International Agency, Says Think Thank‖ The Guardian (London, 4 June 2012) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/04/arab-spring-conflict-international-
security?INTCMP=SRCH>;  Analysts from the Small Arms Survey and other organizations are quoted 
in C J Chivers ―Experts  Fear Looted Libyan Arms May Find A Way to Terrorists‖ The New York 
Times (New York, 3 March 2011) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/world/africa/04weapons.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all>.   
1117 International Campaign to Ban Landmine (ICBL) actively approaches States, which have not yet 
ratified the convention, by approaching the governments.  Similar approaches are made to States 
Parties to remind them of their obligations under the convention.   
1118 Nigel Vinson ―The Demise of Anti-Personnel Mine: A Military Perspective‖ (1998) 143 Royal 
United Service Institute for Defense Studies Journal 18. 
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NGO in the campaign to ban anti-personnel mines.
1119
 Another active NGO in 
support of the treaty is the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD), an organization funded and supported by more than 12 States and 
international organizations.
1120
 The same approach involving a wide public attention 
was applied to the campaign to ban cluster munitions as an organisation of many 
NGOs called Cluster Munition Coalition was formed.
1121
 
 
The indiscriminate character of anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions, that is 
considered inhumane, helps greatly in the universalization of the Mine Ban 
Convention and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, even without support from the 
major powers.
1122
 However, unlike anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions, small 
arms are an indispensable means for States‘ defence and security. The different 
natural characteristics of small arms in comparison with anti-personnel mines and 
cluster munitions is that the latter two fall into the category of indiscriminate 
weapons, whereas small arms are not indiscriminate in nature, the concern is the 
potential use of the weapons in violations of IHL and IHRL. Small arms are designed 
and ―capable of precise direct fire without inherent indiscriminate effects‖.1123 Hence, 
the tactic to rally support from civil society based on the same ethic, might not work 
so well for small arms.  The issue with small arms is not the question of a total ban 
but regulation, to restrict the weapons from falling into the hands of those who are 
more likely to use them wrongfully as opposed to not using them at all.  
 
Many NGOs are also active in campaigns to restrict small arms trade. Despite their 
status as non-governmental organizations, the NGOs and research centres may 
receive funding from contributing governments in executing their research on small 
arms. They are, to name a few, the Small Arms Survey, the Stockholm International 
                                               
1119 Stuart Maslen Anti-Personnel Mines under Humanitarian Law: A View from the Vanishing Point 
(Intersentia-Transnational Publishers, 2001) at 18. 
1120 GICHD states its mission is ―to eliminate anti-personnel mines and to reduce humanitarian impact 
of other landmines and explosive remnants of war‖. The profile of the GICHD can be found at 
http://www.gichd.org/about-gichd/overview/. Last accessed on 1 September 2010. 
1121 Cluster Munition Coalition < http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/>. 
1122 Stuart Marslen Anti-Personnel Mines under Humanitarian Law: A View from the Vanishing Point 
(Intersentia-Transnational Publishers,  2001) 
1123 Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, A/52/298, 27 August 1997, at [32]. 
237 
 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),
1124
 the International Action Network on Small 
Arms (IANSA),
1125
 and the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfer 
(NISAT).
1126
  
 
The international non-governmental organizations such as ICRC, Amnesty 
International, and Human Rights Watch also publish research findings on arms 
controls, in this case on small arms. Research by the NGOs on arms control, as 
Damien Rogers concludes, ―is often conducted with the view to inciting decisive 
governmental action‖.1127  As an illustration, the South Africa based research centre 
Institute for Security Studies (ISS) published a comprehensive guidebook for African 
countries to help them in the diplomatic conference to negotiate an arms trade treaty 
in New York, July 2012.
1128
  The publications and involvement of civil society in 
arms control meetings form a new dimension in arms control negotiation, as their 
presence projects a public opinion that, arguably, has potential to influence the 
governments‘ stance.  
 
The Small Arms Survey is one of the most visible small arms research centres, which 
annually publishes a Small Arms Survey featuring one specific topic about small 
arms in each edition. It has published research findings in yearbooks and extensive 
occasional papers, special reports, book series, and working papers on the subject of 
small arms. Established in 1999, the Small Arms Survey is supported by, and receives 
sustained contributions from, governments of Switzerland, Belgium, Canada, 
Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
1129
 It is evident 
that their mission and research are supported by the sponsoring governments. In 
performing its mission to become a principal public information source on all aspects 
of small arms, the Small Arms Survey works closely with other institutions, including 
                                               
1124 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute < http://www.sipri.org/>. 
1125 International Action Network on Small Arms < http://iansa.org/>. 
1126 Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfer < http://www.prio.no/NISAT/>. 
1127
 Damien Rogers Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control: Theory, Politics, Security (Ashgate, 
2009) at 77. 
1128 Guy Lamb Negotiating An Arms Trade Treaty: A Toolkit for African States (Pretoria, Institute for 
Security Studies, 2012).  
1129 Small Arms Survey‘s mission statement 
<http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/about/partners.html>. Last accessed on 2 September 2010. 
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government agencies.
1130
 The Small Arms Survey has been establishing partnerships 
with other institutions such as the Amnesty International, the Human Rights Watch, 
the International Action Network on Small Arms, research centres and universities 
around the globe, which creates a wide-ranging global network and lays a foundation 
for worldwide awareness on small arms issues.
1131
 
 
As the result of its extensive research, the Small Arms Survey yearbook has been a 
main source for academics, international organizations, and also governments. 
Reports of the Secretary General on small arms, as well as government positions 
frequently cite the Small Arms Survey research findings.
1132
 Since the 1990s, 
published reports of the researchers‘ findings have been attracting considerable 
attention towards small arms as an urgent topic.
1133
  The increasing amount of 
literature, made possible by the civil society, helps the policymakers seeking to 
control arms to better comprehend the topic.
1134
 
 
The International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) is a global network 
against gun violence with most noticeable physical presence in every open meeting 
on small arms under the UN framework. It claims a network of 800 civil society 
organizations working in 120 countries to stop the proliferation and the misuse of 
small arms.
1135
  The IANSA tries to achieve its goal to stop gun violence by, among 
other things, ―raising awareness among policymakers, the public and the media about 
                                               
1130 Ibid; for an example of a joint work between the Small Arms Survey and a government agency, see 
Manasseh Wepundi Availability of Small Arms and Perceptions of Security in Kenya: An Assessment 
(Geneva, Small Arms Survey, 2012).  Assessments and findings of NGO‘s research on arms control 
are published and read by a wider public. Study centres with a focus on arms control have been 
growing in number and many have published their findings for public consumption. Civil society 
representatives also attend meetings on arms control so as to monitor them and make their opinions 
known to the governments‘ delegations. 
1131  List of partners of the Small Arms Survey is available at <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/about-
us/partners.html>. Last accessed 19 July 2012. 
1132 Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on Small Arms to Security Council, S/2008/258 of 
17 April 2008, made references to the Small Arms Survey, SIPRI and other research findings from 
NGO publications. States also quoted the Small Arms Survey in the 2007 Secretary-General Report 
towards an arms trade treaty, A/62/278. 
1133 Damien Rogers Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control: Theory, Politics, Security (Ashgate, 
2009) at 77. 
1134 Ibid. 
1135 International Action Network on Small Arms <http://iansa.org/about.htm>. Last accessed on 2 
September 2010.  
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the global threat to human rights and human security caused by small arms‖.1136 In 
the UN meetings on small arms, the presence of the IANSA is obvious as they 
actively seek to ensure their voice is heard. In session meetings open to NGOs, their 
representatives make their voices heard, including by setting up stalls outside the 
meeting venue to display publications, distribute working and position papers, as well 
as pictures and photographs. They also organize side events and invite government 
delegates for dialogue and discussion.
1137
 
 
The role of NGOs in the campaign for restricting arms trade, toward and at the 2012 
UN Conference on the Arms Trade treaty, is acknowledged explicitly by 
governments and the UN Secretary-General. France, for instance, reminded the 
conference the initiative for an ATT was launched by the Nobel Prize laureate Oscar 
Arias and civil society, for that, France welcomes the involvement of the NGOs 
―whose action, reflection, and commitment have played a leading role throughout this 
process.‖1138 In similar tone, the Secretary-General thanked the NGOs for the 
vigorous support for an ATT, which he said ―have helped capture the imagination and 
energy of millions.‖1139  
 
When it comes to the civil society‘s participation, the United Nations gives both sides 
an opportunity to state their position. Both anti-gun control and pro-gun control 
NGOs are usually in attendance. Anti-gun control associations such as the influential 
National Rifle Association and the National Muzzle Loading Rifle Association (both 
are US-based organizations) attend the UN meetings.
1140
 In terms of physical 
presence, the pro-gun control organizations are more noticeable.  
                                               
1136 Ibid.  
1137 First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade 
Treaty, New York, 12-23 July 2010 decided on the modalities on NGOs participation in the General 
Assembly document A/CONF.217/PC/L.2 of 9 July 2010. 
1138 Statement of France (speech by Foreign Minister Laurent Fabious, delivered by Ambassador Jean-
Hugues Simon-Michel), dated 2 July 2012 before the UN Conference on the ATT, New York, 2-27 
July 2012; see also statement of Costa Rica, 2 July 2012; and statement of the United Kingdom, 3 July 
2012. Statements are available at <http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/statements/>. Last accessed 
31 July 2012. 
1139 Statement of the UN Secretary-General,  3 July 2012, before the UN Conference on the ATT, New 
York, 2-27 July 2012. Available at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sgsm14394.doc.htm>. 
1140 Anti gun control associations such as the Defense Small Arms Advisory Council, the World Forum 
on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities, and National Rifle Association are recorded giving 
statements during the PrepCom meetings on the ATT in 2010-2011. 
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The agenda of the UN small arms process traditionally allocates an open session for 
various civil societies to take the floor.
1141
 As a result, although the time allotted is 
limited, at the very least, governments are positioned to hear what the civil societ ies‘ 
opinions are on aspects of small arms. These activities would put pressure on them 
and make the governments‘ delegates aware that they are being watched by the civil 
societies. Some reject the idea that the presence of civil societies may play an 
influencing role in multilateral negotiations, stating that ―the visibility does not 
necessarily equate to significant effects‖.1142 However, the refusal to acknowledge the 
role civil society plays in the multilateral negotiations on small arms is not in line 
with the fact that the States‘ positions and the UN Secretary-General report on small 
arms frequently quote the research findings published by civil society. It is obvious 
that States may take into account and even adopt the civil societies‘ views. As a 
matter of fact, the effort to establish an arms trade treaty, which includes small arms, 
was originally the initiative pushed by civil society which was later adopted by 
governments.
1143
      
 
Another research centre which actively publishes its research findings on small arms 
is Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The SIPRI was an 
independent research institute established by the Swedish government in 1966 to 
―provide data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to 
policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public.‖1144 The most significant 
contribution of the SIPRI is that it provides a database on arms transfer, although it is 
not exclusively on small arms. The SIPRI database provides information on 
conventional arms transfer which gives an indication of the size and value of the total 
transfer for each supplier and recipient. 
                                               
1141 See the ―Draft decision on the modalities of attendance of non-governmental organizations at the 
session of the Preparatory Committee‖. A/CONF.217/PC/L.2, of 9 July 2010. Preparatory Committee 
for the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, first session, New York, 12-23 July 
2010.    
1142 Damien Rogers Postinternational and Small Arms Control: Theory, Politics, Security (Ashgate, 
2009) at 47. 
1143 Small Arms Surveys 2009: Shadows of War (Cambridge, 2009) at 147. The initiative came from a 
group of Nobel Peace Laureates and the concept was received by civil society groups which then in 
2003 launched a global  campaign. 
1144 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute<http://www.sipri.org/about>. Last accessed on 2 
September 2010.  
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The Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfer (NISAT) provides a public 
database exclusively on small arms transfer. This is, perhaps, the most significant 
contribution of the NISAT so that a reliable estimation of small arms trade is 
available. The institution collects data from all sources with a goal to contribute to 
preventing armed violence.
1145
 The public can search for transfers made by 250 States 
and territories based on specific classification of small arms, light weapons, 
ammunition, missiles, parts and accessories.
1146
 The difference between the database 
provided by the NISAT and other institutes‘ databases is that the NISAT database 
specializes in small arms transfer, a significantly useful source for it reveals the 
transfer values of export and import by each individual State.  
 
The list of the NGOs and civil society does not stop here. There are many other 
independent research centres dedicating themselves to research and disseminating 
their findings. They are distributed among different countries; the Institute for 
Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria, South Africa,
1147
 and the Bonn International Center 
for Conversion (BICC).
1148
   
 
It is worth noting that the human rights NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International, also have an interest in small arms to explain the linkage 
between arms availability and human rights abuses. Perhaps the most influential 
international non-governmental organization that also dedicates some research to 
small arms is the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). This well-known 
and established organization, with a recognized role in promoting humanitarian law, 
has a unique status in the UN General Assembly as the only non-government 
institution granted an observer status at the United Nations.
1149
 This status has 
                                               
1145 Ibid.  
1146 Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfer <http://www.prio.no/NISAT/>. Last accessed on 3 
September 2010.   
1147 Institute for Security Studies < http://www.iss.co.za/>. 
1148
 Bonn International Centre for Conversion < http://www.iss.co.za/>. 
1149 General Assembly document  A/45/PV.31 of 16 October 1990 on Observer status for the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, in consideration of the special role and mandates conferred 
upon it by the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Observer Status in the United Nations is 
usually granted to specialized government organizations or regional organizations. It is the first time a 
non-government institution has been granted such status. The resolution explains that it is because ―the 
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enabled the ICRC to promote its humanitarian views in relevant General Assembly 
meetings, including the meetings on the future arms trade treaty. The ICRC, in 
particular, has made known its opinion on the ongoing discussion on an arms trade 
treaty, and pressed for the inclusion of small arms in the ATT.
1150
 The views from 
ICRC, as expected, reflect the humanitarian concerns caused by the uncontrolled 
proliferation of conventional weapons. The ICRC, and other civil society 
organisations with humanity-based arguments, pushes the linkage of arms trade with 
IHL and IHRL which must be respected in arms trade.
1151
   
 
The partnership of international NGOs with think tanks, universities, and research 
centres with a global network to campaign for gun control creates a world-wide link. 
A broad campaign by civil societies has brought the issue of small arms closer to 
people‘s attention than it has ever been before. Hence, the view of civil societies on 
small arms is now more likely to be seriously taken into account by States.   
 
It is now almost a standard practice for meetings in the United Nations that the NGOs 
are given an opportunity to address the meeting and express their views at an 
allocated time. The Preparatory Committee meetings on the ATT in 2010-2011 were 
open to the relevant NGOs and they were allowed to address the meeting during one 
session specifically allotted for that purpose.
1152
 The same practice of NGO 
participation applies to the 2012 diplomatic conference on the ATT, which also 
allows them to provide material to all delegations, outside the conference room.
1153
   
 
                                                                                                                                      
mandate conferred on it by the international community of States through universally ratified 
international treaties, ICRC acts as a neutral intermediary to provide protection and assistance to the 
victims of international and non-international armed conflicts.‖ 
1150 Statement by the ICRC, 14 July 2010, in the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations 
Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, New York, 12-23 July 2010.   
1151 ICRC Protecting Civilians and Humanitarian Action through An Effective Arms Trade Treaty 
(Geneva, ICRC, 2011); ICRC ―Adopting An Effective Arms Trade Treaty: A Humanitarian 
Imperative‖ (press release, 1 July 2012). 
1152
 A/CONF.217/PC/L.2, of 9 July 2010, on the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations 
Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty. The meeting is open to relevant NGOs in consultative status 
with the Economic and Social Council in accordance with the provisions of Council resolution 
1996/31 of 25 July 1996, or other interested NGOs whose work is relevant to the scope of the 
Conference.  
1153 Provisional Rules of Procedures of the Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty (A/CONF.217/L.1). 
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It was at this allotted time that the coalition NGOs, such as the IANSA and Amnesty 
International, had the chance to make their views officially heard by States‘ delegates 
and recorded in the conference system. In addition, the ICRC, that has standing 
observer status in the general assembly, enjoys the freedom to address the meeting at 
any possible time. This opportunity to directly address the meeting is important for 
civil societies to make their voices heard directly by States‘ officials mandated to 
negotiate. In addition, the NGOs may provide the delegations with their publications, 
working papers, and written statements on particular relevant issues for them to take 
and read. 
 
The UN mechanism to provide opportunities for civil society to participate, however, 
is not inclusive in all arms control negotiations. In contrast, such relative openness is 
non-existent, for example, in the Conference on Disarmament. As another 
international body negotiating arms control, the Conference on Disarmament follows 
its own procedure and does not provide a mechanism for the civil society to be 
directly involved in its meetings.
1154
  The Conference on Disarmament represents the 
traditional procedure in which only States have the right to speak at the Conference 
meetings and provides no chance for any NGOs to directly present their views. 
Likewise, limited presence of civil society is also apparent in the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons meetings.
1155
  In most cases, States are more 
relaxed towards NGO‘s participation in conventional arms control meetings than 
those regarding weapons of mass destruction.  
 
 
2. Ensuring implementation   
 
Any future treaty regulating small arms needs an appropriate mechanism to ensure 
compliance. The existing arms control treaties provide lessons on how a treaty is 
                                               
1154 Rules of Procedure of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/8/Rev.9 of 19 December 2003). Part 
XII (42) deal with the non-governmental organizations where the Rules state ―[a]ll communication 
from non-governmental organizations to the Conference, to the President or to the Secretariat, shall be 
retained by the Secretariat and be made available to delegations upon request. A list of all such 
communications shall be circulated to the conference.‖ The rules of procedure show civil society 
cannot be directly involved in the Conference on Disarmament.       
1155 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968), 729 UNTS 161. 
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implemented, including by a support mechanism to ensure compliance by States 
Parties.  A State is willing to comply with the provisions in a treaty mainly because of 
its concerns both for its reputation and the threat of direct sanctions triggered by non-
compliance, hence breaching law.
1156
  Compliance could be ensured by establishing a 
verification mechanism and/or having periodic inspections by a neutral third party to 
give a greater chance for a treaty to achieve its goals.
1157
  
 
Taking other arms control treaties as examples, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) verifies the compliance of the States Parties by giving a 
mandate to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to carry out the 
verification tasks in a safeguard system.
1158
 For this verification purpose, the IAEA 
may send their inspectors to verify the compliance with the fulfilment of States 
Parties‘ obligations under the treaty.1159 In practice, a treaty with an implementing 
body or permanent secretariat would be able to maintain a more regular 
communication among States Parties than a treaty without it, which would rely on the 
resources of the secretariat of the United Nations instead. The communication on the 
issue of the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), for 
instance, is served by the technical secretariat of the OPCW. Meanwhile, the 
communication on the CCWC, which has no implementing body, is served by the 
United Nations office for disarmament affairs.    
 
The Chemical Weapons Convention verifies the reports of States parties by cross-
checking the States Parties‘ reports of export, to find any suspicious discrepancy, 
combined with on-site inspection. In the case of the CWC, the Convention 
                                               
1156 Andrew T Guzman ―A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law‖ (2002) 90 Cal L Rev 
1825 at 1826; Michael Chertoff ―Responsibility to Contain: Protecting Sovereignty under International 
Law‖ (2009) 88(1) Foreign Aff 132; see generally the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(done 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980), 1155 UNTS 331. The consent to be bound by 
a treaty expressed by signature, exchange of instrument consisting a treaty, ratification, acceptance and 
other means are elaborated in articles 12 -17.   
1157 Ibid, at 1829. 
1158
 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968), 729 UNTS 161, at art III (1). The 
treaty requires a non-nuclear State Party to accept safeguards and conclude agreement with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its 
obligations.  
1159 International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards (INFCIRC/26 of 30 March 1961), part v. 
Available at <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc26.pdf>. 
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established an implementing body of the CWC, namely the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), with the mandate to achieve the 
objectives and ensure the implementation of the convention by the States parties.
1160
 
For those purposes, the OPCW may, as part of its verification activities, deploy their 
inspectors to conduct on-site inspections at short notice to any national authority of 
the CWC States Parties.
1161
 
 
The NPT and the CWC are the two examples of international arms control treaties 
which have succeeded in equipping themselves with implementing bodies to ensure 
the implementation and verify the compliance of the States parties. While an 
implementing body helps in ensuring the implementation, it appears that not all 
conventions on arms controls need to have an implementing body. The experience 
from the recent implementation of particular arms control treaties shows that a treaty 
can still be effective in the absence of periodic intrusive inspections.  
 
The States parties to conventional arms control treaties, at least at this stage, do not 
feel it necessary to have an implementing body such as the CWC and the NPT have. 
The conventions on conventional weapons such as the Mine Ban Convention, the 
CCWC, and Convention on Cluster Munitions have no specific implementing body to 
execute the objectives and implementation of the States Parties.  Although not an 
implementing body, the States Parties to the Mine-Ban Convention in 2001 have 
established an implementation support unit which provides secretarial and 
administrative support in the meetings.
1162
      
 
A regional legally binding instrument can be observed as well. The verification 
mechanism of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) 
                                               
1160
 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on Their Destruction (1993), art VIII.  
1161 Ibid, art VIII (5). 
1162 Final Report of the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on their Destruction 
(APLC/MSP.3/2001/L.7).    
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may provide hints on an effective verification.
1163
 The CFE Treaty is accompanied by 
eight protocols as integral parts of the Treaty which include the Protocol on 
Notification and Exchange of Information with an Annex on the Format for the 
Exchange of Information (Protocol 5); and the Protocol on Inspection (Protocol 6).  
To further ensure compliance by parties, the CFE Treaty establishes a Joint 
Consultative Group to promote the objectives and implementation.
1164
 As a product 
of arms control negotiated in the Cold War, the Treaty ensures the implementation by 
having a detailed arrangement of a verification mechanism, including a detailed site 
inspection.  
 
Verification mechanism was one of the topics that States considered essential in the 
early negotiation of the arms trade treaty. States have indicated the indispensable 
need of verification and compliance processes and the exploration what other 
enforcement measures to have in a successful treaty.
1165
 It would also be subject to 
negotiation to ensure the implementation of the provisions of a treaty and whether it 
needs an implementing body. As in the case of the conventions on anti-personnel 
mines and cluster munitions, another treaty on conventional weapons may be 
expected to rely on transparency and an effective reporting mechanism. The 
challenge of verification for small arms is to find a mechanism of compliance for 
wrongful use of small arms, namely a model which incorporates the consideration of 
IHL and IHRL. 
 
All existing conventions on conventional weapons have no implementing body. For 
example, the CCWC
1166
 and its five protocols are also implemented with no 
implementing body. The Convention has limited reference to the clarification 
mechanism and leaves it to each protocol to deal with it. As a consequence, not all 
                                               
1163 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (signed on 19 November 1990, entered into force 
on 17 July 1992). For comprehensive information on the CFE Treaty, see Sergey Koulik and Richard 
Kokoski Conventional Arms Control: Perspectives on Verification (Oxford University Press, 1994). 
1164 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (signed on 19 November 1990, entered into force 
on 17 July 1992), art XVI. 
1165 The UK is one of States that underlines the importance of the verification process. Statement by 
Ambassador John Duncan, the UK Ambassador for Multilateral Arms Control Disarmament, 12 July 
2010, before the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, 
New York, 12-23 July 2010.  
1166 Certain Conventional Weapons Convention (1980), 1342 UNTS 137. 
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protocols have clear provisions to address the matters relating to compliance, 
implementation, and clarification. Of all the five protocols, Protocol II provides a 
reference to implementation and compliance (article 14), likewise Protocol V (article 
11), meanwhile the other three Protocols (I, II and IV) have no implementing 
provisions or clarification on compliance with the implementation.    
 
An arms control treaty anticipates the problem of the issue of non-compliance by 
providing a compliance mechanism to deal with it. However, not all arms control 
treaty verification is in the form of an intrusive inspection. The Mine Ban Treaty, for 
example, deals with the possibility of non-compliance with a non-intrusive procedure. 
One or more States Parties may wish to clarify ―and seek to resolve questions relating 
to compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may 
submit, through the Secretary-General of United Nations, a Request for Clarification 
of that matter to that State Party.‖1167 The Mine-Ban Convention‘s provision, that 
allows a State to seek a clarification, together with the obligation to submit reports on 
national implementation measures
1168
 have sufficiently ensured relative smooth 
implementation of the Convention.   
 
In the Mine Ban Convention negotiation process, a monitoring and verification 
mechanism initially had been introduced, in the belief that without it the prohibition 
would be toothless.
1169
 The ICRC suggested a method to set up an independent 
mechanism to investigate credible reports of the use of anti-personnel mines, the 
States accepted it at the end of negotiation although they were initially not 
convinced.
1170
 The mechanism of the facilitation and clarification of compliance in 
Article 8 of the Mine Ban Convention is a compromise between ―the intrusive 
                                               
1167 Article 8 on Facilitation and clarification of the compliance of the 1997 the Mine Ban Convention. 
The argument that without a verification mechanism, a treaty will be less effective was also raised in 
the negotiation of the Mine Ban Convention. 
1168
 Mine Ban Convention (1997), art 7, obligates States parties to submit report on, inter alia,  the total 
stockpile, location of mined areas, status of programs for the conversion of anti-personnel mines 
production facilities and mines destruction.  
1169 Stuart Maslen Anti-Personnel Mines under Humanitarian Law: A View from the Vanishing Point 
(Intersentia-Transnational Publishers, 2001) at 81. 
1170 Ibid.  
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verification measures typical of disarmament treaties and the relatively light model 
traditionally favoured by international humanitarian law‖.1171   
 
The Convention on Cluster Munitions, similarly to the Mine Ban Convention, does 
not establish an implementing body to verify the implementation of States Parties. 
Instead, a State Party is obligated to prepare transparency measures which include 
reporting on the total number it has, not later than 180 days after entry into force of 
the convention for that State Party.
1172
 The Convention also facilitates a clarification 
of compliance mechanism if one or more States Parties wish to resolve questions 
relating to a matter of compliance by another State Party.
1173
 Generally, the issues 
that may arise in the application of the convention will be discussed and decided in 
regular meetings of States Parties.
1174
  
 
The successful implementation of the Mine Ban Convention without an implementing 
or intrusive inspection provides a useful lesson for future treaty negotiators with 
regards to ensuring compliance. The Mine Ban Convention has proved that without 
an implementing body and on-site verification, a convention could be well 
implemented by resorting to obligatory reports and the clarification mechanism.
1175
 
Transparency is insured by having regular States Parties meetings to observe 
development of the implementation and address the issues of common concern. 
However, the Mine Ban Convention allows a fact-finding mission for clarification 
after the States parties special meeting authorizes such inspection.
1176
 The absence of 
an implementing body in the Mine Ban Convention, the CCWC, and the CCM 
suggests that the need to have an implementing body may also depend on the type of 
weapons banned or regulated.  
 
                                               
1171 Suart Maslen Commentaries on Arms Control Treaties, Volume I: The Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their 
Destruction (Oxford University Press, 2004) at  214.   
1172 Convention on Cluster Munitions Convention (2008), art 7.  
1173 Ibid, art 8. 
1174
 Convention on Cluster Munitions (2008), art 11. Both the Convention on Cluster Munitions and 
the Mine Ban Convention (1997) have annual meetings which give member countries opportunities to 
discuss all matters of concern in implementation of the Convention. 
1175 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel 
Mines and on their Destruction (1997), art 7 and 8. 
1176 Ibid, art 8. 
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For small arms, as the existing conventional arms control treaties exemplify, the 
possible future small arms trade treaty might also adopt the same practical and 
applicable non-intrusive compliance mechanism. Learning from past experience on 
compliance mechanisms of the existing conventional arms controls, and also taking 
into account the portable nature of small arms, the most possible verification 
mechanism for small arms is by transparency report and not intrusive site inspection. 
It could take a form of a regular transparency report with information on stockpile, 
production, and transfer by a State Party during an indicated period of time.
1177
  
Moreover, the existing conventional arms treaties suggest that an on-site inspection 
for small arms might not be very useful to verify the existence of weapons as they are 
easier to move or conceal than, for example, a chemical plant capable of making 
chemical weapons or special storage in stockpiling.  
 
A multilateral arms control treaty is adopted to limit, control, ban, or regulate 
weapons. It deals with the matter of most significance to States and affects their 
national security, hence it requires ratification for it to enter into force.
1178
 A treaty, to 
be implemented, needs consent from a State to bind itself with provisions contained 
in the treaty. For States to voluntarily agree to be bound by a treaty, among other 
things, it has to accommodate the interests of that State. 
 
 
C. Small Arms in the Arms Trade Treaty  
1. Small arms as part of conventional weapons 
 
The main concern regarding small arms is their excessive availability.  This may 
cause humanitarian problems and a threat to human security, as they can be used to 
violate human rights and international humanitarian laws. Many other conventional 
weapons do not arouse that concern to the degree that small arms do. The control of 
small arms is also much more challenging than other conventional weapons, for 
                                               
1177 Draft of the ATT submitted by the President of the UN Conference on the ATT (dated 26 July 
2012), has articles deal with reporting and a secretariat to support the implementation (UN Doc 
A/CONF.217/CRP.1).     
1178 Andrew Michie ―The Provisional Application of Arms Control Treaties‖ (2005) 10(3) J Conflict & 
Security L 345 at 348. 
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example, anti-personnel mines. This is because firstly, small arms are basic elements 
of States‘ defence and security posture and have other uses for law enforcement and 
recreational purposes; and secondly, they have a strong cultural affinity that may 
shape the policy to oppose any international instrument that might have domestic 
repercussions.
1179
 
 
The development and the roadmap provided by the UNGA resolution 64/48 indicates 
that the most realistic hope to control small arms lies in negotiation to have an ATT. 
Meanwhile, the inclusion of small arms in an arms trade treaty puts the issue of small 
arms dependent on decisions on other conventional weapons, many of which have 
higher profiles: for example, attacking helicopters, fighter jets, missiles, tanks, 
armoured vehicles, military ships, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).
1180
 The trade 
of small arms, because of their distinct characteristics - portability and universal use 
by most countries - is relatively much more difficult to control than other types of 
weapons.  
 
The inclusion of small arms in an arms trade treaty can be seen through two different 
possible scenarios. First, it could be an advantage if the negotiation succeeds to 
establish arms trade standards, as the inclusion will provide a restriction to cover 
small arms trade. Under an ATT, export or import of small arms would require 
exporting and importing States to abide by certain rules and criteria in transferring 
small arms as part of conventional arms. Given the difficulty to regulate small arms 
as a single topic, and the fact that there is no possibility in a foreseeable future that 
the world will have a treaty exclusively on small arms trade, the inclusion is the best 
possible chance the international community has at the present time. Establishing an 
international treaty that regulates the small arms trade will complement and 
strengthen other instruments, including the Security Council arms embargoes. 
 
                                               
1179 S Neil MacFarlene and Yuen Foong Khong Human Security and the UN: A Critical History 
(Indiana University Press, 2006) at 199. 
1180 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), a new type of conventional weapon increasingly used in armed 
conflict, was suggested to be included in the future ATT. Such proposal was heard during the first 
PrepCom in July 2010.   
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Second, it could become a disadvantage if the issue of small arms is to be viewed 
merely as a part of larger conventional weapons which have different reasons to be 
restricted or regulated. There are certain characteristics of small arms that need to be 
taken into consideration. Small arms relate to basic social issues, such as social-
economic devastation as the weapons have a great potential to be used in violating 
IHL and IHRL. The weapons have a discernible profile for what they have caused or 
could cause, while other conventional weapons have a direct significance to military 
capability and national security or defence based on their own merit.  
 
The challenges to an ATT apparently already looked difficult as the early discussion 
of the meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the UN Conference on the ATT 
throughout 2010 and 2011 demonstrated. The inability of the previous working 
groups to work on definitive elements of scope, parameters, and criteria may have 
been utilized by some countries to argue that the States are not ready yet. Russia was 
one of the countries that explicitly argued in the PrepCom that it was ―premature to 
speak now of a legally binding ATT‖.1181 The PrepCom meetings also showed that 
States still kept referring to their concerns that an ATT may damage the sovereignty 
enjoyed by States. In the first Preparatory Committee in 2010, some countries, 
Pakistan for instance, stated again that an arms trade treaty should not affect a 
transaction between two sovereign countries and stressed the need for consensus in 
adopting that treaty.
1182
  
 
 
2. UNGA resolutions on ATT and voting behaviour  
 
The long process to have a control on conventional arms culminated in a diplomatic 
conference in July 2012 as mandated by the General Assembly resolution 64/48 of 2 
December 2009.  Historically, the initiative can be traced back to 1995 when a group 
of Nobel Peace Prize Laureates started campaigning for an international legal 
                                               
1181 Statement of the Russian Federation delegation, 12 July 2010, before the Preparatory Committee 
for the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, New York, 12-23 July 2010.  
1182 Pakistan Delegation Statement in the First Preparatory Committee Meeting, New York 12-23 July 
2010 <http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/ATTPrepCom/Statements-MemberStates.html>. 
Last accessed on 6 September 2010. 
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instrument to prevent irresponsible arms transfer.
1183
 The initiative was supported by 
various civil society groups and later taken up by Governments and brought into the 
UN framework.
1184
  One particular State that pushed for the process was the United 
Kingdom, which also actively approached governments to raise support for the 
ATT.
1185
 
 
The campaign took form when the idea was tabled as a draft resolution on the ATT in 
the United Nations General Assembly in 2006. The resolution 61/89 of 6 December 
2006 explicitly mentions ―respect for international law, including international human 
rights law and international humanitarian law,‖ as considerations in a negotiation 
towards an arms trade treaty.
1186
 The resolution was adopted with overwhelming 
support. The voting record on the resolution is a valuable indication as it reveals 
initial official positions of States, which have now crystallized. It then becomes 
significant to analyse the votes from major producers and main exporting countries 
on the resolution. Considering that arms trade involves considerable economic value, 
political and security interests, their positions on the ATT expectedly reflect those 
interests.   
 
The resolution 61/89 consists of four operative paragraphs containing two important 
points: first, considering steps to negotiate for a legally binding treaty; and second, to 
establish a group of governmental experts (GGE).
1187
 The resolution is to ask the 
States‘ point of view ―on the feasibility, scope and draft parameters for a 
comprehensive, legally binding instrument.‖1188 Later, the compilation of the views 
from States showed that most States were of the view it would be feasible to have a 
treaty and reflected their principle positions on the issues related to arms trade.
1189
 It 
                                               
1183 Paul Holtom and Siemon T Wezeman ―Towards and Arms Trade Treaty?‖ in SIPRI Yearbook 
2007 (New York, Oxford University Press, 2007) at 431; see also, Small Arms Survey: Shadows of 
War (Cambridge, 2009) at 147. 
1184 Among the civil society groups who actively campaign for a legally binding instrument are 
Amnesty International, the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), the Control Arms, 
and Oxfam; see, Small Arms Survey: Shadows of War (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2009) 
at 147. 
1185  Small Arms Survey: Shadows of War (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 147. 
1186 UNGA res 61/89 of 6 December 2006, preamble para 7. 
1187 UNGA res 61/89 of 6 December 2006. 
1188 Ibid, operative para 1. 
1189 Secretary-General‘s report of the member States‘ view of an ATT (2007), A/62/278. 
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was hope that the work of the GGE would lead the process in a more concrete 
direction towards an ATT. The GGE started its work and had three meetings between 
February and August 2008, before submitting a report in the same year.
1190
 
 
The wording of the resolution 61/89 makes it clear the intention to adopt a legal 
instrument, therefore, closes the door for the inadequate results of a mere political 
document that is similar in weight to the UNPoA or the ITI.
1191
 The resolution 
recognizes one of the reasons why the world needs a treaty, is that the absence of 
common international standards on export, import, and transfer of conventional arms 
―is a contributory factor to conflict...thereby undermining peace, reconciliation, 
safety, security, stability and sustainable development‖.1192 
   
The resolution 61/89 states its purpose is to establish common standards but does not 
explicitly confirm it will include small arms. The absence of the exact wording to 
include small arms in it was not satisfying, and States mended this in the  resolution 
63/240 on ATT in 2008 by explicitly mentioning that they ―[d]etermined to prevent 
the diversion of conventional arms, including small arms and light weapons, from the 
legal to the illicit market‖.1193  The unequivocal wording of the resolution speaks 
clearly, the arms trade treaty is to include small arms. 
 
The position of States and this dynamic can be traced by looking at the voting 
patterns of States in the General Assembly. Observing the voting pattern of all the 
three General Assembly resolutions in 2006, 2008, and 2009 provides information on 
each States‘ position with regard to the ATT. The first two resolutions in 2006 and 
2008 show the majority support for a future ATT with 153 and 133, respectively, in 
favour. It is not surprising to find States that abstained included the main 
conventional arms producers.
1194
 They, among others, were China, Israel and the 
                                               
1190 Report of the Group of Governmental Experts, A/63/334 of 26 August 2008.  
1191 UNPoA (2001), UN Doc A/CONF.192/15; International Tracing Instrument on Small Arms and 
Light Weapons (2005), UNGA decision 60/519 of 8 December 2005 . 
1192 UNGA res 61/89 of 6 December 2006, preamble para 9. 
1193 UNGA res 63/240 of 24 December 2008. 
1194 UNGA official records A/61/PV.67. The countries abstaining are Bahrain, Belarus, China, Egypt, 
India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Lao People‘s Democratic Republic, Libya, Marshall Islands, Nepal, 
Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, United Arab Emirates, 
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Russian Federation. It is worth noting that States such as India, Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Syria, and United Arab Emirates 
took the same position, opting to abstain in this matter.
1195
  It is a sensible assumption 
that the States abstained were actually against the resolution, but left themselves some 
room for a change in position if the developments of the later progress in negotiation 
suited their interests. 
 
Meanwhile, the UNGA resolution on ATT in 2009 shows 151 supporting to 1 
against, with 20 abstentions. The significant change in the voting pattern was that 
there was a drastic change of position from the United States from against to in 
favour, which is a very encouraging sign, given its influence as a major power.  
 
Table VII.1: 
Voting pattern of the UNGA resolutions on ATT
1196
 
Resolution In favour Against Abstain 
61/89   (2006) 153 1 
(US) 
24 
63/240 (2008) 133 1 
(US) 
19 
64/48   (2009) 151 1 
(Zimbabwe) 
20 
 
Paying closer attention to the drafting process of resolution 61/89 of 6 December 
2006, the US even rejected the operative paragraphs 2 and 3 which were to request 
the Secretary-General to establish a group of governmental experts and provide 
services and assistance for the group.
1197
  This implies that the US did not want such 
a group to work and receive support from the UN secretariat in its work. The 
establishment of a GGE was a move towards finding a common ground among States 
                                                                                                                                      
Venezuela, Yemen, Zimbabwe.  The GA res in 2008 and 2009 show a decline of countries vote 
―abstain‖ to 19 in 2008 and 20 in 2009. 
1195
 UNGA official records A/61/PV.67. 
1196 In 2007, the UNGA did not adopt a resolution on ATT as the member countries were submitting 
their responses as asked by the UNGA resolution 61/89 of 2006. The table is based on the voting in the 
three UNGA resolutions on the ATT. 
1197 Official record of the 67th Plenary Meeting of the UNGA, Wednesday, 6 December 2006 
(A/61/PV.67). 
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on the scope and parameters, and opposition to the formation of the group indicates 
clear opposition to a treaty. The US stayed with its against position in the ATT 
resolution 6/240 of 24 December 2008. 
 
The voting in the following year, 2009, marked a significant change of the US 
position on the GA resolution towards an arms trade treaty. While in the previous two 
resolutions the United States consistently voted against, it now voted in favour in the 
2009 resolution indicating the shift of its policy on arms control following the 
administration change in Washington. However, one country still voted against in the 
2009 resolution, and that State was Zimbabwe.  
 
The general position of the States with regards to small arms trade may be explained 
by finding what their interests are in small arms transfer. Arguably, although there are 
other factors, the main exporting or importing States will be those most affected by 
the existence of an arms trade treaty. Hence, it can be assumed, the status of 
importing or exporting is one of the factors that may influence a State‘s position. The 
Small Arms Survey puts the United States on top of the list of small arms exporting 
countries, followed by Italy, Germany, Brazil, Austria, and Belgium.
1198
 China and 
Russia are believed to be among the top producers although the transfer data to 
support this claim is not available.
1199
 Meanwhile, the top importers of small arms 
include the United States, France, Japan, Canada, South Korea, Germany, and 
Australia.
 1200
 
 
In a bigger picture of conventional weapons, all those countries mentioned above 
make up the SIPRI list of top 20 conventional arms exporters in 2000-2009, namely 
the USA, Russia, Germany, France, UK, Spain, China, Israel, Netherlands, Italy, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium, Ukraine, Canada, South Korea, South Africa, 
                                               
1198 Small Arms Survey 2009 (Cambridge, 2009) at 8.  
1199 Ibid. It is believed that both China and Russia are not very transparent with their transfer data on 
small arms.  
1200 Ibid.  
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Singapore, Poland, and Uzbekistan.
1201
  This suggests that, in general, the main 
exporters and importers of conventional weapons are also the main exporters and 
importers of small arms. 
 
Meanwhile, the SIPRI database lists the top 20 importers of conventional arms to 
include China, India, South Korea, Greece, UEA, Turkey, Australia, Egypt, Israel, 
USA, UK, Singapore, Pakistan, Algeria, Japan, Chile, Malaysia, Poland, Taiwan, and 
Saudi Arabia.
1202
  The ATT puts the interests of both conventional arms exporters and 
importers on the line. As the absence of international standard in arms transfer 
benefits them, some States reflect it in their reluctance and rejection of adopting a 
legal instrument.   
 
Tables VII.1 and VII.2 below on the voting records show the majority of States 
support an ATT, which also, encouragingly, come from some main exporting and 
importing countries. However, those who abstain, include main exporters and key 
players in international relations, such as China and Russia.     
 
Table VII.2:  
Exporting countries‘ voting records  
Top 20  
Exporting 
Country
1203
 
Res 61/89 
(2006) 
Res 63/240 
(2008) 
Res 64/48 
(2009) 
1. USA Against Against In favour 
2. Russia Abstain Abstain Abstain 
3. Germany In favour In favour In favour 
4. France In favour In favour In favour 
5. UK In favour In favour In favour 
6. Netherlands In favour In favour In favour 
7. China Abstain Abstain Abstain 
8. Italy In favour In favour In favour 
9. Sweden In favour In favour In favour 
10. Israel Abstain Abstain In favour 
11. Ukraine In favour In favour In favour 
                                               
1201
 SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). Data based on SIPRI Trend Indicator 
Values from 2000 to 2009 <http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/toplist.php>. Last accessed on 5 
July 2010. 
1202 Ibid.  
1203 Top 20 conventional arms exporting countries from 2000 to 2009, retrieved from SIPRI database 
<http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/toplist.php>. Last accessed on 5 July 2010. 
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12. Spain In favour In favour In favour 
13. Switzerland In favour In favour In favour 
14. Canada In favour In favour In favour 
15. Rep of Korea In favour In favour In favour 
16. Belarus Abstain Abstain Abstain 
17. Poland In favour In favour In favour 
18. Belgium In favour In favour In favour 
19. South Africa In favour In favour In favour 
20. Uzbekistan Absent Absent Absent 
 
 
Observing from an importing countries‘ perspective (Table VII.3), the vote shows 
those in favour overcome those who are against or abstain. There are, however, some 
importing countries which consistently vote to abstain, China, India, the United Arab 
Emirates, Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. The US and Israel changed their 
position in the 2009 resolution to in favour. The voting pattern shows that the 
potential rejection of an arms trade treaty does not only come from some supplier 
countries but also from some recipient countries. In fact, the recipient countries show 
a greater potential in resisting an arms trade treaty as some of them consistently voted 
to abstain. The two tables show that only six of the exporting countries voted against 
or abstain in resolution 61/89 and this decreased to four in resolution 64/48 compared 
to eight and six of the importing countries. It may suggest that the importing 
countries may feel more threatened by an arms trade treaty.    
 
Table VII.3: 
Importing countries‘ voting records  
 
Top 20 Importing 
Country
1204
 
Res 61/89 
(2006) 
Res 63/240 
(2008) 
Res 64/48 
(2009) 
1. China Abstain Abstain Abstain 
2. India Abstain Abstain Abstain 
3. Rep. of Korea In favour In favour In favour 
4. Greece In favour In favour In favour 
5. UAE Abstain Abstain Abstain 
6. Turkey In favour In favour In favour 
7. Australia In favour In favour In favour 
8. Egypt Abstain Abstain Abstain 
9. Israel Abstain Abstain In favour 
                                               
1204 Top 20 conventional arms importing countries from 2000 to 2009, retrieved from SIPRI database 
<http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/toplist.php>. Last accessed on 5 July 2010. 
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10. USA Against Against In favour 
11. UK In favour In favour In favour 
12. Singapore In favour In favour In favour 
13. Pakistan Abstain Abstain Abstain 
14. Algeria In favour  In favour  In favour 
15. Japan In favour In favour In favour 
16. Chile In favour In favour In favour 
17. Malaysia In favour In favour In favour 
18. Poland In favour In favour In favour 
19. Taiwan1205 n/a n/a n/a 
20. Saudi Arabia Abstain Abstain Abstain 
 
 
3. Preparing to negotiate an arms trade treaty  
a. Elements, objectives and feasibility 
 
The Group of Governmental Experts mandated by the General Assembly resolution 
61/89 of 6 December 2006 to find feasibility, scope, and parameters towards an arms 
trade treaty, submitted the report of its work to the General Assembly in 2008.
1206
 
However, the report did not decide whether an arms trade treaty was feasible but 
indicated that ―the feasibility of a potential arms trade treaty would be dependent on 
establishing its collectively agreed objectives, its practical applicability, its resistance 
to political abuse and its potential for universality.‖1207 It is understood that there is 
particular reference to the need to resist a treaty becoming a political instrument to 
avoid scepticism and refusal. International law has long been seen by sceptical 
observers as being used by powerful nations to impose their will upon smaller and 
weaker nations, while disregarding the same law when it is against their national 
interests.
1208
    
 
                                               
1205 Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations, hence does not have the right to vote. 
1206
 General Assembly Document A/63/334, 26 August 2008 on the Report of the Group of 
Governmental Experts.  
1207 Report of the Group of Governmental Experts, A/63/334, 26 August 2008, at [14-16]. 
1208 Anthony D‘Amato ―International Law from a Machiavellian Perspective‖ in W David Clinton (ed) 
The Realist Tradition and Contemporary International Relations (Louisiana State University Press, 
2007) at 83. 
259 
 
The feasibility, according to the GGE‘s report, depends on ―the clear definition of the 
fundamental goals and objectives of a potential arms trade treaty.‖1209  The concern of 
some States that an arms trade treaty would undermine sovereignty is well expressed 
in the report: for ―an arms trade treaty to be considered feasible, it would need to 
reflect respect for the sovereignty of every State, without interfering in the internal 
affairs of States or their constitutional provisions, and respect for their territorial 
integrity.‖1210 As is clear, from the very beginning the discussion on the feasibility of 
a potential arms treaty does not evade the consideration of the issue of State 
sovereignty. The discussion on feasibility revolves around how States find a common 
ground and balance between individual States‘ interest in maintaining national 
security objective and the collective objective of maintaining international 
security.
1211
  
 
The feasibility was reflected more when the Secretary-General, in 2007, requested the 
States to give their views on the feasibility, scope, and draft parameters of a potential 
arms trade treaty; and the majority of around 98 countries responded with the opinion 
that an arms trade treaty was feasible.
1212
 The adoption of resolution 64/48 itself, 
which mandates the 2012 conference, demonstrates overwhelming support of the 
feasibility of an arms trade treaty from the UN member States.  
 
Before the July 2012 conference, States were invited to submit focused views on 
elements of an arms trade treaty.
1213
 The compilation of States‘ views on the elements 
was issued as a background document in May 2012, two months before the 
diplomatic conference.
1214
 In the compilation, many States repeated their previous 
                                               
1209 Point 17 of the Report of the Group of Governmental Experts. The General Assembly Document 
A/63/334, 26 August 2008. 
1210 Ibid.  
1211 Guido Den Dekker The Law of Arms Control: International Supervision and Enforcement 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 2001) at 33. 
1212 Report of the Secretary-General, A/62/278 of 17 August 2007. There are a few sceptical responses 
which state that an arms trade treaty will be very difficult to achieve. Venezuela‘s response is more 
explicit as it ―does not support this initiative‖ and argues that the priority should be given to nuclear 
disarmament and elimination of the other categories of weapons of mass destruction. For the record, 
the United States did not submit a response to the Secretary-General‘s request.      
1213 Report of the Preparatory Committee for the UN Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, 
A/CONF.217/1 of 7 March 2012. 
1214 Compilation of Views on the Elements of an Arms Trade Treaty, A/CONF.217/2 of 10 May 2012. 
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position showing again their support for the criteria of IHL and IHRL and inclusion 
of small arms in order to have high standards in arms transfer.
1215
 
 
The third PrepCom meeting Chair‘s non-paper (2011) contained six points of goals 
and objectives of the treaty, stating that the treaty will seek to promote the goals and 
objectives of the United Nations Charter; establish the highest possible common 
international standards for conventional arms trade; prevent, combat, and eradicate 
the illicit transfer, production, and brokering; contribute to international and regional 
peace, security and stability; promote transparency and accountability in arms trade; 
and be universal in treaty application.
1216
 The draft of the ATT, issued by the 
President of the 2012 conference, consisting of five points under article 1, has 
different wording: 
 
The goals and objectives of the Treaty are:   
a. For States Parties to establish the highest possible common standards for 
regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in 
conventional arms; and  
b. To prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms 
and their diversion to the illicit market or for unauthorised end use; 
In order to: 
c. Contribute to international and regional peace, security and stability;  
d. Prevent the international trade in conventional arms from contributing to 
human suffering; and  
e. Promote cooperation, transparency and responsibility of States Parties in 
the Trade in conventional arms, thus building confidence among States 
Parties.
1217
   
    
There are some changes from the previous Chair‘s non-paper (2011), but the key 
points are included in the draft ATT, with slightly different wording.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1215 Ibid.  
1216 Chair‘s non-paper (14 May 2011) in the Report of the Preparatory Committee for the United 
Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, A/CONF.217/1 of March 2012, at Annex II. 
1217 The Draft of the Arms Trade Treaty, 26 July 2012, A/CONF.217/CRP.1, art 1. 
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b. Scope  
 
The GGE‘s report in 2008 did not state the scope that a potential arms trade treaty 
may have but only indicated what conventional arms should be part of it. The report 
considered ―the seven categories of the United Nations Register of Conventional 
Arms, small arms and light weapons and whether categories, such as ammunition, 
explosives, components, defence services, technology related to the manufacture of 
weapons and ammunition should be included‖.1218 In addition to that, ―particular 
sport and hunting arms should also be taken into account in a potential arms trade 
treaty‖.1219 The GGE‘s report did not describe a clear cut description 
recommendation, instead, it resorted to a list of categories of weapons that should be 
included.  
 
With regard to the arms transfer activities, the report suggested  that the 
activities/transactions that might be included as being ―exports, imports, transfers, re-
exports, transit, trans-shipment, licensing, transportation, technology transfer and 
manufacturing and foreign licensed production, as well as countering illegal re-
exports, unlicensed production and transfers, illicit arms brokering, and transfers of 
arms to non-State actors‖.1220 The report listed practically all the possible activities of 
the arms trade and included the controversial issue of transfer to non-State actors.    
 
A series of preparatory meetings prior to the 2012 conference negotiated the elements 
of the future ATT, mainly on the scope, criteria and parameters.  The statements from 
States in the preparatory meetings implied that the inclusion of all seven categories of 
weapons in the UN Register plus small arms and ammunition (7+1+1) had the most 
support. The chair of the third preparatory committee meeting in July 2011 
summarised the discussion on the scope to include seven categories of weapons in the 
UN register and four others, namely small arms, light weapons, ammunition, parts or 
components, and technology and equipment.
1221
    
                                               
1218 Report of the Group of Governmental Experts, A/63/334, 26 August 2008 at [14-21]. 
1219 Ibid.  
1220 Ibid, at [15-22]. 
1221 Report of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade 
Treaty, A/CONF.217/1 of March 2012, at Annex II.    
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The type of weapons to be included also relates to the purpose of the treaty. If the 
purpose is the promotion of peace and security as well as the promotion of 
international humanitarian law and human rights law, then all types of conventional 
arms should be relevant to regulation.
1222
 Stating the obvious, there are no 
conventional arms posing no danger to peace and security, humanitarian and human 
rights law so that from this standpoint, all trade in conventional weapons needs to be 
regulated. However, regulating all types of conventional weapons is certainly very 
difficult, the most common view, as heard in the preparatory meetings and the UNGA 
resolutions on the ATT, is to regulate the seven types of weapons in the UN Arms 
Register together with small arms.  
 
 
c. Inclusion of human rights in criteria and parameters  
 
Whether the inclusion of small arms in the ATT fits the framework to regulate small 
arms trade depends on the definition, criteria and standard used in the treaty. If the 
principles based on human rights and humanitarian laws are to apply, the ATT should 
be able to control arms transfers to conflict-prone zones or to regimes that are 
recognized as dictatorial and likely to use the weapons to commit IHL and IHRL 
violations.
1223
  
 
In the early negotiation of the ATT, the 2008 GGE report notified that they had 
discussed the link between international humanitarian law, human rights and arms 
trade; however, it acknowledged the different opinions, as the Group had:  
 
[D]iscussed, with differing views, the applicability of existing international 
human rights law and international humanitarian law, while bearing in mind 
that any potential arms trade treaty should remain objective, non-
discriminatory and resistant to political misuse in recognition of the fact 
                                               
1222 Statement by the ICRC, 14 July 2010, before the first Preparatory Committee for the United 
Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, New York, 12-23 July 2010. 
1223 Paul Holtom and Siemon T. Wezeman ―Towards an Arms Trade Treaty?‖ in SIPRI Yearbook 2007 
(Oxford University Press) at 439. 
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that any potential arms trade treaty would need to respect sovereignty and 
rights of every State under the Charter of the United Nations.
1224
 
 
As in other arms control meetings, the GGE‘s report reflects and reiterates the 
concern of some States that the reference to the humanitarian and human rights 
consideration would be politically misused. In general, the GGE‘s report was unable 
to achieve substantive agreement and did little to pave the way to concrete 
negotiation on an arms trade treaty.
1225
 The discussion in the GGE describes the 
political reality and difficult debate around arms control with regard to the issue of 
sovereignty and rights of a sovereign State. Moreover, the difficulty in achieving 
agreement on specific decisions on feasibility, scope and parameters within the GGE 
signals the complexity of the discussion. 
 
Some countries did not easily accept the notion of linking the arms trade with human 
rights in negotiating an arms control treaty. Putting human rights and humanitarian 
laws into arms control is a new approach to arms control negotiation which is 
traditionally negotiated for strategic security.
1226
 Globalization has seen the agenda of 
international politics as being more multifaceted, and humanitarian and human rights 
issues have become more important.
1227
 While there is no country free from human 
rights violations, arguably, there are countries that have worse records than others. 
 
A demand for a balanced, fair, impartial standard of human rights was raised in the 
ATT negotiation so as to avoid abuse, subjective opinion, and politicization of the 
treaty. The concern of a possible politicization of treaty making is not unfounded as it 
has happened previously.
1228
 Politicized interpretation is exemplified in the 
controversial ―humanitarian intervention‖, especially in a unilateral action, where the 
intervening country itself has a not so good record of human rights.
1229
 Unilateral, 
                                               
1224 Report of the Group of Governmental Experts, A/63/334, 26 August 2008 [15-24]. 
1225 Small Arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War (Cambridge, 2009) at 150-152. 
1226
 See discussion on arms control in Chapter III. 
1227 Joseph S Nye Jr Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History 
(7th ed, Longman, 2009) at 10. 
1228 ―Editorial comments‖ (1985) 79(3) Am. J. Int‘l L. 641 at 666.   
1229 Yoram Dinstein War, Aggression and Self-Defence (4th ed, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2005) at 71.  
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subjective opinions on the linkage of human rights and arms trade may be abusive, 
favouring a few States‘ interests at the expense of others.  
 
Examining previous documents on small arms, one can see that the linkage to human 
rights has not been incorporated in the ITI,
1230
 the UNPoA,
1231
 or the Firearms 
Protocol.
1232
 It confirms that human rights argument was a distant concept in the arms 
control regime. The ITI, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2005, stresses the 
importance of the instrument to combat illicit trade but does not link it to human 
rights or international humanitarian law in its rationales. Similarly, the UNPoA text 
does not have any direct reference to human rights.  The inclusion of human rights 
references in the UNGA resolutions on the ATT and, as most likely, in the future text 
of an ATT, is a new approach to directly link the arms control to the protection of 
human rights. The Mine Ban Convention
1233
 is known as the case where an arms 
control treaty observed international humanitarian law practice and rationale. Adding 
human rights rationale in an arms control treaty is the latest development that has 
taken place, showing the increasing influence of IHRL.  
 
The limitation of reference to human rights in arms control leads to the opinion that 
human rights law is not a consideration in the arms control negotiation. Maya Brehm, 
for example, argues that human rights law does not make a significant contribution to 
the legal regulation of international arms trade.
1234
 While this was, perhaps, true in 
the past, it is now changing. More efforts have been made to link human rights to the 
negotiation of arms trade, primarily to prevent the weapons from being used in 
human rights violations.  
 
The discussion on an arms trade treaty shows States use human rights and 
humanitarian rationales as the basis to achieve an arms control treaty. In their 
statements in small arms related meetings, some States stress the connection between 
                                               
1230
 International Tracing Instrument (UNGA Decision 60/519 of 8 December 2005). 
1231 UN Programme of Action on Small Arms (2001) (A/CONF.192/15). 
1232 Firearms Protocol (2001), 2326 UNTS 208; UN Doc A/55/383/add.2. 
1233 Mine Ban Convention (1997), 2056 UNTS 211. 
1234 Maya Brehm ―The Arms Trade and States‘ Duty to Ensure Respect for Humanitarian and Human 
Rights Law‖ (Oxford University Press, 2008) 12(3) J Conflict & Security L 359 at 359. 
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the arms trade and human rights law and international humanitarian law more than 
others. Their views are supported widely by civil society. The ICRC, in particular, is 
quite vocal in pressing their view to be heard by States.
1235
 The ICRC reminds arms-
exporting States of the responsibility enshrined in customary international law to 
ensure respect for, and refrain from encouraging a party to armed conflict to violate, 
international humanitarian law.
1236
 The civil society links human rights and 
international humanitarian laws with the availability of, and easy access to, small 
arms. It is accepted that the excessive availability of small arms exacerbates and 
intensifies armed conflict, promotes violence, crime and internal repression.
1237
  It 
strengthens the argument to strictly impose end-user criteria based on human rights 
and humanitarian law in arms transfer.
1238
 
 
A careful approach should be taken in incorporating IHL and IHRL in arms control 
agreements as careless pushing of the link of IHL and IHRL could be counter-
productive. When a State feels that it is being unfairly treated, there will be a 
tendency to build its own defence industry at any cost to safeguard its security needs. 
And worse, it could refuse to engage in an international arms control negotiation. 
Creating unfair restriction on arms trade would push some States to explore the 
possibility of having a self-sufficient arms industry at any cost. North Korea and Iran 
are two examples where the States seek self-sufficiency in their defence industry in 
extreme ways.
1239
  
 
                                               
1235 The observer status of the ICRC in the General Assembly gives it more chance for involvement in 
many more meetings than other non-governmental organizations. 
1236 Statement by the ICRC, 204 July 2010, before the first Preparatory Committee for the United 
Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, New York, 12-23 July 2010. 
1237 Maya Brehm ―The Arms Trade and States‘ Duty to Ensure Respect for Humanitarian and Human 
Rights Law‖ (Oxford University Press, 2008)12 (3) J Conflict & Security L 359 at 359. 
1238 Alexandra Boivin ―Complicity and beyond: International Law and the Transfer of Small Arms and 
Light Weapons‖ (2005) 87(859) IRRC at 468. 
1239 North Korea is known to have nuclear weapon capability and Iran, allegedly, is pursuing nuclear 
weapon technology. Iran sits at the 25th of the SIPRI list of conventional arms suppliers in 2011, went 
up from the 36th place in 2010. <http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/toplist.php>. Last accessed 
30 July 2012. The thesis uses the terms Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and North 
Korea interchangeably throughout the discussion.    
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In the third PrepCom held in New York, 11-15 July 2011, the Chair issued a draft 
paper, also called non-paper for its non-official status, to include the elements of a 
treaty discussed by States during PrepCom meetings which links it to IHL and IHRL.  
The preamble of the Chair‘s non-paper mentions the recognition of, among other 
thing things, the responsibility of States to control arms trade, and relation of arms 
transfer to violations of IHL and IHRL:
 
 
 
[T]hat the absence of commonly agreed international standards for the 
transfer of conventional arms and their diversion to the illicit market are 
contributory factors to armed conflict, serious violations of international 
human rights law and international humanitarian law...thereby 
undermining peace, reconciliation, safety, security, stability and 
sustainable social and economic development [emphasis added].
1240
 
 
The progressive nature of the Chair‘s non-paper demands State Party to make risk 
assessment with IHL and IHRL in the criteria of arms trade, stating that: 
 
A State Party shall not authorise a transfer of conventional arms if there is a 
substantial risk that those would:  
... 
2. Be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international 
humanitarian law. 
3. Be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international human 
rights law. 
4. Be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international criminal 
law, including genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.
1241
 
    
This Chair‘s non-paper has fairly accommodated most views from States on the links 
of arms transfer with IHL and IHRL, which brought hope that this paper would be a 
basis for discussion to find consensus in the negotiating an arms trade treaty at the  
UN Conference on the ATT in July 2012.   
 
 
 
 
                                               
1240 Chair‘s Non-Paper, preamble para 2 (14 July 2011) in the Report of the Preparatory Committee for 
the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, A/CONF.217/1 of 7 March 2012.    
1241 Chair‘s Non-Paper at V (criteria) (14 July 2011) in the Report of the Preparatory Committee for 
the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, A/CONF.217/1 of 7 March 2012 
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D. Challenges in Establishing a Legally Binding Treaty to Regulate Small Arms 
1. Self-defence in the ATT   
 
The right of self-defence started to gain significance in the twentieth century and 
played a role as legal justification with regard to hostilities occurring in times of 
peace, when the freedom to resort to war, theoretically, became more restricted.
1242
 In 
what circumstances and to what extent a State may legally exercise self-defence in 
State practice can be traced to the Caroline incident, in which the United States and 
Great Britain had diplomatic correspondence in 1841-1842.
1243
 The significant of the 
Caroline case was that both sides agreed the conditions necessary for a valid act of 
self-defence, which was ―instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no 
moment for deliberation‖.1244 The Caroline case demonstrated the principles of 
necessity and proportionality regarding the limitations in practicing self-defence   
which is now generally accepted as customary international law.
1245
 
 
Self-defence has been States‘ most cited argument to justify the use of force. For 
example, German officials defended the Germany invasion of Norway in 1940 as an 
act of self-defence, an argument which was rejected by the Nuremburg Military 
Tribunal.
1246
The US and UK justified the military action against Afghanistan in 2001 
as being undertaken under article 51 of the UN Charter, which recognises ―individual 
and collective self-defence‖.1247 Although the self-defence justification to invade 
                                               
1242 Bruno Simma and others (eds) The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (2nd ed, Oxford 
University Press, 2002) vol I at 789. 
1243 Caroline case, Letter from Mr Webster (US) to Mr Fox of 24 April 1841 (excerpt) and Letter from 
Mr Webster to Lord Ashburton of 6 August 1842 (excerpt) in Shirley V Scott International Law & 
Politics: Key Documents (Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006) at 87.     
1244 Caroline case, Letter from Mr Webster (US Secretary of State) to Mr Fox (British Minister in 
Washington) of 24 April 1841 (excerpt) and Letter from Mr Webster to Lord Ashburton of 6 August 
1842 (excerpt) reprinted in Shirley V Scott International Law & Politics: Key Documents (Boulder, 
Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006) at 87-88; Martin A Rogoff and Edward Collins Jr ― The 
Caroline Incident and the Development of International Law‖ (1990) 16 Brooklyn J Int‘l L 493 at 498.    
1245 Martin A Rogoff and Edward Collins Jr ―The Caroline Incident and the Development of 
International Law‖ (1990) 16 Brooklyn J Int‘l L 493 at 526;  see Christine Gray International Law and 
the Use of Force (3rd edition, New York, Oxford University Press, 2008) at 148; Ryan T Williams 
―Dangerous Precedent: America‘s Illegal War In Afghanistan‖ (2011-2012) 33 U Pa J Int‘l L 563 at 
576;      
1246 Martin A Rogoff and Edward Collins Jr ―The Caroline Incident and the Development of 
International Law‖ (1990) 16 Brooklyn J Int‘l L 493 at 504. 
1247 Letter from Ambassador John Negroponte, Permanent representative of the USA to the UN in New 
York, to the President of the Security Council, S/2001/946, 7 October 2001; Letter from Stewart 
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Afghanistan had many supporters, still there are opposing arguments with regard to 
necessity and proportionality under humanitarian law, which might challenge the 
legitimacy of the use of force against Afghanistan.
1248
  
 
 Following the formation of the United Nations in 1945, the right to self-defence is 
enshrined in its charter. Cited many times, article 51 of the United Nations Charter is 
an exception to the prohibition of the use of force and has become the pivot upon 
which disputes concerning the lawfulness of the use of force usually concentrate.
1249
 
Article 51 of the Charter states that: 
  
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defence in an armed attack occurs against a Member of 
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary 
to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members 
in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to 
the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at 
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.
1250
  
 
Article 51 refers to self-defence as a right, pointing to a situation where a State faces 
an armed attack and therefore is legally entitled to resort to force.
1251
  The Charter of 
the United Nations requires article 51 to be read in connection with article 2, 
paragraph 4 that ―[a]ll Members shall refrain from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations‖.1252  The International Court of 
Justice in considerations of the case Military and Paramilitary Activities In and 
Against Nicaragua  underlined that this obligation to refrain from the use of force in 
                                                                                                                                      
Eldon, Charge d‘Affaires, UK Mission to the UN in New York, to the President of the Security 
Council, S/2001/947, 7 October 2001.   
1248 Mary Ellen O‘Connel ―Lawful Self-Defense to Terrorism‖ (2002) 63 Pittsburgh L R 889 at 908. 
O‘Connel argues that the military operation in Afghanistan at first met the requirements of lawful self-
defence but later it may have gone beyond the bound of proportionality. O‘Connel particularly 
questions the legality of the military operation, and  whether it remained necessary and proportional to 
American‘s self-defence after the fall of the Taliban government.      
1249
  Bruno Simma and others (eds) The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (2nd ed, Oxford 
University Press, 2002) vol I at 790. 
1250 Charter of the United Nations, art 51. 
1251 Yoram Dinstein War, Aggression and Self-Defence (Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
1252 Charter of the United Nations, art 2(4); see generally, Michael Byers War Law (London, Atlantic 
Books, 2005). 
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article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter is ―not only a principle of customary 
international law but also a fundamental or cardinal principle of such law‖.1253 This is 
to stress that the use of force in the act of self-defence is actually the last resort in 
international relations as the Charter wants the States to renounce forcible self-
defence and a unilateral use of force to be excluded as far as possible.
1254
  
 
The thesis then inspects the application of self-defence in its relation to international 
humanitarian law. The ICJ‘s arguments, in giving advisory opinion on the legality of 
the use of nuclear weapons, state that ―a use of force that is proportionate under the 
law of self-defence, must, in order to be lawful, also meet the requirements of the law 
applicable in armed conflict which comprise in particular the principles and rules of 
humanitarian law‖.1255  In its judgment, the ICJ stressed the use of a type of weapon 
should ―be compatible with the requirements of the international law, particularly 
those of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law‖.1256 Based on the 
observation that the act of self-defence is limited only by the demands of 
proportionality and necessity, and that the use of weapon should not ignore principles 
of humanitarian law,
1257
 the thesis concludes that the same principles should apply to 
the transfer and use of small arms.     
 
Understandably, small arms are an indispensable part of the self-defence force needed 
to repel an armed attack in exercising rights to self-defence. However, the transfer of 
small arms for self-defence purposes must also come with the assurance that the 
weapons will not to be used in contravention of human rights and humanitarian laws.  
In line with the ICJ argument that the use of weapon should be compatible with 
international law,
1258
 States‘ interests in security and self-defence ―cannot be 
                                               
1253 Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of 
America), Merits, Judgement (1986) ICJ Reports 14 at 100, para 190. 
1254 Bruno Simma and others (eds) The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (2nd ed, Oxford 
University Press, 2002) vol I at 790. 
1255 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion (1996) ICJ Reports 226 at 
245, para 42.  
1256 Ibid, at 266, para 105. 
1257 Ibid; see also, Guido Den Dekker The Law of Arms Control: International Supervision and 
Enforcement (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001) at 46. 
1258 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion (1996) ICJ Reports 226 at 
266, para 105. However, the Court cannot conclude ―whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons 
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acceptable grounds, if they are in conflict with IHL obligations and other 
intransgressible norms of international law.‖1259  
 
Article 51, which allows a State to resort to armed self-defence in the face of an 
armed attack, implicitly acknowledges the Security Council limitation to react 
promptly to respond to an armed attack. The structure of the Security Council 
mechanism does not provide an immediate response and therefore allows States to 
use force as an act of self-defence. Therefore, under current reality, a victim country 
confronted with an armed attack cannot expect an effective international police to 
come to its aid and repel the aggressor.
1260
 This situation leaves no option for the 
attacked State other than to defend itself by self-help deploying force, including the 
use of weapons such as small arms. Article 51 explains that any measures taken by 
States, shall be immediately reported to the United Nations as ―these measures shall 
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council‖.1261 
This leads to an argument that the article recognizes a State‘s inherent right to 
exercise self-defence only on an interim basis and requires an immediate report to the 
Security Council of all actions taken and termination of the action as soon as the 
Security Council takes measures.
1262
 
 
States‘ right to self-defence is frequently cited by many countries in small arms 
related meetings in the fear that any arms control could hamper weapon acquisition 
for self-defence.
1263
  Many States attending the United Nations meetings related to 
                                                                                                                                      
would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of 
a State would be at stake‖.  
1259 Zeray Yihdago The Arms Trade and International Law (Hart Publishing; Oxford and Portland, 
Oregon, 2007) at 286. 
1260 Bruno Simma and others (eds) The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (2nd ed, Oxford 
University Press, 2002) vol I at 211. 
1261 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion (1996) ICJ Reports 226 at 
245, para 44.  
1262
 Sikander Ahmad Shah ―War on Terrorism: Self Defense, Operation Enduring Freedom, and the 
Legality of US Drone Attack in Pakistan‖ (2010) 9 (1) Wash U Global Stud L Rev 77.  
1263  UN Secretary-General Report on the Views on Member States‘ Views on an ATT (2007), 
A/62/278 (part I), A/62/278 (part II), A/62/278/Add.1, A/62/278/Add.2, A/62/278/Add.3, 
A/62/278/Add.4; also Compilation of Views on the Elements of An Arms Trade Treaty (2012), 
A/CONF.217/2, A/CONF.217/2/Add.1.    
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small arms such as the UNPoA
1264
 and International Tracing Instrument,
1265
 also 
voice their position with language revolving around the right to self-defence. The 
preamble paragraphs of the UNPoA (2001)
1266
 for instance, repeatedly stress the 
inherent right of a sovereign State to self-defence and to acquire weapons in 
accordance with the United Nations Charter. Three preamble paragraphs 8, 9, and 10, 
of the UNPoA reaffirm the need to respect the principles of territorial integrity of 
sovereign States, non-interference in their internal affairs, the right to self-defence, 
and the right to manufacture small arms for self-defence and security purposes. The 
references address the deep concerns of some States that the process would 
jeopardize State sovereignty in manufacturing, importing, and acquiring small arms 
for the purpose of self-defence.  
 
Many arguments that link small arms with the right to self-defence in the various 
United Nations meetings are voiced by developing countries. It is the small and 
medium size countries that are the most concerned with the right to self-defence 
because they are most likely to be the victims of a possible armed attack and ―small 
arms and light weapons constitute a defence means for the majority of countries in 
the world‖.1267 Similarly, there are arguments which stress the right of governments 
to manufacture and possess small arms to ―fulfil the requirements of their nation‘s 
defence, protect their sovereignty, and provide security to their territories and 
people‖.1268  The others further elaborate beyond the necessity to preserve the right to 
                                               
1264  UN Program of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and 
Light Weapons in All Its Aspect (2001), UN Doc A/CONF.192/15.   
1265 International Tracing Instrument, UNGA Decision 60/519 of 8 December 2005.   
1266 Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in All Its Aspects. UN document A/CONF.192/15 of 9-20 July 2009. 
1267 Statement by Manuel Aquera De La Pez, the Head of the Delegation of Cuba, July 3, 2006 at the 
United Nation Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the United Nations 
Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in All Its Aspects, New York June 26 - July 7, 2006 
<www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/pdf/arms060703cuba-eng.pdf>. Last Accessed 29 December 
2009. 
1268 Statement by Abdulaziz Nasser R Al-shamsi of the United Arab Emirates before the United Nation 
Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the United Nations Program of Action 
to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its 
Aspects, New York June 26 - July 7, 2006 <www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/pdf/arms060703cuba-
eng.pdf>. Last Accessed 29 December 2009. 
272 
 
self-defence as some States argue that the right to self-defence, responsibility, and 
obligation to IHL and IHRL must be in balance.
1269
 
 
The concern that international treaties might undermine State sovereignty is also 
actually found in other arms controls/disarmament treaties. The constraints on State 
sovereignty in the CWC, for example, are said to be stronger constraints than in other 
typical disarmament treaties.
1270
 However, less concern is heard on the prohibition of 
States to acquire chemical weapons because the world has come to an agreement that 
the use of such weapons is inhumane because of their indiscriminate nature. In 
comparison, the world still has not reached full agreement that the wide availability 
of small arms may have a destructive consequence to human lives and regional 
security.
1271
  Often, small arms find their way to those who abuse them because States 
have not sufficient control on arms transfer and to whom the weapons go.
1272
 
 
 
2. Consensus-based decisions in the negotiation   
 
The UNGA resolution 64/48 in 2009 led to a greater push in the process towards an 
arms trade treaty, although there was no illusion that the actual position of several 
major powers and arms producers remained doubtful. The visible potential problem 
was identified when resolution 64/48 required the diplomatic conference in 2012 to 
be held ―on the basis of consensus‖.1273 Clearly, a consensus is difficult to achieve 
with countries which have diverse opinions on some issues of arms transfer; and the 
resolution may suggest that State may block the negotiation on the grounds that a 
consensus has not been achieved.  
                                               
1269 Some countries like Canada, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Norway, Republic of Korea and others 
explicitly state the need to link the right of self-defence with responsibilities and obligation to respect 
human rights and international humanitarian law. The responses compiled in the Report of the 
Secretary General, towards an arms trade treaty, A/62/278 (part II) of 17 August 2007.  
1270 Mika Nishimura ―Constraints on Sovereignty in the Chemical Weapons Convention from the 
Perspective of International Law‖ in Howard M. Hensel (ed) Sovereignty And the Global Community: 
The Quest for Order in the International System ( Hants, England: Ashgate Publishing, 2004) at 72.  
1271 Damien Rogers Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control: Theory, Politics, Security (Ashgate, 
2009) at 52. 
1272 Alexandra Boivin ―Complicity and beyond: International Law and the Transfer of Small Arms and 
Light Weapons‖ (2005) 87(859) IRRC. 
1273 UNGA resolution 64/48 of 2 December 2009, operative para 5. 
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Consensus is an established mechanism in the United Nations multilateral 
agreements, which seeks widespread participation from as many States as possible of 
diverse sovereign entities.
1274
  The choice to have consensus mechanism seems to be 
on the grounds that consensus-based decision and the ability to modify the treaty 
would be essential to achieve universality of a treaty.
1275
 Consensus is the standard 
practice to achieve compromise, accommodate various interests, and bring all 
countries to agreement. However, a consensus is difficult to achieve because each 
country may calculate its own security, political, and economic interests 
differently.
1276
      
 
Some key text in the Chair‘s non-paper (2011), such as to ―establish the highest 
possible international standard‖ in arms transfer with respect for human rights and 
humanitarian law, could have to resist efforts at watering down and weakening to 
nominal denominators in order to achieve consensus.
1277
 The failure of the conference 
to restrict small arms in 2001 was, in part, because of the lack of consensus among 
States and this was identified as one of reasons for the failure of the past small arms 
process.
1278
      
 
Prolonged procedure on the discussion may bring a negotiation to an end and prevent 
finalization of the discussion. For example, in the discussion of the text suggested by 
the chair in the review conference on the implementation of the UNPoA in 2006, 
States piled up amendment upon amendment to the draft under discussion.
1279
 This 
illustrates that active participation of States in a negotiation process does not 
necessarily reflect the States‘ support for it. Hence, it is only logical to think that 
                                               
1274 Catherine Logan Piper ―Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: The Goal of Universality‖ (1985) 
75(1) Iowa L Rev 295 at 301. 
1275 Ibid, at 301. 
1276 Jeffrey D McCausland ―Conventional Arms Control‖ in Jeffrey A Larsen and Gregory J Rattray 
(Eds) Arms Control Toward the 21
st
 Century (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996) at 138. 
1277 Chair‘s non-paper (14 July 2011), Report of the Preparatory Committee for the UN Conference on 
the Arms Trade Treaty, A/CONF.217/1.   
1278 Paul Holtom and Siemon T Wezeman ―Towards an Arms Trade Treaty?‖ in SIPRI Yearbook 2007 
(Oxford University Press) at 432. 
1279 Small arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War (Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 140. 
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some States may come to a negotiation with the purpose of ruining the process, 
watering down, or ensuring the negotiation does not succeed.  
 
It takes long debate in the UN consensus mechanism to adopt a treaty. By 
comparison, the process of adopting a treaty on anti-personnel mines and cluster 
munitions, which was negotiated outside the CCWC, did not take much time. In the 
case of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,
1280
 the first meeting was held in Oslo in 
February 2007 and the last meeting in was in Dublin, May 2008 when an agreed text 
of a treaty was successfully adopted. The process of negotiation took only 18 months. 
In contrast, in a traditional forum to negotiate arms control, such as the Conference 
on Disarmament, a successfully negotiated treaty, may take decades to achieve.
1281
 
 
Consensus for an ATT is difficult to achieve on a series of controversial issues, as 
reflected in the initial views from States, on scope, criteria and parameters.
1282
 Some 
States fear an ATT may restrict the right to manufacture, export, import, transfer, and 
retain conventional arms for self-defence and security purposes.
1283
 In contrast, some 
other States indicate parameters on arms transfers should consider the effect on 
regional stability, human rights and the international humanitarian laws.
1284
  It is 
always important that a treaty is universally accepted, so as to avoid low ratification 
from States; however, it must remain effective in the implementation. Too much 
compromise to reach consensus, arguably, may put the negotiated treaty at risk of 
losing its primary purpose; that is to effectively control arms trade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1280 Convention on Cluster Munitions (2008), MTDSG Chap XXVI (6); CCM/77. 
1281
 S Neil MacFarlene and Yuen Foong Khong Human Security and the UN: A Critical History 
(Indiana University Press, 2006) at 195. 
1282 Report of the United Nations Secretary-General  A/62/278, 17 August 2007.       
1283 Ibid.  
1284 Report of the Secretary-General, towards an arms trade treaty, A/62/278 (part II) of  17 August 
2007 
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F. Opportunities in Current Multilateral Effort 
1. Prospect of having an ATT  
 
As the thesis is being finalising, the diplomatic conference on the Arms Trade Treaty 
in New York, 2-27 July 2012, has failed to reach agreement to adopt a legally binding 
treaty controlling trade of conventional arms. For the second time in 11 years, after 
the failure to adopt a legal instrument on the trade of small arms in 2001, the world 
has again failed to reach an agreement to have the ATT. However, apparently some 
countries will continue the search for an ATT and will bring the draft of the ATT to 
the next General Assembly meeting at the end of the year.
1285
 The thesis in this 
section examines the years of process towards the diplomatic conference which began 
within the UN framework by the adoption of the UNGA resolution 61/89 of 6 
December 2006.  
 
Observing the complexity of issues around small arms, a treaty that includes small 
arms trade cannot be expected to materialize easily. However, this situation could 
change if the international community were to come to terms with the idea that the 
proliferation of small arms has become too destructive and major powers were to 
show their leadership by taking a supportive role in the process. Past experience has 
signalled that any negotiation on small arms proves to be very difficult, as evidenced 
in the meetings of States on the 2001 conference on small arms;
1286
 the reluctance of 
States to add small arms as the eighth category in the UN Register; and the minimum 
results of the GGE
1287
 to agree on feasibility, scope, and parameters of a potential 
arms trade treaty. On the other hand, in general, the discussion related to small arms 
in the United Nations mechanism reveals that the majority of States are still eager to 
find ways to stop the unrestricted proliferation of small arms.  
                                               
1285 Conal Urquhart ―Arms Trade Treaty Failure Is Disappointing, Says William Hague‖ The Guardian 
(UK, 28 July 2012) < http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/28/arms-trade-treaty-william-
hague?INTCMP=SRCH>; Rick GladStone ―UN Misses Its Deadline for Arm Pact‖ The New York 
Times (United States, 27 July 2012) <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/28/world/proponents-of-arms-
trade-treaty-urge-final-approval.html?_r=1>. 
1286 Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in 
All Its Aspects, New York, 9-20 July 2001, A/CONF.192/15. 
1287 Report of the Group of Governmental Experts to examine the feasibility, scope and draft 
parameters for a comprehensive, legally binding instrument establishing common international 
standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms, A/63/334, 26 August 2008. 
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The slow development of the UN Register to include small arms provides some 
insight into the States‘ views on the transparency issue of conventional weapons. The 
latest proposed extension of the scope in the UN Register to add a new category to 
the existing seven categories did not succeed as the discussion on the proposal to 
include small arms in the latest meeting in 2009 appeared stuck on a debate of the 
definition of small arms and whether the inclusion was relevant to the UN 
Register.
1288
 This failure, demonstrating the unwillingness of States to openly report 
their transfers in a more transparent manner, rightly mirrors the complexity in 
negotiation of conventional arms control.  
 
 
2. Major Powers‘ Positions: Observing the Trends 
 
Major powers have significant interests in the trade of conventional weapons, with 
the total market valued at between US$40 billion to US$60 billion a year.
1289
 All 
States with permanent member status in the Security Council, namely China, France, 
Russia, the UK, and the US, are also main exporters of small arms and conventional 
arms, and were among the top 10 largest arms exporters in 2011.
1290
 Predictably, a 
future arms trade treaty will have a significant effect on the arms industries of the 
major powers. Nevertheless, their positions are starkly different from one another 
with regards to the ATT. The UK is a proponent of an ATT and a main sponsor of the 
ATT resolutions in the General Assembly, while the US stance is more complicated. 
Initially it was the main opposition to the first two UNGA resolutions on arms trade 
                                               
1288 Report on the Continuing Operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and Its 
Further Development, A/64/296 of 14 August 2009. 
1289 Michelle Nichols ―United Nations Fails To Agree Landmark Arms-Trade Treaty‖ Reuters (US 
edition, 27 July 2012) <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/28/us-arms-treaty-
idUSBRE86Q1MW20120728>; ― A Treaty on Conventional Arms‖ The New York Times (US, 8 July 
2012) < http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/09/opinion/a-treaty-on-conventional-arms.html>. 
1290 SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). Data based on SIPRI Trend Indicator 
Values in 2011 <http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/toplist.php>. Last accessed on 30 July 2012. 
The top 10 conventional supplier in SIPRI list are USA, Russia, France, China, Germany, UK, Italy, 
Spain, Sweden, and Netherland.     
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treaty,
1291
 then reversed this position to in favour in the 2009 resolution,
1292
 but later 
was one of States that blocked the negotiation in July 2012 conference.  
 
The US shift of position in 2009 gave momentum to the process toward the 2012 
diplomatic conference. With the US support, the Resolution 64/89 was able to decide 
a roadmap to hold a diplomatic conference by 2012, adopted without any against 
votes from P5.  Negotiating a potential arms trade treaty within the United Nations 
based on consensus needs support from major powers to be successful. Hence, it 
would be significant to inspect how States, particularly the major powers, actually 
responded to an arms trade treaty by examining the views in response to the 
Secretary-General request on feasibility, scope, and parameters,
1293
 and the voting 
behaviour on the General Assembly resolutions.  
 
a. China 
 
China, the fourth largest arms supplier,
1294
 consistently opted to abstain in all the 
three General-Assembly resolutions on arms trade treaty.
1295
 China has rarely 
explained its position other than by its vote to abstain in the all resolutions on ATT 
which indicates its cautious response. Taking into account its emerging status as a 
main conventional arms exporter, it is realistic to expect China would be reluctant to 
see a legally binding instrument. Nevertheless, China acknowledges that illicit 
trafficking of arms, in particular small arms, contributes to regional instability and 
humanitarian crises.
1296
 Hence, China, in its official statement, if it was not merely 
diplomatic lip service, would not stand in the way as it ―supports the international 
community in taking necessary measures to regulate international arms trade‖.1297   
                                               
1291 UNGA resolution 61/89; and 63/240. 
1292 UNGA resolution 64/48. 
1293 Secretary-General Report on the Member States‘ views on anATT (2007), A/62/278 (part I), 
A/62/278 (part II); Compilation of Views on the Elements of An Arms Trade Treaty, 10 May 2012, 
A/CONF.217/2.  
1294 SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). Data based on SIPRI Trend Indicator 
Values in 2011 <http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/toplist.php>. 
1295 See UNGA resolutions 61/89, 63/240, 64/48. 
1296 General Assembly Document A/62/678 (Part I) 0f 17 August 2007, Towards an Arms Trade 
Treaty, Report of the Secretary-General. 
1297 General Assembly Document A/62/678 (Part I) of 17 August 2007, Towards an Arms Trade 
Treaty, Report of the Secretary-General. 
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In the 2012 Conference, China outlined its position that, inter alia, the primary 
objective of the ATT should be ―to prevent and combat illicit arms trade‖1298. The 
wording focusing on the word illicit, is ambiguous as it can be interpreted that any 
transfer authorised by State is then legitimate. China mentioned nothing of 
establishing ―the highest possible common international standards‖ for arms trade as 
the contained in the 2011 Chair‘s non-paper.1299       
 
China stated that an ATT ―should address legitimate interest of States and the 
humanitarian concerns in a balanced manner‖.1300 It appears that the wording is in 
defence of the concern of potential consequence of arms transfer and substantial risk 
that those arms would be used to commit violations of IHL.
1301
  China made no 
reference to IHL or IHRL in the response to the Secretary-General‘s request for 
States‘ views on ATT in 2007.  Similarly, China did not make any link between the 
arms trade and IHL and IHRL in its statements during any of the three PrepComs in 
2010-2011.
1302
 Based on its statements, it can be said that China‘s position may not 
very supportive of the ATT as it has shown in its voting in three UNGA resolutions, 
so there was no surprise at the last day of the 2012 conference when it joined several 
other countries saying it needed more time to consider the issues.
1303
      .  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1298 Ibid 
1298  Statement by Chinese Delegation at the General Debate of UN Conference of the ATT, 2-27 July 
2012. Available at <http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/statements/>. Last accessed 30 July 2012.   
1299 Chair‘s non-paper (14 July 2011) in the Report of the Preparatory Committee for the United 
Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, A/CONF.217/1, 7 March 2012.  
1300 Statement by Chinese Delegation at the General Debate of UN Conference of the ATT, 2-27 July 
2012. Available at <http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/statements/>. Last accessed 30 July 2012.   
1301
 Chair‘s non-paper (14 July 2011) (at V.B) in the Report of the Preparatory Committee for the 
United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, A/CONF.217/1, 7 March 2012.  
1302 Statement by Chinese Delegation at the General Debate of UN Conference of the ATT, 2-27 July 
2012. Available at <http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/statements/>. Last accessed 30 July 2012.   
1303 ―UN Global Arms Treaty Talks End without Agreement‖ BBC News (UK, 28 July 2012) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-19025542>. 
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b. France 
 
France voted in favour in all UNGA resolutions on an arms trade treaty despite being 
ranked as the third largest supplier of conventional arms in 2011.
1304
 France showed 
its support further by stating that the scope for a potential arms trade treaty should 
include all seven categories in the Arms Register with the addition of small arms, and 
stressed the importance of effective implementation and the principles of 
responsibility in arms transfer.
1305
   
 
In its statement at the 2012 UN conference, France praised the work of non-
governmental organisations in the process for a creation of an ATT. It continued by 
stressing its position of the importance of IHL and IHRL in the criteria for 
assessments of arms transfer that: 
 
[T]hey must take into account the compliance with States‘ international 
obligations and with international human rights and humanitarian law – 
criteria to which we attach particular importance – and preserving 
international peace and security from the risk of diversion of transferred 
arms.
1306
    
 
 
 
 
c. Russia 
 
Russia, like China, abstained in all the three UNGA resolutions
1307
 on the arms trade 
treaty. Similarly, Russia also argued that the efforts of the world should focus more 
on combating the illegal nature of arms transfer.
1308
  Russia further argued that an 
                                               
1304 SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). Data based on SIPRI Trend Indicator 
Values from 2000 to 2009 <http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/toplist.php>. Last accessed on 5 
July 2010.  
1305 Report of the Secretary-General: Towards an Arms Trade Treaty, UN document A/62/678 (Part II) 
of 17 August 2007; Compilation of Views on the Elements of An Arms Trade Treaty, 10 May 2012, 
A/CONF.217/2.  
1306
 Statement of France at the UN Conference on the ATT, 2 July 2012 
<http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/statements/docs/20120705/Member%20States/20120705_Fran
ce_E.pdf>. Last Accessed 30 July 2012. 
1307 UNG resolutions 61/89, 63/240, and 64/48. 
1308 Report of the Secretary-General: Towards an Arms Trade Treaty,  A/62/678 (Part II) of 17 August 
2007. 
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arms trade regulation would clash with the right to self-defence; saying ―it is still 
more difficult to agree on global rules for legal transfers of all types of conventional 
weapons without jeopardizing legal trade and the right of States to self-defence‖.1309 
Its statements in the first PrepCom in July 2010 indicated its opposition, arguing that 
many aspects had not been clarified, including the feasibility, so that Russia 
―believe[d] it premature to speak now of a legally binding ATT.‖1310  
 
Focusing only on ―countering arms diversion to illicit circulation‖1311 as Russia 
suggested, ignores the fact that even legal transfer may also have a disastrous impact 
when the arms are used in violations of IHL and/or IHRL. Russia reiterated its 
position in the 2012 conference, focusing on preventing illegal trade, stating:  
 
We have been outspoken in favour of consolidating the efforts of 
international community aimed at blocking the channel down which arms 
―drain away‖ from legal trade to ―black market‖....Therefore, we see our 
main goal in preventing the diversion of arms to illegal traffic.
1312
     
 
As in the PrepCom meetings, in 2012 Russia made no reference to either IHL or 
IHRL as considerations in arms transfer. The Russian point of view and focus clearly 
explains why it opted to vote abstain in all three previous UNGA resolutions on 
ATT. Russia, undoubtedly, is one of major powers that has the influence to shape the 
end result of the diplomatic conference to adopt the ATT. However, the Russian 
inflexibility with its position, together with several other countries, was blamed for 
the inability of the 2012 diplomatic conference to reach an agreement.
1313
 
                                               
1309 Ibid.  
1310 Statement by the Russian delegation, 12 July 2010, in the Preparatory Committee for the United 
Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, New York, 12-23 July 2010. Available at 
<www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/ATTPrepCom/Documents/Statements-MS/2010-07-
12/12072010-RussianFederation-E.PDF>. Last accessed on 19 November 2010. 
1311 Statement by the Russian delegation, 12 July 2010, in the Preparatory Committee for the United 
Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, New York, 12-23 July 2010. Available at 
<www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/ATTPrepCom/Documents/Statements-MS/2010-07-
12/12072010-RussianFederation-E.PDF>. Last accessed on 30 July 2012. 
1312 Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the 2012 United Nations Conference on 
the Arms Trade Treaty, New York, 2-27 July 2012. Available at 
<http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/statements/>. Last accessed 30 July 2012.    
1313 Michelle Nichols ―United Nations Fails to Agree Landmark Arms-Trade Treaty‖ Reuters (US 
edition, 27 July 2012) < http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/28/us-arms-treaty-
idUSBRE86Q1MW20120728>; ―UN Global Arms Treaty Talks End without Agreement‖ BBC News 
(UK, 28 July 2012) < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-19025542>. 
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d. United Kingdom  
 
The UK has been taking a leading role in discussing the possibility for the 
international community to start negotiation on an arms trade treaty. The UK, with 
support from Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan and Kenya, co-
sponsored the General Assembly resolution 61/89.
1314
 The UK also actively 
approached other countries and presented its ideas with regards to the feasibility, 
scope, and parameters of an arms trade treaty for other countries to consider.  
 
Among the States, the UK consistently argues that an ATT should uphold the 
principles of international law, including international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law.
1315
  This view is supported and shared by many States 
as well as civil society and every opportunity is used to press its importance for the 
future ATT. In the PrepCom meetings 2010-2011, the UK repeated its view of the 
need for States to uphold the principles of international law, particularly IHL and 
IHRL in conventional arms trade,
1316
 the position is parallel to the EU.
1317
 
 
In the 2012 conference, the UK stated that the negotiation was ―being undertaken 
within the framework of the United Nations...[and] guided by the principles of the 
UN Charter‖.1318 Although the statement reflects the properness of the negotiation 
within the UN, it may imply that such negotiation can be held outside the UN 
framework. The UK reiterated its position on the links between arms trade and human 
                                               
1314 Report of the Secretary-General: Towards an Arms Trade Treaty, UN document A/62/678 (Part II) 
of 17 August 2007. 
1315 Statement by Ambassador John Duncan, UK Ambassador for Multilateral Arms Control 
Disarmament, 14 July 2010, before the first Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference 
on the Arms Trade Treaty, New York, 12-23 July 2010. 
1316 Statement by Ambassador John Duncan, 14 July 2010, in the Preparatory Committee for the 
United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, New York, 12-23 July 2010.   
1317 EU statement, 15 July 2010, in the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on 
the Arms Trade Treaty, New York, 12-23 July 2010 
<http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/ATTPrepCom/Documents/Statements-MS/2010-07-
15/15072010-Belgium-EU-E.PDF>. Last accessed on 19 November 2010; Council of the European 
Union 2009 Annual Report from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy to the European Parliament on the Main Aspects and Basic Choices of the CFSP (European 
Union, 2010) at 10.    
1318 Statement of the United Kingdom, delivered by Ambassador Joanne Adamson, to the UN 
Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, New York, 3 July 2012. Available at 
<http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/statements/docs/20120705/Member%20States/20120705_UK_
E.pdf>. Last accessed 30 July 2012.  
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rights in that an ATT ―will directly help to maintain international peace and security, 
whilst encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedom.‖1319  
 
The UK delegate in the 2012 conference, which was known to be a strong supporter 
of an ATT, was criticised for not joining 74 States appealing the conference to adopt 
a robust arms trade treaty. The appeal was launched in the fourth week when the 
conference seemed to be in a deadlock. The UK position of not joining the appeal, 
perhaps because it tried to get consensus, has been criticised, however, as building 
consensus cannot be a justification to abandon the principle to have a strong an arms 
trade treaty.
1320
      
 
 
e. United States and its shift of position 
 
Foreign policy is determined by internal dynamics, as is a State‘s foreign policy on  
arms control. Foreign policy is the extension of internal political development of a 
nation, which is precisely what happened with the US position on the negotiation 
towards an arms control treaty following the change of administration from 
Republican to Democrat in 2008. The Obama administration shifted and provided a 
more constructive engagement in its policy towards arms control/disarmament, 
applying more engaging policies on arms control of both the WMD and conventional 
weapons.  The particular change of the US policy on an ATT was explained by the 
Secretary of State Hilary Clinton that ―the US was prepared to begin negotiations on 
a global treaty regulating trade in conventional weapons, but would only sign the 
accord if all other States agreed.‖1321  
 
                                               
1319 Statement of the United Kingdom, delivered by Ambassador Joanne Adamson, to the UN 
Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, New York, 3 July 2012. Available at 
<http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/statements/docs/20120705/Member%20States/20120705_UK_
E.pdf>. Last accessed 30 July 2012. 
1320
 Nicholas Watt ―David Miliband  to Urge UK to ‗Get Off Backside‘ over Arms Treaty‖ The 
Guardian (UK,  25July 2012) < http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/25/david-miliband-global-
arms-trade-treaty?intcmp=239>. Last accessed 31 July 2012. 
1321 Guardian Weekly, 23 October 2009; see discussion on the position of the United States in Rachel 
Stohl ―Putting the Arms Trade Treaty into Context: Perspectives on the Global Arms Trade, Existing 
Arms Trade Initiatives, and the Role of the United States‖ (2009) 103 Am Soc‘y Int‘l L Proc 331.    
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The new policy is a contrast to the Bush administration which opposed any regulation 
on conventional arms trade in the UN framework. The Obama administration, 
reportedly, would use the negotiation on arms trade treaty to press other governments 
to adopt a ―rigorous system of export controls similar to one put in place to regulate 
US arms exports.‖1322  While this was welcome news for many, the US hinted that the 
process to achieve an agreement was not going to be uncomplicated. In the official 
statement released on 14 October 2009, the US stressed that the importance of a 
treaty agreed by United Nations should be consensus based to ―ensure the widest 
possible support for the Treaty and to avoid loopholes in the Treaty that can be 
exploited by those wishing to export arms irresponsibly‖.1323 
 
The change of the US policy on the ATT in 2008 had wide implications as it brought 
more optimism that a treaty would be concluded. The support from the US for an 
arms trade treaty paves the way to start a realistic process of negotiation in the United 
Nations. Immediately, the tone of the General Assembly resolution 64/48 of 2 
December 2009 changed and was more decisive in setting up a road map for an ATT.  
The significant decision in the resolution was that the countries decided ―to convene a 
United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty to meet for four consecutive 
weeks in 2012 to elaborate on a legally binding instrument on the highest possible 
common international standards for the transfer of conventional arms‖.1324 The US 
position that an arms trade treaty is to be discussed on consensus basis is reflected in 
the resolution 64/48 wording that ―the United Nations [decision] on the Arms Trade 
Treaty will be undertaken in an open and transparent manner, on the basis of 
consensus, to achieve a strong and robust treaty‖.1325 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1322
 Ibid.   
1323 Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, US Support for the Arms Trade Treaty (14 October 
2009) US Department of State <www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/10/130573.htm>. Last accessed 23 
July 2010.  
1324 UNGA res 64/48 of 2 December 2009, operative para 4. 
1325 Ibid, operative para 5. 
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F. Failure of the 2012 UN Conference on the ATT  
 
Long anticipated, the UN Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty was held in New 
York, 2-27 July 2012.  One more time, 11 years after the 2001 UN conference on 
small arms, the world was presented with an opportunity to adopt an international 
legally binding instrument to regulate small arms trade. One more time, the world had 
to see another failure. The conference was held against the backdrop of bloodshed in 
Syria, which further stressed the importance of setting an international standard of the 
arms trade. However, the 2012 conference ended with no agreement achieved, no 
consensus, which meant no the ATT.  
 
The draft of the ATT,
1326
 submitted by the President of the Conference on 26 July 
2012, apparently has accommodated many concerns, is as flexible as possible, while 
keeping the focus on having an effective treaty on conventional arms trade.  This 
section probes the draft of the ATT submitted by the President of the Conference in 
view of how the text deals with, incorporates and reconciles controversial issues and 
identifies why the conference failed.  
 
 
1. Key issues and the draft of the ATT  
a. Criteria of IHL and IHRL   
 
The fear that IHL and IHRL would not appear beyond preamble paragraphs is 
unproven.  The criteria of IHL and IHRL in conventional arms transfer stand in the 
draft. Article 4, paragraph 2, under the title of national assessment, states:    
... 
Prior to authorisation and pursuant to its national control system, the State 
Party shall assess whether the proposed export of conventional arms could: 
a. be used to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international 
humanitarian law; 
b. be used to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international 
human rights law; 
                                               
1326 Draft of the Arms Trade Treaty, 26 July 2012, UN Doc A/CONF.217/CRP.1. 
285 
 
c. be used to commit or facilitate an act constituting an offense under 
international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism to which the 
transferring State is a Party.
1327
       
 
The inclusion of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in 
a future treaty stays as key criteria in conventional arms transfer, although it has its 
critics in the negotiation.
1328
 The evolution of the wording and change of criteria can 
be traced since the GGE report on ATT (2008), the Chair‘s non-paper (2011), as there 
are some changes, including the deletion of reference to international criminal law 
previously found in the Chair‘s non-paper (2011). The linkage between arms transfer 
and IHL and IHRL is widely supported and has been championed by some States, 
during preparatory meetings and at the UN Conference on the ATT in 2012.
1329
   
 
 
b. Goals and objectives 
 
Several countries since the start of the negotiation prefer a treaty with a focus to 
prevent illicit trade
1330
 to one on responsible transfer with IHL and IHRL criteria. The 
draft of the ATT accommodates both: 
 
The goals and objectives of the Treaty are: 
a. For  States Parties to establish the highest possible common standards for 
regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in 
conventional arms; and  
b. To prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms 
and their diversion to the illicit market or for unauthorised end use;...
1331
       
 
                                               
1327 Draft of the Arms Trade Treaty, 26 July 2012, UN Doc A/CONF.217/CRP.1, art 4. 
1328 Criteria to include IHL and IHRL, perhaps, are what some other States regarded as ―controversial, 
selective, subjective‖  or  ―discriminatory,‖ see statements of China (undated); Cuba (delivered by 
Ambassador Rodolfo Benitez, 5 July 2012); Pakistan (delivered by Ambassador Raza Bashir Tarar, 9 
July 2012);  Venezuela (delivered by Ambassador Jorge Valero, 5 July 2012); Iran (delivered by 
Ambassador Mohammad Kazaee, 10 July 2012); Egypt (Ambassador Motaz Ahmadein Khalil, 5 July 
2012). Statements are available at <http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/statements/>. Last accessed 
31 July 2012.          
1329 See for example, the statement of Canada, New Zealand, Norway and the East African Community 
at the UN Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, New York, 2-27 July 2012. Available at  
<http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/statements/>. Last accessed 21 July 2012. 
1330 For example, statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the 2012 United Nations 
Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, New York, 2-27 July 2012. Available at 
<http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/statements/>. Last accessed 30 July 2012.    
1331 Draft of the Arms Trade Treaty, 26 July 2012, UN Doc A/CONF.217/CRP.1, art 1(1)(2). 
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The focus on only illicit trade would not stop the practice of current irresponsible 
transfer which implies that an authorised transfer by a State will be legal, regardless 
of whether the weapons might be used later in violations of international law. Explicit 
goals of the treaty may help in understanding the purpose of the treaty but the 
effective implementation depends on the criteria and the implementation provisions.    
 
 
c. National assessment 
 
On who decide a transfer of arms, the draft to the Arm Trade Treaty suggests that task 
falls to national authority. Article 4(1) explains: 
 
In considering whether to authorise an export of conventional arms within the 
scope of this Treaty, each State party shall assess whether the proposed export 
would contribute to or undermine peace and security.
1332
     
 
As to how the assessment is conducted, the draft ATT states 4(3): 
 
In making the assessment, the exporting State Party shall apply the criteria 
set out in paragraph 2 of this article consistently, and in objective and non-
discriminatory manner, taking into account relevant factors, including 
information provided by the importing State.
1333
   
 
Further details of assessment are explained in article 4 (3)(4)(5) and (6), which 
include, inter alia, consideration of the establishment of risk mitigating measures, and 
joint action with other States involved in the transfer to avoid the arms from being 
diverted.
1334
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1332 Draft of the Arms Trade Treaty, 26 July 2012, UN Doc A/CONF.217/CRP.1, art 4(1). 
1333 Draft of the Arms Trade Treaty, 26 July 2012, UN Doc A/CONF.217/CRP.1, art 4(3). 
1334 Draft of the Arms Trade Treaty, 26 July 2012, UN Doc A/CONF.217/CRP.1, art 4(4)(5)(5). 
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d. Ammunition 
 
Ammunition is a controversial issue in the ATT and the US is known to be strongly 
against its inclusion in the treaty. Ammunition has been included in the discussion of 
the GGE in the 2008 report, and in the first PrepCom meeting in July 2010, some 
States voiced their position in support of the inclusion of ammunition in an ATT.
1335
 
The Chair‘s non paper of July 2011 retained the inclusion of ammunition in the scope 
of the ATT although resistance to it was heard.  
 
The text of the draft ATT, as submitted by the President on 26 July 2012, does not 
mention ammunition as being included. It was apparently a compromise that had to 
be made in order to have the US agreement on the ATT.
1336
  The Draft states that the 
treaty at minimum apply to battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre 
artillery system,  combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles and missile 
launchers, and small arms an light weapons.
1337
      
 
 
e. Private Ownership 
 
Several countries bring the issues of private ownership and seek the confirmation the 
Treaty respects the right of the private citizen to own small arms for personal and 
recreation uses.
1338
 The US anti-gun control groups, particularly the National Rifle 
Association,
1339
 portray an ATT will take away the American individual‘s right to 
bear arms. While this is not actually the intention of the ATT which deals with 
international arms transfer, the draft of the ATT accommodates the concern. The 
preamble paragraph 13 states: 
                                               
1335 ICRC also pushes the inclusion of the ammunition. ICRC statement, 14 July 2010,  before the first 
Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, New York, 12-
23 July 2010.  
1336 In a President discussion paper, dated 3 July 2012, circulated among the delegates, a reference to 
‖ammunition/military ammunition‖ was still included in the scope.  
1337
 Draft of the Arms Trade Treaty, 26 July 2012, UN Doc A/CONF.217/CRP.1, art 2(1). 
1338 For example, statement by Canada < http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/statements/>. Last 
accessed 31 July 2012. 
1339 Statement by National Rifle Association (delivered by Wayne Lapierre, undated) before the UN 
Conference on the ATT, 2-27 July 2012; see National Rifle Association 
<http://home.nra.org/#/nraorg>. Last accessed 31 July 2012. 
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Taking note of the legitimate trade and use of certain conventional arms, inter 
alia, for recreational, cultural, historical and sporting activities and lawful 
ownership and use are permitted and protected by law.
1340
  
 
 
 
f. Transfer to Non-State Actors 
 
The draft of the Arms Trade Treaty does not make any reference to the transfer to 
non-State actors. It is, perhaps, the best choice, as with the different political interests, 
States would have found the issue divisive. The previous draft, the 2011 Chair‘s non-
paper, did not mention transfer to non-State actors.    
 
 
g. Reporting and Implementation 
 
The States parties are required to maintain a national record of the export 
authorisations or actual export of conventional arms under the scope of the Treaty.
1341
 
Compliance in the trade of conventional arms, as the draft ATT suggests, is ensured 
through reporting mechanism: 
 
Each State party, shall within the first year after entry into force of this 
Treaty for that State party, provide an initial report to the secretariat of 
relevant activities under taken in order to implement this Treaty, including 
national laws, regulations and administrative measures. States parties shall 
report on any new activities undertaken in order to implement this Treaty, 
when appropriate. Reports shall be made available and distributed to States 
parties by the secretariat.
1342
   
 
Thus, the draft ATT was based on a non-intrusive mechanism in ensuring the 
implementation of the ATT. It is a most logical mechanism, considering the mobility 
and portability of conventional arms.   
 
                                               
1340 Draft of the Arms Trade Treaty, 26 July 2012, UN Doc A/CONF.217/CRP.1, preamble para 13. 
1341 Draft of the Arms Trade Treaty, 26 July 2012, UN Doc A/CONF.217/CRP.1, art 10(1). 
1342 Draft of the Arms Trade Treaty, 26 July 2012, UN Doc A/CONF.217/CRP.1, art 10(4). 
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The draft ATT, in the most part, has been successful in accommodating and 
reconciling the controversial issues. It is a compromise text. While it is positive to 
some, it may not be very convincing to others; a reality in a consensus-based 
negotiation.      
   
2. Tactics of those who do not want a treaty 
 
States come to the negotiation table on arms control to serve or protect their own 
interests, including their security interests.
1343
 A State active in a negotiation is not 
necessarily enthusiastic regarding the text.
1344
 It may have found that the text is not 
something it favours or perhaps its proposals on the draft are not well accommodated. 
A State, a powerful State in particular, may heavily influence the result and hijack the 
process of negotiation by submitting unacceptable amendments to the draft text. 
States may also come to a negotiation to block a negotiation using various tactics. In 
a consensus-based negotiation, States have more room to ruin the process.  The 
delaying tactic has been applied in the 2012 UN Conference on the ATT with 
interruption, bickering, and time wasting by those who do not want a treaty.
1345
 The 
opening of the conference itself was delayed for more than 24 hours on dispute of the 
observer status of Palestine; Egypt, known to oppose the treaty, was blamed for 
creating the impasse, with the US and Israel threatening to walk out from the 
conference if Palestine attended as a full participant.
1346
The issue was solved with 
Palestine sitting with the status of an observer. 
 
                                               
1343 Jeffrey D McCausland ―Conventional Arms Control‖ in Jeffrey A Larsen and Gregory J Rattray 
(eds) Arms Control Toward the 21st Century (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996) at 139. 
1344 Anthony Aust Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, 2007) 
at 104. 
1345 Nick Hopkins ―Draft Arms Treaty Condemned‖ The Guardian (UK, 25 July 2012) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/25/arms-trade-treaty-oxfam?INTCMP=SRCH>. 
1346
 Harvey Morris ―Gun, Bullets, Human Rights on Agenda at Arms Treaty Talks‖ The New York 
Times (United States, 3 July 2012) < http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/guns-bullets-
human-rights-on-agenda-at-arms-treaty-talks/>; Nick Hopkins ―Draft Arms Treaty Condemned‖ The 
Guardian (UK, 25 July 2012) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/25/arms-trade-treaty-
oxfam?INTCMP=SRCH>; Louis Charbonneau ―UN Chief Pleads for Arms Pact, Palestinians Demand 
Seat‖ Reuters (UK edition, 3 July 2012).   
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The other tactic of filing new proposals to the draft, as actually applied by some 
countries in previous meetings on small arms,
1347
 could not be applied as the 
President did not issue a draft text treaty until the very last days (the draft was issued 
on 26 July 2012, a day before the closing date). During weeks of negotiation, he put 
the discussion under two parallel main committees: first committee dealing with 
goals and purposes, and the other dealing with scope, implementation and final 
provisions. Hence, there would be no opportunity to submit new proposals, in a 
wasting time tactic, to the actual draft.   
 
  
3. No consensus, no treaty 
 
From their records in the discussion of small arms in the PrepCom meetings and 
UNGA resolutions,
1348
 three of the P5, namely the UK, France, and the US, were 
supportive of the ATT.  Russia and China had not previously taken strong opposition 
stances to the ATT, although, Russia had made its reluctance more apparent than had 
China. The US, however, again changed its position during the very last day of the 
conference, and triggered the inconclusiveness of the conference. 
1349
   
 
Based on the text in the draft Arms Trade Treaty, the US position was relatively well 
accommodated. Particularly, the issue of ammunition was omitted and the draft ATT 
had explicitly included respect for the trade and use of weapons for personal and 
recreation purposes.  From this perspective, and also the positive participation of the 
US before the last day of the negotiation, it was difficult to see how the US rejection 
in the end had come from substantive objection to the draft text.  It strengthens the 
view which argues that the US position on the ATT has less to do with the substance 
                                               
1347 Small arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War (Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 140. 
1348
 Particularly the UNGA resolution 64/48 (2009). 
1349 ―UN Global Arms Treaty Talks End without Agreement‖ BBC News (UK, 28 July 2012) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-19025542>; Rick Gladstone ―UN Misses Its Deadline 
for Arms Pact‖ The New York Times (US, 27 July 2012) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/28/world/proponents-of-arms-trade-treaty-urge-final-
approval.html?_r=1>. 
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and more to do with politics of the ATT in the domestic politics.
1350
 The US refusal 
to adopt the ATT was, apparently, influenced by domestic pressure as 51 senators 
expressed their opposition to the ATT in a letter to the US State Secretary.
1351
 Fifty 
one opposing senators mean that even if the Treaty was adopted, its ratification would 
not get enough votes in senate. That the US is about to have a general election does 
not help the situation.  
 
The current weak international mechanism to control (small) arms trade is primarily 
due to lack of political will, the influence of economic interests, and perceived geo-
strategic concerns.
1352
 This may change if influential major powers, the US in 
particular, provide leadership and political will to push an adoption of an ATT. 
However, the world did not see that leadership in the 2012 UN Conference to the 
ATT. 
 
 
G. Small Arms Control: What is Next? 
 
The hope to have a control on the trade small arms has gone, or been delayed, with 
the failure of the United Nation Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, New York, 2-
27 July 2012. After four weeks of deliberations, President of the Conference 
Ambassador Moritan issued a draft ATT
1353
 ready to adopt, the United States, 
however, on the very last day of the negotiation, delivered a final blow to the 
hopefuls by refusing consensus, stating that it needed more time to consider the issue; 
then Russia and China also said the same thing.
1354
 The diplomatic conference has 
failed. 
 
                                               
1350 Rachel Stohl ―Putting the Arms Trade Treaty into Context: Perspectives on the Global Arms 
Trade, Existing Arms Trade Initiatives, and the Role of the United States‖ (2009) 103 Am Soc‘y Int‘l 
L Proc 331 at 336. 
1351 ―UN Global Arms Treaty Talks End without Agreement‖ BBC News (UK, 28 July 2012) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-19025542>;   
1352
 Theresa A DiPerna ―Small Arms and Light Weapons: Complicity ‗with A View‘ Toward Extended 
State Responsibility‖ (2008) 20 Fla J Int‘l L 25 at 27. 
1353 The Draft of the Arms Trade Treaty, 26 July 2012, A/CONF.217/CRP.1; See chapter VII.  
1354 Michelle Nichols ―United Nations Fails to Agree Landmark Arms-Trade Treaty‖ Reuters (US 
edition, 28 July 2012) <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/28/us-arms-treaty-
idUSBRE86Q1MW20120728>. 
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This is the second failure as the 2001 conference did not result in a legal instrument. 
So what now? Some States think it is not over yet. The President of the conference 
has produced a draft of the ATT incorporating points discussed by States. Now some 
States are considering the possibility of bringing the draft and adopting it by the 
mechanism of the General Assembly at the end of the year 2012.
1355
  Theoretically, 
the General Assembly will provide a better chance for States to adopt the treaty, with 
voting if necessary. Article 18 of the Charter of the United Nations explains the 
voting procedure:  
 
Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a 
two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall 
include: recommendation with respect to the maintenance of international 
peace and security....
1356
         
 
With the General Assembly seeming to be the next ground for debate, the problem of 
sidelining US, Russia, or China, all major conventional arms suppliers, looks rather 
difficult. The US alone controls 40 per cent of global conventional arms transfer.
1357
 
 
The proponents of the Arms Trade Treaty, might think of taking the negotiation out 
of the United Nations framework, as a fall-back position if the General Assembly 
does not succeed to adopt a treaty. The civil society activists who could not take slow 
progress and the unwillingness of the major arms producers to have a robust treaty in 
the conference, evidently taking example from the Mine Ban Treaty which is 
considered a success even without the major anti-personnel mines producers,
1358
have 
started talking about an alternative venue to negotiate the ATT.
1359
  
 
                                               
1355 Conal Urquhart ―Arms Trade Treaty Failure is disappointing, Says William Hague‖ The Guardian 
(UK, 27 July 2012) < http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/28/arms-trade-treaty-william-hague>; 
Michelle Nichols ―United Nations Fails to Agree Landmark Arms Trade Treaty‖ Reuters (US edition, 
27 July 2012) <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/28/us-arms-treaty-
idUSBRE86Q1MW20120728>.  
1356 Charter of the United Nations (1945), art 18. 
1357
 Michelle Nichols ―United Nations Fails to Agree Landmark Arms-Trade Treaty‖ Reuters (US 
edition, 28 July 2012) < http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/28/us-arms-treaty-
idUSBRE86Q1MW20120728>. 
1358 See chapter III. 
1359 See for example, the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 
―Arms Trade Treaty Legal Blog‖< http://armstradetreaty.blogspot.com/>. Last Accessed 30July 2012.  
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I. Summary 
 
The existing conventional arms treaties, such as the CCWC, the Mine Ban 
Convention, and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, provide lessons on the process 
negotiation, mechanism, verification, transparency, and implementation of a treaty. 
The processes in adopting and implementing the existing conventional treaties offer 
models to work from for any future conventional arms treaty, some of which have 
apparently already been incorporated in the elements of the draft ATT. In terms of 
procedures on arms control, there is also the noticeable role of civil society groups 
which have gained recognition from States. The presence and involvement of civil 
society in the arms control process, discussion, and negotiation arguably have an 
influence, to some extent, on States‘ views.  
 
As the process towards adoption of the Mine Ban Treaty (1997) and the Convention 
on Cluster Munitions (2008) shows, the negotiation of arms control may depart from 
its traditional forum and move to a forum outside the United Nations framework. 
While the negotiation on the conventional arms trade is still within the United 
Nations framework, the repeated failure to achieve a legally binding instrument may 
push the process to outside the United Nations. 
   
The influence of humanitarian and human rights law in arms control is apparent, as is 
also reflected in current negotiation on an arms trade treaty. During 2010-2011, in 
preparatory committee meetings toward a diplomatic conference in 2012, some 
challenges and opportunities had been identified; States were known to have different 
opinions on a number of issues, things that they had to reconcile in consensus. The 
2012 UN Conference to adopt the ATT, however, failed to materialise a treaty, so 
another rare opportunity to regulate the trade of small arms has gone. In substance, 
the draft of the Arms Trade Treaty has managed to incorporate the criteria of IHL and 
IHRL in conventional arms trade. If the text concerning the IHL and IHRL in the 
draft stands as it is when adopted, it will be the first clear evidence of the influence of 
IHL and IHRL on contemporary arms control. That might be the decision in another 
round negotiation in the next UN General Assembly.       
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One of the concerns of some States is balancing the right of self-defence and the 
necessity to protect humanity and respect for IHL/IHRL. States may acquire 
weapons, so as to fulfil their rights to self defence, as long as the weapons acquired 
do not pose used threats to human rights, stability, peace and security and are not 
used in violation of IHL/IHRL – criteria in the draft of the ATT. The use of weapons, 
as ICJ stated in its advisory opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons, should be 
compatible with the principles and rules of international humanitarian law.  
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Chapter VIII: Conclusion  
    
A. Contemporary principles of State responsibility demand that States regulate the 
small arms trade  
 
In normative arguments, the international law should be able to control and restrict 
the proliferation of small arms. Arms selling States may be held legally responsible 
for transferring weapons to States that may use them to commit violations of IHL and 
IHRL based on normative arguments found in international documents such as ILC‘s 
Articles of Responsibility States on Internationally Wrongful Acts and the 
Responsibility to Protect.  While there is no treaty law to force States to do a due 
diligence process to assess whether the transfer of small arms could be used to 
commit or facilitate violations of IHL and IHRL, some countries have been practising 
it. It can be said that a risk assessment prior to authorisation the small arms transfer is 
grounded in customary international law as some States and regional organisations 
have been practising the restriction. The European Union has a Code of Conduct on 
Arms Exports which requires member States to take into account the respect for IHL 
and IHRL in the country of final destination. Likewise, some regional conventions or 
Protocols in Africa have provisions to consider the risk in arms transfer by taking into 
account the respect for IHL and IHRL.      
 
Uncontrolled proliferation of small arms plays a role in worsening wars or armed 
conflicts, particularly because of their characteristics: portable, affordable, durable, 
concealable, and lethal. Small arms have been a contributing factor in facilitating 
crimes, including crimes against humanity as demonstrated in Rwanda and Bosnia, 
and violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights 
law.
1360
 These weapons, in the wrong hands, can be tools of oppression. Uncontrolled 
proliferation of small arms has been a threat to human security, destabilised countries 
and regions, and obstructed economic development.
1361
       
 
                                               
1360 See Chapter II. 
1361 See Chapter II. 
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Considering the devastating effects of the uncontrolled small arms to human security 
as they are used in committing or facilitating violations of humanitarian law and 
human rights law, efforts to control the trade of small arms have to take into account 
human rights and humanitarian concerns. Controlling of the trade of small arms, 
arguably, has to focus on protection of civilians from these weapons. The legal 
argument to find the basis of restriction of arms transfer is contained in the 
International Law Commission‘s Articles of Internationally Wrongful 
Acts,
1362
particularly articles 16-19, which state the responsibility of a State in 
connection with the act of another State in the commission of internationally 
wrongful acts. The ILC‘s Articles serve as secondary rules or the rules of general 
application concerning States international responsibility.
1363
     
 
The ILC‘s Articles indicate that a State has a responsibility to avoid and prevent 
small arms transfer when the sending State has knowledge that the weapons may be 
used, or are highly likely to be used in internationally wrongful acts: ―A State which 
aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by 
the latter is internationally responsible for doing so....‖1364 According to the Articles, 
the conduct of an individual or entity which is not an organ of the State, ―but which is 
empowered by the law of the State to exercise elements of the governmental authority 
shall be considered an act of the State under international law...‖1365 This becomes the 
main line of reasoning to argue that States should not conduct any transfer of small 
                                               
1362 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (UNGA res A/56/63 of 12 December 
2001); Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001: General Commentary of the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (United Nations, 2007), part II; see 
deliberation the Articles in James Crawford The International Law Commission’s Articles on State 
Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002); 
see also discussion on State responsibility in Chapter IV of this thesis. 
1363 See Chapter IV; James Crawford The International Law Commission’s Articles on State 
Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002) 
at 2. 
1364 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (UNGA res 56/83 of 12 December 
2001), art 16; James Crawford The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: 
Introduction, Text and Commentaries (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002) at 2; Theresa A 
DiPerna ―Small Arms and Light Weapons: Complicity‘with A View‘ Toward Extended State 
Responsibility‖ (2008)20Fla J Int‘l L 25; Alexandra Boivin ―Complicity and Beyond: International 
Law and the Transfer of Small Arms and Light Weapons‖ (2005) 87(859) IRRC 467; see also 
discussion in chapter IV. 
1365 Ibid, art 5; see chapter IV. 
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arms when there is a high possibility that the weapons transferred will be used for 
internationally wrongful acts.   
 
The significance of the need to have a robust international arms trade treaty, from 
perspective of the ILC‘s Articles, is that the treaty will provide a premier rule. A 
transfer of small arms which leads to violation of IHL/IHRL could raise State 
responsibility under the Articles as the sending State either by action or omission, 
could be held responsible for internationally wrongful acts if there is an agreement in 
law of treaties as premier rules, showing that there ―is a breach of an international 
obligation by a State when an act of that State is not in conformity with what is 
required of it by that obligation‖.1366  
 
A contentious issue which is linked to that of the control of small arms is the right of 
States to self-defence, enshrined in article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
However, an arms trade, for the purpose of exercising the right to self-defence, 
cannot be an acceptable ground if such transfer is in conflict with international 
humanitarian law and international human rights law. The principles of laws set out 
by the International Court of Justice in Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, conclude that a threat or use of nuclear weapons 
―should also be compatible with the requirements of the international law applicable 
in armed conflict, particularly those of the principles and rules of international 
humanitarian law....‖.1367 These fundamental principles of law should also apply to 
the transfer or use of weapons such as small arms. 
 
The thesis also examined the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) (2001)
1368
to show the 
linkage between State responsibility and small arms transfers.  Generally, States are 
in agreement that the responsibility to control arms lies mainly with States. The 
                                               
1366 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (adopted by General Assembly 
A/RES/56/83 of 12 December 2001), art 12; see Chapter IV. 
1367
 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion (1996) ICJ Reports 226, para 
105 (2) D; see also discussion on humanitarian law in Chapter III and on self-defence in Chapter VII.   
1368 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (UNGA res 56/83 of 12 December 
2001); The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (Ottawa, International Development Research centre, 2001); see discussion in 
Chapter IV. 
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Responsibility to Protect suggests prevention as the core element to prevent atrocities 
from happening, in line with the purpose of an arms trade treaty to have a control on 
arms transfer system ―of the highest possible [common] standard‖1369  with the view 
to prevent arms transfer be used in violations of IHL and IHRL.
1370
   
 
Prevention is the main focus of the RtoP as one of the core principles, stating:  
―Prevention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to 
protect‖.1371 The RtoP can be a basis for the link of State responsibility with focus on 
human security in the arms trade.  The significance of the concept with regards to 
small arms is that the effort to regulate and control the arms trade is actually a 
demonstration of a prevention act. Controlling small arms trade means to prevent the 
weapons from being misused, as putting the RtoP in the context of small arms, it 
should be seen as part of the State responsibility to prevent small arms being used in 
violations of IHL and IHRL. Taking the prevention measure first goes together with 
the effort to have a legally binding instrument to control small arms instead of relying 
on the reactive response of an arms embargo after the excessive availability of 
weapons facilitates a mass atrocity. The RtoP does not exclude the use of force, 
therefore, unsurprisingly, the focus of debate of the RtoP centres on the intervention 
to protect as pretext of the use force, and not the prevention which the RtoP actually 
stresses.
1372
  
 
There is a main difference between an arms embargo and the implementation of the 
RtoP, with the principle of prevention is taken into main consideration. An arms 
embargo is a measure taken after a conflict has erupted or is about to erupt, imposed 
on specific targets and time. On the other hand, the prevention, as the State 
responsibility suggests, is to control weapons flowing to States prone to conflicts. In 
line with this, based on the prevention principle, the RtoP supports the need to have 
an international legally binding treaty to prevent small arms from being used to 
                                               
1369
 UN General Assembly resolution 64/48 of 2 December 2009, operative para 1; the draft of the 
ATT, UN Doc A/CONF.217/CPR.1 (26 December 2012), art 1; see Chapter VII.     
1370 Draft of the ATT, UN Doc A/CONF.217/CPR.1 of 26 December 2012, art 4(2). 
1371 Gareth Evans The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All 
(Washington DC, Brooking Institution Press, 2008) at 41; see discussion in Chapter IV.   
1372 Ibid, at 71-104; see Chapter IV.   
299 
 
commit violations of international law, including genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity.  
 
 
B. Ineffectiveness of current mechanism to control small arms    
 
Despite the recognized negative impacts of the wide availability of small arms, the 
world does not have an effective mechanism to control the trade in small arms. The 
absence of an international regulation on small arms transfer leaves the UN arms 
embargo as the only global legal instrument on the small arms transfer. However, 
arms embargo has often proven ineffective in preventing the flow of weapons into 
armed conflict zones.  
 
An arms embargo is imposed after the Security Council comes to agreement that the 
targeted State or entity is a threat to international security. The action is thus a 
reaction in response to a situation that has already occurred or is imminent, rather 
than a preventive measure. An arms embargo is decided based on political 
considerations and Security Council member States‘ interests, so that a non-
discriminatory resolution is hard to achieve. Furthermore, an arms embargo, in many 
cases, has been imposed based on the perceived threat to international security, an 
action that is considered as being too little and too late. 
 
Security Council resolutions on arms embargoes carry legal responsibility; however, 
States would not be able to comply with the resolutions if they did not have the 
national means to enforce them. Violations of arms embargoes occur, in part, because 
States do not have the capacity to fully comply with the resolutions and not because 
they intend to defy them. An international legal arms transfer regime such as the 
ATT, which States can adhere to and incorporate into their national legislation to 
begin with, may help.  
 
Other existing international mechanisms on small arms are not legally binding 
instruments and work only on a voluntary basis. The non-legal instruments, the UN 
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Arms Register, the UNPoA and the International Tracing Instrument, are difficult to 
enforce, as States are under no obligation to implement them. The 2001 UNPoA, 
perhaps, is the most comprehensive guideline for States in combating the illicit trade 
in small arms. It consists of recommended measures for States to implement on 
aspects of small arms trade such as production, export, import, and transit; and 
procedure at national, regional, and global levels. As they complement one another, 
the UNPoA and the International Tracing Instrument adopted by the UN General 
Assembly in 2005 could be very useful instruments to help in regulating the small 
arms trade. However, their status of non-legally binding instruments limits their 
effective implementation. A legally binding ATT would complement and strengthen 
these instruments, although, the need for caution in this area was obvious as from the 
start some criteria have been seen, by some States, as discriminatory and subjective 
criteria which affect the implementation.    
 
The reluctance of States to include small arms as an official category under the UN 
Register
1373
  reflects the different interests and difficulties when it comes to the issue 
of transparency of the trade of these weapons. The proposed inclusion of small arms 
as an official category to the existing seven types of weapon under the UN Register 
has not materialized. The similar difficulties of the reluctance of States to have an 
international legal treaty brought failure to the UN conference on the Arms Trade 
Treaty, July 2012.  This was not particularly surprising as the economic and political 
interests, as well as the strong lobby of anti-gun control, have prevented major States 
from showing their leadership in the past.     
 
 
 
C. IHL and IHRL Influence and the Implications on Future Treaty Negotiation   
 
Recent development in arms control negotiations shows the influence of human 
rights, which was previously a distant concept in arms control. The series of meetings 
to negotiate an arms trade treaty on conventional arms, from  2006 to the 2012 UN 
Conference, demonstrate the growing influence of international humanitarian law and 
                                               
1373 See Chapter V. 
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human rights law in arms control. The inclusion of international humanitarian law has 
been apparent since the adoption of the Mine Ban Convention
1374
 and the Convention 
on Cluster Munitions,
1375
 the further addition of international human rights is a 
significant development of arms control.  
 
Clear evidence of IHL and IHRL considerations is demonstrated in the draft ATT 
submitted by the President of the UN 2012 Conference on the ATT.
1376
 IHL and 
IHRL criteria in the draft ATT is used in assessment of arms transfer to prevent the 
arms from being used in violations of international law: ―States parties shall assess 
whether the proposed export on conventional arms could: a. be used to commit or 
facilitate a violation of international humanitarian law; b. be used to commit or 
facilitate a violation of international human rights law‖.1377    The significance of the 
inclusion of IHL and IHRL concerns in the negotiation of the ATT can be far 
reaching in adoption of a treaty, particularly an arms control treaty, because it has 
created precedence; it is suggesting the future negotiation on arms control needs to 
take into account humanitarian and human rights concerns.  
 
The influence of IHL and IHRL is also evident in the regional instrument. Regional 
and subregional organisations in Africa are the most advanced in terms of adopting 
legal instruments in an effort to control the proliferation of small arms. The existence 
of four legally binding instruments in Africa serves as a model for other countries and 
other regional or sub-regional groupings in regulating small arms transfers. The 
ECOWAS, for example, has moved further in the effort to control small arms by 
adopting a legally binding convention, which incorporates humanitarian law and 
human rights law considerations in its provisions.
1378
  It is evidence of the growing 
influence of IHL and IHRL in treaty making, in particular relating to arms control. 
 
                                               
1374
 Mine Ban Convention (1997), 2056 UNTS 211; see Chapter III. 
1375 Convention on Cluster Munitions (2008),  MTDSG chap XXXVI(6); see Chapter III. 
1376 Draft of the ATT (26 July 2012), UN Doc A/CONF.217/CPRT.1; see Chapter VII. 
1377 Ibid, art 4; see Chapter  VII 
1378 Economic Community of West African States Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, 
their Ammunition and Other related Materials (2006). 
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Europe has been the first regional organisation to regulate arms export and set a code 
of conduct for its member States which has incorporated IHL and IHRL as criteria in 
the European Union Code of Conduct.
1379
 Sub-regional organizations in Africa have 
been advanced in incorporating IHL and IHRL in legally binding instruments. In 
contrast, countries in the Americas approached the issue from a security perspective 
to combat transnational organized crime and drug trafficking by adopting a 
convention in 1997
1380
 which does not deal with IHL or IHRL concerns.  Another 
regional organization examined, ASEAN, is still not able to collectively design a 
regional policy to respond to the small arms issue. The minimal ASEAN response 
may come from the fact that it has more pressing issues to deal with or it may have 
something to do with the organizational mechanism of consensus, which prevents a 
member State from tabling an issue of importance if there are other member countries 
not in favour of discussing it.  
 
 
D.  Negotiation Can Depart from Traditional Forum and Role of Civil Society   
 
The presence of civil society and its global campaign in the support of the effort to 
adopt the Arms Trade Treaty demonstrate the role the NGOs can play in encouraging 
States to adopt an arms control treaty. The NGOs‘ active campaign focuses on 
reminding governments and promoting awareness of the necessity to have a treaty. 
The success of the involvement of NGOs in adopting the Mine Ban Treaty
1381
 
inspires them to do the same in respect to controlling small arms/conventional arms 
proliferation. The information communication technology, arguably, facilitates the 
work of NGOs in establishing effective global networks.   
 
Increasingly involvement of civil society plays a role in disseminating norms through 
publications and facilitates further research on arms control subjects. The published 
research findings may find their way to influencing the government policy on the 
                                               
1379 European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Export (1998); see Chapter VI. 
1380 Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, 
Ammunition, Explosives and Other related Materials (CIFTA) (1997); see Chapter VI. 
1381 Mine Ban Convention (1997), 2055 UNTS 45; see discussion of the Mine Ban treaty in Chapter III 
and the role of NGOS in adopting a treaty in Chapter VII. 
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small arms question. In the front line, the ICRC makes a good use of its observer 
status at the UN meetings to press the view of civil society on small arms. Research 
centres, such as SIPRI and the Small Arms Survey, publish a comprehensive range of 
research findings within the arms control subject. The civil society particularly 
supports the linkage between arms transfer and the IHL and IHRL. The physical 
presence of civil society groups in the UN meetings is not unrewarding, although it is 
the States that negotiate and decide on matters. Some arms control initiatives started 
by civil society, including an arms trade treaty, have been taken over by States.  
 
A significant point, in relation to civil society involvement, is that contemporary arms 
control negotiation may depart from the traditional forum, namely within the United 
Nations framework. The negotiation outside the United Nations needs massive civil 
society support including campaigns to approach governments to join the process. 
Both the 1997 Mine Ban Convention and the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions 
took a different approach in their adoption, which was outside the United Nations. 
Both were negotiated and adopted with massive support from NGOs. An arms trade 
treaty negotiation has the possibility to follow the Mine Ban Convention and the 
Convention on Cluster Munitions to be brought outside the UN when a State or a 
group of States, with push and support from NGOs, take the initiative to do so. 
 
However, it needs to be reiterated that sidelining the major powers is something 
different in the case of small arms/conventional weapons, because all major powers 
are also major producers of the weapons. The option to push a negotiation even 
without the engagement of major powers then is apparently problematic. Other than 
the Mine Ban Convention and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, all multilateral 
arms control negotiations after World War II were held within the UN framework and 
subscribed to by all major powers. Those include the NPT, the CCWC, the Chemical 
Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. This makes the Mine-
Ban Convention and the Convention on Cluster Munitions unique in their process and 
challenges the notion that a convention needs support from all major powers to be 
successful. Both conventions were adopted and attracted substantial State parties. 
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These facts alone illustrate that, in specific circumstances, a convention can be 
adopted and implemented with the major powers‘ absence.  
 
The less inclusive process, without some major powers, as shown by the cluster 
munitions process, accelerates the negotiation to adopt a treaty. However, there is a 
risk its adoption may not be widely adhered to by countries. An exclusive process 
means that some countries‘ opinions and aspirations are not accommodated. 
Consequently, those sidelined States will be more likely to stay outside of the 
convention. In the case of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the major users and 
producers such as the US, Russia, and China were sidelined. However, applying the 
same approach to exclude major players to the Arms Trade Treaty is, perhaps, not a 
good option because, practically, an international treaty on conventional arms will be 
difficult to implement effectively without the support of major producers and 
exporters. Unlike anti-personnel mines, small arms and other conventional weapons 
in the draft ATT cannot be banned totally, and sidelining countries that are major 
arms traders from a treaty may only ensure an ineffective instrument.  
 
Despite the 2012 Conference on the Arms Treaty having failed to adopt a treaty, it is 
not a complete failure: it produced a draft treaty with significant support from most 
States. The momentum is still there and States are to bring the draft to the UN 
General Assembly, 
1382
 and such draft can be a strong basis for further negotiation in 
the General Assembly. Civil society will play their part in promoting awareness and 
reminding governments of the importance of the ATT. Flexibility and a strong 
leadership role by major powers will again play a crucial role in the success of the 
next negotiation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1382 See Chapter VII. 
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